Defense Acquisitions: Higher Level DOD Review of Antiarmor Mission and Munitions Is Needed (08-JUN-01, GAO-01-607)
The Department of Defense (DOD) issued anti armor munitions
master plans beginning in 1985 and updated the plans annually
until 1990. These anti armor plans focused on the Cold War
armored threat and on the weapons that would be needed to prevail
in a Cenral European Scenario. The House Committee on
Appropriations expressed concern that the military services were
continuing to develop and procure an increasing number of
tank-killing weapons at a time when potential adversaries have
smaller numbers of armored forces. The Committee directed the
Secretary of Defense to develop an Anti armor Munitions Master
Plan to identify the projected armor threat and the projected
quantity of all anti armor weapons, with the purpose of
identifying and eliminating excess anti armor capability. This
report reviews the plan to determine if it provides the data and
analysis specified in the Fiscal Year 2000 Defense Appropriations
conference report and provides data and analysis needed to
support the services' current anti armor acquisition plans. GAO
found that DOD's July 2000 Anti armor Munitions Master Plan did
not provide the data and analysis specified in the Fiscal Year
2000 Defense Appropriations conference report. The plan provided
limited data and analysis to support the services' current
aniarmor acquisition plans. In January 2001, DOD stated that, in
anticipation of the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Army has
initiated a number of studies and analyses to more clearly define
an economically sound and operationally effective mix of
munitions.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-01-607
ACCNO: A01165
TITLE: Defense Acquisitions: Higher Level DOD Review of
Antiarmor Mission and Munitions Is Needed
DATE: 06/08/2001
SUBJECT: Munitions
Defense capabilities
Military procurement
Defense contingency planning
Combat readiness
DOD Antiarmor Munitions Master Plan
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GAO-01-607
Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on
Appropriations, House of Representatives
United States General Accounting Office
GAO
June 2001 DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS Higher Level DOD Review of Antiarmor Mission
and Munitions Is Needed
GAO- 01- 607
Page 1 GAO- 01- 607 Defense Acquisitions
June 8, 2001 The Honorable Jerry Lewis Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Department of Defense (DOD) issued antiarmor
munitions master plans beginning in 1985 and updated the plans annually
until 1990. These antiarmor plans focused on the Cold War armored threat and
on the weapons that would be needed to prevail in a Central European
scenario. In its report on the Fiscal Year 1999 Defense Appropriations Bill,
1 the House Committee on Appropriations expressed concern that the military
services were continuing to develop and procure an increasing number of
tank- killing weapons at a time when potential adversaries have smaller
numbers of armored forces. We previously reported that the number of
potential enemy armored targets under current warfighting scenarios is less
than 20 percent of the number considered in 1990. 2 Since 1990, the military
services have maintained and improved their inventories of about 40
different types of antiarmor weapons. The military services currently have
13 new antiarmor weapons acquisitions programs with a total cost of about
$14 billion.
The Committee directed the Secretary of Defense to develop an Antiarmor
Munitions Master Plan to identify the projected armor threat and the
projected quantity of all antiarmor weapons, with the purpose of identifying
and eliminating excess antiarmor capability. In response, DOD prepared a new
master plan and issued it in August 1999. In 2000, we reviewed the plan and
reported 3 that it did not identify any excess antiarmor weapons or provide
the data and analysis needed to identify such excesses. It also did not
provide the data and analysis necessary to support the services? plans to
acquire new antiarmor weapons.
1 House of Representatives, Report 105- 591, June 22, 1998. 2 Defense
Acquisitions: Reduced Threat Not Reflected in Antiarmor Weapons
Acquisitions, (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 105, July 22, 1999). 3 Defense Acquisitions:
Antiarmor Munitions Master Plan Does Not Identify Potential Excesses or
Support Planned Procurements (GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 67, May 5, 2000).
