Electronic Combat: Services Should Consider Greater Use of New Test Equipment for Their Aircraft (30-AUG-01, GAO-01-843)
The armed services have had problems for years with their ability
to adequately test their electronic combat systems. The success
of the new Joint Service Electronic Combat Systems Tester Program
in providing improved test capability is a positive development.
Because the tester has identified many more faults in the F-15C
and F/A-18C electronic combat systems than the current test
equipment was identifying, existing readiness, logistics, and
maintenance problems with such systems could worsen. However,
pilots would at least have greater knowledge about the readiness
and reliability of their self-protection systems and their need
for support from specialized aircraft designed to suppress enemy
air defenses. GAO believes it makes sense for the Air Force and
Navy to consider using the new test equipment on their
non-fighter aircraft.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-01-843
ACCNO: A01413
TITLE: Electronic Combat: Services Should Consider Greater Use
of New Test Equipment for Their Aircraft
DATE: 08/30/2001
SUBJECT: Air defense systems
Cost analysis
Defense capabilities
Performance measures
Avionics
Electronic warfare
Fighter aircraft
EA-6B Aircraft
F-14 Aircraft
F-15C Aircraft
F-15E Aircraft
F-16 Aircraft
F/A-18C Aircraft
F/A-18E/F Aircraft
Joint Service Electronic Combat Systems
Tester Program
Eagle Aircraft
Falcon Aircraft
Hornet Aircraft
Tomcat Aircraft
DOD Operation Southern Watch
ALQ-131 Jammer
******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a **
** GAO Testimony. **
** **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but **
** may not resemble those in the printed version. **
** **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed **
** document's contents. **
** **
******************************************************************
GAO-01-843
Report to the Secretary of Defense
United States General Accounting Office
GAO
August 2001 ELECTRONIC COMBAT
Services Should Consider Greater Use of New Test Equipment for Their
Aircraft
GAO- 01- 843
Page 1 GAO- 01- 843 Electronic Combat
August 30, 2001 The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld The Secretary of Defense
Dear Mr. Secretary: This report summarizes the results of our review of the
Joint Service Electronic Combat Systems Tester program, hereafter referred
to as ?the tester.? The tester is intended to provide the Air Force and Navy
with an improved flight- line test capability to test the readiness of
electronic combat systems, such as radar warning receivers and radar
jammers, on their aircraft. 1 These systems are vital in protecting the
aircraft from enemy air defenses (i. e., surface- to- air missiles and
antiaircraft artillery) and enemy aircraft. Our objective was to determine
the schedule, cost, and performance status of the tester program. In
addition, because the tester?s usage has disclosed serious reliability
problems with electronic combat systems on Air Force and Navy aircraft, we
have included a discussion of such problems in this report.
Although schedule slippage and cost growth have occurred in the tester
program, Air Force and Navy use of the new tester indicates that performance
goals are being met and a useful capability is likely to be achieved. The
tester performed very effectively in testing- so well, that it revealed
numerous previously undisclosed faults in electronic combat systems on Air
Force F- 15C and Navy F/ A- 18C aircraft. For instance, we found in testing
late last year that 12 of 13 aircraft at Langley Air Force Base and all 10
aircraft at Oceana Naval Air Station had one or more previously undiagnosed
electronic combat system faults, indicating that the reliability of these
systems is much lower than the services had previously believed. Because the
tester works so well at disclosing faults, the Air Force and Navy plan to
expand its use to other electronic combat systems on other fighter aircraft,
including the F- 16 and F- 14.
Widespread use of the tester could have several implications. First, the
services could find that the readiness of their aircraft is lower than
1 These systems are also referred to as ?electronic warfare systems.?
Electronic warfare is part of electronic combat.
