Military

Military Aircraft: Cannibalizations Adversely Affect Personnel and Maintenance (22-MAY-01, GAO-01-693T)

All the military services use cannibalization, the removal of a  
working component from one aircraft to install it on another,	 
extensively as a routine aircraft maintenance strategy. However, 
neither the Department of Defense nor the services know the	 
overall magnitude of this practice.  Cannibalizations increase	 
maintenance costs by increasing workloads, may affect morale and 
the retention of personnel, and sometimes result in the 	 
unavailability of expensive aircraft for long periods of time.	 
Cannibalizations also can create unnecessary mechanical problems 
for maintenance personnel. With the exception of the Navy, the	 
services do not consistently track the specific reasons for	 
cannibalizations. In the broadest sense, cannibalizations are	 
done because of pressures to meet readiness and operational needs
and the shortcomings of the supply system. In addition, a Navy	 
study found that cannibalizations are sometimes done because	 
mechanics are not trained well enough to diagnose problems or	 
because testing equipment is either not available or not working.
Although the services have undertaken some initiatives to reduce 
cannibalizations, none of them have developed a specific strategy
to reduce the maintenance hours associated with cannibalizations.
Because they view cannibalization as a symptom of spare parts	 
shortages, they have not closely analyzed other possible causes  
or made concerted efforts to measure the full extent of the	 
practice.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-01-693T					        
    ACCNO:   A01046						        
  TITLE:     Military Aircraft: Cannibalizations Adversely Affect     
             Personnel and Maintenance                                        
     DATE:   05/22/2001 
  SUBJECT:   Aircraft maintenance				 
	     Military aircraft					 
	     Logistics						 
	     Spare parts					 
	     Aircraft components				 
	     B-1B Aircraft					 
	     B-52H Aircraft					 
	     C-5 Aircraft					 
	     C-5A Aircraft					 
	     C-5B Aircraft					 
	     E-2C Aircraft					 
	     EA-6B Aircraft					 
	     F-117A Aircraft					 
	     F-15C Aircraft					 
	     F-15E Aircraft					 
	     KC-135R Aircraft					 
	     P-3C Aircraft					 
	     S-3B Aircraft					 
	     Stealth Aircraft					 
	     Prowler Aircraft					 
	     Galaxy Aircraft					 
	     A-10A Aircraft					 
	     F/A-18A Aircraft					 
	     F-16C Aircraft					 
	     Air Force Cannibalization Dock Program		 
	     E-3C Aircraft					 
	     OA-10A Aircraft					 
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GAO-01-693T
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs,
and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of
Representatives
United States General Accounting Office
GAO For Release on Delivery Expected at 10: 00 a. m., Tuesday, May 22, 2001
MILITARY AIRCRAFT
Cannibalizations Adversely Affect Personnel and Maintenance
Statement of Neal P. Curtin, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
GAO- 01- 693T
Page 1 GAO- 01- 693T
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: We are pleased to be here
today to share the preliminary results of our ongoing work regarding the
military services? practice of cannibalization, which is the removal of a
working component from one aircraft to install it on another. In January
2001, we reported on the major performance and accountability challenges
facing the Department of Defense and identified inventory management as a
high- risk area because the Department continues to maintain levels of
inventory that are too high, and its management systems and procedures are
ineffective. 1 This means that in some instances, excessive quantities of
some parts may be procured and held in stock, while in other instances,
quantities are insufficient. We warned that if this condition persists, the
Department risks having key items, including spare aircraft parts, not
available when needed, impairing aircraft and other equipment readiness. To
compensate for logistics shortfalls, all the military services- Army, Air
Force, Navy, and Marine Corps- have resorted to the inefficient maintenance
practice of cannibalization.
Our testimony today is based on the work we performed in response to your
request that we analyze cannibalizations by the services over the last 5
years. We determined the extent to which the services rely on
cannibalizations, the effects of cannibalizations, the reasons for
cannibalizations, and the actions that the Department of Defense and the
services are taking to reduce cannibalizations.
