Kosovo Air Operations: Need to Maintain Alliance Cohesion Resulted in Doctrinal Departures (27-JUL-01, GAO-01-784)
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance succeeded
in achieving the goals of Operation Allied Force--Yugoslavian
forces were removed from Kosovo, refugees returned, and a
peacekeeping force was put in place, with no allied combat
fatalities. Through it all, the NATO allies stayed united and
learned much about working together as a combat force. These
achievements, though, did not come easily, and the departures
from accepted U.S. military doctrine were troubling for many U.S.
military commanders and planners involved in the operation. The
Department of Defense (DOD) has made efforts to address these and
other issues through revisions in its doctrine, and many
activities are underway in DOD and the services to study these
issues and adjust military doctrine. Nevertheless, GAO made two
observations for both the executive and legislative branches to
consider about the nature of conducting military operations in a
multinational environment. First, the challenges of dealing with
the constraints of working within a multinational environment may
not be completely resolved through the development of new joint
multinational operations doctrine and revisions to joint and
service doctrine. These revisions to doctrine will likely not be
able to provide conclusive solutions to these issues because each
multinational operation will differ according to the nations that
participate and the extent of their interests. Second, future
multinational operation, particularly those where vital interests
are not at stake, will likely continue to emphasize avoiding
collateral damage and multinational force casualties. These
concerns will likely weigh as heavily in the decision-making
process as achieving the military objectives, and therefore,
military commanders of multinational operations should not expect
to always apply decisive military force with a strict adherence
to military doctrine. As a result, to balance the variety of
interests and concerns that arise during multinational
operations, these operations may not be conducted as effectively
or efficiently as operations that more closely follow U.S.
military doctrine, which may lead to higher costs.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-01-784
ACCNO: A01479
TITLE: Kosovo Air Operations: Need to Maintain Alliance Cohesion
Resulted in Doctrinal Departures
DATE: 07/27/2001
SUBJECT: Military intervention
Military policies
NATO military forces
International cooperation
Armed forces abroad
International organizations
Peacekeeping
DOD Operation Allied Force
Kosovo
Yugoslavia
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GAO-01-784
Report to Congressional Requesters
United States General Accounting Office
GAO
July 2001 KOSOVO AIR OPERATIONS
Need to Maintain Alliance Cohesion Resulted in Doctrinal Departures
GAO- 01- 784
Page i GAO- 01- 784 Kosovo Air Operations Letter 1
Results in Brief 2 Background 3 Politically Constrained Environment Resulted
in Departures From
Doctrine 5 Recent DOD Actions Address Wide Range of Doctrinal Issues 11
Observations 14 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 15 Scope and Methodology
15
Appendix I Timeline of Major Events Leading Up to and Including Operation
Allied Force 18
Appendix II Political and Military Objectives of Operation Allied Force 20
Appendix III NATO Member Nations 22
Appendix IV Major Doctrine Issues Surfaced From Air Force Studies 23
Appendix V Doctrine Issues Surfaced During After- Action Reporting 25
Appendix VI Comments From the Department of Defense 30
Appendix VII GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 31 Contents
Page ii GAO- 01- 784 Kosovo Air Operations Related GAO Products 32
Tables
Table 1: Significant Departures in Doctrine During Operation Allied Force 6
Table 2: Status of Major Doctrine Issues Surfaced From Air Force
Studies 23 Table 3: Status of Doctrine Issues Surfaced During After- Action
Reporting 26
Abbreviations
DOD Department of Defense NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Page 1 GAO- 01- 784 Kosovo Air Operations
July 27, 2001 The Honorable Bob Stump Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
The Honorable John P. Murtha Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives
Following Operation Allied Force, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization?s
(NATO) 1999 air operation against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Yugoslavia), numerous high level U. S. military officials 1 stated that U.
S. military doctrine 2 had not been followed and that not doing so had
impeded military operations and increased risk to alliance forces. 3
Doctrine is defined as the principles that shape the way the military thinks
about and trains for warfare. The U. S. military believes that its doctrine
provides a common perspective for planning and conducting effective and
efficient military operations. This report is one of a series associated
with the conduct of Operation Allied Force (see Related GAO Products at the
end of this report). This report, as you requested, addresses the following
objectives: (1) What were the significant departures from U. S. military
doctrine in Operation Allied Force and why did they occur? (2) What recent
actions has the Department of Defense (DOD) taken to address doctrinal
issues related to the U. S. military?s participation in the operation?
To answer our first objective, we identified significant doctrinal
departures through our review of DOD and service documents and
1 Some of these U. S. military officials concurrently held positions in the
NATO military structure during Operation Allied Force. 2 Unless otherwise
noted, all references to doctrine refer to U. S. service and joint military
doctrine. Most doctrine related specifically to air operations originates
from the Air Force and is integrated in joint doctrine. Joint doctrine may
not always be as specific as doctrinal concepts specified in service
doctrine.
3 The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a federation of the republics of
Serbia and Montenegro. Kosovo and Vojvodina are provinces of Serbia.
United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO- 01- 784 Kosovo Air Operations
discussions with principal U. S. military officials in organizations such as
the U. S. European Command, the Joint Task Force Noble Anvil, 4 and the NATO
Combined Air Operations Center. 5 To answer our second objective, however,
we focused on a wider range of doctrinal issues, drawing upon DOD reviews of
the lessons learned from the operation and the status of actions taken to
address those lessons.
We identified seven significant departures from U. S. military doctrine
during Operation Allied Force. These departures ranged from not having clear
and attainable objectives to not following various principles associated
with conducting an air campaign to not having a fully functional command
structure. These doctrinal departures were largely the result of the NATO
alliance?s desire to maintain alliance cohesion. To maintain cohesion, the
alliance initially adopted an operation of limited scope and duration with
vague objectives, and it emphasized avoiding collateral damage and alliance
force casualties. The vague and less decisive objectives were not easily
attainable through military means as recommended in doctrine. Limiting the
scope of the campaign prevented the military from targeting as called for in
doctrine. In addition, concern about collateral damage did not allow the
military to strike vital targets in as decisive a manner as recommended in
doctrine. The alliance's desire to avoid casualties led it to exclude the
use of alliance ground forces. Without alliance ground forces to draw out
enemy forces, finding, identifying, and targeting Yugoslavian ground forces
from the air in a doctrinal manner were more difficult tasks. Finally, the
belief that the operation would be of short duration led to a joint task
force that was not formed according to doctrine. The NATO alliance members
remained united throughout the operation, perhaps because of these doctrinal
departures. However, many U. S. participants in the operation believed that
these departures resulted in a longer campaign, more damage to Yugoslavia,
and greater risk to alliance forces than likely would have occurred if
doctrine had been followed.
DOD has taken actions to address shortcomings in strategic, operational, and
tactical doctrine as a result of Operation Allied Force. For example, DOD
recently issued a new doctrine publication dedicated to providing
4 Joint Task Force Noble Anvil controlled the employment and integration of
U. S. assets into Operation Allied Force and was responsible for all NATO
targeting. 5 The Combined Air Operations Center planned, directed, and
executed the NATO air operation in support of Operation Allied Force.
Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO- 01- 784 Kosovo Air Operations
guidance for multinational operations. Its primary aims are to convey the
fundamentals of multinational operations, such as command relationships, and
the factors affecting the planning and execution of these operations,
including those concerning political, linguistic, cultural, and sovereignty
issues. In addition, a number of Air Force publications have been revised to
reflect lessons learned from the Air Force?s assessment of the air campaign.
