Military Transformation: Navy Efforts Should Be More Integrated and Focused (02-AUG-01, GAO-01-853)
With the end of the Cold War, national security strategies
changed and dictated the need for the military to "transform"
itself in order to meet new global challenges. The Navy,
recognizing the shift in strategy from a focus on the global
threat of the Soviet Union to a focus on regional challenges,
developed a new strategic direction in the early 1990s, shifting
its primary focus from open ocean "blue water" operations to
littoral, or shallow water, operations closer to shore.
Transforming an organization with the history and size of the
Navy and with a force structure that has longevity and large
capital investment presents a significant challenge. GAO found
that although the Navy has recently placed more emphasis on
transformation, it does not have a well-defined and overarching
strategy for transformation. It has not clearly identified the
scope and direction of its transformation; the overall goals,
objectives, and milestones; or the specific strategies and
resources to be used in achieving these goals. It also has not
clearly identified organizational roles and responsibilities,
priorities, resources, or ways to measure progress. Without a
well-defined strategic plan to guide the Navy's efforts, senior
leaders and Congress will not have the tools they need to ensure
that the transformation is successful.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-01-853
ACCNO: A01515
TITLE: Military Transformation: Navy Efforts Should Be More
Integrated and Focused
DATE: 08/02/2001
SUBJECT: Agency missions
Federal agency reorganization
Strategic planning
DOD Quadrennial Defense Review
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GAO-01-853
Report to Congressional Committees
United States General Accounting Office
GAO
August 2001 MILITARY TRANSFORMATION
Navy Efforts Should Be More Integrated and Focused
GAO- 01- 853
Page i GAO- 01- 853 Military Transformation Letter 1
Results in Brief 2 Background 3 Progress Being Made, but Key Issues Require
Attention 5 Conclusions 16 Recommendations for Executive Action 17 Agency
Comments and Our Evaluation 17 Scope and Methodology 18
Appendix I Future Naval Capabilities 21
Appendix II Fleet Battle Experiments 23
Appendix III Navy- Wide Innovation Activities 24
Appendix IV Factors for Successful Transformation 25
Appendix V Comments From the Department of Defense 27
Appendix VI Organizations and Offices Contacted 31
Tables
Table 1: Future Naval Capabilities and Examples of Supporting Technology
Efforts 21 Table 2: Examples of Issues Addressed in Fleet Battle Experiments
23 Table 3: Examples of Navy Innovation Activities 24
Abbreviations
DOD Department of Defense Contents
Page 1 GAO- 01- 853 Military Transformation
August 2, 2001 The Honorable Carl Levin Chairman The Honorable John W.
Warner Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed Services United States
Senate
The Honorable Bob Stump Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking Minority
Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives
With the end of the Cold War, national security strategies changed and
dictated the need for the military to ?transform? itself in order to meet
new global challenges. The Navy, recognizing the shift in strategy from a
focus on the global threat of the Soviet Union to a focus on regional
challenges, developed a new strategic direction in the early 1990s, shifting
its primary focus from open ocean, ?blue water,? operations to littoral, 1
or shallow water, operations closer to shore. The 1999 Maritime Concept
added a new thrust, emphasizing the role that Navy combat power could play
in ensuring access of joint forces to littoral areas. 2
The Navy has made a concept known as network centric warfare the centerpiece
of its efforts to transform its forces. Under this concept, a data network
of advanced communications and computer technologies would be developed to
connect different and widely dispersed forces into an effective, coordinated
team. The Navy?s transformation also means (1) using innovations to
introduce new technologies and advanced concepts, doctrine, and
organizations to increase the Navy?s capabilities
1 Littoral areas extend from the shore to open ocean and inland from the
shore over an extensive area that can be supported and controlled directly
from the sea. 2 The Maritime Concept is the Navy?s latest strategic concept
that describes the organizing principles, operational concepts, and
priorities by which future naval forces will exploit new opportunities and
capabilities to ensure access and influence, despite an adversary?s efforts
to preclude U. S. presence.
United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO- 01- 853 Military Transformation
and (2) conducting organized events (experiments) to explore and validate
the major force and operational aspects of those innovations.
Because of the importance of military transformation and of the changing
threats faced by the United States, we assessed the Navy?s plans, processes,
and initiatives to transform its forces to meet the challenges of the 21st
century. This report provides our observations of key management issues that
are affecting the Navy?s progress. We are addressing this report to you
based on your role in overseeing military programs.
Transforming an organization with the history and size of the Navy and with
a force structure that has longevity and large capital investment presents a
significant challenge. Although the Navy has recently placed more emphasis
on transformation, it does not have a well- defined and overarching strategy
for transformation. It has not clearly identified the scope and direction of
its transformation; the overall goals, objectives, and milestones; or the
specific strategies and resources to be used in achieving those goals. It
also has not clearly identified organizational roles and responsibilities,
priorities, resources, or ways to measure progress. These shortcomings have
had the following effects on its transformation efforts:
Because transformation has not been clearly defined, there is some
confusion throughout the Navy about what constitutes transformation and how
all of its elements, such as network centric warfare, are related.
The Navy?s ?evolutionary? approach to transformation promotes incremental
changes to the existing force structure and operations. But fiscal and
technological challenges suggest that more fundamental changes may be needed
for the Navy to have sufficient and capable forces to conduct future
missions.
The Navy has made important organizational changes that better support its
efforts, but the Navy Warfare Development Command, a key organization with
responsibilities for transformation, has not been provided the necessary
influence, resources, or management mechanisms for achieving its goals.
The Navy has not given sufficient attention to long- term technology and
concept experiments, which are necessary for the Navy to analyze and
implement more significant force structure and operational changes.
Innovation activities have not been sufficiently coordinated and tracked
across the Navy. Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO- 01- 853 Military Transformation
We are recommending that the Navy develop a long- term strategic plan and
roadmap to manage and execute its transformation effort. We are also
recommending that the Navy adjust its experimentation efforts to include
exploration of long- term force structure and operational issues and that
the Navy establish a central clearinghouse to coordinate and track the wide
range of Navy innovation activities. In its comments on a draft of this
report, the Department of Defense (DOD) concurred with our recommendations
and said that our findings accurately reflect the Navy?s transformation
process, its current status, and the increased efforts in the Navy toward
transformation.
The need to transform the military services has been widely recognized in a
number of DOD policy papers, reports, and strategy documents. The national
security strategy, the national military strategy, the Secretary of
Defense?s guidance to the services, the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, and
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?s Joint Vision statements (2010
and 2020) all cite the need to transform U. S. armed forces to maintain
military dominance in the new security environment.