All the military services use cannibalization extensively as a routine
aircraft maintenance strategy. In fiscal years 1996 through 2000, the Navy 2
and the Air Force reported about 850,000 cannibalizations, requiring over 5
million maintenance hours. These numbers, however, do not include the Army?s
cannibalizations, 3 and the Navy reportedly understates its data by as much
as 50 percent. As a result, neither the Department of Defense nor the
services know the overall magnitude of the practice.
1 See Performance and Accountability Series: Major Management Challenges and
Program Risks: Department of Defense (GAO- 01- 244, Jan. 2001). 2 Navy data
includes the Marine Corps because it is consolidated at the headquarters
level. 3 While information is available for the Army at the installation
level, the Army does not collect servicewide data; therefore, we could not
include Army totals in our statistics. Summary
Page 2 GAO- 01- 693T
Cannibalizations have several adverse impacts. They increase maintenance
costs by increasing workloads, may affect morale and the retention of
personnel, and sometimes result in the unavailability of expensive aircraft
for long periods of time. Cannibalizations can also create unnecessary
mechanical problems for maintenance personnel. As shown by a recent survey,
over half of all aircraft maintenance personnel work more than 50 hours a
week (some work 70 hours or more) compared with the average of 40 hours. A
Navy study notes that the additional work generated by cannibalizations
adversely affects morale and lowers reenlistment rates. However, because the
services do not keep track of all the maintenance hours they spend on
cannibalizations, they cannot assess all of the consequences.
The services have many reasons for cannibalizing aircraft and strong
incentives for continuing to do so. With the exception of the Navy, the
services do not consistently track the specific reasons for
cannibalizations; as a result, much of the information on causes is
anecdotal. In the broadest sense, cannibalizations are done because of
pressures to meet readiness and operational needs and the shortcomings of
the supply system. When parts are not available and an aircraft needs to fly
a mission, cannibalization becomes the answer. In addition, a Navy study
found that cannibalizations are sometimes done because mechanics are not
trained well enough to diagnose problems or because testing equipment is
either not available or not working.
Although the services have undertaken some initiatives to reduce
cannibalizations, none of them have developed a specific strategy to reduce
the maintenance hours associated with cannibalizations. Because they view
cannibalization as a symptom of spare parts shortages, they have not closely
analyzed other possible causes or made concerted efforts to measure the full
extent of the practice. A number of working groups have been asked to
address cannibalization, but they have had very limited success in
determining how to reduce it. Neither the Department of Defense nor the
services can accurately determine (1) which cannibalizations are necessary
and what alternatives, if any, are available to reduce the number of those
that are not; (2) what specific improvements or changes need to be
implemented to effectively limit the adverse effects of cannibalizations;
and (3) to what extent reducing the workload associated with
cannibalizations would increase morale and retention rates. Furthermore,
they cannot make sound economic decisions concerning the relative costs of
alternatives, such as changes to stockage levels or storage locations.
Page 3 GAO- 01- 693T
In fiscal years 1996- 2000, Air Force and Navy units reported a total of
about 850, 000 cannibalizations and annual figures ranging between 154,000
and 176,000 (see fig. 1). The actual numbers, however, may be considerably
higher because of underreporting by the Navy and the Air Force and the lack
of servicewide data for the Army.
Figure 1: Total Navy and Air Force Cannibalizations Reported in Fiscal Years
19962000
Source: Navy and Air Force.
Cannibalizations Are Extensive, but Full Magnitude Is Unknown
0 50, 000
100, 000 150, 000
200, 000 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 170,958 174,448 175,717 168, 836 154,440
Cannibalization actions Fiscal year
Navy Air Force
Page 4 GAO- 01- 693T
In 1998, a Navy group studying aviation readiness noted that as many as half
of all cannibalizations may go unreported, and the Navy?s Inspector General
has reported that cannibalizations are consistently unreported. 4 In
addition, a 1998 review conducted by the Air Force Audit Agency on the Air
Force?s maintenance analysis program noted that maintenance technicians did
not always report cannibalizations. 5
According to Army officials, only a small portion of Army cannibalizations
are reported- for serial- numbered parts. The Army does not track
cannibalizations servicewide and does not require subordinate commands to do
so. Several Army headquarters officials we talked to agreed that
cannibalizations should be tracked so as to provide an overall picture of
the degree to which units are performing cannibalizations.
