Combat Identification Systems: Strengthened Management Efforts Needed to Ensure Required Capabilities (25-JUN-01, GAO-01-632)
Friendly fire, or fraticide, incidents accounted for about 24
percent of U.S. fatalities during Operation Desert Storm in 1991.
Following that operation, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the
military services have been working to find new ways to avoid
friendly fire in joint and coalition operations. Preventing
friendly fire is a complex and challenging endeavor. It
encompasses the development of new technologies as well as new
training, tactics, and warfighting techniques. It involves a
range of equipment and systems that have historically not been
able to effectively interact as well as a variety of military
operations. It is a concern among each of the services as well as
U.S. allies. Clearly, it is essential to have a blueprint that
ties together these elements and provides a comprehensive map for
long-term improvements as well as a management framework that is
strong enough to implement the blueprint. While DOD has taken
some concrete steps toward both ends, it needs to strengthen
these efforts and ensure that they are supported by the services.
Without doing so, it may well continue to contend with problems
leading to friendly fire incidents.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-01-632
ACCNO: A01036
TITLE: Combat Identification Systems: Strengthened Management
Efforts Needed to Ensure Required Capabilities
DATE: 06/25/2001
SUBJECT: Accident prevention
Air warfare
Defense contingency planning
Ground warfare
Systems design
Warning systems
Army Battlefield Combat Identification
System
Black Hawk Helicopter
Desert Storm
DOD Operation Provide Comfort
UH-60 Helicopter
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GAO-01-632
Report to the Secretary of Defense
United States General Accounting Office
GAO
June 2001 COMBAT IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS
Strengthened Management Efforts Needed to Ensure Required Capabilities
GAO- 01- 632
Page i GAO- 01- 632 Combat Identification Systems Letter 1
Appendix I DOD?s Enterprise Architecture Framework: A Brief Description 19
Appendix II Comments From the Department of Defense 21
Figures
Figure 1: The Battlefield Combat Identification System 8 Figure 2:
Interrelationship of Three Architecture Views 19
Abbreviations DOD Department of Defense C4ISR Command, Control,
Communications, Computers,
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance NATO North Atlantic Treaty
Organization OMB Office of Management and Budget Contents
Page 1 GAO- 01- 632 Combat Identification Systems
June 25, 2001 The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld The Secretary of Defense
Dear Mr. Rumsfeld: Friendly fire, or fratricide, incidents accounted for
about 24 percent of U. S. fatalities during Operation Desert Storm in 1991.
Following that operation, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the military
services have been working to find new ways to avoid friendly fire in joint
and coalition operations. Their efforts have focused on developing new
equipment and technologies as well as new tactics, training, techniques, and
other solutions.
In particular, DOD and the military services have been working toward
developing a group, or family, of systems that can effectively work together
to improve the military?s ability to prevent friendly fire. These range from
systems that can query and identify a specific target as ?friendly? or
?unknown,? to situational awareness systems that rely on periodic updates of
position data to help users locate friendly forces. They would be used in
surface- to- surface, air- to- surface, air- to- air, and surfaceto- air
operations. And they would be equipped on aircraft, surface vehicles, air
traffic control stations, as well as weapon systems carried by ground
troops.
Effectively managing such a large and complex endeavor requires, among other
things, a well- defined and enforced blueprint for operational and
technological change, commonly referred to as an enterprise architecture. By
providing a clear and comprehensive picture of a mission area- both in
logical (e. g., operations, functions, and information flows) terms and
technical (e. g., software, hardware, and communications) terms-
architectures help ensure that new systems are compatible, interoperable,
and supportive of long- term plans.
Because of the importance of an enterprise architecture to effective systems
development, we reviewed DOD?s efforts to develop and implement one for
combat identification. We also reviewed DOD?s efforts to establish the
management structures and processes needed to ensure that new systems can
operate jointly and with U. S. allies.
United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO- 01- 632 Combat Identification Systems
DOD does not have an enterprise architecture to guide its effort to develop
combat identification systems. While it has initiated efforts to develop
one, they have not been comprehensive or adopted by the military services.
DOD began an effort in 1994, for example, to develop a systems architecture,
but it did not define the operational elements activities, tasks, and
information flows required to accomplish combat identification functions. It
also did not define technical standards and rules governing the arrangement
and interaction of combat identification systems. And, it did not address
future needs and capabilities. A subsequent effort that began in 2000 would
exclude air- to- air and surface- to- air operations and DOD has yet to
develop specific tasking plans for defining systems and technical
architectures. In addition, the effort has not been fully funded.