Over the last several years, the Navy has undergone some reorganization,
shifted its science and technology funding, and undertaken a wide range of
experiments and innovation activities. A key organization for carrying out
the Navy?s transformation has been the Navy Warfare Development Command,
which was established in June 1998 to develop new operational and
warfighting concepts to plan and coordinate experiments based on new
concepts and to develop doctrine. The Command has been preparing a capstone
concept 3 based on network centric warfare that is to serve as a guide for
future naval operations. The Command has also planned and coordinated a
series of major experiments involving the fleets 4 to evaluate many of the
concepts and technologies associated with network centric warfare. Before it
established the Command, the Navy did not have an organization dedicated to
operational experimentation. The Command?s fiscal year 2000 and 2001 budgets
are about $45.3 million and $44 million,
3 Capstone Concept for Naval Operations in the Information Age, draft. A
capstone concept provides the organizing principles for future naval
operations and force structure required to meet the challenges of the
projected future warfighting environment.
4 The Navy?s operating forces are assigned to two principal, permanent
fleets- the Atlantic Fleet and the Pacific Fleet- that train, support, and
provide forces to five numbered fleets. The numbered fleets- Second, Third,
Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Fleets- are major tactical units that are
organized for the purpose of prosecuting specific naval operations.
Background
Page 4 GAO- 01- 853 Military Transformation
respectively. In fiscal year 2002, the Command?s budget is projected to
decline to about $41.7 million. Almost half of each annual budget is
allocated to experimentation- related activities.
Two other organizations important to transformation are the Naval War
College and the Chief of Naval Operations? Strategic Studies Group. The
college conducts war games that test concepts and potential technologies. 5
Its close working relationship with the Navy Warfare Development Command
provides an avenue for new concepts to be further evaluated and integrated
into experimentation efforts. The Strategic Studies Group, comprised of a
small group of senior Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard officers, generate
and analyze innovative and revolutionary naval warfighting concepts and
reports directly to the Chief of Naval Operations. Recent studies have
centered on attacking land targets from the sea, future surface ship
deployments, new crewing concepts, and multitiered sensor grids.
In 1999 the Navy reorganized its science and technology resources into 12
future naval capabilities to focus more sharply on the capabilities needed
over the next 10- 15 years. Senior Navy and Marine Corps officials lead
integrated product teams that prioritize individual efforts in the
capability areas. The Navy?s science and technology budget has remained
relatively static over the last decade and has decreased as a percentage of
its total budget. The Navy currently allocates about 35 percent of its
science and technology budget to support its future naval capabilities. The
Navy plans further refinements to its science and technology structure,
including the possibility of adding or subtracting individual future naval
capabilities. Appendix I provides further information on the future naval
capabilities.
Since March 1997, the Navy has also conducted nine fleet battle experiments.
The experiments are assessed to determine which new operational concepts,
tactics, and technologies prove workable and what follow- on experimentation
to pursue. The Navy Warfare Development Command is also coordinating with
other military organizations to jointly lease one or more dual hulled high-
speed ships for a broad range of experiments. For 18 months starting in
September 2001, the Navy will
5 A war game is a simulation, by whatever means, of a military operation
involving two or more opposing forces, using rules, data, and procedures
designed to depict an actual or assumed real life situation.
Page 5 GAO- 01- 853 Military Transformation
conduct a series of experiments to explore potential uses for such vessels,
including amphibious lift, armament configuration, and helicopter
operations. Appendix II provides examples of issues explored in the fleet
battle experiments.
Finally, the Navy conducts a wide range of innovation activities. For
example, the Third Fleet has set aside a portion of its command ship, the U.
S. S. Coronado, to test innovations related to command, control,
communications, computers, and intelligence concepts. Appendix III provides
some examples of these innovation activities.
The Navy is conducting a variety of transformation activities: it is
experimenting with new technologies, it has made some organizational
changes, it has introduced the new network centric warfare concept, and it
is pursuing a wide range of innovations. However, the Navy has not developed
an overarching, long- term strategy that integrates these activities or that
clearly defines transformation goals, organizational roles and
responsibilities, timetables for implementation, resources to be used to
achieve its transformation goals, and ways to measure progress toward those
goals. In other words, the Navy does not have a strategic plan and roadmap
for its transformation that shows where it wants to go; how it proposes to
get there; and how transformation will be managed, funded, implemented, or
monitored. The lack of a plan and roadmap has contributed to confusion
within the Navy and DOD about what constitutes the Navy?s transformation.
The adoption of an evolutionary approach to transformation has so far not
led the Navy toward careful and full consideration of all the strategic,
budgetary, and operational elements of transformation. Additionally, the
Navy?s progress has been adversely affected by insufficient support for new
organizations responsible for leading transformation efforts, limited
conduct of long- term experiments, and a variety of Navy- wide innovation
activities that are not well coordinated and tracked.
There is no clear consensus on the precise definition, scope, or direction
of Navy transformation. In discussions with Navy and DOD officials and
outside defense experts, we found there was some confusion about what
constitutes transformation and about the role of the network centric warfare
concept, which is the centerpiece of the Navy?s transformation efforts.
Progress Being Made,
but Key Issues Require Attention
Navy Does Not Have a Defined, Integrated Strategy for Transformation
Page 6 GAO- 01- 853 Military Transformation
The Navy has not developed a plan that clearly identifies what
transformation is and what its goals or components are. For example,
although network centric warfare is clearly a fundamental concept for the
Navy?s future operations, the Navy still has not made it clear how the
concept fits in with its many ongoing transformation activities or with its
overall transformation efforts, what effects the concept will have on the
types and composition of forces, or how the concept?s many components will
be integrated with each other or with those of the other services. The Navy
plans to soon publish a capstone concept document for its future force. The
concept document is expected to apply the tenets of network centric
operations to the Navy?s vision statements and identify some of the
capabilities required to implement these tenets. Navy Warfare Development
Command officials believe the concept document is critical to the success of
the Navy?s transformation, and they expect the concept document to be
approved by the Chief of Naval Operations in the near future.
Good management practices and the advice of defense experts both inside and
outside the Navy suggest that a clear strategy is central to the success of
transformation efforts. DOD and Navy officials and outside defense experts
identified a number of benefits that can be obtained from strategic
planning. Navy officials at headquarters and several commands stated that
establishing an agreed- upon definition of transformation would be vital for
explaining what constitutes transformation. Most Navy officials we spoke
with believe that a strategic plan and roadmap would bring greater coherence
to the Navy?s transformation efforts. A strategic plan and roadmap would
also provide the Congress with a means to evaluate and make optimal
decisions on the Navy?s transformation. The need for a strategic plan when
attempting major organizational and operational changes, such as those the
Navy is undertaking, has also been long recognized in the private sector as
a best business practice.
