Tactical Aircraft: Continuing Difficulty Keeping F-22 Production Costs Within the Congressional Limitation (16-JUL-01, GAO-01-782)
The Air Force F-22 Raptor, an air superiority aircraft with an
air-to-ground attack capability is set for completion in
September 2003. However,contracts to begin 10 low-rate initial
production aircraft for fiscal year 2001 have been delayed until
after completion of the President's review of Department of
Defense (DOD) programs. The Air Force plans to procure 333
production aircraft through 2013. The cost of F-22 production is
limited by law, but the total number of aircraft to be procured
is unspecified. This report (1) identifies the cost reduction
plans by F-22 contractors, (2) compares the latest F-22
production cost estimates completed by the Air Force and the
Office of the Secretary of Defense with the congressional cost
limitation and determines the extent to which cost reduction
plans were considered in establishing these estimates, and (3)
provides the status of DOD's actions to implement recommendations
included in GAO's 2000 report concerning production cost
estimates and cost reduction plans for the F-22 program. GAO
found that enhancing production technology, improving
manufacturing techniques, and improving acquisition practices
have attributed to cost reduction. Both the Air Force and the
Office of the Secretary cost estimators projected that F-22
production costs would exceed the congressional cost limitation
if the Air Force were to procure 333 F-22s. DOD and the Air Force
have partially responded to GAO's August 2000 report on F-22
production cost estimates recommendations.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-01-782
ACCNO: A01394
TITLE: Tactical Aircraft: Continuing Difficulty Keeping F-22
Production Costs Within the Congressional Limitation
DATE: 07/16/2001
SUBJECT: Aircraft
Fighter aircraft
Military cost control
Air Force procurement
Future budget projections
Cost analysis
Air Force F-22 Raptor
******************************************************************
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GAO-01-782
Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs,
and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of
Representatives
United States General Accounting Office
GAO
July 2001 TACTICAL AIRCRAFT Continuing Difficulty Keeping F- 22 Production
Costs Within the Congressional Limitation
GAO- 01- 782
Page i GAO- 01- 782 Tactical Aircraft Letter 1
Appendix I Comments From the Department of Defense 13
Appendix II GAO Staff Acknowledgments 15
Related GAO Products 16
Tables
Table 1: Comparison of Latest Air Force and Office of the Secretary F- 22
Production Cost Estimates With the Congressional Cost Limitation 7 Table 2:
Comparison of Production Cost Estimates by the Air
Force and the Office of the Secretary and the Impact of Cost Reduction Plans
on These Estimates 8
Figures
Figure 1: Examples of Progression of Production Cost Reduction Plans 6
Contents
Page 1 GAO- 01- 782 Tactical Aircraft
July 16, 2001 The Honorable Christopher Shays Chairman, Subcommittee on
National Security,
Veterans Affairs, and International Relations Committee on Government Reform
House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Air Force F- 22 Raptor is designed to be an air
superiority aircraft with an air- to- ground attack capability and is to
replace F- 15 fighter aircraft. Lockheed Martin Corporation and Pratt &
Whitney Corporation are the contractors for the airframe and engine,
respectively. Development of the aircraft, which started in 1991, is
currently scheduled to be completed in September 2003, according to the Air
Force. The Air Force had planned to award contracts to begin low- rate
initial production in December 2000. However, award of a fully- funded
contract for 10 low- rate initial production aircraft approved for fiscal
year 2001 has been delayed at least until after completion of the
President's review of Department of Defense (DOD) programs. The Air Force
currently plans to procure 333 production aircraft through 2013. The cost of
F- 22 production is limited 1 to $37.6 billion by the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 2 , but the act does not specify the
total number of aircraft to be procured.