We found that selected aircraft- which the services depend on the most to
accomplish their mission- had relatively high reported cannibalization
rates. In addition, some of these aircraft experienced a significant
increase in the number of cannibalizations from fiscal year 1996 to 2000.
The Navy measures cannibalization rates as the number of cannibalizations
per 100 flying hours. In the 5- year period under study (fiscal years 1996-
2000), the Navy?s average cannibalization rate ranged from a high of 9. 6 in
fiscal year 1997 to a low of 8. 8 in fiscal year 2000. However, in fiscal
year 2000, 4 of the 63 aircraft types reporting cannibalizations had more
than twice the service?s average rate of 8. 8, while 2 aircraft types had
rates that were almost twice the average. (See fig. 2.)
4 See Final Report of Naval Aviation Spares and Readiness, Naval Inspector
General (Apr. 28, 2000). 5 See Report of Audit on Maintenance Analysis
Program, Air Force Audit Agency (July 31,
1998).
Page 5 GAO- 01- 693T
Figure 2: Reported Cannibalization Rates of Six Navy Aircraft, Fiscal Year
2000
Source: Navy.
Of the 31 Air Force aircraft types reporting cannibalizations in fiscal year
2000, 4 accounted for over half the service?s total. They included three
fighter aircraft (F- 16C, F- 15C, and F- 15E) and the B- 1B bomber. From
fiscal year 1996 to 2000, the Air Force reported a 100- percent or more
increase in the number of cannibalizations of several aircraft, including
the A- 10A, OA- 10A, F- 15B, E- 3C, and F- 117A. Unlike the Navy, the Air
Force measures cannibalization rates in terms of cannibalizations per 100
sorties (flights). The Air Force?s average cannibalization rate during the
5- year period ranged from a low of 10.6 in fiscal year 1996 to a high of
12. 7 in fiscal year 1997. However, in fiscal year 2000, the rates of the B-
52H, C- 5B, C- 5A, and B- 1B were all well over twice the average rate of
11.6. Cannibalization rates for these aircraft ranged between 30 and 85 per
100 sorties. The rates of the F- 15C and F- 15E were almost twice the
average at 22 and 23, respectively. (See fig. 3.)
32. 8 27.7 21. 5 18. 2 16.7 16. 2
0 10
20 30
40 E- 2C EA- 6B S- 3B FA- 18E FA- 18B F- 14D Cannibalizations per 100 flying
hours
Navy aircraft Navy average rate = 8.8
Page 6 GAO- 01- 693T
Figure 3: Reported Cannibalization Rates of Six Air Force Aircraft, Fiscal
Year 2000
Source: Air Force.
Cannibalizations are done to meet operational and readiness needs, but they
come at a high cost. Cannibalizations have increased the workload of
maintenance personnel by millions of hours since fiscal year 1996- costly
time that could have been spent more productively. Evidence shows that
increasing the workload of maintenance personnel has a negative effect on
morale. Cannibalizations also take expensive aircraft out of service,
sometimes for long periods of time, and can create unnecessary mechanical
problems. Nevertheless, it is difficult to gauge the precise effects of
cannibalizations because the services do not know how many they are
performing, what the specific reasons are for performing them, or how much
time and money they are spending on them.
Cannibalizations require at least twice the maintenance time of normal
repairs because they involve removing and installing components from two
aircraft instead of one (see fig. 4). Cannibalizations Have
Many Negative Effects
Effects on Workload
22 22.8 30. 2
42.2 54. 6
85.4 0 20
40 60
80 100
F- 15C F- 15E B- 52H C- 5B C- 5A B- 1B
Cannibalizations per 100 sorties
Air Force aircraft Air Force average rate = 11.6
Page 7 GAO- 01- 693T
Figure 4: Repairs Require Two Steps, Cannibalizations Four
Through the 5- year period, the Navy and the Air Force reported spending
about 5. 3 million additional maintenance hours on cannibalizations- the
equivalent of more than 500 aviation maintenance personnel working fulltime
for 5 years. The annual reported cannibalization hours ranged from a low of
951,000 to more than 1.1 million (see fig. 5). The Navy accounted for 2.8
million of the total hours, while the Air Force reported 2. 4 million hours.