For example, the Air Force found little information in doctrine publications
that described how to tie selected targets to intended effects, and it
determined that the concept needed to be addressed formally through
doctrine. Consequently, Air Force doctrine is being revised. In addition,
shortly after the close of Operation Allied Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
collected lessons learned from the military services, commands, and other
DOD agencies. This effort led to a number of changes to existing joint
doctrine as well as the development of new joint doctrine publications, many
related to tactical operations. For example, because commanders did not have
adequate information on the status of shipped items, their ability to manage
resources was impeded. After the operation, many joint doctrine publications
were revised to ensure that the commanders receive timely and complete
resource data.
Despite the many activities under way in DOD and the services to study these
doctrinal issues and adjust military doctrine, we offer some observations
for decision- makers to consider about the conduct of military operations in
a multinational environment.
The NATO alliance, which consists of the United States and 18 additional
nations, began air strikes on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on March
24, 1999. (Appendix I contains a timeline of events during the planning and
execution of Operation Allied Force.) This military campaign was the largest
combat operation in NATO?s 50- year history. The NATO alliance initially
adopted a limited response envisioned to be a 2- day air strike. The NATO
alliance planned to use air strikes as a means to compel President Milosevic
to cease the violence in Kosovo and allow all refugees to return to their
homes, which would restore peace throughout the Balkan region. (Appendix II
provides a further description of the political and military objectives of
Operation Allied Force.) When the initial attacks did not achieve NATO?s
objectives, the air campaign gradually grew in intensity to an around- the-
clock air combat operation, which lasted for 78 days. The United States was
a major participant in this NATO- led operation. The United States provided
about 70 percent of the aircraft to the operation and over 60 percent of the
total sorties during the operation. Background
Page 4 GAO- 01- 784 Kosovo Air Operations
The 19 NATO member nations have disparate histories and interests, and this
led to varied support for this operation, which was outside of NATO?s
central mission to provide for the collective defense of its members. The 19
NATO member nations are shown in appendix III. For example, one member
nation, which shared religious and cultural backgrounds with the Kosovar
Albanians, was sympathetic to their plight, while another nation had
historic and religious ties to the Serbian Yugoslavs. Another NATO nation
was led by a coalition government, where part of the coalition supported the
NATO alliance operation while the other part of the coalition did not want
the bombing campaign to continue and said that it would withdraw from the
government if the NATO alliance used a ground force. Even within the United
States, there was not a consensus of support for this operation. 6 Although
the three newest members of the NATO alliance supported the operation, the
level of support expressed by their governments varied. 7 For example,
although one nation offered NATO forces the use of its air space and
military airfields, it was concerned about Yugoslavian retaliation against a
minority population in Yugoslavia that was ethnically related to this
nation.
Military doctrine provides the fundamental principles of how best to employ
the national military power to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical
ends. Each of the U. S. services has doctrine to guide the employment of its
forces, and the military has joint doctrine for operations involving two or
more services. Joint doctrine takes precedence over individual service
doctrine, and service doctrine must be consistent with joint doctrine. Joint
doctrine states that when the United States participates in multinational
operations, U. S. commanders should follow multinational doctrine and
procedures that have been ratified by the United States. Multinational
operations are conducted by forces of two or more nations within the
structure of an alliance or a coalition. An alliance is the result of formal
agreements between two or more nations for broad, long- term objectives,
such as NATO. A coalition is a special arrangement between two or more
nations for a common action, such as the nations involved in the 1991
Persian Gulf War against Iraq. NATO is currently
6 For example, the U. S. Senate passed a resolution (S. Con. Res. 21)
authorizing military air operations and missile strikes against Yugoslavia
on March 23, 1999 (58 for, 41 against). This resolution failed passage in
the U. S. House of Representatives on April 28, 1999 (213 for, 213 against).
7 The newest members of NATO - the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland -
became full members of NATO less than 2 weeks prior to the start of
Operation Allied Force.
Page 5 GAO- 01- 784 Kosovo Air Operations
developing allied joint doctrine, which is applicable to NATO- led
multinational forces conducting operations involving more than one service.
While doctrine represents the preferred approach to employing military
power, doctrine does not replace or alter a commander?s authority or
obligation to determine the proper course of action for a specific operation
or battle. 8 At the same time, the military is subject to civilian command
and control at all times; therefore, decisions made by political leaders
supercede doctrinal guidance, even if those decisions conflict with
doctrine. Doctrine continually evolves based on the experience and outcome
of military exercises and operations and changes in technology.
There are three levels of war - strategic, operational, and tactical. At the
strategic level, a nation determines security objectives and guidance and
develops and uses resources to achieve these objectives. The operational
level of war is the level at which campaigns and major operations are
planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within
theaters or areas of operations. At the tactical level of war, battles and
engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives
assigned to tactical units or task forces.
Based on discussions with prominent officials who participated in the
operation and on DOD and service reports documenting the doctrinal
departures, we identified seven areas in which significant departures from
military doctrine occurred during Operation Allied Force. The departures
from doctrine ranged from not having clearly defined and attainable military
objectives to not following various principles associated with conducting
air operations (from targeting to conducting strikes) to not having a fully
functional command structure. The departures were caused in large part by
the NATO alliance?s adoption of an operation of limited scope, a great
emphasis on avoiding collateral damage and alliance casualties, and a desire
to achieve its goals within a short time frame to ensure alliance cohesion.
While alliance members remained united and achieved success in the
operation, many U. S. military officials believed that these departures
resulted in a longer campaign, more damage to Yugoslavia, and greater risk
to alliance forces than likely would have occurred if doctrine had been
followed.
8 An operation is an arrangement of battles to achieve objectives. A battle
is a series of related encounters with an enemy?s force. Politically
Constrained Environment Resulted in Departures From Doctrine
Page 6 GAO- 01- 784 Kosovo Air Operations
Table 1 summarizes the seven doctrinal areas we identified and the manner in
which Operation Allied Force departed from them.
Table 1: Significant Departures in Doctrine During Operation Allied Force
Doctrine Departure from doctrine Clear military objectives: Military
operations should be directed toward a clearly defined, decisive, and
attainable objective. Objectives require an end state (required conditions
that show that the stated objectives were achieved). In addition, guidance
should be given to all personnel engaged in the operation to provide the
commander?s plan for attaining the objectives. Objectives, an end state, and
guidance should be provided at the start of an operation.
Initial objectives were not clearly defined and militarily attainable. The
end state was not provided until about 30 days into the operation. Formal
commander?s guidance for achieving campaign goals was not provided until
approximately 6 weeks into the operation, which limited the military?s
ability to identify the effects it should achieve.
Strategic attack: Operations should strike the enemy?s vital interests such
as command elements, war production assets, and key supporting
infrastructure.
The military was not allowed initially to use overwhelming forces to attack
many of the enemy?s vital interests. Some examples of vital interests that
could not be decisively attacked were roads and bridges, electrical power
grids, command and control facilities, fuel storage facilities, and
transportation networks. Initial targets focused on airfields, air defense
and communication centers, military barracks, and some equipment production
centers.
Effects- based planning and operations: Operations should be designed to
generate the type and extent of effects necessary to create outcomes that
will realize the commander?s objective.
The lack of clear, consistent guidance initially limited the military?s
ability to plan for effects. Air operation officials stated that targets
were struck in a less systematic manner than needed to achieve measurable
effects because, in part, targets were approved individually instead of as a
package.
Mass and parallel operations: Forces should be concentrated and used
simultaneously against varied target sets (i. e., bridges, communications
systems, and electrical power supply). This approach is intended to shock,
disrupt, and overwhelm the enemy.
Sporadic approval of targets limited the military?s ability to apply
concentrated effects of combat power and to simultaneously attack multiple
targets.
Air interdiction: Air operations (i. e., bombing and shooting) should
destroy, delay, or neutralize an enemy ground force. This is usually done in
support of friendly ground forces.