DOD also does not yet have the management structure and processes that are
required to ensure that combat identification systems developed across the
department are compatible and interoperable, not duplicative, and are in-
line with overall department goals. Such mechanisms would include
specifically defined focal points responsible for coordinating development
efforts; plans that lay out specific initiatives, programs, and projects
needed to achieve DOD?s combat identification goals; procedures for defining
such things as system requirements, procuring systems, and funding specific
efforts; and performance measures. Again, DOD has initiated efforts to
develop a management framework, including a 1993 initiative that created a
focal point for all combat identification activities and defined an
acquisition strategy. However, these are no longer in use. Moreover, needed
actions in the Joint Chiefs of Staff?s combat identification action plan
have not been fully funded.
Our experience with federal agencies has shown that attempting to define and
build major systems without first completing an enterprise systems
architecture often results in systems that are duplicative, not well
integrated, unnecessarily costly to maintain and interface, and do not
effectively optimize mission performance. Moreover, without good management
controls, agencies are not able to ensure efforts are sufficiently
coordinated and funded. Some of these problems have already occurred in DOD.
Consequently, we are making recommendations to strengthen DOD?s management
of its combat identification efforts to help ensure attainment of required
capabilities.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with all of our
recommendations and cited ongoing and planned initiatives to address our
concerns. Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO- 01- 632 Combat Identification Systems
Friendly fire is a serious problem confronting DOD and the military
services. According to a report issued by the Office of Technology
Assessment in 1993, 1 about 24 percent of the fatalities experienced during
Operation Desert Storm were the result of friendly fire- a rate that
appeared very high compared to past conflicts. Sixty- one percent of these
incidents involved ground- to- ground incidents, while air- to- ground and
ground- to- air incidents accounted for 36 and 3 percent, respectively. A
more recent notable incident is the 1994 friendly forces? shootdown of two
Blackhawk helicopters over Iraq during Operation Provide Comfort. 2 Such
incidents may be caused by command and control failures, navigation
failures, or target misidentification.
A key aspect of DOD?s effort to prevent friendly fire is the development of
new combat identification systems. Some of these systems will ?cooperate? to
identify friendly targets through queries and answers. Others will identify
targets as friendly or unknown with the help of data sources, such as radio
emissions or acoustic signals. And others, known as situational awareness
systems, will rely on periodic updates of position data to help users locate
friendly forces. The cost of such systems is significant. For example, the
Army?s efforts to develop, field, and maintain cooperative combat
identification systems alone are expected to cost more than $1 billion.
Successfully developing and implementing these systems is a major challenge
for DOD. The systems themselves will be developed and managed by many
different entities within DOD and the military services. They will be
involved in a wide range of military operations and installed on a broad
array of equipment. At the same time, however, these systems will need to be
compatible and interoperable. They will also need to fit in with DOD?s long-
term goals for achieving information superiority over the enemy. DOD defines
this as ?the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an
uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary?s
ability to do the same.? Additionally, it is important that these systems be
able to work with systems belonging to North
1 U. S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Who Goes There: Friend or
Foe?, OTA- ISC- 537 (Washington, DC; U. S. Government Printing Office, June
1993). 2 Operation Provide Comfort, which began April 5, 1991 and ended on
December 31, 1996, combined the efforts of four nations- the United States,
United Kingdom, France and Turkey- to provide a security force for the 3.2
million people in northern Iraq, a deterrent force against Iraqi aggression
and a humanitarian relief effort. Background
Page 4 GAO- 01- 632 Combat Identification Systems
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other allies in order to help
preclude friendly fire incidents during coalition operations.
DOD does not yet have a complete enterprise architecture to guide its
efforts to develop a family of combat identification systems and past
attempts to establish an architecture were not comprehensive or adopted by
the services. Without a ?blueprint? to guide and constrain DOD?s investments
in combat identification systems, the military services and Defense agencies
may well find themselves with combat identification systems that are
duplicative, not interoperable, and unnecessarily costly to maintain and
interface.
An enterprise architecture systematically captures in useful models,
diagrams, and narrative the full breadth and depth of the mission- based
mode of operations for a given enterprise, which can be (1) a single
organization or (2) a functional or mission area that transcends more than
one organizational boundary (e. g., financial management, acquisition
management, or combat identification). Further, such an architecture
describes the enterprise?s operations in both (1) logical terms, such as
interrelated functions, information needs and flows, work locations, and
system applications, and (2) technical terms, such as hardware, software,
data, communications, and security attributes and performance standards.