A relatively small group of aircraft accounted for most of these maintenance
hours. For example, in fiscal year 2000, six Navy aircraft (FA18C, P- 3C, S-
3B, FA- 18A, E- 2C, and EA- 6B) were responsible for about 45 percent of the
Navy?s 441,000 cannibalization hours, while five aircraft (F15C, F- 15E, F-
16C, B- 1B, and KC- 135R) accounted for 65 percent of the Air Force?s 510,
000 hours.
Repair 4 3
1 2
Supply system
Cannibalization 1 2
Supply system
Remove broken part Install new part 1
2 1 2 3 4
Remove broken part Remove working part from cannibalized aircraft Install
working part on aircraft under repair Install new part on cannibalized
aircraft
Recipient aircraft
New part Old
part Cannibalized
aircraft New
part Cannibalized
part Old part
Page 8 GAO- 01- 693T
Figure 5: Total Cannibalization Personnel Hours, Fiscal Years 1996- 2000
Source: Navy and Air Force.
Evidence suggests that cannibalizations have a negative effect on morale
because they are sometimes seen as routinely making unrealistic demands on
maintenance personnel. Cannibalizations may have to be performed at any
time, day or night, and very quickly in order to meet operational
commitments. In such cases, personnel must continue working until the job is
done, regardless of how much time it takes.
To the extent that cannibalizations contribute to extensive overtime, morale
and retention may be adversely affected, and additional costs may be
incurred in recruiting and training new personnel. In April 2000, the Naval
Inspector General reported that cannibalization is counterproductive and has
a ?huge? impact on morale. Our analysis of a Effects on Morale
0 500
1,000 1,500
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Fiscal Year 1,080 1,035
1,142 1,065
951 Personnel hours (thousands)
Navy Air Force
Page 9 GAO- 01- 693T
1999 survey of active duty personnel showed that a significant portion of
aviation maintenance personnel worked more than 50 hours a week, and that
some worked 70 hours a week. In August 1999, we reported that the majority
of factors cited by military personnel as sources of dissatisfaction and
reasons for leaving the military were work- related circumstances such as
the lack of parts and materials to successfully complete daily job
requirements. 6
One example of how cannibalizations may become the source of waste or
frustration is the case in which a major component needed by an EA- 6B
aircraft to perform its mission was removed from or reinstalled on four
different aircraft, for a total of 16 times in 6 days. In another case, an
Air Force C- 5 was missing 136 parts, 47 of which had been used to make
another cannibalized aircraft operational.
Aircraft that are missing parts due to cannibalizations may remain grounded
for long periods of time. These aircraft are not available for operations,
denying the military the use of valuable assets. Air Force and Navy guidance
states that, to the maximum extent possible, cannibalized aircraft should
not remain grounded for more than 30 consecutive days. Yet we observed
numerous cases in which aircraft were grounded for much longer periods. One
wing we visited provided us a daily aircraft status report showing that 6
out of 28 aircraft downed for parts had not flown for 37 days or more. One
of these aircraft had not flown for more than 300 days and, according to the
Maintenance and Material Control Officer, was missing 111 parts. As a
result, the Navy had been unable to use this multimillion- dollar asset for
almost a year. He estimated it would take more than 1, 000 maintenance hours
to return the aircraft to flying status. In another example, four
cannibalized FA- 18 aircraft were missing so many parts that they were
referred to as ?wind chimes? (see fig. 6). According to Navy officials, the
number of days these aircraft had not flown ranged between 903 and 1, 756
when they were transported to a Navy depot in July 2000. As of May 2001, one
of the aircraft, which had been missing over 400 parts, had been funded for
assembly, while the remaining three were in storage waiting funding
approval. The depot estimated reassembly costs for the funded aircraft at
about $568, 000, if the squadron that owns the aircraft supplies all needed
parts.
6 See Military Personnel: Perspectives of Surveyed Service Members in
Retention Critical Specialties (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 197BR, August 16, 1999).
Expensive Assets
Unusable
Page 10 GAO- 01- 693T
Figure 6: Cannibalized Navy FA- 18 Aircraft
Source: Navy.
