Air Force Inventory: Parts Shortages Are Impacting Operations and Maintenance Effectiveness (27-JUN-01, GAO-01-587)
Spare parts shortages on the three Air Force systems GAO reviewed
have adversely affected the performance of assigned missions and
the economy and efficiency of maintenance activities.
Specifically, the Air Force did not meet its mission-capable
goals for the E-3 or C-5 aircraft during fiscal years 1996-2000,
nor did it meet its goal to have enough F-100-220 engines to meet
peacetime and wartime goals during that period. Also, the
shortages may affect personnel retention. GAO recently reported
that one of the six factors cited by military personnel as
sources of dissatisfaction and reasons to leave the military
related to work circumstances such as lack of parts and materials
to successfully complete daily job requirements. The majority of
reasons cited by item managers at the maintenance facilities for
spare parts shortages were most often related to more spares
being required than were anticipated by the inventory management
system and delays in the Air Force's repair process as a result
of the consolidation of repair facilities. Other reasons included
(1) difficulties with producing or repairing parts, (2)
reliability of spare parts, and (3) contracting issues. The Air
Force and the Defense Logistics Agency have numerous overall
initiatives under way or planned that may alleviate shortages of
the spare parts for the three systems GAO reviewed.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-01-587
ACCNO: A01278
TITLE: Air Force Inventory: Parts Shortages Are Impacting
Operations and Maintenance Effectiveness
DATE: 06/27/2001
SUBJECT: Inventory control systems
Logistics
Spare parts
Aircraft engines
Aircraft maintenance
Military aircraft
Air Force E-3 Airborne Early Warning
System
C-5 Aircraft
E-3 Aircraft
F-15 Aircraft
F-16 Aircraft
Eagle Aircraft
Falcon Aircraft
Galaxy Aircraft
Sentry Aircraft
F-100-220 Engine
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GAO-01-587
Report to Congressional Committees
United States General Accounting Office
GAO
June 2001 AIR FORCE INVENTORY Parts Shortages Are Impacting Operations and
Maintenance Effectiveness
GAO- 01- 587
Page i GAO- 01- 587 Air Force Inventory Letter 1
Results in Brief 2 Background 3 Spare Parts Shortages Adversely Affect
Mission Performance,
Economy and Efficiency of Operations, and Retention of Military Personnel 7
Shortages of Specific Spare Parts Occurred for Multiple Reasons 11 Overall
Initiatives Exist to Address Problems 16 Agency Comments 20 Scope and
Methodology 21
Appendix I Management Weaknesses Have Contributed to Spare Parts Shortages
24
Appendix II E- 3, C- 5, and F- 100- 220 Engine Parts and Part Function 26
Appendix III Spare Parts Reviewed and Reasons for Shortage 27
Appendix IV Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Installations and Logistics,
Directorate of Supply, Spare Parts Initiatives 29
Appendix V Comments From the Department of Defense 30
Related GAO Products 31 Contents
Page ii GAO- 01- 587 Air Force Inventory Tables
Table 1: Reported Rates for Aircraft That Were Mission Capable and Not
Mission Capable Due to Supply Problems 4 Table 2: Reported Mission- Capable
Goals and Rates for the E- 3 7 Table 3: Reported Goals and Rates at Which E-
3 Aircraft Were Not
Mission Capable Due to Supply Problems 8 Table 4: Reported Mission- Capable
Goals and Rates for the C- 5
Aircraft 9 Table 5: Goals and Rates at Which the C- 5 Aircraft Were Reported
Not Mission Capable Due to Supply Problems 9 Table 6: F- 100- 220 War
Readiness Engine Goal and Reported
Usable Engines Available, by Quarter 10 Table 7: Reasons for Shortages of 75
Spare Parts for Selected
Engine and Aircraft 12
Figures
Figure 1: E- 3, C- 5, F- 15, and F- 16 Aircraft 6
Page 1 GAO- 01- 587 Air Force Inventory
June 27, 2001 Congressional Committees Having spare parts available when
needed to perform required maintenance is critical to the Department of
Defense?s accomplishment of its missions. Shortages of spare parts are a key
indicator of whether the billions of dollars annually spent on these parts
are being used in an effective, efficient, and economical manner. Since
1990, we have designated the Department ?s management of its inventory,
including spare parts, as high risk because its inventory is vulnerable to
fraud, waste, and abuse.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 requires us to
evaluate various aspects of the military services? logistics support
capability, including the provision of spare parts. 1 Also, the Chairman,
House Committee on Appropriations, and the Chairman, Subcommittee on
Defense, House Committee on Appropriations, requested that we review issues
related to the quality and availability of spare parts for aircraft, ships,
vehicles, and weapon systems. In response to these requests, we reviewed
known spare parts shortages within the services. For this report, our
objectives were to determine (1) the impact of spare parts shortages on
three selected Air Force systems and (2) the reasons for the shortages.
Additionally, we identified the overall initiatives that the Air Force and
the Defense Logistics Agency have in place or planned to address the
shortages.