As requested, we updated information we provided to the Subcommittee in
August 2000 3 on the Air Force's F- 22 production program and the service's
efforts to offset production cost increases through activities known as
production cost reduction plans. Specifically, this report (1) identifies
the amount of potential offsets attributable to production cost reduction
plans by F- 22 contractors, (2) compares the latest F- 22
1 The cost limitation, as adjusted, is currently $37.6 billion for 333
aircraft and does not include $1.575 billion associated with six aircraft
labeled Production Representative Test Vehicles that are excluded from the
production cost limitation. Those aircraft are funded mostly with
appropriations for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation as approved by
the Congress. The production cost limitation does however, include about
$200 million of costs related to those six aircraft.
2 P. L. 105- 85, Nov. 18, 1997.
3 Defense Acquisitions: Recent F- 22 Production Cost Estimates Exceeded
Congressional Limitation (GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 178, Aug. 15, 2000).
United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO- 01- 782 Tactical Aircraft
production cost estimates completed by the Air Force and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense with the congressional cost limitation and determines
the extent to which cost reduction plans were considered in establishing
these estimates, and (3) provides the status of DOD's actions to implement
recommendations included in our August 2000 report concerning production
cost estimates and cost reduction plans for the F- 22 program.
F- 22 contractors and the Air Force have been developing cost reduction
plans that are created to reduce costs by enhancing production technology,
improving manufacturing techniques, and improving acquisition practices. The
amount of cost reductions the contractors estimated to be achievable through
production cost reduction plans has increased substantially since 1997. The
contractors' estimated reductions in costs associated with these plans
increased from $13. 1 billion in January 1997, to $21 billion in mid- 2000,
to $26. 5 billion in January 2001.
In late 2000, both Air Force and the Office of the Secretary cost estimators
projected that F- 22 production costs would exceed the $37.6 billion
congressional cost limitation if the Air Force were to procure 333 F- 22s.
Air Force cost estimators projected the likely cost at $39.6 billion 4 ; the
Office of the Secretary estimated the likely cost at $46.6 billion. 5 Air
Force and Office of the Secretary estimates differ mainly because their
respective cost estimators made differing judgements about labor efficiency,
engine costs, and the potential impacts of production cost reduction plans
designed by F- 22 contractors to reduce the production costs of F- 22s. Cost
estimators from the Air Force and Office of the Secretary both agree that
many of the cost reduction plans will result in cost reductions. However,
they do not agree on which of the plans are fully viable, or the amounts of
cost reductions that will be generated. For example, the Office of the
Secretary estimated that $1 billion less would be
4 Air Force cost estimators projected the costs for 331 aircraft at $38.5
billion. To arrive at the cost for 333 aircraft that are planned, $1. 1
billion must be added for 2 production representative test aircraft and
advance procurement for 6 production representative test aircraft approved
for fiscal year 1999, making the projected cost $39.6 billion for 333
aircraft.
5 Briefing documents indicate that Office of the Secretary estimators
projected the costs for 331 aircraft at $45. 5 billion. To arrive at the
projected cost for 333 aircraft that are planned, $1. 1 billion must be
added for 2 production representative test aircraft and advance procurement
for 6 production representative test aircraft approved for fiscal year 1999,
making the projected cost $46. 6 billion for 333 aircraft.
Results In Brief
Page 3 GAO- 01- 782 Tactical Aircraft
saved by the planned manufacturing cost reductions as compared with the Air
Force's estimated cost reductions. Because F- 22 production is in its early
stages (a fully funded contract for production has not yet been awarded),
most of the cost reductions associated with the plans have not yet been
achieved. However, the Air Force asked the Defense Contract Audit Agency
(DCAA), an agency responsible for contract audits at DOD, to conduct a
limited, independent review of the validity of some plans that accounted for
about 2 percent of the estimated cost reductions. DCAA did not generally
take exception to the potential cost reductions associated with these plans.