A Navy squadron within 30 days of a major exercise reported that 6 of its 13
assigned aircraft had not flown for 30 or more days- 2 of them because the
squadron?s wing directed that parts be given to other squadrons. A Navy
training squadron we visited had 20 of its 29 aircraft down for parts or
maintenance- 6 of them were cannibalized aircraft. In 2000, the same
squadron reported an average of 113 cannibalizations a month.
In order to remove a component, mechanics often have to remove other parts
or components as well. This increases the risk of collateral damage to the
aircraft and components involved. Substantial anecdotal evidence indicates
that cannibalizations do indeed cause these types of problems because they
involve two aircraft rather than one and are often performed under very
rushed conditions. Furthermore, cannibalizations do not replace a broken
part with a new part, but with a used one. According to a December 2000
study, 7 cannibalizations do not restore a component to its full projected
life expectancy but rather increase the chance that the same component will
break down again prematurely.
7 Analysis of Aircraft Maintenance Cannibalization With Respect to Aging
Aircraft Within the EA- 6B Community, Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, California, Daniel C. Worra (Dec. 2000). Potential for Mechanical
Side Effects
Page 11 GAO- 01- 693T
The services have many reasons for cannibalizing aircraft and strong
incentives for continuing to do so. They are operating with aging aircraft,
a high operational tempo, and continued spare parts shortages. As aircraft
age, they tend to break more often, take longer to inspect and maintain, and
are less available for training and operations. 8 The combination of these
factors, along with intense readiness requirements, creates an environment
that encourages cannibalization. But it is impossible to know why a
particular aircraft or system is cannibalized because, with the exception of
the Navy, the services do not record the reasons for cannibalizations. This
lack of information makes it difficult to develop strategies to reduce
cannibalizations.
Service officials believe that the shortage of parts is the major reason for
cannibalizations and claim that they must cannibalize if parts are not
available in the right place at the right time. Given the current logistics
shortfalls, officials also believe that cannibalizations must continue in
the foreseeable future. In a recent report to the Congress, the Department
of Defense identified aviation readiness as one of its major problems and
expressed concern about parts shortages and maintenance issues. 9
The Comptroller General recently testified that for years, the Department of
Defense has had equipment readiness problems because of a lack of key spare
parts. He also said that the insufficiency of spare parts has been
recognized as a major contributor to aircraft performing at lower mission
capable rates than expected. 10 Our ongoing work shows that the failure of
service logistics systems to deliver parts in a timely manner is caused by a
number of different reasons, including parts production problems, lower
reliability of parts than predicted, inadequate initial procurement of
spares, and unanticipated demand for an item. The services will sometimes
cannibalize aircraft for ?convenience?- when it is faster to cannibalize
than wait for a part to be delivered from across the base or town. A Navy
study group estimated that these actions may account for as many as half of
all Navy cannibalizations.
8 See Tactical Aircraft: Modernization Plans Will Not Reduce Average Age of
Aircraft (GAO01- 163, Feb. 2001). 9 See Department of Defense Quarterly
Readiness Report to the Congress, January-
February 2001. 10 See Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:
Departments of Defense, State, and Veterans Affairs (GAO- 01- 492T, Mar. 7,
2001). Services Cannibalize
for Many Reasons Supply System Problems
Page 12 GAO- 01- 693T
Readiness and operational demands put heavy pressure on the supply system to
provide parts immediately and wherever they may be needed. Local commanders
are willing to do whatever is necessary to keep readiness ratings high, even
if this requires cannibalizing aircraft constantly and having personnel
routinely work overtime.
The services believe that cannibalizations allow them to better perform
their operational missions. Information is not available to determine to
what extent cannibalizations contribute positively to readiness. But two
Army studies concluded that readiness would be significantly degraded if
cannibalizations were not performed. A 2000 study cited cannibalization
among the reasons for maintaining readiness rates at acceptable levels and
concluded that readiness would suffer if units were not allowed to
cannibalize. A 1987 study of similar helicopter units found that readiness
rates dropped more than 25 percent when units were forced to stop
cannibalizations as part of a controlled experiment, and readiness rates
rose back to previous levels when cannibalizations resumed. The Army has not
repeated the experiment elsewhere.