United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO- 01- 607 Defense Acquisitions
Subsequently, the October 1999 Conference Report accompanying the Fiscal
Year 2000 Defense Appropriations Bill 4 noted shortfalls in the plan and
directed the Secretary of Defense to provide another antiarmor master plan.
The conference report specified that the plan (1) evaluate the joint
effectiveness of the existing antiarmor weapons in addressing the threat
depicted in the defense planning guidance, (2) describe how planned
antiarmor weapons could meet shortfalls in current capability in the defense
planning guidance scenarios, and (3) prioritize DOD?s antiarmor weapons
acquisition programs based on this analysis. In July 2000, DOD submitted its
revised antiarmor munitions master plan. At your request, we have reviewed
the revised plan to determine if (1) it provides the data and analysis
specified in the Fiscal Year 2000 Defense Appropriations conference report,
and (2) provides data and analysis needed to support the services? current
antiarmor acquisition plans.
DOD?s July 2000 Antiarmor Munitions Master Plan did not provide the data and
analysis specified in the Fiscal Year 2000 Defense Appropriations conference
report. Specifically, the plan did not include a joint effectiveness
analysis, describe how planned antiarmor weapons could meet shortfalls in
current capabilities, or provide a prioritization of antiarmor weapon needs
and requirements. According to the Office of the Secretary of Defense
official in charge of preparing the antiarmor master plan, his Office did
not require the services to jointly analyze their antiarmor munitions
capabilities because of past difficulties obtaining service- wide agreement
on results from joint analyses. Without a joint effectiveness analysis, DOD
could not evaluate shortfalls in current capabilities or prioritize
antiarmor weapons acquisition programs on a DOD- wide basis.
The plan provided limited data and analysis to support the services? current
antiarmor acquisition plans. Instead of a joint effectiveness analysis, the
plan relied on two individual service analyses that did not consider the
weapons capabilities of the other services. The master plan included the
results of separate Army and Air Force weapons effectiveness analyses based
on each service?s modeling of the current two regional war scenario. The
analyses showed that each service achieved favorable warfighting outcomes
with or without their planned new antiarmor weapons. With the new weapons,
the analysis showed that the favorable outcomes were achieved slightly
sooner in some cases and/ or with a few
4 House of Representatives, Conference Report 106- 371, October 8, 1999.
Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO- 01- 607 Defense Acquisitions
percent less casualties in others. These analyses provided useful data on
each service?s collective antiarmor capabilities but did not assess the
relative warfighting impact of individual new systems in a joint service
warfighting environment. Knowledge of the relative warfighting contributions
of each new system is critical to determining and comparing cost
effectiveness and establishing priorities among the new weapons programs.
Such an analysis is needed to assure that the mix and quantities of new
weapons being acquired provide the greatest increase in capability for the
dollars spent.
In January 2001, following the August 2000 submission of the revised
antiarmor master plan, DOD notified us that, in anticipation of the
Quadrennial Defense Review, the Army has initiated a number of studies and
analyses to more clearly define an economically sound and operationally
effective mix of munitions. While we welcome the Army?s studies and analyses
of its munitions mix, there continues to be a need for a joint service
assessment of current and future munitions requirements and priorities.
Accordingly, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense include in
the forthcoming Quadrennial Defense Review an examination of joint service
antiarmor munitions capabilities, requirements, and priorities.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD agreed and stated that they
will examine requirements, plans, and priorities for antiarmor weapons as
part of the Quadrennial Defense Review. DOD?s comments are reprinted in
Appendix I.
The armored threat has declined significantly since the end of the Cold War.