DOD and the Air Force have been partially responsive to the recommendations
included in our August 2000 report on F- 22 production cost estimates. 6 We
recommended that the Air Force improve the regularity and scope of its
reporting to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics on the status of the cost reduction plans. We recommended the
reports include summary information such as the total number of cost
reduction plans identified and implemented, the total estimated cost
reductions, and cost reductions realized to date. However, the Air Force has
not regularly reported that information in the manner we recommended. For
example, the information reported did not include estimated cost reductions
realized. We also recommended that DOD reconcile the number of F- 22s needed
with the amount of the congressional cost limitation on F- 22 production.
DOD partially concurred with that recommendation and advised us they would
make the judgements as part of the next Quadrennial Defense Review. Since
DOD made that response, the President has directed that the Secretary of
Defense review defense programs.
This report contains no new recommendations as DOD efforts to implement our
prior F- 22- related recommendations are still in progress.
Because of potential cost increases, the Air Force established a team- the
Joint Estimating Team- to review the total estimated cost of the F- 22
program. This team reported in 1997 that the cost of the F- 22 production
program could grow substantially from the amount planned, but that the
contractors should design cost reduction plans to fully offset that cost
6 Defense Acquisitions: Recent F- 22 Production Cost Estimates Exceeded
Congressional Limitation (GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 178, Aug. 15, 2000).
Background
Page 4 GAO- 01- 782 Tactical Aircraft
growth. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics generally adopted the team's recommendations to
change certain aspects of the program as well as a plan to define and
implement cost reduction plans. The contractors have continued since 1997 to
refine and increase the number and dollar amounts associated with the plans
to reduce F- 22 production costs.
Ultimately, the savings to be achieved by production cost reduction plans
must be reflected in lower production contract prices, and lower
expenditures by the Air Force than would have been the case if the plans had
not been implemented. The Air Force and contractors have entered into
memoranda of understanding that relate the affordability of F- 22 production
to contract prices that will be negotiated for low- rate initial production.
The memoranda established target price objectives against which the
negotiated prices will be evaluated and financial incentives to achieve the
target price objectives for the applicable production lots. To encourage a
reduction in production costs, the Air Force and contractors agreed that
production cost reduction plans would be proposed, approved and implemented
as appropriate. The Air Force agreed to reimburse certain investment costs
and to pay award fees to the contractors based on negotiating contracts for
certain prices. Until contract prices are negotiated, cost estimates will
continue to reflect judgements of estimators about the potential impact of
cost reduction plans when implemented.
In an effort to offset production cost increases, F- 22 contractors have
been developing production cost reduction plans to enhance production
technology, improve manufacturing techniques, and improve acquisition
strategies and subcontract agreements for buying materials. These cost
reduction plans are categorized as: implemented, not yet implemented, or
"challenge". The Air Force and contractors' criteria for determining if a
cost reduction plan is implemented include whether
the contractor has submitted a firm- fixed price proposal that recognizes
the impact of the cost reduction,
the impact of the reduction has been reflected in a current contract
price- either with the prime contractor or a supplier to the prime
contractor,
the contractor has reduced the standard number of hours allocated to a
specific task,
the reduction has been negotiated in a forward pricing rate agreement, or
the reduction has been negotiated with a subcontractor or vendor. Potential
Cost
Reductions Identified by Contractors Have Increased
Page 5 GAO- 01- 782 Tactical Aircraft
Plans are categorized as not yet implemented if none of the criteria are
met. Challenge plans represent additional potential savings in areas that
have been identified, but that are not yet well defined.
The contractors' estimated reductions in costs that are associated with F-
22 cost reduction plans increased from $13.1 billion in January 1997, to $21
billion in mid- 2000, to $26.5 billion in January 2001. According to the
contractors, the $26.5 billion is distributed as follows by category:
About $13.7 billion (52 percent) in cost reductions that have been
implemented;
About $8.5 billion (32 percent) in cost reductions not yet implemented;
and
About $4.2 billion (16 percent) labeled as a challenge amount. Figure 1
shows examples of implemented, not yet implemented, and challenge cost
reduction plans and the relative progression of these plans toward
potentially achieving some cost reductions in the future.