If defined properly, enterprise architectures can assist in optimizing
interdependencies and interrelationships among an organization?s operations
and the underlying technology supporting these operations. Our experience
with federal agencies has shown that attempting to define and build major
systems without first completing an enterprise systems architecture often
results in systems that are duplicative, not well integrated, unnecessarily
costly to maintain and interface, and do not effectively optimize mission
performance.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has recognized the importance of
agency enterprise architectures. OMB has issued guidance that, among other
things, requires agency information system investments to be consistent with
agency architectures. 3 More recently, the Chief
3 OMB Memorandum M- 97- 02, Funding Information Systems Investments, October
25, 1996, and OMB Memorandum M- 97- 16, Information Technology
Architectures, June 18, 1997. DOD Lacks
Architecture for Combat Identification
Value of an Enterprise Architecture
Page 5 GAO- 01- 632 Combat Identification Systems
Information Officers Council produced guidance for federal agencies in
initiating, developing, using, and maintaining enterprise architectures. 4
DOD has also issued architecture policy, including a framework defining an
architecture?s structure and content. Specifically, in February 1998, 5 DOD
directed its components and activities to use the Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
(C4ISR) Architecture Framework, Version 2. 0. DOD?s framework is comprised
of three components: (1) an operational architecture- that is, the
operational elements, activities, tasks, and information flows required to
accomplish or support a mission, (2) a systems architecture- that is, the
systems and interconnections supporting the functional mission, and (3) a
technical architecture- that is, the minimum set of standards and rules
governing the arrangement, interaction, and interdependence of systems
applications and infrastructure.
According to DOD, the C4ISR Architecture Framework is a critical tool for
achieving its strategic direction and all DOD components and activities
should use the framework for all functional areas and domains within the
Department. The C4ISR Architecture Framework is recognized in the Federal
Chief Information Officers Council?s A Practical Guide to Federal Enterprise
Architecture as a model architecture framework for developing enterprise
architectures. Appendix I provides more detailed information on the C4ISR
Architecture Framework.
DOD has also recognized the importance of architectures in its recently
revised acquisition guidance, DOD Directive 5000. 1 and Instruction 5000. 2.
This guidance sets DOD policy for managing all acquisition programs. Among
other things, it requires the use of architectures to characterize the
interrelationships and interactions between U. S., allied, and coalition
systems.
4 Chief Information Officers Council, A Practical Guide to Federal
Enterprise Architecture, Version 1. 0, February 2001. 5 The February 28,
1998, memorandum was jointly signed by the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition and Technology), the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence), and the Director for
C4 Systems, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Page 6 GAO- 01- 632 Combat Identification Systems
DOD has initiated efforts to develop an architecture for combat
identification, but they have not been comprehensive or adopted by the
military services. The first effort began in 1994 with the creation of a
Combat Identification Task Force. Among other things, such as identifying
promising combat identification technologies for a planned demonstration,
the Task Force sought to develop an overall architecture for combat
identification through an architecture working group. However, this effort
only focused on specific systems and how they would work together. It did
not define the operational elements and activities required to support a
future warfighting vision or technical standards. Both views are integral to
an overall architecture. According to DOD, for example, the operational view
is useful for facilitating a number of actions across DOD, such as defining
operational requirements to be supported by physical resources and systems.
The technical view enables interoperability and compatibility of systems, by
providing the standards, criteria, and reference models upon which
engineering specifications are based, common building blocks are
established, and applications are developed.
The work of the architecture working group also excluded elements integral
to the battlefield, such as dismounted soldiers, ships, air defense sites,
and air- to- ground missions other than close- air support. Additionally,
the architecture developed only dealt with the need to identify forces as
being either friendly or hostile. It did not address the need to further
distinguish targeted systems by class (e. g., ?tank? vs. ?truck?), platform
(e. g., MIG 29 vs. T- 72 Main Battle Tank) or intent (e. g., a defecting vs.
an attacking platform). More critically, the architecture was never adopted
by the services.
Subsequent work began in January 2000 when the Joint Chiefs of Staff?s
Combat Identification Assessment Division began planning draft guidance on
an effort to analyze alternative current and evolving combat identification
technologies to support development of an operational architecture. The
analysis is expected to take over 2 years to complete at an estimated cost
of $10 million. However, this effort is to focus on surface- to- surface and
air- to- surface military operations and not to include air- to- air or
surface- to- air operations. While the draft guidance for the analysis
indicated that the Army should lead the effort with support from the other
services, thus far, only the Air Force has budgeted funds- $2 million-
toward accomplishing this task. Similarly, in January 2001, the Assessment
Division described efforts to develop the operational architecture itself.