To address our objectives, we reviewed the Air Force?s E- 3 early airborne
warning and control system aircraft; the C- 5 transport aircraft; and the F-
100- 220 engine, which is used in some F- 15 and F- 16 fighter aircraft; we
also reviewed 75 parts that were in short supply for these systems. We
selected these systems because they are key to fulfilling Air Force
missions. The Air Force sets goals to have a certain number of each aircraft
available and capable of performing its missions at any given time. It
measures the impact of parts shortages on aircraft availability by
determining the percentage of aircraft that cannot meet mission requirements
because parts needed for repairs are unavailable. The Air
1 P. L. 106- 65, sec. 364.
United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO- 01- 587 Air Force Inventory
Force and the Defense Logistics Agency are responsible for managing and
providing spare parts for the Air Force?s aircraft.
Spare parts shortages on the three systems we reviewed have adversely
affected the performance of assigned missions and the economy and efficiency
of maintenance activities. Specifically, the Air Force did not meet its
mission- capable goals for the E- 3 or C- 5 during fiscal years 1996- 2000,
nor did it meet its goal to have enough F- 100- 220 engines to meet
peacetime and wartime goals during that period. For example, in fiscal year
2000 the E- 3s were not mission capable for supply reasons 11. 3 percent of
the time. In other words, 3 or 4 of the total of 32 E- 3 aircraft were not
available during the year. In fiscal year 2000, the C- 5s were not mission
capable for supply reasons 18. 1 percent of the time, or almost 23 of 126 C-
5s were not mission capable. Also, maintenance personnel have been required
to use the inefficient practice of removing parts from one aircraft for use
on another. Maintenance personnel report that this practice can require
double the work since they also have to fix the aircraft that parts are
removed from. Lastly, the shortages may affect personnel retention. We
recently reported that one of the six factors cited by military personnel as
sources of dissatisfaction and reasons to leave the military related to work
circumstances such as the lack of parts and materials to successfully
complete daily job requirements.
The majority of reasons cited by item managers at the maintenance facilities
for spare parts shortages were most often related to more spares being
required than were anticipated by the inventory management system and delays
in the Air Force?s repair process as a result of the consolidation of repair
facilities. Other reasons included (1) difficulties with producing or
repairing parts, (2) reliability of spare parts, and (3) contracting issues.
For example, the anticipated quarterly demand for a machine bolt for the F-
100- 220 engine was 828, but actual demand turned out to be over 12, 000. As
a result, some F- 100- 220 engines were not mission capable because they
were waiting for more bolts to be obtained. In another case, a contractor
produced sufficient quantities of a visor seal assembly for the C- 5, but
the parts failed to meet design tolerances. As a result of this production
problem, demands for this part could not be met.
The Air Force and the Defense Logistics Agency have numerous overall
initiatives under way or planned that may alleviate shortages of the spare
parts for the three aircraft systems we reviewed. The initiatives generally
address the reasons we identified for the shortages. For example, the Air
Force Materiel Command is developing a model to better forecast the repair
facilities? demands for parts needed in the repair process. In another
Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO- 01- 587 Air Force Inventory
overall initiative, the Command is developing a pilot program to have
contractors bypass the supply system and fill the supply bins for
maintenance personnel directly. This is an attempt to expedite the delivery
of repair parts. To ensure that the initiatives are achieving the goals of
increasing efficiencies in the supply system, the Air Force has developed a
Supply Strategic Plan that contains specific goals and outcome- oriented
measures for the initiatives. While the initiatives are intended to improve
processes for providing spare parts, they would likely result in increased
costs and larger inventories of needed spare parts.
The Air Force?s plan is in keeping with our previous recommendations to
improve overall logistics planning. We are, therefore, not making
recommendations at this time. We will separately review the overall approach
and initiatives, once they are more fully developed, to determine whether
there are opportunities to enhance these efforts. The Department of Defense
generally concurred with this report.
In January 2001, we reported on Department of Defense management challenges
and noted that the Department has had serious weaknesses in its management
of logistics functions and, in particular, inventory management. 2 We have
identified inventory management as a high- risk area since 1990. 3 In 1999,
we reported on the Air Force?s specific problems in managing spare parts and
noted an increase in the percentage of some of its aircraft that were not
mission capable due to supply problems. 4 (See appendix I for examples from
our reports on management weaknesses related to the Air Force.) Also, the
Secretary of the Air Force reported that the readiness of the Air Force has
declined since 1996 and attributed this overall decline, in part, to spare
parts shortages. 5 Table 1 shows the percentage of all aviation systems that
were mission capable and the percentage of aircraft that were not mission
capable due to supply problems from fiscal year 1996 through the first
quarter of fiscal 2001.
2 Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Defense (GAO-
01- 244, Jan. 2001). 3 High Risk Series: An Update (GAO- 01- 263, Jan.
2001).