Page 6 GAO- 01- 782 Tactical Aircraft
Figure 1: Examples of Progression of Production Cost Reduction Plans
In late 2000, the Air Force cost estimators projected, in an estimate
supporting the fiscal year 2002 budget request, that production costs of 333
F- 22s were likely to exceed the $37.6 billion congressional cost limitation
by $2 billion. The cost estimate produced by the Office of the Secretary
indicates that costs will likely exceed the congressional cost limitation by
$9 billion. Important reasons for the differences between Air Force and
Office of the Secretary estimators are differing judgements about labor
efficiencies, engine costs, and the viability of cost reduction plans and
their potential impact on the cost of F- 22 production. Latest F- 22
Production Cost Estimates Exceed Cost Limitation by a Greater Margin
Page 7 GAO- 01- 782 Tactical Aircraft
In late 1999, both the Air Force and Office of the Secretary cost estimators
projected that production costs for 339 aircraft would exceed the
congressional cost limitation of $39.8 billion in effect at that time. The
Air Force cost estimators projected production costs at $40.8 billion, and
the Office of the Secretary estimated $48.6 billion for the 339 production
aircraft. Even though the cost estimates exceeded the $39.8 billion cost
limitation in effect at that time, the Secretary of the Air Force maintained
that the cost would not exceed the limitation, and established the Air
Force's position on F- 22 production cost at $39.8 billion.
In estimates made in December 2000 to support the fiscal year 2002 budget
request, both Air Force and Office of the Secretary cost estimators continue
to project that F- 22 production costs will exceed the congressional cost
limitation. Table 1 shows the details of these estimates and the amounts by
which the estimates exceed the congressional cost limitation.
Table 1: Comparison of Latest Air Force and Office of the Secretary F- 22
Production Cost Estimates With the Congressional Cost Limitation
Then- year dollars in billions
Estimates Air Force Office of the Secretary
Estimate (333 production aircraft) $39.6 $46.6 Cost limitation (333
production aircraft) $37.6 $37.6 Amount over the cost limitation $2.0 $9.0
Source: GAO analysis of Air Force and Office of the Secretary data
The current cost limitation of $37.6 billion has been adjusted to reflect
planned acquisition of 333 production aircraft, 6 fewer than included in the
cost limitation in effect in 1999. This change reflects congressional action
on the fiscal year 2000 Air Force budget, in which the Congress approved
funding for 6 aircraft using appropriations for Research, Development, Test
and Evaluation. Accordingly, the 6 aircraft and associated costs of $1.575
billion (excluding about $200 million that had been appropriated in fiscal
year 1999 for advanced procurement for those aircraft) were eliminated from
the production cost limitation and added to the development cost limitation.
If the Office of the Secretary's higher estimate is correct and additional
cost reduction plans are not developed and implemented, we project that the
Air Force would have to buy about 85 fewer F- 22s (or about 25 percent) than
the 333 aircraft now planned to stay within the cost Production Cost
Estimates
Have Increased
Page 8 GAO- 01- 782 Tactical Aircraft
limitation. In our August 2000 report, we had also calculated that the Air
Force would not be able to procure about 85 F- 22s if the Office of the
Secretary's 1999 estimate was correct.
The Air Force and the Office of the Secretary cost estimators included in
their projections the effect of cost reduction plans that have been
categorized as implemented. They also estimated the expected future impact
of cost reduction plans that have not yet been implemented. Neither included
challenge plans.. Air Force officials advised us that their cost estimates
consider the same cost reduction plans as the Office of the Secretary
estimators, but that differing judgements regarding the viability of the
plans and potential amounts of cost reductions are applied. Table 2 compares
the two cost estimates.