United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548
Results in Brief
Page 2 GAO- 01- 843 Electronic Combat
previously believed. Because the tester effectively disclosed unknown
faults, the Air Force found that 41 of 44 F- 15Cs tested were not fully
mission capable. Second, the services could be faced with additional demands
for logistical support and maintenance. For example, while we observed the
new tester being used on F- 15C aircraft at Eglin Air Force Base,
technicians took electronic combat system parts from other aircraft and
installed them on the aircraft being tested before the testing could be
completed. Maintenance officials told us that because spare parts were in
limited supply, it was common for aircraft being tested to use cannibalized
parts from another aircraft in order to be repaired. Third, although the
expanded use of the new tester to other aircraft could make existing
logistics and maintenance problems even worse, pilots would know more about
the readiness and reliability of their self- protection systems. The failure
to address these problems would encourage pilots to rely more on support
from specialized aircraft designed to suppress enemy air defenses, such as
the Navy/ Marine Corps EA- 6B.
Because the new tester is so effective, we are recommending that you direct
the Air Force and the Navy to consider expanding the use of the new tester
beyond their fighter aircraft to other types of aircraft. The Department of
Defense concurred with the findings and recommendation in our report.
The armed services have a long- standing shortfall in their capability to
adequately test electronic combat systems on aircraft and ships. From August
1989 through July 1991, we issued a series of reports identifying each
service?s problems with their test equipment for electronic combat systems.
2 To address these problems, in June 1993, the Air Force and Navy approved a
Joint Mission Need Statement for a flight- line electronic combat systems
tester to improve aircrafts? electronic combat test capability. The
Department of Defense designated the Air Force as the lead service, and the
Air Force and Navy entered into a memorandum of agreement in December 1994
to establish a joint tester program. Following
2 See Electronic Warfare: Reliable Equipment Needed to Test Air Force?s
Electronic Warfare Systems (GAO/ NSIAD- 89- 137, Aug. 11, 1989), Electronic
Warfare: Faulty Test Equipment Impairs Navy Readiness (GAO/ NSIAD- 91- 205,
July 8, 1991), Electronic Warfare: No Air Force Follow- Up on Test Equipment
Inadequacies (GAO/ NSIAD- 91- 207, July 17, 1991), and Electronic Warfare:
Faulty Test Equipment Impairs Readiness of Army Helicopters (GAO/ NSIAD- 92-
128, Apr. 17, 1992). Background
Page 3 GAO- 01- 843 Electronic Combat
a concept development phase, an engineering and manufacturing development
contract was awarded in March 1996.
The tester has been developed to provide the Air Force and Navy with a
flight- line test capability for aircraft electronic combat systems, to
include both on- board systems and those mounted outside the aircraft in
pods. The contractor for the tester, AAI Corporation, has developed a basic
core test set that can be used with various aircraft. The basic core test
set is supplemented by subsidiary test program sets and related software for
each aircraft type and its specific systems. The tester provides an end- to-
end test capability for electronic combat systems, including jammers, radar
warning receivers, and other subsystems and their associated wiring. The
tester inputs radio frequency signals into the aircraft?s antennae and then
measures whether the signals were correctly received and the appropriate
responses generated by the electronic combat systems. The tester can
identify faulty wiring and also isolate the faulty system component to make
the maintenance task easier.
Developmental testing of the basic core test set and the test program set
for the F- 15C was completed in October 2000 and for the F/ A- 18C test
program set in December 2000. Additional test program sets are to be
developed for most of the current Air Force and Navy fighter aircraft
equipped with electronic combat systems, and there will be growth potential
for adapting the system for future aircraft. Quantities to be procured
include 56 Air Force and 40 Navy basic core test sets with test program sets
for the F- 15C and F/ A- 18C, respectively. The total planned procurement
for the basic core test set is 121 for the Air Force and 188 for the Navy.
Test program sets for other aircraft are to be subsequently developed and
procured.
Schedule slippage and cost growth have occurred in the tester program.
However, the Air Force?s and Navy?s use of the new tester indicates that
performance goals are being met and that a useful capability is likely to be
achieved.