Nevertheless, the overall size of the U. S. inventory of antiarmor munitions
has remained fairly constant since 1990, while U. S. weapons have become
more sophisticated, lethal and effective. Currently, DOD has a large
inventory of about 40 different types of antiarmor weapons capable of
destroying tanks, armored combat vehicles, and artillery. These weapons
include various types of ground- and air- fired guided missiles, tank
rounds, rockets and mines. DOD is currently funding the acquisition of 13
new antiarmor weapon systems, at a projected cost to completion of almost
$14 billion. Table 1 below shows the funding levels for the planned
procurements from fiscal year 2001 to completion. Background
Page 4 GAO- 01- 607 Defense Acquisitions
Table 1: Procurement Cost of Planned Antiarmor Weapon Acquisitions 5
Millions of then- year dollars
Weapon Service Total Procurement Cost Procurement Cost Fiscal Year 2001 to
Completion
BAT/ Army Tactical Missile System Army $4,171 $3,792 Guided Multiple Launch
Rocket System Army 3,369 3,369 Joint Stand- off Weapon (BLU- 108) Navy/ Air
Force 1, 571 1,559 Javelin Army/ Marine Corps 3, 012 1,129 Sense and Destroy
Armor Army 295 15 Wide Area Munition Army 1,733 1,669 Longbow Hellfire Army
2107 799 Sensor Fuzed Weapon Air Force 709 506 Predator Marine Corps 592 592
Tank Round M829A2/ E3 Army 1,613 144 Remote Area Denial Munition Army 151
143 25- mm Gun Round, Army M919 Army 242 24 Multipurpose Individual Munition
Army 141 141 Total $19,706 $13,882
The Fiscal Year 2000 Defense Appropriations conference report specified that
DOD?s antiarmor master plan (1) evaluate the joint effectiveness of the
existing antiarmor weapons in addressing the threat depicted in the defense
planning guidance, (2) describe how planned antiarmor weapons could meet
shortfalls in current capability in the defense planning guidance scenarios,
and (3) prioritize DOD?s antiarmor weapons acquisition programs based on
this analysis. DOD?s July 2000 antiarmor master plan does not provide the
data and analysis specified in the conference report.
Instead of evaluating the joint effectiveness of existing antiarmor weapons,
the plan presented a separate effectiveness analysis of Army and Air Force
antiarmor weapons. The analyses showed the separate modeling results of each
services? antiarmor weapons in the current two regional war- planning
scenario. The plan noted that Navy and the Marine Corps weapons were not
included because the Army and Air Force represent tactical air and ground
forces that account for 87 percent of planned antiarmor expenditures.
5 The Multiple Launch Rocket System, the 25- mm Gun Round and the
Multipurpose Individual Munition are used against light armor, but not heavy
armor. The Master Plan Does
Not Provide Data and Analyses Specified by Congress
Page 5 GAO- 01- 607 Defense Acquisitions
The Office of the Secretary of Defense did not require the individual
services or anyone else to provide a joint weapons effectiveness analysis.
According to the Office of the Secretary of Defense official in charge of
the antiarmor master plan, his office did not require such an analysis
because of the past difficulties in getting the services to accept the
results of a joint analysis. He cited the difficulties his office has had in
achieving DOD- wide consensus in other studies, such as the 1997 Deep Attack
Weapons Mix Study. 6
The conferees also requested that the plan describe how planned antiarmor
weapons are expected to fill shortfalls in current capabilities in the two
defense planning scenarios. The plan did not identify any specific
capability shortfalls or describe how individual new weapons would impact
current capabilities. The plan compared the capabilities with and without
the planned new antiarmor munitions. Because the services were not directed
to do a joint analysis, each service focused on the effectiveness of their
own weapons. These separate analyses showed that each service clearly
achieved their objectives with or without their planned antiarmor
procurements, but with the new weapons added, there was some reduction in
casualties and time required to achieve the objectives. These reductions
reflected the collective impacts of the planned antiarmor weapons
procurements. The impacts of individual new weapons were not identified.