4 Air Force Supply: Management Actions Create Spare Parts Shortages and
Operational Problems (GAO/ NSIAD/ AIMD- 99- 77, Apr. 29, 1999). 5 Annual
Report to the President and the Congress, part VI: Statutory Reports,
Secretary of the Air Force. Background
Page 4 GAO- 01- 587 Air Force Inventory
Table 1: Reported Rates for Aircraft That Were Mission Capable and Not
Mission Capable Due to Supply Problems
In percent
Fiscal year Aircraft reported as mission capable
Aircraft reported as not mission capable due to supply problems
1996 78.5 11.0 1997 76.6 12.6 1998 74.3 13.9 1999 73.5 14.0 2000 72.9 14.3
2001 (1st quarter) 72.9 14.0
Source: The Air Force?s Multi- Echelon Requirements and Logistics
Information Network.
As table 1 shows, the percentage of all Air Force systems reported as not
mission capable due to supply problems steadily increased from fiscal year
1996 through fiscal year 2000. The Air Force requested additional funding to
address concerns with spare parts shortages. The Air Force states in the
Department of Defense Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress 6 for July
through September 2000 that funding Congress provided in earlier years has
begun to improve the availability of spares, citing a 58- percent reduction
in parts that have been ordered but not received since December 1998. The
Secretary also expressed cautious optimism that recent congressional funding
would improve the availability of spare parts and aircraft mission- capable
rates. In the most recent quarterly readiness report (Oct. through Dec.
2000), the Air Force cautions that although as of early December 2000
overall mission- capable rates had improved from average fiscal year 2000
rates, this improvement had come at the cost of the increased use of the
practice of removing parts from one aircraft for use on another, that is,
cannibalization. 7
Because of concerns that spare parts shortages were causing readiness
problems, the Air Force received in fiscal 1999 an additional $904 million
in obligation authority from the Department of Defense to buy more spare
6 Department of Defense Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress is a
review of individual service and joint readiness on a quarterly basis and is
submitted to Congress by the Secretary of Defense no later that 45 days
after the end of each quarter. 7 We are separately reviewing this issue and
will report the results later this year to the
Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and
International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform.
Page 5 GAO- 01- 587 Air Force Inventory
parts. This amount consisted of $387 million to buy spare parts attributable
to the Kosovo operation, $135 million to buy engine- related spare parts for
the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, and $382 million to overcome the
accumulated shortfall of spare parts inventories. Also in 1999, the
Department of Defense announced plans to provide $500 million to the Defense
Logistics Agency to purchase spare parts for all the services over fiscal
years 2001- 2004. Of that $500 million, $213.8 million is to be for parts to
be used on Air Force aircraft. According to a Department of Defense
official, the Air Force was provided the first $50 million in fiscal 2001 to
pass on to the Defense Logistics Agency to pay for Air Force parts ordered
in fiscal year 2000. The Air Force and the other military services received
additional funds in fiscal year 1999 that, unlike the funds cited above,
were placed largely in operations and maintenance accounts. In a separate
report issued earlier this year, we indicated current financial information
did not show the extent to which these funds were used for spare parts. 8
However, the Department plans to annually develop detailed financial
management information on spare parts funding uses but does not plan to
provide it to Congress. We, therefore, recommended to the Secretary of
Defense that the information to be developed annually by the Department and
the services on the quantity and funding of spare parts be routinely
provided to Congress as an integral part of the Department?s annual budget
justification; the Department agreed to do so.
The aviation systems that we reviewed are vital to the Air Force achieving
its missions. The E- 3 provides surveillance of the airspace and manages the
flight of all aircraft in an assigned battlefield area. The Air Force first
received E- 3s in 1977, and an Air Force official told us that it is the
oldest aircraft in the Air Force in terms of operational hours flown. The C-
5 is the Air Force?s largest cargo aircraft, carrying cargo such as Army
tanks, and is one of the largest aircraft in the world. About 70 percent of
the oversized cargo required in the critical first 30 days of one major war
scenario would be the type of cargo the C- 5 carries. The Air Force first
received operational C- 5 aircraft in 1970, and according to Air Force
officials, one of the reasons for the lower than expected mission- capable
rates in recent years for the C- 5 aircraft is its age. The F- 100- 220
engine powers many of the Air Force?s F- 15 and F- 16 fighter aircraft and,
according to an Air Force official, will become increasingly critical to
operations as some older engines are replaced with the F- 100- 220. For
8 Defense Inventory: Information on the Use of Spare Parts Funding Should Be
Provided to Congress (GAO- 01- 472, Apr. 2001).
Page 6 GAO- 01- 587 Air Force Inventory
each of these systems, we judgmentally selected for review 25 parts, a total
of 75, with the highest number of hours or incidents of unavailability for
given time periods.
Figure 1: E- 3, C- 5, F- 15, and F- 16 Aircraft
Source: www. af. mil\ gallery.
Air Force spare parts are classified as either consumables or reparables.