The development schedule for the new tester has slipped about 2 years from
the original plan?s schedule because the difficulty in designing the system
was underestimated. This delayed the production decision for the tester
until April 2001. Prior to the production decision, the services completed
developmental testing but did not undertake operational testing of the
tester as planned. Operational testing was deferred because the lead test
agency- the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Command- Although
Behind
Schedule and Over Cost Estimate, New Tester Is Performing Effectively
Page 4 GAO- 01- 843 Electronic Combat
was concerned that the tester contractor was still making design changes to
the system and that operational testing should utilize articles that
represent the final design to be produced. Consequently, additional
developmental testing using available prototypes was substituted for
operational testing to provide test data to support the production decision.
If operational testing of the tester?s final design identifies a need for
further design changes, the testers procured would require retrofit.
Regarding program cost, the cost under the initial development contract for
the basic core test set and the F- 15C and F/ A- 18C test program sets was
originally estimated to be about $12 million. As of January 2001, the cost
of the contract had increased to $28.9 million. Ultimately, the program?s
total cost will be a function of future decisions regarding the extent to
which other aircraft and electronic combat systems, such as the radar
warning receivers and radar jammers on the Air Force?s F- 15E and the Navy?s
F/ A- 18E/ F, will use the new tester. These aircraft and their electronic
combat systems will require the development and procurement of customized
test program sets, as well as additional quantities of the basic core test
set.
According to the Air Force, the tester has performed effectively in testing.
Developmental testing of the basic test set and the F- 15C test program set
was performed at Eglin Air Force Base from March through October 2000.
According to the Air Force?s developmental test organization, the tester met
or exceeded expectations for all test objectives. For the key performance
parameter of demonstrating at least 90- percent success in fault detection,
the tester detected and isolated all faults. The testing disclosed that 29
of 31 F- 15Cs actually had one or more faults in their electronic combat
systems. The faults detected ranged from the identification of parts needing
to be replaced inside the electronic combat systems (so- called Group B) to
the wiring, antennae, and control units that connect the systems to the
aircraft (so- called Group A). According to program officials, no existing
tester has previously been able to test the Group A equipment as well as the
Group B systems. Moreover, the new tester provides an ability to augment an
electronic combat system?s internal system check (referred to as Built in
Test, or BIT). In the past, if a system?s BIT indicated a fault, maintenance
technicians were forced to remove the system components from an aircraft to
retest them in the maintenance shop- a time- consuming and cumbersome
process. The new tester provides a check against the BIT without the
system?s removal from the aircraft.
Page 5 GAO- 01- 843 Electronic Combat
The Air Force used the tester to test operational 33rd Fighter Wing F- 15C
aircraft at Eglin about to be deployed to Operation Southern Watch in Iraq.
After successful testing at the 33rd, it was then used to test F- 15C
aircraft at the 1st Fighter Wing at Langley Air Force Base. These aircraft
are regularly deployed to Operation Northern Watch in Iraq. At Langley, 12
of 13 F- 15Cs thought to be fully mission capable actually had one or more
faults in their electronic combat systems. The potential effects of some of
these faults could have been that these aircraft would have entered combat
with partially functioning protective systems; some of these faults would
have left the systems nonfunctional.
Navy test officials advised us that the tester also performed well with
their F/ A- 18C aircraft, identifying faults that the Navy?s current test
equipment had been unable to identify. The Navy performed developmental
testing of the basic test set and the F/ A- 18C test program set at Naval
Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, Point Mugu, California; Miramar Marine
Corps Air Station, California; Lemoore Naval Air Station, California; and
Oceana Naval Air Station, Virginia, from September 1999 through January
2001. The Navy tested 16 aircraft in California, 14 of which had faults
identified by the tester. Subsequently, 10 F/ A- 18C aircraft were tested at
Oceana, and all were found to have unknown faults in their electronic combat
systems. Each of the 10 aircraft had at least 3 faults disclosed by the new
tester, and 1 aircraft had 12 faults.