Air interdiction was done without using alliance ground forces to draw out
the enemy, which made it difficult to find and destroy mobile targets.
Target approval: The military commander will approve individual targets and
determine target priorities, levels of effort, and the sequencing of those
efforts, based on guidance from political leadership and higher military
authorities.
Initially, political leadership and high level military command provided
approval of individual fixed targets, and even by the end of the operation,
the military commanders were only allowed to approve fixed, military-
related targets with estimated low levels of collateral damage.
Formation and organization of a joint task force: A joint task force should
be representative of the force that is participating and trained to be
effective.
Joint Task Force Noble Anvil was not staffed with people representative of
the force that was participating nor was the staff trained to conduct combat
operations.
Source: GAO analysis.
Significant Departures from Doctrine Involved Aspects of Planning and
Executing an Air Operation
Page 7 GAO- 01- 784 Kosovo Air Operations
The need to build and keep a political consensus among the NATO alliance
members led to many of the departures from military doctrine. Various
alliance members were concerned about inflicting undue punishment on
Yugoslavian civilians, incurring the cost of rebuilding Yugoslavian
infrastructure, or turning public opinion against the operation. To balance
these concerns and to ensure support to begin the operation, the alliance
adopted objectives that were not clearly defined and limited the campaign?s
scope, the potential for collateral damage and allied force casualties, and
the duration of the operation. The vague objectives adopted by NATO were
difficult for the military to attain. The limited scope of the campaign as
well as concerns about collateral damage affected the target approval
process and made it difficult to conduct strategic attack, effects- based
planning, and mass and parallel operations as described in doctrine.
Concerns about alliance force casualties diminished the effectiveness of air
interdiction operations, and the assumption that the campaign would be of
short duration caused problems in forming the joint task force.
The vague objectives were not easily attainable by the military as
recommended in doctrine. For example, one goal of the alliance?s action was
to stop the violence against the Kosovars and institute a peaceful solution
by ?contributing to the response of the international community.? According
to U. S. military officials, it was difficult to translate these objectives
into a clear, attainable military plan, particularly during the first few
weeks of the campaign. Since the goals of the military action were not to
defeat the Yugoslavian leadership but to get it to stop the violence and
reach a peace agreement, it was unclear how to achieve the goals with air
operations. Several officials stated that the NATO alliance?s objective of
demonstrating resolve led initially to approved targets that were selected
to show that the NATO alliance was serious rather than tied to a coherent
military plan. It was not until the objectives were clearer with defined end
states, about 1 month into the operation, that the military leaders
developed guidance that could be translated into a coherent campaign.
The alliance?s decision to limit the scope of the campaign by initially
using minimum force in achieving its objectives prevented the military from
targeting what it considered some of the enemy?s vital interests during the
early stages of the campaign as called for by strategic attack doctrine. The
alliance decided that it would use an incremental air campaign, which would
strike Yugoslavia in a carefully controlled way in the hope that the initial
strikes would quickly convince Yugoslavian President Milosevic of the NATO
alliance?s determination, causing him to back down and accept its terms. If
the alliance?s terms were not accepted, it would gradually Doctrinal
Departures Were
Largely the Result of Need to Maintain Alliance Cohesion
Unclear Objectives Limited Scope
Page 8 GAO- 01- 784 Kosovo Air Operations
escalate the intensity of the air campaign. For example, the alliance
approved only about 50 carefully chosen military targets prior to the
campaign. The alliance expected to strike these initial targets, which were
mostly air defense systems, within 2 days. There were no targets approved
for locations in downtown Belgrade to avoid the appearance of conducting a
war against the people of Yugoslavia. Senior military commanders wanted to
focus strikes on targets in downtown Belgrade, which they believed would be
more likely to influence Yugoslavia?s leadership to accept the alliance?s
terms. One high ranking military commander involved in the air operation
stated that he would have destroyed the bridges across the Danube and would
have hit five or six political- military headquarters in downtown Belgrade
immediately. According to the official, the way to achieve the NATO
alliance?s objectives would have been to disable the Serb leadership as
rapidly and as decisively as possible. Instead, according to this and other
U. S. military officials, political pressures from the alliance led to a
selection of scattered targets.
To ensure that collateral damage was limited, alliance members were involved
in the approval of individual fixed targets, which was not consistent with
military doctrine. 9 The alliance emphasized avoiding collateral damage
because it was concerned that unfavorable public opinion could fracture the
alliance. According to doctrine, the military commander of the operation
would have much more discretion in selecting and prioritizing the individual
targets to be struck. However, alliance members wanted to review individual
targets to assess the potential for collateral damage and the sensitivity of
the targets. This approach led to reviews by multiple levels of command
above the commanding general that often included reviews by the U. S.
National Command Authorities, NATO?s North Atlantic Council, and some
individual alliance members. This cumbersome review process often took an
additional 2 weeks to get individual targets approved. A Center for Naval
Analysis report on targeting stated that of 778 fixed targets that were
approved by the commanding general, 495, or about 64 percent, required a
higher level of approval. At the end of the operation, over 150 targets were
still waiting approval. The high level concern about collateral damage also
led to some approved targets being canceled, which caused some missions to
be canceled at the last minute or aborted while aircraft
9 The commanding general had the authority to approve fixed targets that
would potentially cause less than 20 civilian casualties and mobile targets.
This authority was only given to him later in the operation. Collateral
Damage Concerns
Page 9 GAO- 01- 784 Kosovo Air Operations
were en route. Several senior Air Force officials believed this led to an
inefficient use of assets.
Officials at the air operation center stated that the high level approval
process also led to approved targets being provided on a sporadic basis,
which limited the military?s ability to achieve planned effects and mass and
parallel operations as recommended in doctrine. For example, to achieve the
effect of stopping production of an oil refinery, one official said that
several targets were identified and submitted for approval. However, the
approval was provided only for some of those targets, which reduced the
effectiveness of the strike since the refinery was not totally disabled.
Moreover, several officials said that the process could not produce enough
targets in a timely manner for the number of aircraft involved to conduct
parallel and simultaneous operations as called for in mass and parallel
attack doctrine.
In an attempt to reduce public concern about the potential of allied
casualties, the NATO alliance publicly stated that it would not use ground
forces by directing its militaries not to plan for a ground phase of the
campaign. This limitation made it difficult for air forces to find and
target enemy ground forces without the use or threat of use of supporting
ground forces, as preferred in military doctrine. U. S. military officials
familiar with the air interdiction operations against the Yugoslavian army
stated that they were not prepared to conduct these operations without the
support of ground forces. To conduct air interdiction without ground forces
necessitated air planners to develop tactics for locating mobile targets
without the assistance of ground forces who normally perform the mission.
Finding targets was also difficult because the Yugoslavian forces were able
to disperse since they did not have to mass to prepare to encounter allied
ground forces.
Targeting enemy ground forces was further complicated by concerns that
alliance aircraft were vulnerable to enemy antiaircraft weapons that could
be launched from ground sites. As a result, alliance aircraft were initially
restricted from flying below 15,000 feet. While this restriction reduced the
risk for alliance casualties, it made it more difficult to positively
identify enemy targets. Later in the operation, the altitude restriction was
lowered in Kosovo to allow aircrews to more accurately identify mobile
targets in order to reduce the potential for collateral damage. Casualty
Concerns
Page 10 GAO- 01- 784 Kosovo Air Operations
Based on the NATO alliance?s previous experience during Deliberate Force 10
and earlier threats of air strikes in 1998, alliance members believed that
only a few days of strikes would be necessary to get the Yugoslavian leader
to comply with the alliance?s demands. Some senior U. S. officials indicated
that they doubted that the air campaign would have ever begun if some
alliance members believed it was going to take almost 3 months to complete
the operation. The expected short duration of the campaign may have ensured
the alliance?s support, but it complicated the planning for the operation
and led to doctrinal departures.