Consumable items, which are mostly managed by the Defense Logistics
C- 5 aircraft F- 15 with F- 100- 220 engine E- 3 aircraft F- 16 with F- 100-
220 engine
Page 7 GAO- 01- 587 Air Force Inventory
Agency, are those items that are discarded when they fail because they
cannot be cost- effectively repaired. The Defense Supply Center Richmond is
the lead center for managing aviation consumable spare parts. Reparable
items, managed by the Air Force Materiel Command, are items that can be
cost- effectively repaired. The Command?s mission is to research, develop,
test, acquire, deliver, and logistically support Air Force weapon systems.
The shortages of spare parts for the three aircraft systems we reviewed have
not only affected readiness but also have created inefficiencies in
maintenance processes and procedures and may adversely affect the retention
of military personnel. Two aircraft we reviewed, the E- 3 and C- 5, did not
meet their mission- capable goals in fiscal years 1996- 2000 and were not
mission capable due to supply problems from 7. 3 percent to 18. 1 percent
during the same period. The number of usable spare F- 100- 220 engines that
the Air Force had on hand fell short of its goal by as few as 6 and as many
as 104 engines during the same period.
The Air Force did not achieve its mission- capable goals during fiscal years
1996- 2000 for any of the three Air Force aircraft systems we reviewed, in
part, due to spare parts shortages. Table 2 shows the mission- capable goals
and actual rates for the E- 3 aircraft for fiscal years 1996- 2000, and
table 3 shows the rates at which the E- 3 was not mission capable due to
supply problems during the same period.
Table 2: Reported Mission- Capable Goals and Rates for the E- 3
In percent
Fiscal year Missioncapable goal Reported mission
capable rate Difference
1996 85 82.5 (2.5) 1997 85 79.2 (5.8) 1998 85 71.9 (13.1) 1999 85 73.5
(11.5) 2000 73 72.8 (0.2)
Source: The Air Force?s Multi- Echelon Requirements and Logistics
Information Network.
The goal for the E- 3 was lowered to 73 percent from March through September
2000 based on an Air Force assessment of its ability to achieve its mission-
capable goal. The Air Force recognized that it had failed to Spare Parts
Shortages
Adversely Affect Mission Performance, Economy and Efficiency of Operations,
and Retention of Military Personnel
Spare Parts Shortages Contributed to Three Systems? Failure to Meet Mission
Performance Goals
Page 8 GAO- 01- 587 Air Force Inventory
achieve historical performance levels to the point that falling short of the
standard had become the norm. Citing constraints regarding spare parts,
maintenance personnel, and repair equipment, the Air Force lowered mission-
capable goals for the E- 3 and other aircraft with the intent of providing
maintenance personnel with more achievable targets. The mission- capable
goal for the E- 3 aircraft rose to 81 percent in fiscal year 2001, and it is
planned to return to 85 percent in fiscal year 2002.
Table 3: Reported Goals and Rates at Which E- 3 Aircraft Were Not Mission
Capable Due to Supply Problems
In percent
Total not mission capable due to supply problems Fiscal year Goal Reported
rate Difference
1996 6 or less 7.3 (1.3) 1997 6 or less 9.4 (3.4) 1998 6 or less 12.9 (6.9)
1999 6 or less 11.9 (5.9) 2000 12 or less 11.3 0. 7
Source: The Air Force?s Multi- Echelon Requirements and Logistics
Information Network.
The goal was 12 percent or less from March through September 2000 and was
raised based on an Air Force assessment of the aircraft?s ability to achieve
the not mission capable due to supply problems goal for the E- 3 and other
aircraft. The Air Force recognized that it had failed to achieve historical
performance levels to the point that falling short of the standard had
become the norm. Citing constraints regarding spare parts, maintenance
personnel, and repair equipment, the Air Force raised its goal for not
mission capable due to supply problems for the E- 3 and other aircraft with
the intent of providing maintenance personnel with more achievable targets.
The not mission capable due to supply problems goal changed to 8 percent in
fiscal year 2001, and it is planned to return to 6 percent in fiscal year
2002.
The reported rate for total not mission capable due to supply problems in
fiscal year 2000, 11. 3 percent, equated to about 3 or 4 E- 3s of the total
of 32 aircraft being not mission capable due to supply problems.
The C- 5 also did not achieve its goals during fiscal years 1996- 2000.
Table 4 shows the C- 5?s mission- capable goals and actual mission- capable
rates for those years, and table 5 shows the rates at which the C- 5 was not
mission
Page 9 GAO- 01- 587 Air Force Inventory
capable due to supply problems as well as its goals during the same period.
Table 4: Reported Mission- Capable Goals and Rates for the C- 5 Aircraft
In percent
Mission capable rates Fiscal year Goal Reported rate Difference
1996 75 64.2 (10.8) 1997 75 62.7 (12.3) 1998 75 61.2 (13.8) 1999 75 59.5
(15.5) 2000 75 60.8 (14.2) Source: The Air Force?s Multi- Echelon
Requirements and Logistics Information Network.