We discussed the need for a strategic plan and roadmap with a wide range of
DOD and Navy officials and with outside defense experts, many of whom have
been directly involved in advising DOD on military transformation. These
individuals agreed that such a plan should clearly articulate the Navy?s
transformation goals and objectives, priorities, specific responsibilities,
and linkages with other organizations, as well as the scope of activities
and the resources necessary to carry them out. These management tools should
also identify the challenges and obstacles that need to be addressed and
should include understandable, simple, and reasonable metrics to provide
ways to gauge progress, provide information to decisionmakers, and make
necessary changes. Some Navy
Page 7 GAO- 01- 853 Military Transformation
officials expressed caution that such a plan should not dictate a particular
force structure but rather provide the elements of the process to guide the
transformation efforts. Appendix IV provides additional information on the
key factors for successful transformation planning and management.
The same officials and experts said that further complicating Navy
transformation planning efforts is the absence of clearly articulated
transformation guidance from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the military services. The Secretary and the
Chairman have provided only broad guidance on the direction and progress of
military transformation and on the types of future capabilities required for
transforming the military. The responsibility for clearly identifying
priorities and developing an implementation plan for their transformations
has been left to the individual services. However, it is widely recognized
that the success of future joint operations requires careful joint planning
and integration. Various organizations, including the Defense Science Board,
have cited the need for the Secretary of Defense to provide clear guidance
on transformation. In 1999, the Board called for an explicit strategy, or a
master plan; a roadmap; and outcome- related metrics to assess progress. 6
In its annual performance plan, issued pursuant to the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993, 7 DOD identified the transformation of
U. S. forces among its performance goals. The act requires federal agencies
to clearly define their missions, set goals, link activities and resources
to goals, prepare annual performance plans, measure performance, and report
on accomplishments. However, we recently reported that two of the
transformation?s three underlying metrics- procurement spending and defense
technology objectives- do not provide a direct link toward reaching that
performance goal. 8 Without such metrics, DOD cannot adequately assess its
progress toward transforming its forces for the 21st century. The Navy would
be expected to provide input to such a DOD effort and should therefore have
its own clearly articulated transformation plan.
6 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on DOD Warfighting
Transformation,
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology,
Department of Defense, Sept. 1999.
7 Pub. L. 103- 62, also known as the Results Act. 8 Department of Defense:
Status of Achieving Outcomes and Addressing Major Management Challenges
(GAO- 01- 783, June 25, 2001).
Page 8 GAO- 01- 853 Military Transformation
The Navy has adopted what it calls an evolutionary approach to
transformation, meaning that its effort is more about incremental changes in
its force posture than in its force structure. 9 The Navy believes that this
is an appropriate path to follow since it already is an expeditionary,
selfsustaining, and mobile force with worldwide reach. What it needs to do,
the Navy asserts, is to improve its expeditionary capabilities by focusing
less on the types of ships in its force structure and more on linking them
together through data networks- hence the network centric warfare concept.
This evolutionary approach, however, has so far not led the Navy toward
careful and full consideration of all the strategic, budgetary, and
operational elements of transformation. Through its approach, the Navy has
also allowed almost a decade to pass with slow progress in a number of key
transformation areas. Without the benefit of an overarching strategic plan
and roadmap, the Navy has not taken the steps necessary to explore the
possibilities of long- term changes to its force structure and operations to
adequately address near- and long- term security requirements within
existing and projected fiscal parameters.
There are at least three reasons why the Navy may need to adopt a more far-
reaching and considered approach to its transformation: (1) it may not be
able to recapitalize its existing forces at current shipbuilding rates,
which might necessitate more fundamental changes in force structure and
operations than it currently plans; (2) new operational concepts and
technologies needed to operate in littoral areas may be coming into the
force too slowly, given the increased importance of littoral operations
recognized by the Navy; and (3) there are substantial technological
challenges presented by network centric warfare that could take a long time
and considerable effort to overcome. DOD in its comments to a draft of this
report, stated that the evolutionary approach followed by the Navy for
transformation was prudent and allowed the Navy to continuously improve its
combat capabilities. It also stated that Navy transformation efforts, such
as the Navy?s fleet battle experiment program, have not excluded
consideration of innovative force structures. DOD attributed the majority of
actual and perceived transformation shortfalls to the lack of an
9 Force structure refers to the numbers, size, and composition of the Navy?s
forces, such as ships and aircraft. Force posture refers primarily to how
the ships and aircraft operate together. Approach Does Not
Adequately Address Challenges
Page 9 GAO- 01- 853 Military Transformation
overarching strategic plan and roadmap rather than to the approach followed
for transformation by the Navy.
The Navy has not been building enough ships to maintain the roughly 300-
ship force mandated by the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review. The high costs
of supporting the current force, the time needed to acquire new ships, and
the prospect of a continued mismatch between fiscal resources and force
structure requirements increase the urgency of planning for and carrying out
transformation. Although we did not make an independent assessment of the
funds needed to maintain a force of 300 ships and its associated inventory
of aircraft and supporting infrastructure, the Congressional Budget Office
has estimated that the Navy would require roughly $17 billion more each year
for fiscal years 2001 through 2005 than it is currently expected to receive
to sustain this force level. 10 If current construction rates and funding
levels remain the same, the Navy?s force could decrease to approximately 260
ships or lower after 2020. Navy officials believe they face even bigger
challenges. As part of DOD?s July 2000 report on naval vessel force
structure requirements, the Navy reported that its force needed to increase
to about 360 ships over the next 15 to 20 years to better meet its total
operational requirements and the national military strategy. 11
The recent establishment of an Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs may help focus the Navy?s
attention on analyzing the potential for changes that might be needed to
address fiscal concerns as well as current and future force structure
requirements. In addition, the President of the Naval War College was
recently chosen by the Chief of Naval Operations to lead a task force to
analyze the force structure implications of operating the Navy on
approximately the same budget level it now has.
A senior Navy headquarters official agreed that the shortfall in funding and
the mismatch between requirements and resources are major drivers for
transformation. But the official also acknowledged that the Navy?s
evolutionary approach to transformation might not address its fiscal
problems.