The formation of Joint Task Force Noble Anvil, which oversaw much of the
operation, was a prominent example of how the expectation of a short
campaign caused departures in doctrine. Because a short campaign was
anticipated, the joint task force was not staffed with people trained to
conduct combat operations, nor was it established with all the functional
areas that normally comprise a joint task force. For example, the task
force?s commander decided that it would be more expedient to use staff
primarily from U. S. Naval Forces Europe, although some of these officials
have described their peacetime role as administrative and most of these
personnel had little experience in conducting combat operations. As a
result, the joint task force staff was receiving on- the- job combat
training at the same time they were planning the air campaign. Officials
also stated that the short campaign assumption was a factor in using
primarily naval personnel to be the core of the joint task force rather than
being representative of the services participating in the operation as
recommended in doctrine. Since the commander of the joint task force also
commanded U. S. Naval Forces Europe, it was more expedient to use this
headquarters staff for the joint task force. Some air operations officials
stated that by not having more senior officials trained in air operations in
the joint task force, it took weeks for the joint task force to become an
efficient organization. Also, certain functional areas of the task force,
such as intelligence and planning, were not initially formed because those
functional areas would not have been needed in a short campaign where the
targets had already been identified and approved. Once it became apparent
that the operation would last longer than a few days, officials stated they
had to concurrently complete the formation of the joint task force and
oversee the operation, an approach that was less than optimal.
10 Deliberate Force was the 21- day 1995 NATO Balkan air campaign against
Bosnians of Serbian ethnicity supported by President Milosevic. Short
Duration Expected
Page 11 GAO- 01- 784 Kosovo Air Operations
U. S. officials cited several overall effects that doctrine departures had
on the execution of Operation Allied Force. The effects mentioned were a
lengthened campaign, additional damage to Yugoslavia, and increased risk to
alliance participants. Several officials believed that not following
doctrine likely lengthened the campaign. While their estimates varied, some
senior officials estimated that the campaign was 2- 3 times longer than it
would have been without these concerns. One official estimated that it is
likely that a more decisive campaign would have lasted a few weeks rather
than almost 3 months if one of the initial plans developed by the United
States, which adhered to accepted military doctrine, had been adopted. 11
These estimates were largely based on the belief that the incremental
campaign adopted by NATO gave the Yugoslavian forces the opportunity to
adjust to the offensive and possibly led the Milosevic government to
underestimate the alliance?s determination. In addition, other officials
thought that the incremental campaign may have led to more overall damage to
Yugoslavia. They believed that some targets of limited military value would
not have been struck if overwhelming force on Yugoslavia?s vital interests
was used at the outset of the operations. Some officials also cited an
increased risk to alliance forces because of the decision to pursue targets
of limited military value, such as previously damaged targets and dispersed
enemy fielded forces. Because Yugoslavia?s air defenses had not been
destroyed, alliance pilots were at risk every time they had to enter any
part of Yugoslavia. One high ranking official indicated that it was not
uncommon for 15 sorties 12 to be needed to destroy one enemy tank.
DOD has taken a number of actions that address doctrinal issues, including
many of those addressed in the previous section. 13 DOD?s recently issued
joint publication for multinational operations conveys more detailed
guidance than had been previously available to commanders. Although not
available prior to Operation Allied Force, commanders now have available a
more detailed discussion on the strategic context of multinational
operations, as well as command relationships and considerations for planning
and execution of operations conducted within the structure of an alliance.
After assessing its
11 Prior to the start of Operation Allied Force, U. S. military planners
developed a number of plans for conducting combat operations against
Yugoslavia. 12 A sortie is one mission or attack by a single plane.
13 In some instances, doctrine was deemed sufficient but was not followed.
Senior U. S. Officials Cited
Several Overall Effects of Doctrine Departures
Recent DOD Actions Address Wide Range of Doctrinal Issues
Page 12 GAO- 01- 784 Kosovo Air Operations
participation in Operation Allied Force, the Air Force identified a number
of problematic issues relating to service and joint doctrine and
subsequently revised a number of its doctrine publications. Additionally,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in concert with other services, is considering
whether issues related to targeting, strategic attack, and effects- based
operations should be addressed in joint doctrine. Finally, during the
closing days of Operation Allied Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff collected
lessons learned from the military services, commands, and other DOD agencies
as a result of their participation in the operation. An assessment of these
lessons learned resulted in a number of changes to joint doctrine.
In April 2000, DOD published its Joint Doctrine for Multinational
Operations, which was being developed prior to and at the time of Operation
Allied Force. This publication provides commanders with more detailed
guidance on these operations and is consistent with NATO doctrine across the
full range of operations, from combat to humanitarian assistance. Its
primary aims are to convey the fundamentals of multinational operations,
command relationships, and considerations to be addressed during the
planning and execution of these operations, including factors concerning
political, linguistic, cultural, and sovereignty issues. Military commanders
should expect a high level of political involvement in the future,
regardless of whether the multinational operation involves war, a mission
other than a large- scale war, or a peacetime engagement. The Joint Chiefs
of Staff believes the multinational operations doctrine is a major step
forward in the development of joint doctrine and for the integration of
future multinational forces.
The Air Force, a major U. S. participant in Operation Allied Force,
completed two reviews of the operation. First, The Air War Over Serbia:
Aerospace Power in Operation Allied Force provides the Air Force?s
perspective on its participation in the air war. By assessing its
participation, the Air Force hoped to determine what it needs to do better
in the future and to decide how it can best organize, train, and equip to
meet future requirements. The second, the Operation Allied Force Doctrine
Summit, was specifically convened to assess the strategic- and operational-
level doctrinal issues arising from the Air Force?s participation in
Operation Allied Force.
As a result of these assessments, the Air Force identified a number of
issues that needed to be addressed in both Air Force and joint doctrine.
Consequently, the Air Force is revising a number of its doctrine
publications. For example, the Air Force identified problems that arose from
the use of an incremental targeting plan during the operation rather New
Joint Doctrine
Publication Focuses on Operations with Other Nations
Air Force Takes Action to Improve Operational Doctrine
Page 13 GAO- 01- 784 Kosovo Air Operations
than the more preferred approach, known as effects- based operations. The
preferred approach begins with the identification of the desired effect and
ends with a selection of targets and a plan designed to achieve the intended
effect. The Air Force found that although this was the preferred approach
used by airmen, it was not well documented in its doctrine publications and
this hindered its efforts to convince leadership on the merits of an
effects- based operational approach. Consequently, four Air Force doctrine
publications are being revised. For instance, the draft publications state
that commanders must be prepared to cope with political and diplomatic
constraints that may affect the planning and execution of strategic attack
operations and provide some suggestions to help meet these challenges. In
addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff is considering many of the Air Force?s
doctrinal issues, such as targeting, strategic attack, and effects- based
operations, as part of its doctrine review and development process.
Information on other issues being addressed within Air Force and joint
doctrine can be found in appendix IV.
In the closing days of Operation Allied Force, the Secretary of Defense
directed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to identify the lessons
learned from the operation that were most critical to future joint
operations. About 300 individual responses from the unified commanders,
military services, defense agencies, and defense offices were received. The
responses encompassed a wide variety of both issues and observations
pertaining to logistics, personnel, communications, intelligence, as well as
other areas. We identified 26 issues that pertained to doctrine. 14
For the past year, the Joint Staff has been working to resolve these issues.