Table 5: Goals and Rates at Which the C- 5 Aircraft Were Reported Not
Mission Capable Due to Supply Problems
In percent
Fiscal year Total not mission capable due to supply problems Goal Reported
rate Difference
1996 9 or less 15.6 (6.6) 1997 8.5 or less 15.2 (6.7) 1998 8.5 or less 16.8
(8.3) 1999 8.5 or less 17.3 (8.8) 2000 8.5 or less 18.1 (9.6)
Source: The Air Force?s Multi- Echelon Requirements and Logistics
Information Network.
The reported rate for total not mission capable due to supply problems in
fiscal year 2000, 18. 1 percent, equated to almost 23 C- 5s of the fleet of
126 aircraft being not mission capable, at least in part, due to supply
problems.
With regard to the F- 100- 220 engine, the Air Force never met its goal,
called the war readiness engine goal, during fiscal years 1996- 2000 (see
table 6). The goal can change each fiscal year for the number of usable-
ready to be installed in an aircraft- spare engines the Air Force would like
to have on hand to meet wartime needs. In some cases, it has had F- 15s or
F- 16s grounded due to the lack of the engine. When the number of usable
spare engines is shown as a negative number, there are not enough engines
for all the aircraft required for peacetime operations; in other words,
aircraft that would otherwise be available to fly are grounded
Page 10 GAO- 01- 587 Air Force Inventory
because they lack engines. During fiscal years 1996 through 2000, this
occurred in five different quarters.
Table 6: F- 100- 220 War Readiness Engine Goal and Reported Usable Engines
Available, by Quarter
Fiscal year quarter War readiness
engine goal Usable spare engines Difference
1996 -1 54 10 (44) 1996 -2 54 22 (34) 1996 -3 5448( 6) 1996 -4 54 42 (12)
1997 -1 68 -5 (73) 1997 -2 68 11 (57) 1997 -3 68 17 (51) 1997 -4 68 14 (54)
1998 -1 90 -1 (91) 1998 -2 90 -13 (103) 1998 -3 90 3 (87) 1998 -4 90 17 (83)
1999 -1 90 40 (50) 1999 -2 90 41 (49) 1999 -3 90 -14 (104) 1999 -4 90 0 (90)
2000- 1 84 -6 (90) 2000- 2 84 16 (68) 2000- 3 84 38 (46) 2000- 4 84 44 (40)
Source: Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, Department of the Air Force.
To compensate for a lack of spare parts, maintenance personnel sometimes
remove usable parts from aircraft for which spare parts are unavailable to
replace broken parts on others. Maintenance personnel at Seymour- Johnson
Air Force Base said that this practice is necessary to attempt to maintain
mission- capable rates when spare parts are not available. As we have
previously reported, the result of this practice is that maintenance
personnel spend a large amount of time cannibalizing parts and performing
double work. 9 According to a Naval Postgraduate School thesis, there is
also the potential for breaking the needed part or causing
9 GAO/ NSIAD/ AIMD- 99- 77, Apr. 29, 1999. Spare Parts Shortages Can
Cause Inefficient Maintenance Practices and May Hamper Efforts to Retain
Maintenance Personnel
Page 11 GAO- 01- 587 Air Force Inventory
collateral damage while removing the part. Additionally, a part removed from
another aircraft will likely not last as long as a part from the supply
system and will require maintenance sooner.
Additionally, our past work shows that spare parts shortages may affect
retention. In August 1999, we reported on the results of our December 1998
through March 1999 survey of about 1,000 Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine
Corps active duty personnel that were selected based on their work in jobs
in which the Department of Defense believed were experiencing retention
problems. More than half of the respondents stated that they were
dissatisfied and intended to leave the military. The majority of factors
were associated with work circumstances such as the lack of parts and
materials needed to successfully complete daily job requirements. Both
officers and enlisted personnel ranked the availability of needed equipment,
parts, and materials among the top 2 of 44 quality- of- life factors that
caused their dissatisfaction. 10
Spare parts shortages on the three systems we reviewed occurred for various
reasons. In addition, an internal Department of Defense study found similar
reasons for spare parts shortages.
The 75 parts (25 for each system) we selected for review were recorded as
being the cause for the most hours of the systems being not mission capable
due to supply problems for a given time period. Specific parts were in short
supply for numerous and varied reasons. Because of the interrelated nature
of the supply system, some of the parts were unavailable for more than one
reason. Table 7 provides a summary of the reasons for the shortages of the
top 25 problem parts for each system for a given month. (See appendix II for
a more detailed list of the parts discussed in this report.)
10 Military Personnel: Perspectives of Surveyed Service Members in Critical
Specialties (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 197BR, Aug. 16, 1999). Shortages of Specific
Spare Parts Occurred for Multiple Reasons
Selected Systems Have Experienced Parts Shortages for Multiple Reasons
Page 12 GAO- 01- 587 Air Force Inventory
Table 7: Reasons for Shortages of 75 Spare Parts for Selected Engine and
Aircraft Reason F- 100- 220 a E- 3 b C- 5 c Total
Demands were not anticipated 10 11 5 26 Changes in location of repairs 7 7 8
22 Parts production problems 3 5 10 18 Component reliability 5 2 9 16
Contracting issues 4 3 3 10 Other 3 9 0 12
Total 32 37 35 104
Note: The totals exceed 25 because some parts were unavailable for multiple
reasons. a The time period for the shortages was April 2000.
b The time period for the shortages was March 2000. C The time period for
the shortages was July 2000.