According to feedback provided through a Navy internet tracking system, the
reasons for cannibalizations also include parts- related issues such as
vendor production problems, depots without the necessary parts to fix a
repairable component, and delays from vendors. For its part, the Navy
Inspector General has cited three other reasons for cannibalizations related
to maintenance deficiencies: (1) lack of experience and insufficient
training on the part of maintenance personnel, (2) outdated maintenance
manuals and (3) lack of testing equipment. 11 In other words,
cannibalizations are sometimes done to diagnose a problem or to identify
which component is not working properly. By removing a suspect part and
replacing it with one that is known to be working, a mechanic can identify
where a problem lies.
The services have not developed servicewide strategies to reduce
cannibalizations. Services consider cannibalization a symptom of logistics
shortfalls and are trying to improve logistics support, especially through
the application of best inventory management practices. Although the
services have not established or identified specific strategies for reducing
cannibalizations, each has taken some initiative to deal with the issue. But
11 See Final Report of Naval Aviation Spares and Readiness, Naval Inspector
General, (Apr. 28, 2000). Readiness and Operational
Demands Other Reasons Services Have Not Developed Specific Strategies to
Reduce Cannibalizations
Page 13 GAO- 01- 693T
until they develop an overall reduction plan, the services will not be in a
position to significantly reduce cannibalizations or to alleviate their
negative effects.
The Air Force is undertaking an initiative to minimize cannibalizations at
bases in Langley, Virginia, and Elmendorf, Alaska. The bases have instituted
a ?consolidated? cannibalization program, referred to as the Cannibalization
Dock Program. The program centralizes cannibalization management, whereby
each of the squadrons in the wing provides a
?donor? aircraft and a cadre of maintenance personnel on a rotating basis.
The program is designed to ensure that as few aircraft as possible are
cannibalized and that the cannibalized parts are better controlled. While
these efforts are localized, they have reduced the number of cannibalized
aircraft and the amount of time that aircraft remain cannibalized, minimized
the number of personnel performing cannibalizations, and improved quality
control over the process. Although Air Force policies allow cannibalizations
to meet urgent operational requirements, the policies also state that such
actions should be minimized because they tend to adversely affect morale and
aggravate the very same supply problems that they are meant to overcome.
According to Navy policy, cannibalization is a manifestation of a logistics
or maintenance support system failure and its reduction or elimination
should be of prime concern to management. In March 1998, the Navy
established an Aviation Maintenance- Supply Readiness Study Group to
recommend specific actions to reduce overall Navy aviation maintenance and
supply costs and increase readiness. Noting the fleet?s increasing concern
over cannibalization, the Study Group included the practice among the
primary issues. As a result of the Group?s findings and recommendations, the
Navy initiated actions to better identify the specific causes of
cannibalizations and increase the visibility of items that are being
cannibalized extensively. Beginning in June 2001, the Navy will also
implement the requirement that more specific reasons be reported for each
cannibalization. Although a requirement that reasons be reported is
currently in place, the new requirement increases the number of reasons that
can be considered, so that causes can be better captured. In addition, a
website has been established to better highlight the items frequently
cannibalized and to provide an avenue for maintainers, program managers, and
inventory control personnel to comment on problems and track progress in
resolving issues. Logistic program managers within the Naval Air Systems
Command also maintain lists of top cannibalization items in the weapon
systems for which they are responsible. In addition, a new Air Force
Navy
Page 14 GAO- 01- 693T
reporting system is being implemented which, according to Navy officials,
should improve reporting accuracy.
The Army has taken the least formal approach to addressing cannibalization.
Its actions so far have been limited to the two studies mentioned above,
which concluded that cannibalizations are a good tool for commanders to use
and that command involvement is adequate for preventing abuse. Although Army
policy limits cannibalizations to whenever a needed item is not available
through the supply system, it allows commanders at installation levels and
below to use their discretion as to whether and how much to cannibalize.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes our statement.
We appreciate the opportunity to have it placed in the record. Our report on
this work will be out this summer with a series of recommendations for the
services to address this issue.
Contacts and Acknowledgments
For future contacts regarding this statement, please contact Neal Curtin at
(757) 552- 8111 or William Meredith at (202) 512- 4275. Individuals making
key contributions to this statement included Harry Taylor, Hugh Brady,
Douglas Mills, Janine Cantin, and Stefano Petrucci. Army
(702067)
*** End of document. ***