Our analysis of the issues and actions taken thus far fell into three broad
categories:
Instances where doctrine was found to be valid and not the root of the
problem. In many of these cases, doctrine that addressed the situation
existed but was not followed or implemented. In several cases, training was
the remedial action recommended. For example, one issue involved
coordination problems between services in identifying in- theater sources of
common supplies. The Joint Staff found that joint doctrine for logistics
adequately assigned responsibility for this function, but it was not
properly
14 Either the issue or the problem, as stated, identified a shortcoming or
gap in doctrine or the remedial action taken to correct the problem involved
developing or revising doctrine. Joint Chiefs of Staff Takes
Action to Remedy Doctrinal Issues
Page 14 GAO- 01- 784 Kosovo Air Operations
implemented. The Joint Staff will monitor the activity during an upcoming
training exercise.
Instances where gaps or shortcomings in doctrine were found. In these
cases, the remedial action taken was to revise or develop doctrine to
address the issue. For example, because commanders did not have adequate
information on the status of shipped items, their ability to manage
resources was impeded. Twenty- six joint doctrine publications have been
revised to ensure that the commanders receive timely and complete resource
data.
Instances where DOD has not fully resolved the issue. In some of these
cases, DOD will need the involvement of NATO to resolve the issue. For
example, the Joint Staff believed that doctrinal agreements between NATO
members would facilitate standardization of equipment, munitions, and
communications in order to minimize problems with interoperability when
operating within a multinational environment. The issue was passed on to the
Defense Capabilities Initiative as the preferred pathway to resolving the
issue.
Information on the issues being addressed by the Joint Staff can be found in
appendix V.
The NATO alliance succeeded in achieving the goals of Operation Allied
Force- Yugoslavian forces were removed from Kosovo, refugees returned, and a
peacekeeping force was put in place, with no allied combat fatalities.
Through it all, the NATO allies stayed united and learned much about working
together as a combat force.
These achievements, though, did not come easily, and the departures from
accepted U. S. military doctrine that we described in this report were
troubling for many U. S. military commanders and planners involved in the
operation. DOD has made efforts to address these and other issues through
revisions in its doctrine, and many activities are underway in DOD and the
services to study these issues and adjust military doctrine. Nevertheless,
we are providing two observations for both the executive and legislative
branches to consider about the nature of conducting military operations in a
multinational environment.
The challenges of dealing with the constraints of working within a
multinational environment may not be completely resolved through the
development of new joint multinational operations doctrine and revisions to
joint and service doctrine. These revisions to doctrine will likely not be
Observations
Page 15 GAO- 01- 784 Kosovo Air Operations
able to provide conclusive solutions to these issues because each
multinational operation will differ according to the nations that
participate and the extent of their interests.
Future multinational operations, particularly those where vital interests
are not at stake, will likely continue to emphasize avoiding collateral
damage and multinational force casualties. These concerns will likely weigh
as heavily in the decision- making process as achieving the military
objectives, and therefore, military commanders of multinational operations
should not expect to always apply decisive military force with a strict
adherence to military doctrine. As a result, to balance the variety of
interests and concerns that arise during multinational operations, these
operations may not be conducted as effectively or efficiently as operations
that more closely follow U. S. military doctrine, which may lead to higher
costs.
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the
contents of the report. DOD also provided technical comments, which we
incorporated where appropriate. The comments are presented in appendix VI.
To determine the significant departures from U. S. military doctrine in
Operation Allied Force and the reasons the departures occurred, we reviewed
DOD?s Kosovo/ Operation Allied Force After- Action Report, the Air Force?s
The Air War Over Serbia: Aerospace Power in Operation Allied Force report,
the U. S. European Command?s Joint After- Action Report, and various after-
action briefings from organizations that participated in the operation. We
also examined our reports as well as those from the Congressional Research
Service and the Center for Naval Analysis. We interviewed over 50 senior-
and mid- level leaders of Operation Allied Force, who were involved in
planning, operations, and intelligence areas, from the U. S. European
Command; U. S. Air Forces, Europe; Joint Task Force Noble Anvil; and NATO?s
Combined Air Operations Center. We included in these interviews senior
leaders and squadron commanders from the U. S. S. Theodore Roosevelt battle
group and six Air Force air expeditionary wings. The officers interviewed
ranged in rank from general/ admiral to lieutenant colonel/ commander and
were either active- duty or retired from the military. We solicited from
each interviewee his viewpoints on significant doctrinal issues that
affected his unit?s missions. Based on these interviews, we determined which
doctrinal issues were cited most frequently as adversely affecting the
conduct of Operation Allied Force. We also interviewed staff from DOD?s
Balkans Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation Scope and Methodology
Page 16 GAO- 01- 784 Kosovo Air Operations
Task Force. In addition, we reviewed current and draft joint, Air Force, and
Navy doctrine publications. For this analysis of doctrinal issues from
Operation Allied Force, we reviewed U. S. participation in the NATO
alliance?s operation. Therefore, our focus was on U. S. joint and service
doctrine only.
To determine the status of Operation Allied Force lessons learned, we
collected and reviewed the lessons learned collected by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff?s Joint Exercise and Assessment Division, which was based on
submissions from the military services, unified commanders, defense
agencies, and other defense organizations. The Joint Exercise and Assessment
Division also provided us with information regarding the actions taken and
status of each of the lessons learned. We also collected and reviewed
materials prepared by the Air Force regarding its assessment of its
participation in Operation Allied Force and the implications on doctrine.
The Navy Warfare Development Command and the Joint Forces Command provided
brief summaries of their doctrine- related issues resulting from U. S.
participation in Operation Allied Force. We recently issued a report on the
Army?s lessons learned from its participation in Operation Allied Force -
including actions taken to revise doctrine. 15 The Marine Corps, although it
had submitted several lessons learned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made no
changes to its doctrine based specifically on its experience in Operation
Allied Force. We did not assess the appropriateness of the actions taken on
the doctrinal issues or the speed in which the recommended changes to
doctrine were being implemented.
We conducted our review from June 2000 through May 2001 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of
this report earlier, we will not distribute it until 15 days from the date
of this report. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the
Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense; the Honorable James G.
Roche, Secretary of the Air Force; the Honorable Gordon R. England,
Secretary of the Navy; and the Honorable Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., Director
of the Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available
to others upon request.
15 Kosovo Air Operations: Army Resolving Lessons Learned Regarding the
Apache Helicopter (GAO- 01- 401, Mar. 2, 2001).
Page 17 GAO- 01- 784 Kosovo Air Operations
Please contact me at (757) 552- 8111 if you or your staff have any questions
concerning this report. GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed in
appendix VII.
Neal P. Curtin Director Defense Capabilities and Management
Appendix I: Timeline of Major Events Leading Up to and Including Operation
Allied Force
Page 18 GAO- 01- 784 Kosovo Air Operations
1998
Early March The situation in Kosovo began to deteriorate when Yugoslavian
security forces launched a series of strikes to suppress the growing Kosovar
insurgent movement known as the Kosovo Liberation Army. During these
strikes, the Yugoslavians used excessive force and terrorized the Kosovar
civilian population. Mar. 31 The United Nations adopted Security Council
Resolution 1160, condemning the excessive use of force by
Yugoslavian security forces against civilians in Kosovo and also established
an embargo against Yugoslavia on arms and materials. May The first meeting
between Yugoslavian President Milosevic and Dr. Rugova, the leader of the
shadow
government in Kosovo, to lay the groundwork for peace talks. July North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance began planning for a phased air
operation. August U. S. European Command established Joint Task Force
Flexible Anvil, a U. S. Navy- led command, to plan and
conduct a limited air response (quick strike, limited duration operation).