10 Budgeting for Naval Forces: Structuring Tomorrow?s Navy at Today?s
Funding Level,
Congressional Budget Office, October 2000. 11 Naval Vessel Force Structure
Requirements, Department of Defense, July 2000. Fiscal and Force Structure
Challenges Require Greater Urgency
Page 10 GAO- 01- 853 Military Transformation
The Navy has been slow in acquiring many of the capabilities that it needs
to successfully conduct littoral operations. We recently reported on the
Navy?s limited countermine, antisubmarine, and ship self- defense
capabilities and the lack of credible surface fire support capabilities. 12
Although the Navy has had acquisition programs under way to improve its
capabilities in each of these areas for many years, we found progress has
been slow. We also found that unless current efforts can be accelerated or
alternatives developed, it will be another 10 to 20 years before the naval
services have the capabilities they say they need to successfully execute
littoral warfare operations against a competent enemy. Our ongoing reviews
of Navy chemical and biological defense capabilities have found shortcomings
in equipment and training for shipboard personnel and naval personnel ashore
in high- threat areas. Such deficiencies could also seriously affect the
Navy?s ability to operate successfully in littoral areas. 13
The Navy faces significant challenges in developing the network centric
warfare capability. Navy officials told us that they have only just begun to
define and implement the concept and that making it operational involves
significant challenges. Officials in the Navy?s operating forces expressed a
lack of a clear understanding about what network centric warfare is and how
it is expected to change operations and forces. Some elements such as the
Cooperative Engagement Capability 14 have recently deployed, while others
are in the early stages of research and development and are years away from
practical use. Most will rely on interoperability (compatibility with
equipment used by the Navy and the other services) for their ultimate
success. Yet the Navy does not have an implementation plan to integrate all
the different elements. Several Navy and joint officials have indicated that
some components require much more comprehensive planning and an
12 Navy Acquisitions: Improved Littoral War- fighting Capabilities Needed
(GAO- 01- 493, May 18, 2001). 13 We plan to report on these shortcomings in
Navy chemical and biological defense capabilities later this year. 14
Cooperative Engagement Capability is a Navy sensors networking capability
with integrated fire control. This allows for various dispersed sensors
measurements to be fused together in real time to develop and distribute a
common track picture. The initial operational capability was achieved in
1996. The next group of ships with this capability (an aircraft carrier
battle group) is scheduled to deploy in 2002, but it will take a decade or
more to install this capability on select Navy ships and aircraft. Slow
Progress in Developing
Littoral Warfare Capabilities Network Centric Warfare Presents Significant
Challenges
Page 11 GAO- 01- 853 Military Transformation
integrated roadmap for their development. Others said that the Navy and the
other services were not doing enough to ensure interoperability. 15
The Navy has carried out several organizational changes aimed at moving
transformation forward. But as with all of its other transformation
activities, these changes have not been carried out within the context of an
overarching strategy that clearly and authoritatively identifies roles and
responsibilities of different bodies and stakeholders. Thus, even though the
Navy Warfare Development Command was established primarily to direct the
Navy?s transformation efforts, the Command has had difficulty building
relationships with other Navy organizations and has not yet achieved the
priority for resources needed to make it an effective focal point for
transformation.
Several important activities are underway at the Command. For example, it is
pursuing a comprehensive review and reorganization of the Navy?s doctrine
structure, and it is coordinating all major Navy fleet battle experiments as
well as the Navy?s participation in joint experiments. Its work on the
capstone concept document based on network centric warfare- the centerpiece
of the Navy?s transformation activities- is nearing completion. It has also
established a constructive working arrangement with the Naval War College
and the Strategic Studies Group.
The Command has had less success establishing itself as the Navy?s focal
point for transformation and has sometimes faced resistance at the fleets
and at Navy headquarters while trying to carry out its responsibilities.
Atlantic and Pacific Fleet officials said that while they appreciate the
intent of the Command?s work, fleet personnel sometimes see the Command?s
experiments as disruptions to their everyday operations and do not fully
understand how the experiments can benefit them. They explained that the
fleets are focused more on immediate issues affecting operations and are
therefore less receptive to activities that might be aimed at the Navy?s
longer term interests. A number of senior Navy officials said that the
Command has had difficulty promoting its concepts to the fleets because some
fear that new concepts could threaten support and funding for existing
programs.
15 For further information on interoperability issues, see Joint Military
Operations: Weaknesses in DOD?s Process for Certifying C4I Systems?
Interoperability (NSIAD- 98- 73, Mar. 13, 1998). Navy Warfare
Development Command Not Firmly Established and Supported
Page 12 GAO- 01- 853 Military Transformation
Part of the difficulty of building relationships with other Navy
organizations is that the Command is just 3 years old, and its mission is
not well known throughout the Navy. During our fleet visits, we found that
with the exception of fleet battle experiments, the Command?s overall role,
responsibilities, and relationships were not fully understood. Several
senior Navy officials noted that the Command has not been afforded a high
priority for staffing. For example, only 46 of its 60 authorized positions
for military personnel were filled as of June 2001. 16 The Command?s
detachments at the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets have several important
responsibilities, including providing support for experimentation,
innovation activities, and concept and doctrine development and acting as
the liaison between joint and fleet organizations and the Command. 17
However, they have only a skeletal number of authorized staff to carry out
these responsibilities, and even these positions have not always been fully
staffed. An official of the Command?s Pacific Fleet detachment said that
lack of personnel prevents the detachment?s staff from attending key
meetings and making visits to Navy organizations throughout the region.
Officials at the Command?s Atlantic Fleet detachment expressed similar
limitations to involvement with organizations in that area. Additionally,
the Command has been unable to assign a permanent representative to the U.
S. Joint Forces Command to represent the Navy on joint experimentation
issues.
The Command has also had some difficulties with funding needed to support
its activities. An official in the Command?s Pacific Fleet detachment told
us the detachment has had to rely on other Navy organizations, such as the
Third Fleet, to provide funds for basic support such as office space,
telephones, heating, and lighting. Plans for prototyping of ships and other
weapon systems will require additional funds over the Command?s current
funding. Navy Warfare Development Command officials expressed concern that
about 75 percent of the Command?s research and development budget for fiscal
year 2002 will be spent to support its portion of one single experiment- the
U. S. Joint
16 As of June 2001, the Command?s total authorized personnel was 81 military
and civilian positions. All of its 21 authorized civilian positions are
filled. 17 The Navy Warfare Development Command has detachments at Norfolk,
Virginia, and San Diego, California, to support the Command?s mission at the
Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, respectively.
Page 13 GAO- 01- 853 Military Transformation
Forces Command?s Millennium Challenge. 18 To cover its other experimentation
requirements, it will need to obtain additional funds from the Navy and
other organizations with which the Command cooperates on experimentation
projects.