Because the tester works so well at disclosing faults, the services plan to
expand its use to other electronic combat systems on other fighter aircraft.
The Air Force intends to use the tester also on its F- 16s and the Navy, on
its F- 14s.
Because the tester has a much greater ability to identify electronic combat
system problems, it can identify faults that the currently used test
equipment is not able to find. The disclosure of these problems could have
significant implications for readiness levels, logistics, and maintenance.
Additionally, the failure to address problems with the electronic combat
systems could encourage pilots to rely less on their electronic combat
systems and more on other specialized aircraft designed to suppress enemy
air defenses, such as the EA- 6B.
The test results for the F- 15C and F/ A- 18C have implications for
readiness levels not only for those types of aircraft, but also for other
aircraft using either the same or similar electronic combat systems (such as
the F- 15E Potential Implications
From Widespread Use of New Tester
Readiness Issues
Page 6 GAO- 01- 843 Electronic Combat
and F/ A- 18E.) Readiness levels are lower than the services previously
believed, since the F- 15C and F/ A- 18C aircraft, which were previously
(and reasonably) reported by the services as fully mission capable, actually
have electronic combat systems with previously unknown faults. During our
review, we found this to be true as a result of our direct observation of
the new tester in use at Eglin. We observed four aircraft being tested for
an upcoming Southern Watch deployment. In the testing that we observed, all
four aircraft, which were believed to be fully mission capable, were found
to have unknown faults that had to be repaired.
The Air Force has a criterion that its F- 15 fighter wings seek to maintain
an 81- percent fully mission capable rate. However, combining the statistics
for using the new tester in 2000 at the Eglin wing (29 of 31 aircraft had
unknown faults) and the Langley wing (12 of 13 had unknown faults), the Air
Force found that 41 of 44 F- 15Cs tested were not fully mission capable.
Likewise, since all 10 of the Navy?s F/ A- 18C aircraft tested at Oceana
Naval Air Station with the new tester had three or more unknown faults, the
Navy also could face unacceptably low readiness levels.
Once the services introduce the new tester for widespread usage, they are
likely to find, as they did during testing, that the reliability of their
electronic combat systems is much lower than previously thought.
Consequently, more logistics support in the form of additional spare parts
to fix previously undiagnosed faults will be required in the future.
According to Air Force officials, on the basis of the new tester?s use on
the F- 15C aircraft at Eglin and Langley, the Air Force will experience a
requirement for more frequent repairs and an added logistics problem. At
Warner Robbins Air Logistics Center, we were advised that spare parts
shortages already exist for F- 15 electronic combat systems. Maintenance
officials at both Eglin and Langley stated that these shortages cause them
to use cannibalization- i. e., removing a working part from one aircraft to
install it on another aircraft- to meet the wing?s flying schedule. For
example, while we observed the new tester being used on operational aircraft
at Eglin, several cannibalizations of electronic combat system parts were
required before the testing could be completed. Maintenance officials told
us that because spare parts were in limited supply, it was Logistics Issues
Page 7 GAO- 01- 843 Electronic Combat
common for aircraft being tested to use cannibalized parts from another
aircraft in order to be repaired. 3
Although the scope of our review did not include an assessment of the impact
of using the new tester on logistics for the Navy?s F/ A- 18C fleet, we
believe that using the new tester could also reveal a significant future
problem for F/ A- 18C operational deployments. Generally, even if the Navy
does not have a spare parts shortage as serious as the Air Force?s,
maintaining the readiness of deployed aircraft on carriers is more difficult
because of the quantity limitations on spare parts storage aboard ship. A
Navy maintenance person advised us that on his carrier?s recent deployment
to Southern Watch, the spare parts for the electronic combat systems used on
the F/ A- 18C were completely exhausted and maintenance personnel had to
resort to cannibalization to maintain flight operations. This situation
existed without the Navy?s having access to the new tester, which would
likely identify even more parts needing to be replaced.