However, this effort is currently unfunded. According to DOD officials, the
reasons for the current lack of funding include the DOD Still Lacks a
Complete Architecture for Combat Identification
Page 7 GAO- 01- 632 Combat Identification Systems
difficulty of reflecting such efforts in DOD?s budgets in a timely manner
and addressing competing service funding priorities.
Architectures enable organizations to know their portfolio of desired
systems and to develop a clear understanding of how these systems will
collectively support and carry out their objectives. Moreover, they help
ensure that systems are interoperable, function together effectively, and
are cost- effective over their life cycles. Our previous reviews at the
Federal Aviation Administration, Customs Service, Department of Education,
Internal Revenue Service, Bureau of Indian Affairs, and National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration have shown that while the absence of a complete
architecture does not guarantee the failure of system modernization efforts,
it does greatly increase the risk that agencies will spend more money and
time than necessary to ensure that systems are compatible and in line with
business needs. 6
Our previous work reviewing DOD?s combat identification efforts has shown
that DOD is confronting such risks. In 1993, we reported 7 on the Army?s
ongoing efforts to develop its Battlefield Combat Identification System (see
fig. 1)- a system designed to provide a ground- to- ground and potentially
an air (helicopter)- to- ground cooperative identification capability. We
found that the Army planned to spend up to $100 million on a near- term
combat identification system even though the system might eventually be
discarded if it could not be integrated into a long- term solution. We also
reported that the Army planned to eventually buy 1,520 of the near- term
systems to equip some forces even though that number would not be sufficient
for a larger- scale operation.
6 Air Traffic Control: Complete and Enforced Architecture Needed for FAA
Systems Modernization (GAO/ AIMD- 97- 30, Feb. 3, 1997); Customs Service
Modernization: Architecture Must Be Complete and Enforced to Effectively
Build and Maintain Systems (GAO/ AIMD- 98- 70, May 5, 1998); Student
Financial Aid Information: Systems Architecture Needed to Improve Program?s
Efficiency (GAO/ AIMD- 97- 122, July 29, 1997); Tax Systems Modernization:
Management and Technical Weaknesses Must Be Corrected If Modernization Is to
Succeed (GAO/ AIMD- 95- 156, July 26, 1995); Weather Forecasting: Systems
Architecture Needed for National Weather Service Modernization (GAO/ AIMD-
94- 28, Mar. 11, 1994); Indian Trust Funds: Interior Lacks Assurance That
Trust Improvement Plan Will Be Effective (GAO/ AIMD- 99- 53, Apr. 28, 1999).
7 Minimizing Friendly Fire: The Army Should Consider Long- Term Solution in
Its Procurement Decision on Near- Term Needs (GAO/ NSIAD- 94- 19, Oct. 22,
1993). Lack of an Architecture
Poses Significant Risks
Page 8 GAO- 01- 632 Combat Identification Systems
Figure 1: The Battlefield Combat Identification System
Source: U. S. Army.
Additionally, absent the understanding provided by an enterprise
architecture, the services risk being unable to effectively define and
develop weapon system requirements (e. g., system characteristics,
functions, and performance parameters). As mentioned earlier, developing an
enterprise architecture provides further understanding of (1) the
operational elements, activities, tasks, and information flows needed to
accomplish a mission, (2) the systems needed and their interconnections to
support that mission, and (3) the minimum set of standards and rules
Page 9 GAO- 01- 632 Combat Identification Systems
needed to govern their arrangement, interaction, and interdependence. As a
result, systematically reviewing specific systems? requirements within the
context of such an architecture can help ensure the development of cost-
effective systems to provide needed capabilities.
DOD has already identified some broader needs for combat identification.
Specifically, in 1992 and again in 1998, DOD defined its overall mission
needs for combat identification systems and it defined the capabilities it
expected from these systems, including
positive, timely, and reliable identification of friends, foes, and
neutrals; 8
classification of foes by platform, class/ type, and nationality; and
friend- from- friend discrimination. More recently, the U. S. Joint Forces
Command developed a Capstone Requirements Document that defines overarching
requirements for the combat identification family of systems.