Recent organizational changes at Navy headquarters should help overcome some
of these difficulties. The establishment of the Office of the Deputy Chief
of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs provides a clearer
link between headquarters and organizations vital to transformation. This
link may help increase the visibility of the Navy Warfare Development
Command?s efforts and could afford more support for promising new ideas that
may not otherwise be embraced by other Navy organizations.
The Warfare Requirements and Programs Office was created to separate
requirements and resource allocation functions that had previously been
handled by a single office. The office?s responsibility for balancing
warfighting requirements with available resources could also provide a
better means for the Navy to assess its resource priorities and make the
necessary budget trade- offs between current and future needs. The Navy is
also considering establishing ?mission capability packages.? Rather than
focusing on individual platforms (ships, submarines, or aircraft), the
packages would examine requirements in terms of all the capabilities needed
to perform a specific mission. Officials at Navy headquarters and the Navy
Warfare Development Command said these packages could help the Navy focus
more on the capabilities it needs to clarify funding priorities.
Officials at Navy headquarters and the Navy Warfare Development Command have
told us that since the reorganization, the Command has begun to obtain
greater acceptance from other Navy organizations, and its ties with
headquarters have improved. The Navy is also considering changing the
Command?s link to the fleet to provide the Command with more visibility and
influence. One possibility under consideration is to place the Command under
the Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet. While this could increase the
Command?s visibility and influence with the fleet, some Navy officials said
it could also have the consequence of
18 Millennium Challenge 2002 will be the first major joint field experiment
to incorporate the Navy?s and each of the other military services?
individual experimentation efforts. The Navy?s next fleet battle experiment-
Juliet- will be conducted as part of the joint experiment. The joint
experiment is scheduled to take place during summer 2002. Reorganization May
Help
Page 14 GAO- 01- 853 Military Transformation
focusing their efforts on more near- term fleet issues over longer term
transformation.
While the Navy has actively conducted experimentation over the last 4 years,
it has focused its experiments on near- and mid- term operational and force
issues and much less on long- term issues. 19 In spite of the importance of
experimentation for transformation, the Navy has not developed a
comprehensive strategy that places long- term goals and resources for
experiments within the context of its overall transformation objectives and
priorities.
Experimentation allows the Navy to explore new operational concepts,
identify alternative force mixes and capabilities, validate promising
technologies and system concepts, and serve as an overall mechanism for
transformation. Most importantly, it helps to shape and challenge ideas and
thinking about the future.
Despite the Navy?s increased experimentation effort since 1997, Navy
officials at headquarters, fleet, and other organizations believe the Navy
needs to expand its experimentation activities to explore major long- term
operational and force concepts to provide better information on future
requirements and capabilities. A wide range of Navy officials and defense
experts stated that the Navy needs to explore new ship design concepts-
possibly revolutionary ones- and employ prototypes to experiment with them.
Such experimentation is necessary for the Navy to analyze potential force
structure and operating options in the face of likely budgets and
opportunities possible in emerging technologies. An example of this type of
effort is the Navy?s current plan to begin at- sea experimentation with a
high- speed ship concept.
Resource priorities also affect the Navy?s ability to experiment and address
long- term issues. The Navy has stated that operating a smaller force in a
period of increased level of overseas operations has limited the number of
ships it can assign to experimentation. It has worked around
19 The Navy defines the scope of near- term (or short- term) experimentation
to be from the present to 2 years out and is aimed more at enhancing current
systems and processes. Midterm experimentation focuses on 2 to 4 years out
and may affect budget and requirements decisions. Long- term experimentation
focuses on 5 to 15 years out and involves new warfighting concepts and
technologies that could cause significant force and operational changes.
Long- Term
Experimentation Has Not Received Adequate Attention
Page 15 GAO- 01- 853 Military Transformation
this limitation by conducting its experimentation, such as fleet battle
experiments, as part of its major fleet exercises. 20 Another resource issue
is the limited staff available to support the Navy experimentation program.
Since 1997, the Navy has conducted fleet battle experiments at the rate of
two each year. In addition to drawing heavily on the staff and resources of
the Navy Warfare Development Command and the fleets, the Navy believed this
pace did not allow sufficient time to plan and prepare for experiments
beforehand and assess the results afterward. In 2001, it changed the
schedule to approximately one experiment each year.
We learned that many of the Navy?s innovation activities are not well
coordinated or tracked between different organizations. The Navy has been
undertaking a wide range of innovation activities. Some of these activities
are directed at specific problems, while others have a broader servicewide
focus. Some are aimed at best business practice innovations; others are
operational in nature. These activities contribute to the incremental,
evolutionary approach the Navy has adopted for transformation, and if
sufficiently orchestrated and sustained, they can lead to substantial
change.
Many Navy officials throughout the organizations we visited believed that
the Navy needs to improve the servicewide coordination and tracking of
innovation activities. An official at the Pacific Fleet headquarters stated
that the Pacific Fleet has attempted to identify and track these innovation
activities, both within the Fleet and in other parts of the Navy. However,
the official said that it was not possible to determine the extent to which
all activities were captured because of the large number of and differences
in activities. Several Navy officials from various fleet and headquarters
organizations stated that a central Navy clearinghouse for maintaining and
disseminating information about ongoing and past activities would benefit,
promote, and accelerate other innovation efforts. Various Navy officials
suggested that the Navy Warfare Development Command would be an appropriate
organization to manage and maintain this information. The Navy Warfare
Development Command has proposed an effort to provide greater servicewide
coordination of innovation and transformation- related activities. According
to the proposal, the Navy would develop web- based
20 An exercise is a military maneuver or simulated wartime operation for the
purposes of training and evaluation. An experiment is an event to further
define a new concept or refine an established concept. Innovation Activities
Are
Not Well Coordinated or Tracked
Page 16 GAO- 01- 853 Military Transformation
tools to further enhance coordination efforts. It would also focus on
coordinating innovation efforts with the other services and the U. S. Joint
Forces Command. However, no decision has yet been reached by the Navy?s
leadership on who will lead the coordination effort.
The complexities and uncertainties that underlie the Navy?s transformation
require that clear direction and guidance be given to all levels of the
organization on what transformation is and how it will be carried out. While
the Navy has initiated a number of activities to transform its forces, it
has not articulated and promulgated a well- defined transformation program.
Current activities have not been conducted within the context of an overall
strategic plan and roadmap to provide the direction, goals, priorities,
scope, options, and resource requirements necessary to achieve a successful
transformation. The importance of such planning to effective and efficient
management of federal programs is recognized under the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993.