Source: Our analysis of Air Force Materiel Command data.
Greater demand than anticipated by repair activities for the spares we
reviewed was one of the most frequent reasons parts were not available.
According to agency officials, the Air Force and the Defense Logistics
Agency forecast the demand for parts using past data on usage of parts. 11
According to current policy, if a part had no demands over the specified
period and no anticipated future demands, it may not be purchased for stock.
Twenty- six (about 35 percent) of the 75 parts we reviewed were unavailable
because of unanticipated demands for spare parts. For example, there had
been no demand for a tension regulator for the C- 5 since 1993, and it was
therefore not on hand when needed through the end of July 2000. As of July
2000, C- 5 aircraft had not been mission capable for a total of 155
operational days (24- hour days) due to the lack of this part. In another
case, the demand calculated from past experience for a machine bolt for the
F- 100- 220 engine was far less than the demand by the end of April 2000. In
that case, the average quarterly demand for the bolt was 828 but increased
to over 12, 000 in one quarter. The item manager did not know the specific
reasons for this increase in demand. At the end of April 2000, in 96 cases
the lack of this bolt rendered F- 100- 220 engines not mission capable.
Also, in the case of a metallic seal for the engine, demand increased after
responsibility for the repair of the seal was transferred from a closing
repair facility. Parts managers speculated that workers at
11 When establishing initial spares for new weapon systems, the Air Force
uses, in part, engineering estimates to determine the quantities of spare
parts to purchase. Actual Demands Were Greater
Than Anticipated
Page 13 GAO- 01- 587 Air Force Inventory
the new repair facility were replacing this item more often than at the
previous repair facility as a part of their routine maintenance efforts. As
a result of the lack of this seal, F- 100- 220 engines were not mission
capable in 11 cases by the end of April 2000.
Twenty- two (about 29 percent) of the parts reviewed were on back orders
because of difficulties related to the transfer of workload from two
maintenance facilities that were closing. As a result of the Base
Realignment and Closure Commission?s 1995 recommendations, the Air Force
consolidated its air logistics centers, or maintenance repair facilities,
from five to three locations and increased its use of contractor repair
capability. Air Force data indicated that back orders for critical parts
affected by the consolidation peaked at about 615, 000 in December 1998
before falling to 374, 000 by the end of fiscal 1999 and to just over
258,000 by December 2000, a 58- percent reduction. The Department of Defense
cited underestimated workloads in several key shops at the remaining three
air logistics centers as the primary reason for the increase in back orders.
For one part we reviewed, a blade lock retainer for an F- 100- 220 engine, a
closing air logistics center had repaired the part on a special, as- needed
basis and did not record demands for repair. When responsibility for repair
of the part was transferred to the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, the
Center had no demand data for the part and had not ordered replacement
retainers, and no retainers were on hand to install on engines as needed. As
a result of the lack of this blade lock retainer, F- 100- 220 engines were
not mission capable in 22 instances by the end of April 2000. Also, the
receiving air logistic centers did not have some of their repair shops ready
as planned when items were to be transferred. For example, a hydraulic valve
for the E- 3 was unavailable because the receiving air logistics center did
not have a required test stand repaired and certified in time to prevent
this part from being available when needed. Because of the lack of this
part, by the end of March 2000, E- 3 aircraft had accumulated a total of
about 8 operational days of time not mission capable.
Production problems were at least partially the cause of the unavailability
of 18 (24 percent) of the spare parts reviewed. Several examples follow.
The sole- source contractor for a C- 5 part could not deliver as many
aircraft turbines as the Air Force needed in the time specified in the
contract. As of July 2000, due to the lack of the turbine, C- 5s had
accumulated about 335 days of not mission capable time. Changes in Location
of Repairs
Parts Production Problems
Page 14 GAO- 01- 587 Air Force Inventory
Although a contractor produced sufficient quantities of the visor seal
assembly for the C- 5, the parts failed to meet design tolerances. As a
result, C- 5s had accumulated the equivalent of 186 operational days of not
mission capable status by the end of July 2000.
Most of the dual ignition exciters for the F- 100- 220 engine that a
contractor produced failed quality inspections, and the contractor therefore
could not provide a quantity sufficient to satisfy Air Force demands. By the
end of April 2000, the lack of dual ignition exciters had caused F- 100- 220
engines to be not mission capable in 104 cases.
A contractor agreed to increase production of an augmentor nozzle for the
F- 100- 220 engine to meet the demand created by the Kosovo air campaign.
The contractor scaled back production after the campaign was over. According
to an Air Force official, this was within the terms of the contract, which
called for an average number of parts per month. However, overall demand for
this part exceeded supply. By the end of April 2000, the lack of the nozzle
had caused F- 100- 220 engines to be not mission capable in 63 cases.