Finally, the conferees requested that the plan prioritize the Department?s
antiarmor weapons acquisition programs. The purpose of such a prioritization
would be to identify and eliminate excess capabilities. The plan does not
provide a joint service prioritization or individual service prioritization
of antiarmor weapons. Instead, the plan describes each type munition and its
capabilities. The Office of the Secretary of Defense official in charge of
the plan told us that the individual services would not agree on a joint
prioritization. Additionally, he stated that release of such analysis,
unless all weapon systems are supported, is unlikely since the services
would have to agree on the final report. Without the joint effectiveness
analysis, the Department of Defense cannot provide either a description of
how the planned antiarmor weapons could fill shortfalls across service lines
or a prioritization of the antiarmor munitions.
6 The results of the study were issued in two parts. Part 1 is the Weapons
Mix Analysis and Part 2 is the B- 2 Force Tradeoff Analysis.
Page 6 GAO- 01- 607 Defense Acquisitions
The master plan does not provide data and analysis needed to support the
services? acquisition plans for individual antiarmor weapons. However, the
plan does provide some insight into the collective value of planned
antiarmor procurements. At the direction of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Army and the Air Force compared the effectiveness of their
forces with and without the planned procurements. Our analysis of the
results show that for the projected $14 billion cost of these new
procurements, some improvements were realized in an already favorable
situation. However, the effectiveness analysis leaves many questions
unanswered, particularly about the significance of the improvements realized
and whether this amount of improvement warrants the investment.
The Army?s analysis compared the outcomes of the two regional conflicts with
and without the planned antiarmor procurements. The Army analysts chose
three measures to evaluate the effectiveness of these planned procurements:
attrition of U. S. forces, attrition of enemy forces, and days of combat to
achieve campaign success. The two regional conflict scenarios were modeled
against a 2007 threat and were evaluated both with and without the planned
new antiarmor procurements. In the first regional scenario, the attrition
rate of U. S. forces decreased slightly with the addition of the planned
antiarmor procurements. Enemy kills by U. S. forces were increased and the
days of conflict were somewhat shorter with the addition of these weapons.
In the second regional scenario, the attrition of U. S. forces also
decreased with the addition of the planned procurements. Enemy kills by U.
S. forces increased slightly with these planned antiarmor procurements, but
the days of conflict remained the same. The specific numbers associated with
attrition, enemy kills and days of combat are classified.
The Army official in charge of the analysis acknowledged that the planned
procurements provide a modest increase in mission effectiveness, but he
considered the funding requirements- about $11 billion for 10 programs- only
moderate as well. He noted that larger expenditures would provide greater
improvements.
Like the Army analysis, the Air Force analysis shows that the planned
antiarmor procurements provide some improvements in the expected battle
outcomes. Similarly, the analysis shows that the Air Force is capable of
killing its allocated armored targets with or without the planned antiarmor
procurements. The Air Force also chose three measures to evaluate the
effectiveness of these procurements: attrition of U. S. aircraft, number of
aircraft sorties, and days to complete the Air Force campaign. The Master
Plan
provides Only Limited Insight into the Capabilities Provided by the New
Antiarmor Munitions
Page 7 GAO- 01- 607 Defense Acquisitions
The two regional conflict scenarios were modeled against a 2007 threat and
were evaluated both with and without the planned procurements. Our analysis
of the Air Force data shows that the improved weapons slightly decreased
attrition of U. S. aircraft and the number of aircraft sorties required to
defeat the enemy. Additionally, the improved weapons slightly decreased the
days of combat. The specific numbers associated with aircraft attrition,
aircraft sorties, and days of combat are classified.
Air Force officials told us that the planned antiarmor procurements do not
result in additional enemy losses, since the target set is neutralized with
or without these weapons. They stated that the real significance of these
improved weapons is that they help the Air Force kill its allocated target
set more quickly and thus gain ground for allied forces. We were unable to
determine how much ground would be gained because the Air Force did not
model the movement of U. S. troops. Instead, the Air Force analysis showed
the effects on use and/ or attrition of aircraft and weapons as well as on
the length of the campaign.