Our review indicates that, in addition to the potential for heightened
readiness and logistics concerns, the introduction of the new tester could
increase the maintenance burden on the services because the new tester could
identify many more repairs that have to be made. This could intensify
existing pressures on maintenance personnel to resort to cannibalization. As
we stated in our recent testimony for the Congress, making repairs via
cannibalization requires at least twice the maintenance time as making
repairs using new spare parts. Moreover, if use of the new tester results in
further increases to the maintenance burden, it could also affect the Air
Force?s problem in retaining skilled technicians. Reinforcing this, both
Eglin and Langley maintenance officials advised us that there are already
shortages of trained maintenance personnel at the 33rd and 1st wings. In
fact, the Air Force Posture Statement 2000 cites low retention of
maintenance technicians as one of four factors resulting in the 99- percent
drop in the mission- capable rates of Air Force aircraft since 1994.
Furthermore, given the test results associated with the use of the new
tester on the F/ A- 18C, the Navy could expect a significant increase in its
maintenance burden. However, we were not made aware of any particular
3 For an extensive discussion of cannibalization and its adverse effects,
see Military Aircraft: Cannibalization Adversely Affects Personnel and
Maintenance (GAO- 01- 693T, May 22, 2001). Maintenance Burden
Page 8 GAO- 01- 843 Electronic Combat
retention problem associated with the maintenance burden being experienced
by Navy personnel during this review.
The new tester?s use could cause pilots of Air Force and Navy combat
aircraft to be reluctant to rely solely on their electronic combat systems
for self- protection from enemy air defenses. Recognizing reduced readiness
and reliability of their self- protection systems, pilots could look for
greater support from other specialized aircraft designed to suppress enemy
air defenses, such as the EA- 6B. We recently reported that current
suppression capabilities are not adequate. 4 To the extent that the new
tester discloses reliability problems with existing electronic combat
selfprotection systems, the need to improve suppression capabilities would
only be that much greater.
Given the experience from using the new tester on the F- 15C and F/ A- 18C,
it is likely that using the new tester will find a number of undisclosed
faults in electronic combat systems. Many of the electronic combat systems
on current aircraft are older systems that are already experiencing
obsolescence problems, such as difficulty in acquiring spares due to vendors
that go out of business or are no longer producing old technology equipment
(referred to as ?vanishing vendors?). The Air Force?s special test program,
called Combat Shield, is used periodically to test a variety of types of
operational aircraft for readiness. Typically, even without using the new
tester, testing via Combat Shield has found that some aircraft in every wing
tested have faults in their electronic combat systems, regardless of the
aircraft type. For example, Combat Shield found undisclosed faults when
testing was conducted at wings equipped with the F- 16.
In fact, Air Force and Navy officials have already identified emerging
problems regarding readiness, logistics, and maintenance for other
electronic combat systems. This applies to systems both internally carried
or externally mounted on an aircraft. For example, the ALQ- 131 jammer
system, externally carried by several Air Force aircraft, is projected to
have a mission capable rate of 30 to 40 percent by 2006 because of
obsolescence and the lack of spares. Furthermore, according to Air Force
4 See Electronic Warfare: Comprehensive Strategy Needed for Suppressing
Enemy Air Defenses (GAO- 01- 28, Jan. 3, 2001). Reduced Electronic
Combat Readiness Could Increase the Need for Suppression of Enemy Air
Defenses
Using New Tester on Other Aircraft Types Could Reveal Similar Problems
Page 9 GAO- 01- 843 Electronic Combat
officials at Warner Robbins Air Logistics Center, funding priorities have
constrained both spare parts acquisition and sustaining the engineering
needed to address the obsolescent parts issue.