Table 2: Comparison of Production Cost Estimates by the Air Force and the
Office of the Secretary and the Impact of Cost Reduction Plans on These
Estimates
Then year dollars in billions
Estimate Air Force Office of the Secretary
Production cost estimate including implemented cost reduction plans $47.2
$51.9 Impact of not yet implemented cost reduction plans ($ 7.6) ($ 5.3)
Total $39.6 $46.6
Source: GAO analysis of Air Force and Office of the Secretary data
Air Force and Office of the Secretary officials attributed the majority of
the differences in the estimates to the Office of the Secretary having-
Estimated higher labor costs than the Air Force relating to subcontractor
efforts,
Estimated higher costs for the F- 22 engines,
Excluded some cost reduction plans because of the limited viability, and
Estimated more conservative savings from some cost reduction plans. Labor
costs for subcontractors projected by estimators from the Office of the
Secretary were $3.0 billion more than those projected by Air Force cost
estimators. Projections of engine costs by the Office of the Secretary
estimators were $1.2 billion higher. The Office of the Secretary also
excluded some planned manufacturing cost reduction plans because they were
not adequately detailed, and estimated $1 billion less would be saved by the
planned manufacturing cost reductions than did the Air Force. Differing
Judgements
About Viability of Cost Reduction Plans in Developing Cost Estimates
Page 9 GAO- 01- 782 Tactical Aircraft
Further, the Office of the Secretary estimated $800 million less in cost
reductions than the Air Force for plans relating to productivity
investments.
Because F- 22 production is in its early stages, few plans have resulted in
actual cost reductions. However, analysis of plans categorized as
implemented do show indications that lower costs can be achieved. The Air
Force in mid- 2000 asked DCAA 7 to conduct a limited, independent review of
some of these plans. In late 2000, the DCAA examined eleven cost reduction
plans totaling $425 million of total estimated savings of $26.5 billion.
These eleven plans were chosen so DCAA could examine cost reduction plans at
different stages of development and at different locations including
Lockheed Martin Aeronautical Systems, Marietta, Georgia; Lockheed Martin
Tactical Aircraft Systems, Fort Worth, Texas; and Boeing Military Aircraft,
Seattle, Washington. DCAA did not conduct detailed audits of these cost
reduction plans. Their reviews focused primarily on methodologies used to
calculate the reported savings or the verification of rates or material cost
used in the calculations of contractor reported savings.
DCAA did not take exception to the potential cost reductions for 8 of the 11
plans reviewed; found potential cost reductions on two others to be based on
judgement, not discrete, measurable events; and found documentation on one
to be lacking. Regarding the one plan where documentation was lacking, DCAA
auditors were unable to validate contractor estimates totaling around $2
million that involved a new process developed to only require one step to
drill a hole in the airframe, rather than two steps.
Our August 2000 report recommended that the Secretary of Defense reconcile
the number of F- 22s that need to be procured with the cost limitation and
report to the Congress on the implications of procuring fewer F- 22s because
of potentially higher costs. DOD partially agreed, stating that the
affordability of the F- 22 will be evaluated during an upcoming Quadrennial
Defense Review.
7 DCAA is responsible for contract audits at DOD.
Limited Validation of Eleven Cost Reduction Plans at Three Contractor
Locations
Actions to Implement Prior GAO Recommendations
Page 10 GAO- 01- 782 Tactical Aircraft
We also found that Air Force quarterly reports provided to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics did not
regularly highlight major changes associated with cost reduction plans.
While the status of individual cost reduction plans are tracked by
contractors and the F- 22 Program Office, we believe regular reporting by
the Air Force to the Under Secretary of Defense on the status of these plans
is necessary to continuously assess their impact on the estimated cost of F-
22 production. Achievement of the estimated cost reductions embodied in the
plans is critical to completing F- 22 production within the congressional
cost limitation. Quarterly reporting of cost reduction plan information
enhances its visibility. As a result, we recommended the Air Force report to
the Under Secretary of Defense on the status of the cost reduction plans
each quarter and that quarterly reports include summary information such as
the total number of cost reduction plans identified, the number implemented,
the total estimated cost reductions, cost reductions realized to date, and
additions or deletions from the plans included in the prior report.