Both the Army and Air Force analyses provided useful data on each service?s
collective antiarmor capabilities but did not assess the relative
warfighting impact of individual new systems in a joint service warfighting
environment. Knowledge of the relative warfighting contributions of each new
system is critical to determining and comparing cost effectiveness and
establishing priorities among the new weapons programs. Such an analysis is
needed to assure that the mix and quantities of new weapons being acquired
provide the greatest increase in capability for the dollars spent.
In January 2001, following the August 2000 submission of the revised
antiarmor master plan, DOD notified us that the Army has initiated, in
anticipation of the forthcoming Quadrennial Defense Review, 7 a number of
studies and analyses to more clearly define an economically sound and
operationally effective mix of munitions. Further, the Vice Chief of the
Army has directed a munitions assessment be performed to determine if the
Army has the appropriate munitions mix capable of meeting legacy and
objective force 8 operational requirements. While we welcome the
7 The Quadrennial Defense Review is expected to be a comprehensive and
fundamental examination of the national defense strategy, including force
structure and modernization plans. 8 The legacy force is the force as it
exists today and the objective force is the force
designed to meet future operational needs.
Page 8 GAO- 01- 607 Defense Acquisitions
Army?s assessments of its munitions mix, there continues to be a need for a
joint service assessment of current and future munitions requirements and
priorities.
The July 2000 antiarmor master plan does not provide the data and analysis
specified in the Fiscal Year 2000 Defense Appropriations conference report.
DOD?s 1999 antiarmor master plan also did not provide the data and analysis
required by the report of the House Committee on Appropriations on the
Fiscal Year 1999 Defense Appropriations Bill. The Office of the Secretary of
Defense continues to experience difficulties in providing joint service
weapons effectiveness analyses and did not require the services to jointly
analyze their antiarmor munitions. However, such analyses are critical to
determining cost effectiveness and establishing priorities among new
antiarmor weapons programs.
Given the difficulties the Office of the Secretary of Defense has had in
providing antiarmor weapons data and analyses as directed by congressional
reports, we recommend the Secretary include, in his forthcoming Quadrennial
Defense Review, an independent cross- service examination of antiarmor
weapons requirements, plans, and priorities.
In commenting on a draft of our report, DOD agreed and stated that the
Department will examine its requirements, plans, and priorities for
antiarmor weapons as part of the Quadrennial Defense Review
To determine if DOD?s July 2000 Antiarmor Master Plan provided the analysis
directed by the Committee, we evaluated the information in the plan and
discussed the plan with representatives from the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense, Acquisition and Technology, Washington, D. C.; the
Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, Washington, D. C.; and the Office
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D. C. We discussed the separate
service analyses contained in the report with representatives from the
Center for Army Analysis, Ft. Belvoir, Virginia and the Air Force Studies
and Analysis Agency.
To determine whether the Master Plan provided the necessary data and
analysis to support the planned antiarmor procurements, we reviewed and
analyzed the data from the master plan as well as the Army and the Air Force
analyses to determine the degree of improvement provided by the planned
procurements. We reviewed the fiscal year 2001 budget submission; the
Commanders- in- Chief?s target allocations, past antiarmor master plans and
our prior reports. We reviewed available information on the upcoming
Quadrennial defense Review. Conclusion
Recommendation for Executive Action
Agency Comments Scope and Methodology
Page 9 GAO- 01- 607 Defense Acquisitions
We conducted our review from September 2000 to April 2001 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld,
Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Thomas White, Secretary of the Army; the
Honorable James G. Roche, Secretary of the Air Force; and to interested
congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others upon
request.
Please contact me on (202) 512- 4841 or Bill Graveline on (256) 650- 1400,
if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Major
contributors to this report were Beverly Breen and Tana Davis.
Sincerely yours, James F. Wiggins, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing
Management Team
Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 10 GAO- 01- 607 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense
Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 11 GAO- 01- 607 Defense Acquisitions (707544)
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