Lastly, without having a complete architecture for combat identification,
DOD may not be able to ensure that its own operational, systems, and
technical requirements are aligned with those of NATO allies. NATO is
currently developing both an operational architecture and a systems
architecture in all mission domains (air- to- air, surface- to- air, air-
to- surface, and surface- to- surface). It plans to complete these
architectures by the end of 2001 and the end of 2002, respectively. If DOD?s
efforts to develop an enterprise architecture for combat identification
occur in a timely manner, they could be more closely aligned with NATO?s
efforts and possibly improve coalition interoperability. Moreover, DOD would
be able to ensure that the long- term capabilities it envisions for combat
identification are recognized.
8 DOD has further clarified this by stating that ?friendly includes military
allies and coalition partners? and the neutral ?includes non- aligned
military forces and noncombatants.?
Page 10 GAO- 01- 632 Combat Identification Systems
The effort to develop new systems for combat identification is challenging
not only because the systems themselves span a number of entities within DOD
but also because they may need to operate jointly and with systems belonging
to allies and work in concert with DOD?s long- term goals for information
superiority. DOD?s success, therefore, hinges on having effective management
structures and processes- e. g. focal points, funding and development plans,
schedule and resource estimates, performance measures, progress reporting
requirements- to guide and manage systems development.
DOD and the services have established focal points for coordinating combat
identification efforts. For example, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence is responsible for
overseeing combat identification programs and the Joint Chiefs of Staff has
ongoing efforts to improve combat identification capabilities. However, DOD
currently lacks a formalized framework defining the procedures and controls
that would facilitate these efforts. As a result, coordination and funding
of development initiatives is not assured.
Because the prevention of friendly fire is a DOD- wide effort involving the
military services, other DOD components, and even U. S. allies, it must be
approached as an enterprise endeavor with senior executive management
sponsorship. This requires identifying an entity or individual with
organizational authority, responsibility, and accountability for managing
system development as an agencywide project and ensuring appropriate
resources are provided to accomplish needed tasks and develop required
systems.
We have reported on the need for cohesive management in developing combat
identification systems in the past. In 1995, we issued a report 9 on Army
and Navy- led efforts to develop cooperative identification systems. We
found that the Army and Navy were pursuing development of systems without
having developed a cohesive management plan and organizational structure and
made recommendations to strengthen those efforts.
9 Combat Identification Systems: Changes Needed in Management Plans and
Structure (GAO/ NSIAD- 95- 153, Sept. 14, 1995). Important
Management Tools for Developing Combat Identification Systems Needed
Management Structures and Controls Needed to Guide System Development
Page 11 GAO- 01- 632 Combat Identification Systems
Given the size and complexity of the project, it is important for DOD to
have a plan that lays out the current combat identification capabilities,
desired capabilities, and specific initiatives, programs, and projects
intended to get DOD and the services to that vision. Such plans, or
roadmaps, are often developed as part of an enterprise architecture. To
facilitate the implementation of these plans, it is also necessary for DOD
to define the organizational structure, responsibilities, and procedures for
such things as defining system requirements, developing and procuring
systems, and funding specific efforts. Together, these structures and
processes can help ensure that combat identification projects are not
duplicative or disparate and that they receive adequate priority and
funding.
Lastly, it is important that DOD define performance measures to assess the
progress of combat identification improvements. The Government Performance
and Results Act of 1993 10 requires federal agencies and activities to
clearly define their missions, set goals, link activities and resources to
goals, prepare annual performance plans, measure performance, and report on
their accomplishments.
Performance measures can be particularly helpful in ensuring that services
and components are effectively coordinating their development efforts. For
example, DOD could measure the progress associated with planning and
successfully conducting joint, cross- service, and allied demonstrations of
interoperable systems. Performance measures can also help ensure projects
are adequately funded, for example, by measuring whether the services?
budgets support efforts to develop an enterprise architecture for combat
identification.
DOD has recognized the benefit of formally defining management structures
and processes in the past to guide combat identification efforts, but those
efforts are no longer in use.
First, in January 1993, the services signed a Memorandum of Agreement on
Joint Management of Combat Identification to coordinate and provide
oversight of their requirements, policies, procedures, development and
procurement programs, and related technology efforts. The agreement stated
that combat identification encompasses widely varying
10 Public Law 103- 62, August 3, 1993. Past Efforts That Sought to
Ensure Cohesiveness No Longer in Use
Page 12 GAO- 01- 632 Combat Identification Systems
requirements, policies, platforms, mission areas, and technologies. Among
other things, the agreement created a General Officer Steering Committee to
serve as a primary focal point for all DOD combat identification activities;
a Joint Combat Identification Officer under that committee to provide lower-
level coordination on all DOD efforts and develop a master plan for combat
identification efforts; three supporting committees; and two acquisition-
related groups.