Implementing the Navy?s transformation will be complicated and will require
careful consideration of near- term needs, as well as fundamental changes in
the force structure, concepts, and organizations required to meet future
security challenges within likely budgets. Actions need to be planned and
orchestrated as part of a broader, well- developed strategy designed to
achieve long- term objectives and not simply to satisfy immediate
requirements. Development of a long- term strategic plan and roadmap would
help to maintain the delicate balance between current and future
requirements as the Navy transforms. It would also provide the necessary
guidance to better focus and direct the Navy?s transformation activities and
tools to guide and oversee progress toward achievement of goals and
objectives. Such a plan, for example, could also address the coordination
and monitoring of innovation activities and delineate the authority of the
Navy Warfare Development Command in carrying out its mission. Without such a
plan, it can be difficult for senior leaders, the Congress, and others to
provide the necessary support and make optimal decisions on priorities and
the effective use of resources to successfully transform Navy forces.
Although the Navy has stated that its transformation efforts are focused on
force posture and not necessarily force structure, there is a clear and
persistent need for the Navy to explore potential fundamental changes in its
force structure and operational concepts that would permit it to carry out
its requirements within certain fiscal parameters. The time required to
design and build ships further compels urgent action by the Navy. Without
Conclusions
Page 17 GAO- 01- 853 Military Transformation
an experimentation effort that includes evaluating long- term issues such as
new ship designs and operational concepts, the Navy will be less able to
make the difficult but important decisions that will be needed regarding the
size, shape, and composition of its future fleet.
The wide range of innovation activities being conducted throughout the Navy
contributes to the Navy?s overall transformation efforts. But the lack of
adequate Navy- wide coordination and tracking limits the potential benefits
these activities could have for all organizations. The creation of a Navy-
wide clearinghouse would provide a central repository for all organizations-
in the Navy and elsewhere in the Department of Defense- to exchange
information and lessons learned on innovation activities.
To more clearly determine the Navy?s direction and promote better
understanding of actions taken to transform its forces for the 21st century,
we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy
to develop a long- term strategic plan and roadmap that clearly articulates
priorities, objectives, and milestones; identifies the scope, resource
requirements, and responsibilities; and defines the metrics for assessing
progress in achieving successful transformation.
We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the
Navy to (1) adjust the Navy?s experimentation program to provide greater
exploration of long- term force structure and operational issues and (2)
create a clearinghouse for Navy- wide innovation activities to improve
coordination and monitoring of such activities.
We received written comments from the Department of Defense on a draft of
this report, which are included in their entirety as appendix V. The
Department agreed with our recommendations but did not elaborate on how it
would address them. DOD generally believed that our findings accurately
reflect the Navy?s transformation process, the current status, and the
increased efforts in the Navy toward transformation.
DOD agreed with our overall conclusion that the Navy needs to develop a
strategic plan and roadmap to manage and execute its transformation efforts.
In its comments, DOD stated that the Navy is implementing near-, mid-, and
far- term steps to achieve a transformation goal of assured Recommendations
for
Executive Action Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
Page 18 GAO- 01- 853 Military Transformation
access, 21 which was identified by the Navy?s 1999 Maritime Concept as a key
operational challenge. We agree that these steps are an element in the
development of a comprehensive long- term strategic plan and roadmap that we
recommend for Navy transformation. However, such a plan and roadmap must
also articulate the priorities, objectives, and milestones; identify the
scope, resource requirements, and responsibilities; and define the metrics
for assessing progress. By including these additional elements, the plan and
roadmap would provide the clear direction, focus, and integration necessary
for the Navy to carry out a successful transformation.
To develop criteria for assessing the Navy?s management of its
transformation, we identified several key factors important to success in
military transformation (see app. IV). We identified these factors from our
review of a wide range of DOD and Navy publications and statements, open
literature, academic research on the subject of military innovation and
transformation, and case studies of past transformation efforts. To assess
the reasonableness and completeness of these factors, we discussed them with
Navy and DOD officials and outside defense experts from various research and
academic organizations. We also used the principles laid out in the
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 as additional benchmarks for
our assessment.
To determine the Navy?s transformation- related activities and develop our
observations of the key management issues affecting progress, we obtained
information, documents, and perspectives from officials at all levels of the
Navy, including Navy headquarters, the Navy Warfare Development Command, the
Naval War College, the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, and the Offices of the
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We
discussed Navy transformation with the former Secretary of the Navy (1998-
2001) and with several senior Navy leaders who have responsibility for
various aspects of the Navy?s transformation. We also obtained perspectives
from several defense experts and academicians who have followed military and
Navy transformation. Appendix VI lists the principal organizations and
offices where we performed work. We reviewed an extensive array of policy,
planning, and guidance documents; intelligence documents; posture statements
and
21 Assured access is the ability of the U. S. military to have immediate and
sustained access to any region of the world at any time. Scope and
Methodology
Page 19 GAO- 01- 853 Military Transformation
speeches; congressional hearings and testimonies; open literature; and
studies and assessments. We also made extensive use of information available
on public and DOD Internet web sites.
To develop a better understanding of the Navy?s transformation and the
actions it has taken to carry out the transformation, we obtained
information on various areas related to concept development,
experimentation, innovation, research and development, and other
transformation activities. We reviewed the concept of network centric
warfare with Navy officials at several organizations and offices responsible
for developing and implementing the concept. To ascertain the Navy?s
experimentation and innovation efforts, we discussed the plans, content, and
results with officials at the Navy Warfare Development Command, Atlantic and
Pacific Fleets, and research and development organizations. To obtain
information on the Navy?s participation in joint experimentation efforts,
particularly Millennium Challenge 2002, we met with officials at the U. S.
Joint Forces Command and the Joint Staff?s Joint Vision and Transformation
Division. To be cognizant of the security environment in which the Navy is
likely to operate its forces through 2020, we obtained an intelligence
briefing from the Defense Intelligence Agency. To attain information on the
Navy?s investment in research and development to support transformation, we
met with officials at the Office of Naval Research, the Space and Naval
Warfare Systems Command, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.
Although we did not include a review of Marine Corps transformation
activities in our review, we did meet with a senior Marine Corps official
responsible for the service?s transformation to discuss coordination and
joint transformationrelated efforts between the two services. We did not
include the Navy?s management of service Defense Reform Initiatives in our
scope.
Our review was conducted from August 2000 through May 2001 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 20 GAO- 01- 853 Military Transformation
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees,
the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations. We will also make
copies available to others upon request.
Please contact me at (202) 512- 3958 if you or your staff have any questions
concerning this report. Major contributors to this report were Marvin E.