September U. S. European Command activated Joint Task Force Sky Anvil, an
Air Force- led command, to plan for a
phased air operation (gradually escalating military air operation, targeting
Yugoslavia?s air defense system, command and control sites, fielded forces,
and targets of military significance first in Kosovo, then in the rest of
Yugoslavia). Sept. 23 The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution
1199, which called for a cease fire in Yugoslavia, the
withdrawal of all Yugoslavian security forces, the access for
nongovernmental and humanitarian organizations, and the return home of
refugees and internally displaced persons. Sept. 24 NATO defense ministers
authorized an ?activation warning? for limited air strikes and a phased air
campaign in
Kosovo. October U. S. European Command ordered both joint task forces to
disband after they finalized U. S. planning in support
of NATO planning. NATO?s contingency planning efforts continued through
March 1999. Oct. 5 The United Nations released a report critical of
Yugoslavia?s compliance with the most recent Security Council
Resolution. Oct. 25 Based on an agreement between the Organization for
Security and Co- operation in Europe and Yugoslavia, a
Kosovo Verification Mission was established. The purpose of the Kosovo
Verification Mission was to verify Yugoslavia?s compliance with the United
Nations Security Council Resolutions 1160 and 1199. Dec. 23 The Yugoslavian
army and the internal special police undertook military action near
Podujevo, in northern
Kosovo, along the main road linking the provincial capital Pristina to
Belgrade.
1999
Jan. 15- 16 Yugoslavian security forces arbitrarily detained, killed, and
mutilated unarmed Kosovo civilians in three Kosovo towns. Jan. 30 NATO?s
North Atlantic Council gave NATO Secretary General Solana the authority to
authorize air strikes
against targets on Yugoslavian territory. Jan. 31 Joint Task Force Noble
Anvil formed. Feb. 6 Peace talks began in Rambouillet, France, among
representatives from the Yugoslavian and the Serbian
provincial governments and representatives of Kosovo Albanians. Mar. 15
Second round of peace negotiations at the Kleber Center in Paris, France.
Kosovo Albanians signed the
proposed agreement, but Yugoslavian government officials did not sign the
agreement. Almost one- third of Yugoslavian forces were massed in and around
Kosovo. Mar. 19 The Organization for Security and Co- operation in Europe
decided to withdraw the Kosovo Verification Mission
from Kosovo. Mar. 20 Yugoslavian forces launched a major offensive, driving
thousands of Kosovo Albanians out of their homes -
executing some and displacing many others. Mar. 23 With no concessions from
Yugoslavia, NATO Secretary General Solana directed General Clark, NATO?s
Supreme Allied Commander Europe, to initiate air operations in Yugoslavia.
Mar. 24 The NATO alliance air strikes, known as Operation Allied Force,
began. NATO forces shot down three
Yugoslavian fighter aircraft. Mar. 25 Target list expanded to include forces
and headquarters in Kosovo. Mar. 26 Massive group of refugees fled to
Albania.
Appendix I: Timeline of Major Events Leading Up to and Including Operation
Allied Force
Appendix I: Timeline of Major Events Leading Up to and Including Operation
Allied Force
Page 19 GAO- 01- 784 Kosovo Air Operations
Mar. 27 U. S. F- 117 downed pilot rescued. Mar. 28 The NATO alliance
authorized an expanded target list. Mar. 30 Strikes commenced against
targets throughout the Serbian republic of Yugoslavia. Mar. 31 Three U. S.
soldiers captured near Macedonian border. Apr. 1 Bombers began attacking
Yugoslavian forces in Kosovo. Apr. 3 First NATO force strike on Belgrade
-Yugoslavian and Serbian interior ministries destroyed. Apr. 6 U. S. S.
Theodore Roosevelt commenced attack sorties. Apr. 8 Targeting began against
mobile targets in Kosovo. Apr. 13 NATO alliance requested 300 additional U.
S. aircraft. Deployment order issued for Task Force Hawk (a
deployment of Army Apache helicopters and supporting equipment and
personnel). At NATO?s North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting, the
alliance defined the five requirements for the end of the air campaign. Apr.
14 Collateral damage against a civilian convoy. Apr. 21 NATO forces struck
Serbian headquarters and President Milosevic?s private residence. First Task
Force Hawk
Apache helicopters arrived in Tirana, Albania. Apr. 23 NATO 50th Anniversary
Summit began in Washington, D. C. - alliance members stated the conditions
that
would bring an end to the air campaign and announced that the air campaign
will intensify. Apr. 26 All Task Force Hawk Apache helicopters in Tirana,
Albania. May 1 U. S. F- 16 downed, pilot rescued; NATO?s North Atlantic
Council approved an expanded target list. May 2 Three U. S. soldiers
released by Yugoslavian President Milosevic. May 5 Army Apache helicopter
crashed during training, both crewmen killed. May 7 NATO alliance planes
accidentally hit Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. May 13 Unintended civilian
casualties in Korisa. May 14 The use of U. S. cluster bomb units was
suspended. May 23 The NATO alliance began bombing campaign of Yugoslavian
electrical grid. May 27 President Milosevic and our other Yugoslavian
leaders were indicted by the United Nations War Crimes
Tribunal for crimes against humanity. May 30 Yugoslavs attacked Kosovo
Liberation Army on Mount Pastrik near Albanian border; unintended civilian
casualties during bridge attack in Varvarin. June 2 Use of U. S. cluster
bomb units resumed. June 3 Yugoslavian President Milosevic agreed to the
NATO alliance?s conditions to end air campaign. June 7 The NATO alliance and
Yugoslavian commanders failed to agree to terms of pullout from Kosovo and
suspended talks. The NATO alliance intensified bombing campaign. June 9 A
military technical agreement was signed between the NATO alliance and
Yugoslavian representatives. June 10 NATO Secretary General Solana called
for a suspension of NATO force air strikes. June 20 Yugoslavian forces
completely withdrew from Kosovo, leading NATO Secretary General Solana to
officially end
the NATO alliance?s air campaign in Yugoslavia. July 19 Joint Task Force
Noble Anvil disbanded.
Appendix II: Political and Military Objectives of Operation Allied Force
Page 20 GAO- 01- 784 Kosovo Air Operations
To achieve consensus among alliance members, the NATO alliance had limited
objectives in the conflict. The operation was not intended to take the
Kosovo province away from Yugoslavia or to remove Yugoslavian President
Milosevic from power. The NATO alliance used air strikes as a means to
compel President Milosevic to cease the violence in Kosovo and allow all
refugees to return to their homes, which would restore peace throughout the
Balkan region. These goals were the basis for the NATO alliance?s political
and military objectives.
The NATO alliance announced Operation Allied Force?s initial political and
military objectives on March 23, 1999- the day before the air campaign
began. The political objectives were to (1) help achieve a peaceful solution
to the crisis in Kosovo by contributing to the response of the international
community and (2) halt the violence and support the completion of
negotiations on an interim political solution. The corresponding NATO
alliance military objectives of the air campaign were to (1) halt the
violent attack being committed by the Yugoslav Army and security forces, (2)
disrupt their ability to conduct future attacks against the population of
Kosovo, and (3) support international efforts to secure Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia agreement to an interim political settlement.