DOD concurred with our recommendation in October 2000 and agreed to report
cost reduction plan information in subsequent quarterly reviews to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. DOD agreed
that the achievement of cost reduction plans is essential to the execution
of the F- 22 program within the congressional cost limit. However, our
recommendation has not been implemented. In the Air Force's March 2001
quarterly review to the Under Secretary, the information reported included
only summary information on the total estimated cost reductions.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD agreed there continues to be a
notable difference between the Air Force and Office of the Secretary F- 22
production cost estimates. They indicated that data would emerge toward
verification of these estimates as the program begins to accumulate
production cost data.
DOD also agreed that the dollar amounts associated with the cost reduction
plans have continued to increase since 1997. They indicated that as F- 22
cost pressures have increased, so have the number of cost reduction plans
and the cost reductions attributed to them.
In commenting on the progress the Air Force has made toward complying with
our recommendation from August 2000 for specific cost reduction plan
information to be reported in quarterly reviews, DOD indicated the Agency
Comments
and Our Evaluation
Page 11 GAO- 01- 782 Tactical Aircraft
information reported in the last quarterly review (June 2001) contained more
detailed information. We have examined the June 2001 quarterly review and
agree it contains more information on cost reduction plans than previous
quarterly reviews. Information on the total estimated cost reductions was
reported. However, the information reported is still not consistent with
what we recommended be reported in August 2000. Information was not reported
as we recommended regarding the total number of cost reduction plans
identified, the number implemented, the cost reductions realized to date,
and any additions or deletions from the plans included in the prior report.
To identify the amount of potential offsets attributable to production cost
reduction plans by F- 22 contractors we reviewed contractor cost reduction
plans to determine the basis for the reductions expected to be achieved and
whether the reduction was implemented or not yet implemented. We reviewed
the documentation from the contractors and discussed the plans and the Air
Force procedures for reporting on such plans with contractor and Air Force
officials.
To compare the latest F- 22 production cost estimates of the Air Force and
the Office of the Secretary with the congressional production cost
limitation and to determine the extent to which cost reductions plans were
considered in establishing these estimates, we reviewed the Joint Estimating
Team's report and various Air Force briefings. We discussed the estimates
with officials in the Office of the Secretary and the Air Force's F- 22
Program Office to determine why they differed. We compared the two
estimates, including the baseline estimate, the estimated reductions from
cost reduction plans, and the net estimates. We obtained a description of
the reasons for the variances between the two estimates. We also discussed
the estimates and production cost limitation with Air Force and Office of
the Secretary officials. The Office of the Secretary cost estimate shown in
this report is recorded in briefing documents we obtained during the course
of our review. The Office of the Secretary provided us neither its cost
estimate nor documentation related to its cost estimate. Officials from the
Office of the Secretary cited their policy of not allowing access to that
information because they considered it predecisional. However, we
corroborated the information contained in the briefing documents we
analyzed. An Office of the Secretary official reviewed and agreed with the
estimated and projected costs included in this report that are attributed to
the Office of the Secretary. To calculate the number of F- 22s that could
not be procured within the cost limitation we allocated the dollars in the
Office of the Secretary estimate to Scope and
Methodology
Page 12 GAO- 01- 782 Tactical Aircraft
production lots 1 through 11 in the previous Air Force estimate. Starting
with the adjusted costs for production lot 1, we determined how many
aircraft could be purchased without exceeding the applicable cost limitation
To evaluate whether the Office of the Secretary and the Air Force were
complying with our prior recommendations, we determined whether a defense
review, that potentially could reconcile the number of F- 22s needed with
the cost limitation, had been completed. We also reviewed recent quarterly
briefings from the Air Force to the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to determine how the information
included on production cost reduction plans compared to the information we
recommended be included in the briefings.