Casterline, Mark J. Wielgoszynski, Joseph W. Kirschbaum, and Stefano
Petrucci.
Carol R. Schuster Director, Defense Capabilities
and Management
Appendix I: Future Naval Capabilities Page 21 GAO- 01- 853 Military
Transformation
To more sharply focus on the capabilities the Navy will need in the next 10
to 15 years, in 1999 the Navy reorganized its science and technology
resources into 12 future naval capabilities. The objective is to focus on
capabilities and not platforms. The future naval capabilities are managed by
integrated product teams, which include senior Navy and Marine Corps
military and civilian officials. These teams focus on the overall capability
by prioritizing the individual efforts and supporting technology areas.
Table 1 lists the 12 future naval capabilities and provides examples of
individual technology efforts for each capability.
Table 1: Future Naval Capabilities and Examples of Supporting Technology
Efforts Future naval capability Examples of supporting technologies
Autonomous operations Sensor data processing
Unmanned aerial vehicle propulsion and power system
Maritime reconnaissance
Tactical unmanned ground vehicle Capable manpower Simulation- based
warfighter test battery
Cognitive modeling capability
Artificial intelligence data quality tools
Integrated maintenance training and performance support through distance
technologies Decision support system Intuitive/ interactive visualization
tools
Network- based knowledge operations
Management of collaboration services and tools
Resource/ asset optimization Expeditionary logistics Automated
warehousing system
Asset visibility
Optimization tools
Shared data Information distribution VHF/ UHF/ L- band antenna systems
Dynamic network for tactical links
Underwater surveillance data link network
Allied/ coalition command and control applications Littoral antisubmarine
warfare Lightweight broadband variable depth sonar
Cross- platform data fusion- common tactical picture
Deployable shallow water autonomous systems
Weapon/ platform connectivity Missile defense Infrared sensors
Affordable ground based radar
Distributed weapons coordination
Reactive material advanced warhead Organic mine countermeasures
Autonomous undersea vehicles
Wide area surveillance
Influence sweeping
Remote buried mine detection Platform protection Surface ship acoustic
control
Advanced degaussing/ deamping
Missile warning system
Damage tolerant advanced double hull
Appendix I: Future Naval Capabilities
Appendix I: Future Naval Capabilities Page 22 GAO- 01- 853 Military
Transformation
Future naval capability Examples of supporting technologies
Time critical strike Enhanced targeting acquisition and location system
Barrage round
Advanced gun barrel and propulsion technology
Capabilities against moving and hard and deeply- buried targets Total
ownership cost reduction Advanced coating and longer life components
Corrosion preventive compounds for aircraft
Real- time structural diagnostics
Ground tests of components and materials
Enhanced cost estimating tools Warfighter protection Hemostatic field
dressing
Portable medical water producer
Agile laser
Occupational fitness for injury reduction Source: Office of Naval
Research.
Appendix II: Fleet Battle Experiments Page 23 GAO- 01- 853 Military
Transformation
Since March 1997 the Navy has conducted nine fleet battle experiments. Each
of these experiments has focused on some of the Navy?s core missions, such
as land attack, or those it expects to conduct in the future. These
experiments have also enabled the Navy to assess how new technologies and
approaches could enhance fleet capabilities and operations with joint and
allied forces. The experiments rotate among the Navy?s fleets and are
scheduled to coincide with a major fleet exercise. Roughly $5 million is
dedicated to each fleet battle experiment. This amount does not include the
operation and maintenance funds expended by a fleet during the actual
experiment. Upon completion, each experiment is assessed to determine which
concepts proved workable and what follow- on experimentation should be
pursued. Table 2 provides some examples of issues addressed in the fleet
battle experiments.
Table 2: Examples of Issues Addressed in Fleet Battle Experiments Name and
date Issues addressed Alfa
Mar. 1997
?Ring of Fire? naval surface fire support concepts and systems, such as
the arsenal ship.
C4ISR a systems and concepts for sea- based joint task force commander,
including computer assisted collaborative planning tools and common tactical
picture.
Bravo
Aug.- Sept. 1997
?Ring of Fire? joint fire support coordination processes and systems.
Joint task force targeting for satellite- guided munitions.
Charlie
May 1998
Systems and procedures for coordinating area air defense.
Distributed collaborative planning tools and single air picture.
Delta
Oct.- Nov. 1998
Data exchange between Navy and Army radar and mission coordination between
the AEGIS combat system and the 2nd Infantry Division.
Collaborative planning tools and procedures for joint theater air and
missile defense.
Echo
Mar. 1999
Countering asymmetric threats in the littorals. Focus on urban warfare.
Network centric antisubmarine warfare.
Foxtrot
Nov.- Dec. 1999
Integrating and coordinating joint fires to destroy fixed and time
critical targets.
Concepts and procedures for mine warfare, antisubmarine warfare, and force
protection.
Golf
Apr. 2000
Effective response to time critical targets.
Coordinating theater air and missile defense with U. S. allies.
Hotel
Aug.- Sept. 2000
Application of network centric operational principles to ensure access in
littorals, including antisubmarine warfare, mine countermeasures, theater
air and missile defense, information operations, and strike support.
Digital Fires Network.
Concepts for remote sensors and underwater unmanned vehicles.
India
June 2001
Operational and tactical concepts and procedures for littoral operations
in the 2005- 2010 time frame.
Focus on forced entry and access for expeditionary/ contingency
operations. a Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance.
Source: Navy Warfare Development Command.
Appendix II: Fleet Battle Experiments
Appendix III: Navy- Wide Innovation Activities Page 24 GAO- 01- 853 Military
Transformation
A wide range of innovations and transformation- related activities are being
conducted at the fleet level and in many other Navy organizations. For
example, the Second Fleet has been evaluating the concepts, technologies,
and procedures for network centric antisubmarine warfare. This concept
employs collaborative tools to link ships and aircraft to greatly increase
the effectiveness of antisubmarine forces. It assists the Navy in
implementing its plan to distribute antisubmarine warfare capability
throughout its forces rather than in only a few dedicated platforms. Table 3
provides examples of Navy innovation activities.
Table 3: Examples of Navy Innovation Activities Activity Description
Participants
Mission Support Center This center provides a central location for gathering
data and information from multiple sources and integrating it into a single
command picture.
Commander, Naval Special Warfare Group One
Sea- Based Battle Lab A portion of the Third Fleet command ship, U. S. S.
Coronado,
is dedicated to configuring technology for experiments with new command,
control, communications, computers, and intelligence concepts.