The NATO alliance expanded its objectives by defining five requirements for
the end of the air campaign at the April 12, 1999, North Atlantic Council
Ministerial Meeting and reiterated them during the NATO 50th Anniversary
Summit on April 23, 1999. The NATO alliance stated that President Milosevic
must
ensure a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending
of violence and repression in Kosovo;
withdraw from Kosovo his military, police, and paramilitary forces;
agree to the stationing of an international military presence in Kosovo;
agree to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced
persons and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations; and
provide credible assurance of his willingness to work for the
establishment of a political framework agreement based on the Rambouillet
accords in conformity with international law and the Charter of the United
Nations. 1
1 The Rambouillet accords were a planned interim agreement among
representatives of the province of Kosovo, the Republic of Serbia, and the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to provide democratic self- government,
peace, and security for everyone living in Kosovo. Appendix II: Political
and Military Objectives
of Operation Allied Force
Appendix II: Political and Military Objectives of Operation Allied Force
Page 21 GAO- 01- 784 Kosovo Air Operations
As a member of the NATO alliance, the United States had agreed to the
objectives announced by the alliance for the air campaign. However, the
United States presented its own objectives to measure the progress in
achieving the NATO alliance objectives, although the U. S. objectives were
subordinate to the alliance?s objectives. President Clinton made a statement
in the afternoon of March 24, 1999, stating that the United States had three
objectives for its participation in the air strikes. The objectives were (1)
to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO?s opposition to aggression and its
support for peace; (2) to deter President Milosevic from continuing and
escalating his attacks on helpless civilians by imposing a price for those
attacks; and (3) to damage, if necessary, Serbia?s capability to wage war
against Kosovo in the future by seriously diminishing its military
capability. That evening, U. S. Secretary of Defense Cohen stated that the
U. S. military objectives were to deter further action against the Kosovars
and to diminish the ability of the Yugoslavian army to continue those
attacks if necessary.
Appendix III: NATO Member Nations Page 22 GAO- 01- 784 Kosovo Air Operations
Source: NATO.
Appendix III: NATO Member Nations
United States Canada
Denmark Germany France
Greece Iceland
Italy Luxembourg
Netherlands Norway
Poland Spain
United Kingdom
Turkey Kosovo
Czech Republic
Belgium Portugal
Hungary
Appendix IV: Major Doctrine Issues Surfaced From Air Force Studies
Page 23 GAO- 01- 784 Kosovo Air Operations
The Air Force conducted two assessments of its participation in Operation
Allied Force. These assessments identified a number of issues that needed to
be addressed in Air Force and joint doctrine. As shown in table 2, the
revisions to doctrine publications have begun. 1 In a number of cases, the
Joint Staff is considering the impact of these issues on joint doctrine as
part of its normal doctrine review and development process.
Table 2: Status of Major Doctrine Issues Surfaced From Air Force Studies
Effects- based operations Issue Competing objectives, conflicting views, and
political and senior military
leadership involvement in the targeting process led to an incremental,
phased plan. As a result, airmen had difficulty applying the concept of
effects- based planning and strategy. Additionally, the lack of written
doctrine restricted their efforts to discuss the merits of this approach
with senior officials.
Resolution A discussion of effects- based operations inserted in four Air
Force doctrine publications- Air Warfare, Strategic Attack, Space
Operations, and
Information Operations. The Joint Staff will consider this issue during its
normal doctrine review and development process. Several joint publications
that could be affected are Joint Operations (being revised),
Command and Control for Joint Air Operations (being revised), Targeting
(draft), and Strategic Attack (draft).
Mass and economy of force and parallel operations Issue The principles of
mass and economy of force were difficult to apply. This
was partially due to a lack of an effects- based plan but also because
precision weapons might reduce the number of weapons needed to achieve a
desired effect and allow for parallel operation. Doctrine does not reflect
the changing reality precision weapons offer.
Resolution Revise the discussion of the principles of mass and economy of
forces to encompass the changing balance between the quantity and quality of
the force in achieving mass. Revisions are being made in Air Force Basic
Doctrine. The Joint Staff will consider this issue during its normal
doctrine review and development process. Several joint publications that
could be affected are Command and Control for Joint Air Operations (being
revised),
Targeting (draft), and Strategic Attack (draft).
1 Revisions may still be in draft and not yet be available in the published
versions. Appendix IV: Major Doctrine Issues Surfaced
From Air Force Studies
Appendix IV: Major Doctrine Issues Surfaced From Air Force Studies
Page 24 GAO- 01- 784 Kosovo Air Operations
Operating in a military operation other than war Issue Senior political and
military leaders considered Operation Allied Force as a
military operation other than war, while airmen sought to apply conventional
airpower doctrine. This highlighted the need to strengthen doctrine for
military operations other than war.
Resolution Revise the discussion and guidance throughout Air Force doctrine
publication- Military Operations Other Than War. This issue will also be
included in the Aerospace Commander?s Handbook.
Air superiority Issue The advent of stealth aircraft, standoff precision
weapons, and the
experience of airpower- only operations challenged the traditional concept
and achievement of air superiority.
Resolution Revise the discussion of air superiority relative to the
operational environment in Air Force Basic Doctrine, as well as two other
Air Force doctrine publications- Organization and Employment of Aerospace
Power
and Strategic Attack.
Space and information operations Issue Airmen had difficulty differentiating
between the capabilities offered by
space assets and the product (information) provided by these assets.
Doctrine needs to clearly establish the differences between the two and
highlight the capability of space assets beyond that of information
production.
Resolution Revise the discussion of counterspace and counterinformation in
Air Force Basic Doctrine as well as three other doctrine publications- Air
Warfare, Space Operations, and Information Operations. The Joint Staff will
consider this issue during its normal doctrine review and development
process. The joint publication Space Operations (draft) could be affected.
Counterland operations Issue Airmen had difficulty attacking dispersed enemy
ground forces without
friendly ground forces to shape the battlespace. Doctrine needs to address
situations where friendly ground forces are not present, when the air
component is the main effort in counterland battles, or when ground forces
support an air component in counterland operations.
Resolution Revise discussion on counterland operations in two Air Force
doctrine publications- Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power and
Counterland Doctrine.
Collateral damage Issue Consideration of collateral damage was a significant
concern in the target
selection process. Doctrine needs to recognize the imperative and find ways
to incorporate such concerns in effects- based planning.
Resolution Revise discussion in Air Force doctrine publication- Strategic
Attack. The Joint Staff will consider this issue during its normal doctrine
review and development process. Several joint publications that could be
affected are
Targeting (draft) and Strategic Attack (draft). Source: GAO analysis of Air
Force information.
Appendix V: Doctrine Issues Surfaced During After- Action Reporting
Page 25 GAO- 01- 784 Kosovo Air Operations
Unified commanders, military services, and defense agencies and offices
assessed their experiences with Operation Allied Force and identified nearly
300 issues they believed critical to future operations. For the past year,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff has worked to resolve these issues. Based on our
review of the issues and actions taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we
identified 26 issues that pertained to doctrine. By this we mean, either the
issue or the problem, as stated, identified a shortcoming or gap in doctrine
or the remedial action taken to correct the problem involved developing or
revising doctrine.
As shown in the following table, our analysis showed that the issues fell
into three broad categories: (1) instances where doctrine was found to be
valid and not the root problem, (2) instances where a gap or shortcoming in
doctrine was identified and doctrine is being revised, 1 and (3) instances
where DOD has not fully resolved the issue.
1 Revisions may still be in draft and not yet be available in the published
versions. Appendix V: Doctrine Issues Surfaced During
After- Action Reporting
Appendix V: Doctrine Issues Surfaced During After- Action Reporting
Page 26 GAO- 01- 784 Kosovo Air Operations
Table 3: Status of Doctrine Issues Surfaced During After- Action Reporting
Instances where doctrine was determined to be valid and not the root
problem.
Sustainment and theatre distribution support Issue There was little
coordination between services during early phases to determine in- theater
supply
sources.
Resolution Joint doctrine publications adequately address responsibility for
common- user logistics with the commander?s staff. Shortcoming was the
result of implementation. The Joint Staff will monitor during major training
exercise.
Logistics responsibilities Issue The delineation of responsibility for
logistical support for all phases of the operation was poorly
defined.
Resolution Joint doctrine publications adequately address authority for
logistics to the commanders- in- chief and the delegation of control
functions to subordinate joint commands during contingencies. No additional
action is planned.