The armed services have had problems for years with their ability to
adequately test their electronic combat systems. The success of the new
tester in providing improved test capability is a positive development.
Because the tester has identified many more faults in the F- 15C and F/ A-
18C electronic combat systems than the current test equipment was
identifying, existing readiness, logistics, and maintenance problems with
such systems could worsen. However, pilots would at least have greater
knowledge about the readiness and reliability of their self- protection
systems and their need for support from specialized aircraft designed to
suppress enemy air defenses. On balance, we believe it makes sense for the
Air Force and Navy to consider using the new test equipment on their
nonfighter aircraft.
Because the new tester?s use provides the ability to identify previously
unknown faults in electronic combat systems, we recommend that the Secretary
of Defense direct the Air Force and the Navy to consider expanding the new
tester?s use beyond fighter aircraft to other types of aircraft.
In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense
agreed with our finding that the new tester provides a much better
capability to assess electronic combat systems than the services? existing
testers. It also agreed that once the services introduce the new tester for
use on a widespread basis, they are likely to find that the reliability of
the electronic combat systems is lower than previously thought.
Consequently, more logistics support may be required in the future, and the
maintenance burden may increase. The Department concurred with our
recommendation.
We reviewed the results of the Joint Service Electronic Combat Systems
Tester development testing and determined program status through discussions
with program office officials and a review of appropriate documentation. We
discussed the status of the Air Force?s aircraft electronic combat systems
with Air Combat Command officials responsible for these systems on all Air
Force operational aircraft. We held Conclusion
Recommendation for Executive Action
Agency Comments Scope and Methodology
Page 10 GAO- 01- 843 Electronic Combat
discussions regarding logistics support and maintenance with officials at
Warner Robbins Air Logistics Center responsible for Air Force electronic
combat systems. We held similar discussions with officials at Jacksonville
Naval Air Station regarding Navy aircraft electronic combat systems. We also
observed and discussed the testing of operational F- 15C aircraft with
officials at the 33rd Wing at Eglin Air Force Base and discussed the results
of similar tests with officials of the 1st Wing at Langley Air Force Base.
These two Wings have about 40 percent of the Air Force?s F- 15C aircraft. We
also relied on our previous reviews of electronic warfare for background
information on the existing logistics and maintenance problems with
electronic combat systems.
We conducted our review from August 2000 to August 2001 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this letter to the Secretaries of the Air Force and
Navy; to interested congressional committees; and to the Director, Office of
Management and Budget. If you have any questions, please contact me on (202)
512- 4841. Major contributors to this report were Michael Aiken, Terry
Parker, and Charles Ward.
Sincerely yours, R. E. Levin Director, Acquisition and
Sourcing Management
Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 11 GAO- 01- 843 Electronic Combat
Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense
Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 12 GAO- 01- 843 Electronic Combat (120068)
The first copy of each GAO report is free. Additional copies of reports are
$2 each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of
Documents. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are also accepted.
Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are
discounted 25 percent.
Orders by mail:
U. S. General Accounting Office P. O. Box 37050 Washington, DC 20013
Orders by visiting:
Room 1100 700 4 th St., NW (corner of 4 th and G Sts. NW) Washington, DC
20013
Orders by phone:
(202) 512- 6000 fax: (202) 512- 6061 TDD (202) 512- 2537
Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and testimony. To
receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any list from the past 30
days, please call (202) 512- 6000 using a touchtone phone. A recorded menu
will provide information on how to obtain these lists.
Orders by Internet
For information on how to access GAO reports on the Internet, send an e-
mail message with ?info? in the body to:
Info@ www. gao. gov or visit GAO?s World Wide Web home page at: http:// www.
gao. gov
Contact one:
Web site: http:// www. gao. gov/ fraudnet/ fraudnet. htm
E- mail: fraudnet@ gao. gov
1- 800- 424- 5454 (automated answering system) Ordering Information
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
*** End of document. ***
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