Following the agreement, DOD published a joint master plan for its
?cooperative identification? system development efforts (that is, systems
that identify friendly or unknown through queries and answers). The plan
defined management strategies and structures to plan and execute these
technologies and it defined an acquisition strategy that called for such
things as baselining existing capability, identifying and prioritizing
deficiencies, coordinating advanced research and development activities, and
integrating system architectures.
However, the memorandum of agreement is no longer in use and only one of the
entities created from the memorandum still exists- the Joint Chiefs of
Staff?s Combat Identification Assessment Division (formerly the Joint Combat
Identification Office). Moreover, according to a DOD official, the Joint
Master Plan for cooperative systems development is no longer in use because
the services? efforts did not evolve into joint programs as originally
envisioned.
In 1996, the services developed another master plan that represented their
strategic vision for developing, maintaining, and enhancing their combat
identification capability. This plan went beyond the 1993 plan by including
noncooperative and situational awareness system development efforts. The
plan was to serve as the focal point for coordination of joint and service-
unique initiatives during the budget process. However, it was updated only
once in 1998 and that revision was never adopted by the department.
Since then, the Joint Chiefs of Staff?s Combat Identification Assessment
Division has developed and updated an annual action plan. Many of the plan?s
tasks are designed to address known deficiencies that can be corrected in
the near term. The plan does not define management structures and procedures
for guiding system development. And, while it does call for a semiannual
report on progress, it does not define specific measures to be used in
assessing that progress. Moreover, the Assessment Division does not have
authority to direct the services to implement its plan nor does it have
funding authority of its own to carry out the plan?s
Page 13 GAO- 01- 632 Combat Identification Systems
tasks. Rather, an Assessment Division official stated that the services?
cooperation is essential to implement the plan.
Without sufficient structures and processes to coordinate and guide systems
development, some combat identification projects have not been sufficiently
funded. For example, as mentioned earlier, the systems analysis DOD planned
to support development of an operational architecture for combat
identification has an estimated cost of $10 million. However, while the
guidance for this analysis indicated that the Army should lead the effort
with support from the other services, thus far only the Air Force has
budgeted funds-$ 2 million- toward its accomplishment. In addition, the
Combat Identification Assessment Division?s planned operational architecture
is also unfunded at this time.
Similar problems are occurring at the service level. Based on a review of
the Battlefield Combat Identification System program, the DOD Inspector
General recently reported 11 that the Army has obligated $132. 4 million in
research, development, test and evaluation, and procurement funds through
fiscal year 2000 and plans to obligate another $86.5 million to complete
development efforts and procure 1, 169 low- rate initial production systems
from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2007 for the 4th Infantry
Division. However, the Inspector General also reported that the Army has not
provided $918. 5 million of procurement and operations and maintenance funds
for the program?s procurement objective of 16,414 systems. 12
The lack of a management framework also makes it difficult to coordinate
projects among the services to ensure that they are not redundant or
disparate. For example, the Army recently proposed a memorandum of agreement
between the Army and the Marines for cooperation in battlefield
identification activities. The memorandum was to describe the activities and
intentions of the two services to promote and ensure joint operational
interoperability and to encourage sharing of information and
11 Acquisition of the Battlefield Combat Identification System, Department
of Defense, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Report D- 2001- 093,
March 30, 2001. 12 DOD?s acquisition guidance now addresses the risk
involved in such incidents by requiring that programs be fully funded (i.
e., inclusion in the budget and out- year program of the funding for all
current and future efforts necessary to carry out the acquisition strategy)
before they transition into system development and demonstration.
Development Efforts Have
Not Been Effectively Coordinated or Sufficiently Funded
Page 14 GAO- 01- 632 Combat Identification Systems
joint work on combat identification concepts, doctrine (tactics, techniques,
and procedures), experimentation, operational analysis, and lessons learned.
The proposed agreement was also to acknowledge that the Army was pursuing
its Battlefield Combat Identification System for ground- to- ground
identification and that the Marines? priority of effort would go toward air-
to- ground identification.
The Marines declined the Army?s proposed agreement. A Marine Corps official
told us that the recent approval of a NATO Standardization Agreement for
battlefield identification systems mandating the use of the same technology
employed in the Army?s system 13 and the development of the recently
approved combat identification Capstone Requirements Document negate the
need for a separate agreement to address interoperability between Army and
similar Marine Corps systems. Complying with the NATO agreement and the
Capstone Requirements Document may enable the Marines to build systems that
can interact with those built to NATO?s standards and that have the
capabilities that DOD has envisioned. However, it reduces assurance that
Marine systems will be fully interoperable with the Army?s and it will not
reduce the risk of inefficient redundancy of service efforts.