Third Fleet Smart Ship This program focuses on identifying and implementing
labor
saving technologies in Navy surface ships with the potential of saving funds
and allowing personnel to concentrate on their warfighting mission.
Fleets and Navy headquarters Cross- functional Support Team These teams
evaluate new concepts and projects for
command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence and manage
priorities within associated programs.
Pacific Fleet Manpower Personnel Database Project This system allows the
Pacific Fleet submarine force to better
coordinate and manage its personnel. Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific
Fleet
Afloat Supply Department of the Future This initiative optimizes supply
operations to coincide with
such efforts as reduced manning aboard Navy ships. Naval Supply Systems
Command and the Atlantic and
Pacific Fleets Network Centric Innovation Center This small organization is
focused on evaluating the
innovations possible within the 18- 24 month range and integrating them into
the force.
Third Fleet Disruptive Technologies A small staff cell has been dedicated to
evaluating disruptive
technologies that could have a significant potential impact on future
operations.
Office of Naval Research Source: GAO interviews and Navy data.
Appendix III: Navy- Wide Innovation Activities
Appendix IV: Factors for Successful Transformation
Page 25 GAO- 01- 853 Military Transformation
A number of factors are important for the Navy or any military organization
to successfully transform its forces and operations. On their own or in
combination, these eight factors are useful in establishing effective
planning mechanisms for managing transformation efforts. We identified these
factors from our review of a wide range of Department of Defense (DOD) and
Navy publications and statements, open literature, academic research on the
subject of military innovation and transformation, and case studies of past
transformation efforts. To assess the reasonableness and completeness of
these factors, we discussed these factors with Navy and DOD officials and
outside defense experts from various research and academic organizations.
A clear and authoritative statement of vision, rationale, and direction of
transformation efforts is necessary. The precise shape and structure of the
future Navy is difficult to determine. But the direction of development for
required capabilities can be outlined to the extent that lines of effort can
be delineated, priorities established, and responsibilities for executing
them assigned. The Navy?s leadership must ensure that such policies are
communicated throughout its organization.
This factor involves the details of transformation and how an organization
should carry them out. This entails a delineation of organizational elements
responsible for converting concepts and ideas into practical operational and
force structure changes.
It is important that personnel and funds are dedicated to innovation and
transformation- related efforts. These efforts include experimentation,
prototype development, and acquisition. For example, the period of the 1920s
and 1930s was one of fiscal constraint for the Navy. But it devoted
considerable resources to the development of aircraft carriers and naval
aviation, which later contributed to the Navy?s success during the Second
World War.
Clear and adaptable measures of effectiveness are required for experiments
to determine the value of innovations and for procedural matters to
determine the progress of transformation. Appendix IV: Factors for
Successful
Transformation Policy Organization and Process Resources
Metrics
Appendix IV: Factors for Successful Transformation
Page 26 GAO- 01- 853 Military Transformation
Innovation and transformation must include changes in how the Navy operates
at all levels. There must be feedback among innovators, operators,
experimenters, doctrine writers, and the training and education
establishment. Many defense experts have recognized this linkage as one of
the most important elements of military transformation.
This is the ?culture? aspect of transformation. Leaders from all levels of
the organization should provide tangible commitment to Navy transformation
and to those who make contributions to that end. Innovators must be given
incentives to innovate, allowed to take reasonable risks in areas such as
experiments, and given the authority to conduct energetic analyses to
address the Navy?s future warfare challenges.
The active support of the Congress is vital to effecting transformation in
the Navy. In some cases, this may be resource- oriented. In others, such
support would involve congressional oversight, as it has in the past, and
provide incentives and direction when and where appropriate. For example,
during the development of naval aviation, the Congress mandated that those
officers seeking to command the new aircraft carriers had to be flight
qualified. 1 This mandate stimulated the career path. To better ensure an
effective transformation, the Navy needs to coordinate its plans and efforts
with the Congress as well as the other services and joint organizations.
Individual Navy efforts must be interoperable with the other services in
order for future joint operations to be viable. This is applicable to the
specifications of individual capabilities, such as communication equipment,
as well as to the broader issue of developing integrated operational level
capabilities and concepts.
1 Flight qualified was determined to be that the officer was qualified as
either a naval aviator or as an ?observer.?
Linkage Among Technology, Concepts, and Doctrine
Organizational Support Congressional Support
Joint Interconnectivity
Appendix V: Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 27 GAO- 01- 853 Military Transformation
Appendix V: Comments From the Department of Defense
Appendix V: Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 28 GAO- 01- 853 Military Transformation
Now on p. 17. Now on p. 17.
Appendix V: Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 29 GAO- 01- 853 Military Transformation
Now on pp. 15- 16. Now on p. 15. Now on p. 9.
Appendix V: Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 30 GAO- 01- 853 Military Transformation
Now on pp. 8 and 16.
Appendix VI: Organizations and Offices Contacted
Page 31 GAO- 01- 853 Military Transformation
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics, Science and Technology Plans and Programs
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat
Reduction
Defense Intelligence Agency
Joint Vision and Transformation Division
Joint Advanced Warfighting Program
Office of the Director for Navy Test and Evaluation and Technology
Requirements
Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and
Operations, Strategy and Policy Division
Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements
and Programs
Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Requirements
and Assessments
Secretary of the Navy (November 16, 1998 - January 20, 2001)
Office of Naval Research
Marine Corps Combat Development Command U. S. Commission on National
Security/ 21st Century Brookings Institution Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments Center for Strategic and International Studies DFI
International Elliot School of Security Studies, George Washington
University Appendix VI: Organizations and Offices
Contacted Washington, D. C., Area
Department of Defense The Joint Staff Department of the Navy
Other Organizations
Appendix VI: Organizations and Offices Contacted
Page 32 GAO- 01- 853 Military Transformation
Naval War College Navy Warfare Development Command Chief of Naval
Operations? Strategic Studies Group
U. S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Experimentation Directorate U. S. Atlantic
Fleet
Headquarters
Naval Surface Force
Naval Air Force
Naval Submarine Force U. S. Second Fleet Navy Warfare Development Command,
Norfolk Detachment
U. S. Third Fleet (U. S. S. Coronado)
Naval Surface Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific
Fleet Naval Special Warfare Command
Naval Special Warfare Group One Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command
Navy Warfare Development Command, San Diego Detachment
U. S. Pacific Command U. S. Pacific Fleet
Headquarters
Naval Submarine Force Newport, Rhode
Island, Area Norfolk, Virginia, Area
San Diego, California, Area
Honolulu, Hawaii, Area
(350009)
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