At an Air Force repair facility, spares of an augmentor fuel control for
the F- 100- 220 engine were mistakenly disposed of instead of being turned
in for repair, and the controls had to be bought on an emergency basis to
make repairs. Through April 2000, having to purchase this item on an
emergency buy resulted in 30 incidents of F- 100- 220 engines being
classified not mission capable.
Sixteen (about 21 percent) of the parts that we reviewed were unavailable
because the life of parts was shorter than the Air Force had predicted.
Thus, the parts in stock were exhausted before the Air Force could replace
them. For example, a skid detector for the C- 5 aircraft experienced a 50-
percent increase in failures, and all the spare parts were used before the
item could be ordered and restocked. Through July 2000, C- 5 aircraft were
not mission capable for over 368 operational days due to the lack of this
part. Some reliability problems raised safety concerns and created new, and
higher, requirements for the part. For example, when a nozzle in the
augmentor duct on some F- 100- 220 engines began to fall off due to cracks
at the rivet head, the Air Force began to replace the duct routinely as each
aircraft came in for maintenance. By the end of April 2000, the lack of this
part had resulted in F- 100- 220 engines not being mission capable in 34
cases. Component Reliability
Page 15 GAO- 01- 587 Air Force Inventory
Both the Air Force and the Defense Logistics Agency have encountered a
variety of problems in contracting for spare parts needed for repairs. Ten
(about 13 percent) of the parts we reviewed were unavailable, at least in
part, because of contracting issues. These issues included lengthy price
negotiations, a contract requirement to have a minimum number of units
before beginning repairs, failure of a contractor to meet the delivery date,
and termination of a contract. For example, the Defense Logistics Agency did
not have a straight pin for the F- 100- 220 engine in stock because the
sole- source company wanted a price that the Agency was unwilling to pay.
This resulted in extended negotiations with the company before an award
could be made. By the end of April 2000, the lack of this part had caused F-
100- 220 engines to be not mission capable in nine cases. In another case,
to obtain an acceptable price for a contract for the repair of a temperature
indicator for the E- 3 aircraft, the Air Force was required to provide a
minimum of 10 regulators for repair. By the time 10 units were accumulated
and shipped, the demand for the part had exceeded the supply. Through March
2000, E- 3 aircraft were not mission capable over 19 operational days due to
the lack of this part. Also, a contract for an axle beam fitting for the C-
5 aircraft had to be terminated because the contractor requested too many
delivery schedule extensions. As of July 2000, the equivalent of one C- 5
aircraft was not mission capable for 124 operational days.
Twelve (16 percent) of the parts we reviewed were unavailable for reasons
other than those we have already cited. In one case, the Air Force used an
incorrect replacement rate for an engine core, and as a result, the repair
of parts was not timely. Through April 2000, F- 100- 220 engines were not
mission capable due to the lack of this part in 33 cases. Also, the limited
repair facility capacity for certain spare parts, such as electric
generators, created shortages of the parts. By the end of March 2000, E- 3
aircraft had been not mission capable for almost 10 operational days due to
the lack of this part. In another case, because maintenance facilities
prioritize repairs based on current Air Force requirements, a receiver
transmitter was not repaired in time to avoid a shortage because higher
priority items had to be repaired first. As a result, over 15 operational
days of not mission capable time had been accumulated on E- 3s by the end of
March 2000. In another case, the required part, a vaneaxial fan, was on
hand, but E- 3 aircraft had accumulated over 15 operational days of not
mission capable time by the end of March 2000 because of the time it took to
ship the part overseas. In some cases, no spare parts had been purchased
when an aircraft was being modified or the technical data for the
modification was incomplete. At the end of March 2000, over 10 operational
days of not Contracting Issues
Other Reasons
Page 16 GAO- 01- 587 Air Force Inventory
mission capable time had accumulated for E- 3 aircraft due to the lack of a
control indicator that fell into this category.
An internal study conducted by the Department of Defense found similar
reasons for Air Force reparable spare parts shortages. 12 The study examined
parts causing aircraft to be not mission capable and found that there were
two reasons for the shortages. The first reason was an insufficient
inventory of certain reparable parts. The second was that although there
were enough parts in the system, other constraints prevented a repair
facility from repairing the parts in a timely manner. The study states that
this may have happened for several reasons. The parts may not have been
returned from units to the repair facility, a repair facility may have
lacked capacity in certain key areas such as manpower or testing equipment,
the consumable parts required to fix the reparable item may not have been
available, or the item managers may not have requested the repair facility
to repair a part because of a lack of funding. 13 The study contained a
recommendation that the Air Force provide $609 million for fiscal years 2002
to 2007 to improve the availability of reparable spare parts. According to a
Department of Defense official, the Air Force plans to provide the funds.