Preventing friendly fire is a complex and challenging endeavor. It
encompasses the development of new technologies as well as new training,
tactics, and warfighting techniques. It involves a range of equipment and
systems that have historically not been able to effectively interact as well
as a variety of military operations. And it?s a concern among each of the
services as well as our allies. Clearly, it is essential to have a blueprint
that ties together these elements and provides a comprehensive map for long-
term improvements as well as a management framework that is strong enough to
implement the blueprint. While DOD has taken some concrete steps toward both
ends, it needs to strengthen these efforts and ensure that they are
supported by the services. Without doing so, it may well continue to contend
with problems leading to friendly fire incidents.
13 The Army?s current Battlefield Combat Identification System will require
some modifications to become compliant with the standardization agreement.
Conclusions
Page 15 GAO- 01- 632 Combat Identification Systems
To improve DOD?s combat identification system development efforts, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, in
collaboration with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Joint Staff?s Combat
Identification Assessment Division; and the services; to
Develop- in accordance with federal guidelines and relevant DOD policies
and guidance- an enterprise architecture for combat identification that
reflects the needs of its future warfighting vision. The architecture should
define (1) the operational elements, activities, tasks, and information
flows required to accomplish the combat identification mission, (2) the
systems and interconnections supporting the mission, and (3) the minimum set
of standards and rules governing the arrangement, interaction, and
interdependence of systems applications and infrastructure. It should also
encompass air- to- air, surface- to- air, surface- to- surface, and air- to-
surface operations. Once the architecture is defined, we recommend that DOD
review specific system requirements to determine whether they should be
adjusted to address the needs reflected in those architectures or determine
if gaps exist and new development efforts are needed.
Develop and annually update a written, formalized management framework to
guide the department?s combat identification efforts. The framework should
define the organizational structure and procedures to be used in managing
those efforts including the structures and procedures to coordinate
requirements? and systems? development and funding, and develop and enforce
the enterprise architecture. Until an enterprise architecture is developed,
the framework should contain interim procedures for the review of ongoing
efforts and that allow continuation of only efforts deemed essential or for
which risk mitigation mechanisms have been provided. The framework should
also provide roadmaps to future developments and define time- phased
measures of program performance.
In addition, to enable accomplishment of overarching combat identification
efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense ensure that adequate
funding is provided to implement these initiatives. Recommendations for
Executive Action
Page 16 GAO- 01- 632 Combat Identification Systems
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with all three of
our recommendations and cited ongoing and planned initiatives to address our
concerns. We are encouraged by the department?s initiatives.
In concurring with our recommendation related to the development and use of
an enterprise architecture, DOD stated that two of the three views forming
that architecture- the operational and systems views- are to be developed in
the near- term. The department added- as we recommended- that these views
can then be used as a guide to review and adjust systems requirements and to
determine if gaps exits that may require new development efforts. DOD also
stated that development of the technical architecture view will be initiated
once development of the other views has progressed to an appropriate point.
DOD agreed with our recommendation that the department develop and annually
update a written, formalized management framework to guide its combat
identification efforts. DOD commented that it has a formalized framework to
guide its combat identification efforts that is delineated in a draft Joint
Staff Combat Identification Assessment Team charter, the Joint Staff Combat
Identification Action Plan, and a Combat Identification Capstone
Requirements Document. To complement the Joint Staff?s efforts, DOD proposes
the establishment of a combat identification integrated product team to
assist in developing and enforcing the combat identification systems
architecture and resolving combat identification system acquisition,
integration, and synchronization issues. Also, the team is to produce
roadmaps and time- phased measures of program performance for individual
system?s development efforts as required.
DOD stated that it agreed with our recommendation regarding the need for
adequate funding of overarching combat identification efforts. The
department commented that it is committed to the identification of funding
to support these efforts through its budgeting and requirements processes.
DOD?s comments are reprinted in appendix II. In addition, DOD also provided
technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate.