In performing our work, we obtained information or interviewed officials
from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington D. C.; the F- 22
Program Office, Wright- Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; the Defense Contract
Management Agency, Marietta, Georgia; Lockheed Martin Aeronautical Systems,
Marietta, Georgia; Lockheed Martin Tactical Aircraft Systems, Fort Worth,
Texas; and Boeing Military Aircraft, Seattle, Washington. We performed our
work from December 2000 through May 2001 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after
the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies to appropriate
congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Air
Force; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also
be made available to others on request.
Please contact me at (202) 512- 4841 or Robert D. Murphy at (937) 258- 7904
if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. GAO staff
acknowledgments to this report are listed in appendix II.
Allen Li Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management
Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense Page 13 GAO- 01- 782
Tactical Aircraft
Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense
Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense Page 14 GAO- 01- 782
Tactical Aircraft
Appendix II: GAO Staff Acknowledgments
Page 15 GAO- 01- 782 Tactical Aircraft
Marvin E. Bonner, Christopher T. Brannon, Edward R. Browning, Arthur L.
Cobb, Michael J. Hazard, Don M. Springman, and John Van Schaik made key
contributions to this report. Appendix II: GAO Staff Acknowledgments
Related GAO Products Page 16 GAO- 01- 782 Tactical Aircraft
Tactical Aircraft: F- 22 Development and Testing Delays Indicate Need for
Limit on Low- Rate Production (GAO- 01- 310, Mar. 15, 2001).
Supporting Congressional Oversight: Framework for Considering Budgetary
Implications of Selected GAO Work (GAO- 01- 447, Mar. 9, 2001).
Defense Acquisitions: Recent F- 22 Production Cost Estimates Exceeded
Congressional Limitation (GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 178, Aug. 15, 2000).
Defense Acquisitions: Use of Cost Reduction Plans in Estimating F- 22 Total
Production Costs (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 00- 200, June 15, 2000).
Budget Issues: Budgetary Implications of Selected GAO Work for Fiscal Year
2001 (GAO/ OCG- 00- 8, Mar. 31, 2000).
F- 22 Aircraft: Development Cost Goal Achievable If Major Problems Are
Avoided (GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 68, Mar. 14, 2000).
Defense Acquisitions: Progress in Meeting F- 22 Cost and Schedule Goals
(GAO/ T- NSIAD- 00- 58, Dec. 7, 1999).
Fiscal Year 2000 Budget: DOD's Procurement and RDT& E Programs (GAO/ NSIAD-
99- 233R, Sept. 23, 1999).
Budget Issues: Budgetary Implications of Selected GAO Work for Fiscal Year
2000 (GAO/ OCG- 99- 26, Apr. 16, 1999).
Defense Acquisitions: Progress of the F- 22 and F/ A- 18E/ F Engineering and
Manufacturing Development Programs (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 99- 113, Mar. 17, 1999).
F- 22 Aircraft: Issues in Achieving Engineering and Manufacturing
Development Goals (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 55, Mar. 15, 1999).
F- 22 Aircraft: Progress of the Engineering and Manufacturing Development
Program (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 98- 137, Mar. 25, 1998).
F- 22 Aircraft: Progress in Achieving Engineering and Manufacturing
Development Goals (GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 67, Mar. 10, 1998).
Tactical Aircraft: Restructuring of the Air Force F- 22 Fighter Program
(GAO/ NSIAD- 97- 156, June 4, 1997). Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products Page 17 GAO- 01- 782 Tactical Aircraft
Defense Aircraft Investments: Major Program Commitments Based on Optimistic
Budget Projections (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 97- 103, Mar. 5, 1997).
F- 22 Restructuring (GAO/ NSIAD- 97- 100R, Feb. 28, 1997). Tactical
Aircraft: Concurrency in Development and Production of F- 22 Aircraft Should
Be Reduced (GAO/ NSIAD- 95- 59, Apr. 19, 1995).
Tactical Aircraft: F- 15 Replacement Issues (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 94- 176, May 5,
1994).
Tactical Aircraft: F- 15 Replacement Is Premature as Currently Planned (GAO/
NSIAD- 94- 118, Mar. 25, 1994).
(120022)
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