Air tasking orders Issue Use of dual air tasking orders (one for the United
States and one for NATO) did not effectively support
joint and combined air doctrine.
Resolution Air tasking orders are adequately addressed in joint doctrine.
The implementation of air tasking orders was contrary to doctrine. No
additional action is planned.
Frequency list Issue This issue is classified.
Resolution Issue is adequately addressed in joint doctrine. Lack of training
was the probable cause for failure to follow doctrine, process, and
procedures. There are a number of training efforts underway. The Joint Staff
will continue to monitor.
Support vessel deployments Issue Army support vessel deployments were made
without coordination with cognizant fleet commander
who was responsible for the Mediterranean and for ensuring force protection.
Resolution Joint doctrine for logistics for these types of deployment
provided sufficient guidance concerning these operations and coordination.
Improper coordination was probably the result of the ad- hoc use of Army
support vessels as ferries and not to unload ships. No additional action is
planned.
Intelligence accessibility Issue An abundance of and access to national-
level intelligence information was poorly coordinated.
Resolution Joint doctrine and supporting tactics, techniques, and procedures
for intelligence exists and is valid. There are procedures and architecture
in place to address this problem. No additional action is planned.
Targets Issue This issue is classified.
Resolution Joint doctrine exists and is valid. No additional action is
planned.
Appendix V: Doctrine Issues Surfaced During After- Action Reporting
Page 27 GAO- 01- 784 Kosovo Air Operations
Interoperability of alliance technology Issue Concerns about the ability to
integrate and/ or leverage advanced technology to support military
operations were identified.
Resolution Reviewed current process and procedures and found them to be
valid. No additional action planned.
Alliance spectrum management (related to frequency list) Issue A central
spectrum manager needed to be assigned.
Resolution Issue is adequately addressed in joint doctrine. Lack of training
was the probable cause for failure to follow doctrine, process, and
procedures. There are a number of training efforts underway. The Joint Staff
will continue to monitor.
Instances where gaps or shortcomings in doctrine were found Use of
contractors on the battlefield Issue When planning for the operation, there
was no in- depth analysis of what support and services would
be required by the commercial contractor. Planners need to be sensitive to
the needs of contractors in theater because the contractors will likely ask
for force protection and security.
Resolution Joint doctrine for logistics support has been revised and now
addresses the use of contractors in theater. No additional action is
planned.
Expeditionary airfields systems installed and operated Issue Expeditionary
airfields systems were successfully installed and operated during the
operation. Use of
the systems provided rapid cycle aircraft recovery operations, increasing
the sortie rate and improving ground traffic flow.
Resolution Joint doctrine for engineer operations was revised in concert
with Marine Corps Aviation. No additional action is planned.
Coordination of joint suppression of enemy air defense and integrated air
defense systems Issue At the start of the air war, there was little/ no
coordination due to the absence of a joint electronic
warfare cell at the Combined Air Operations Center for NATO decision-
making.
Resolution During Operation Allied Force, Allied Air and Space Operations
Doctrine was under development. This new doctrine establishes an appropriate
electronic warfare cell at the Joint Task Force Headquarters. No additional
action is planned.
Joint information management Issue There was a lack of coordination and
control of information flow during the operation.
Resolution Doctrine is being revised to include specific guidance for the
establishment of a joint information management board.
Information operations Issue There were shortfalls in training, manning, and
doctrine for information operations.
Resolution Doctrine is being revised to address the deficiencies, manning
levels have been increased, and additional emphasis has been placed on
information operations training.
Appendix V: Doctrine Issues Surfaced During After- Action Reporting
Page 28 GAO- 01- 784 Kosovo Air Operations
Intratheater in- transit visibility Issue There was a lack of supporting
doctrine, policy, and plans for intratheater in- transit visibility, which
resulted in ad- hoc planning efforts that affected the commander?s resource
management capabilities. Appropriate doctrine and policies must be outlined
in order to provide a solid basis for theater intransit visibility plans.
Resolution As the executive agent for in- transit visibility doctrine,
policy, and plans, the U. S. Transportation Command began inserting
appropriate definitions and language in joint publications. To date, 26
joint publications have been revised and the services are revising their
publications. No additional action is planned.
Imagery intelligence Issue This issue is classified.
Resolution Joint doctrine is being developed to rectify this issue.
Joint digital network Issue There were concerns with the interoperability,
standardization, and flexibility of the joint digital
network.
Resolution Joint manual has been revised to address the concerns.
Fire support Issue There were concerns with combined fire support.
Resolution The issue is being addressed in joint doctrine publications.
Instances where the issue has not been fully resolved NATO command structure
Issue A more effective U. S.- NATO command structure, including access to
classified information, was
needed.
Resolution Issue could not be resolved at the Joint Staff level and was
passed on to U. S.- NATO working group.
Air tasking order process Issue The air tasking order process did not lend
itself to ensuring the speed of command needed in a
rapidly developing operational environment.
Resolution Issue passed to the Joint Staff for operations target working
group for resolution.
Alliance and coalition interoperability Issue Defense spending dichotomy is
making interoperability problems more complex. Since U. S. policy
prefers to engage alongside allies, doctrinal agreements would facilitate
the standardization of equipment, munitions, and communications to minimize
problems. Some of the details regarding this issue are classified.
Resolution This issue was passed to the Defense Capabilities Initiative for
corrective action. This initiative, which began in April 1999, focuses
alliance members on attaining interoperability and common capabilities
needed to perform the roles and missions that are outlined in NATO?s new
strategic concept. Though this initiative was not a direct result of
Operation Allied Force, shortcomings of the operation gave the initiative
additional impetus.
Allied joint doctrine Issue There needs to be a more responsive process for
developing joint doctrine.
Resolution Issue being addressed through the allied joint doctrine process.
Appendix V: Doctrine Issues Surfaced During After- Action Reporting
Page 29 GAO- 01- 784 Kosovo Air Operations
Political military interface Issue The interface between the political
process and military planning was less than optimal.
Resolution Issue passed to joint conventional warplans division for
resolution.
NATO intelligence Issue This issue involved the production and dissemination
of intelligence information among the allies.
Resolution Issue was passed on to Supreme Commander, Europe, for resolution.
Interface with NATO Issue Deception planning with NATO was lacking.
Resolution Issue still requires further study.
Joint broadcast system Issue The joint broadcast systems should continue to
be used until operational forces are satisfied that the
global broadcast system is fully ready to take its place.
Resolution Issue requires further study. Source: GAO analysis of DOD
information.
Appendix VI: Comments From the Department of Defense Page 30 GAO- 01- 784
Kosovo Air Operations
Appendix VI: Comments From the Department of Defense
Appendix VII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
Page 31 GAO- 01- 784 Kosovo Air Operations
William Solis (202) 512- 8365 Edna Falk Curtin (202) 512- 4067
In addition to those named above, Rodell Anderson, Michael Avenick, Margaret
Best, Kathleen Joyce, Madelon Savaides, and Susan Woodward made significant
contributions to this report. Appendix VII: GAO Contacts and Staff
Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Acknowledgments
Related GAO Products Page 32 GAO- 01- 784 Kosovo Air Operations
Kosovo Air Operations: Mission Effectiveness of U. S. Air Strikes Against
Fixed and Mobile Targets (GAO- 01- 925, forthcoming).
Kosovo Air Operations: Combat Aircraft Basing Plans Are Needed in Advance of
Future Conflicts (GAO- 01- 461, May 29, 2001).
Kosovo Air Operations: Army Resolving Lessons Learned Regarding the Apache
Helicopter (GAO- 01- 401, Mar. 2, 2001).
Balkans Security: Current and Projected Factors Affecting Regional Stability
(GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 125BR, Apr. 24, 2000). Related GAO Products
(702076)
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