To determine whether the services are using an enterprise architecture to
guide their combat identification efforts, we reviewed documents relating to
services? prior, current, and planned combat identification efforts. We also
discussed architecture- related issues with officials from the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and
Intelligence; the Joint Chiefs of Staff Combat Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation Scope and Methodology
Page 17 GAO- 01- 632 Combat Identification Systems
Identification Assessment Division; the NATO Identification System
Coordination Office; and various service activities. Additionally, we
reviewed DOD and Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance on requirements development
and examined DOD?s and the service?s planned actions within the context of
that guidance. We also discussed requirements issues with cognizant DOD and
service officials.
To determine whether DOD and the services have developed and are using
cohesive management plans to assure inter- service and allied
interoperability of cost- effective combat identification systems, we
reviewed previous combat identification plans and discussed those plans with
DOD representatives and the services. We also discussed general management
issues with those officials and developed information on management problems
that might be avoided by developing a cohesive management plan.
Additionally, to gain a better understanding of DOD and allied
interoperability requirements, we discussed combat identification issues
with representatives of NATO and the United Kingdom?s National Audit Office,
Ministry of Defence, and Defence Evaluation and Research Agency.
We conducted our work from September 2000 through June 2001 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
This report contains recommendations to you. As you know, 31 U. S. C. 720
requires the head of a federal agency to submit a written statement of the
actions taken on our recommendations to the Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs and to the House Committee on Government Reform not later than 60
days from the date of this letter and to the House and Senate Committees on
Appropriations with the agency?s first request for appropriations made more
than 60 days after the date of this letter.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees. We are also sending copies to the Honorable Thomas E. White,
Secretary of the Army; the Honorable Gordon R. England, Secretary of the
Navy; the Honorable James G. Roche, Secretary of the Air Force; General
James L. Jones, Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Honorable Mitchell E.
Daniels, Jr., Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other
interested parties. We will make copies available to others upon request.
The report will also be available on our homepage at http:// www. gao. gov.
Page 18 GAO- 01- 632 Combat Identification Systems
Please contact me at (202) 512- 4841 if you have any questions concerning
this report. Major contributors to this report were Charles F. Rey, Bruce H.
Thomas, Thomas W. Hopp, Rahul Gupta, Hai Tran, Gary L. Middleton, Cristina
Chaplain, and Randolph C. Hite.
Sincerely yours, Allen Li Director, Acquisition
and Sourcing Management
Appendix I: DOD?s Enterprise Architecture Framework: A Brief Description
Page 19 GAO- 01- 632 Combat Identification Systems
The Department of Defense (DOD) has published a framework for the
development and presentation of architectures within DOD. 1 The framework
defines the type and content of architectural artifacts, as well as the
relationships among artifacts, that are needed to produce a useful
enterprise architecture. Briefly, the framework decomposes an enterprise
architecture into three primary views (perspectives into how the enterprise
operates): the operational, systems, and technical views, also referred to
as architectures. According to DOD, the three interdependent views are
needed to ensure that information technology systems are developed and
implemented in an interoperable and cost- effective manner. Each of these
views is summarized below. (Fig. 2 is a simplified diagram depicting the
interrelationships among the views.)
Figure 2: Interrelationship of Three Architecture Views
Source: C41SR Architecture Framework, Version 2.0, December 18, 1997.
1 C4ISR Architecture Framework, Version 2.0, December 18, 1997. Appendix I:
DOD?s Enterprise Architecture
Framework: A Brief Description
Appendix I: DOD?s Enterprise Architecture Framework: A Brief Description
Page 20 GAO- 01- 632 Combat Identification Systems
The operational architecture view defines the operational elements,
activities and tasks, and information flows required to accomplish or
support an organizational mission or business function. According to DOD, it
is useful for facilitating a number of actions and assessments across DOD,
such as examining business processes for reengineering or defining
operational requirements to be supported by physical resources and systems.
The systems architecture view defines the systems and their
interconnections supporting the organizational or functional mission in
context with the operational view, including how multiple systems link and
interoperate, and may describe the internal construction and operations of
particular systems. According to DOD, this view has many uses, such as
helping managers to evaluate interoperability improvement and to make
investment decisions concerning cost- effective ways to satisfy operational
requirements.
The technical architecture view defines a minimum set of standards and
rules governing the arrangement, interaction, and interdependence of system
applications and infrastructure. It provides the technical standards,
criteria, and reference models upon which engineering specifications are
based, common building blocks are established, and applications are
developed.
Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 21 GAO- 01- 632 Combat Identification Systems
Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Defense
Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 22 GAO- 01- 632 Combat Identification Systems
Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 23 GAO- 01- 632 Combat Identification Systems
Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 24 GAO- 01- 632 Combat Identification Systems (707557)
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