The Air Force and the Defense Logistics Agency have overall initiatives
under way or planned to improve the availability of spare parts. The
initiatives are intended to improve the efficiency of the supply system and
increase the requirements for spare parts. The initiatives generally address
the specific reasons for shortages identified by our review, with the
exception of changes in the location of repairs that is not a recurring
problem. The Air Force has developed a Supply Strategic Plan that includes a
management framework and specific goals and outcomeoriented measures for its
initiatives. We have made various recommendations to address this issue. The
Air Force has actions under way to respond to address these recommendations;
therefore, we are not
12 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation,
Aviation Spare Parts Inventory Funding for Readiness, Feb. 2001. 13 We also
found in our 1997 study that even though military units had funds to
purchase spare parts, the supply group did not always have sufficient funds
to buy new parts or pay for the repair of broken parts that customers
needed. See Air Force Supply: Management Actions Create Spare Parts
Shortages and Operational Problems (GAO/ NSIAD/ AIMD- 99- 77,
Apr. 29, 1999). Department of Defense Internal
Study Found Similar Reasons for Shortages
Overall Initiatives Exist to Address Problems
Page 17 GAO- 01- 587 Air Force Inventory
making any additional recommendations at this time. We will be reviewing the
strategic plan?s initiatives, once they are more developed, to evaluate
their likely effectiveness and to assess whether additional initiatives are
needed.
The Air Force is regularly monitoring which spare parts are unavailable for
the longest period of time and undertakes ad hoc actions to resolve the
problems causing the shortage. In 1999, the Air Force developed the Supply
Strategic Plan to help create an integrated process for supply planning, to
facilitate the exchange of information throughout the supply system, and to
improve measures of effectiveness for the supply system. The plan, which was
updated in January 2001, establishes five goals for the Air Force supply
community to achieve by 2010.
Each goal has associated objectives to be achieved in the next 4 to 7 years
and tasks to be completed in the next 1 to 4 years. Air Force Supply
Strategic Plan
Supply Strategic Plan Goals
Manage assets effectively Organize, train, and equip supply personnel
Support Department of Defense operations Establish and implement fuel policy
Implement effective financial management
Page 18 GAO- 01- 587 Air Force Inventory
In support of the Supply Strategic Plan, the Air Force Deputy Chief of
Staff, Installations and Logistics, Directorate of Supply, 14 established in
1999 the Supply Foundation Project, which includes 10 objectives with
associated initiatives for each. The Directorate views the project as a
comprehensive means of improving the supply system. The first objective is
to improve spare parts management. The intent is to determine the baseline
for formulating a spare parts policy; to determine the overall trend for
spare parts, that is, are shortages increasing or decreasing; and to develop
and implement initiatives to reduce the shortages of spare parts.
Within the objective of improving spare parts management, the Directorate
has initiatives within the goal of managing assets under way or under study.
For each of these initiatives, the Air Force has established short- term and
14 The Air Force Directorate of Supply establishes and implements Air Force
supply and fuel policy. The Directorate also prepares, executes, and manages
budget programs totaling over $17 billion annually for Air Force aircraft,
missiles, munitions, communications, and vehicles. Objectives to Support
Supply
Strategic Plan
Initiatives for Managing Assets
Improve the process for determining requirements for spare parts
Improve the process for funding the parts Increase the stock of certain
parts Increase the parts contained in readiness spares packages (deployment
kits for maintaining aircraft)
Coordinate with the Defense Logistics Agency to ensure that it buys the most
critically needed parts from the Air Force portion of the $500 million
provided by the Department of Defense for fiscal years 2001 to 2004
Reduce the time that customers wait for parts
Page 19 GAO- 01- 587 Air Force Inventory
long- term milestones and accountability for implementation by assigning
program responsibility to specific offices and individuals. The measures for
success include achieving goals such as (1) increasing the issuance of parts
when requested, (2) increasing the stock of certain parts, (3) improving
total rates for aircraft not mission capable for supply reasons, and (4)
lowering cannibalization rates. (See appendix IV for a complete listing of
these Air Force initiatives.)
In addition to the initiatives contained in the Air Force Supply Strategic
Plan, the Air Force Materiel Command also has actions under way and planned
to separately address more specific aspects of spare parts management and
policies. According to Air Force officials, these actions are being
coordinated with the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Installations and
Logistics, Directorate of Supply. As part of its Constraints Analysis
Program, the Air Force Materiel Command identified six major problems that
had prevented it from providing timely support to the warfighter. These
problems were unavailability of consumable parts; unreliability of parts;
poor management of the suppliers of parts; inadequate workload planning;
ineffective inventory management; and inefficient policies regarding which
parts are repaired and, if repair is needed, where the repairs should be
made. The Command focused its initial efforts on studying ways to resolve
the problems with supplier management, parts reliability, and unavailability
of consumable parts. Implementation plans are being developed for actions
for each of these problems while the remaining problems are being studied.
The Command is also developing (1) a model to forecast the repair
facilities? demands for consumable spare parts and electronically transmit
this data to the Defense Logistics Agency and (2) a pilot program to have
contractors bypass the supply system and fill the supply bins for
maintenance personnel directly.
Among the efforts the Defense Logistics Agency has under way to improve the
availability of spare parts are its Aviation Investment Strategy and Aging
Aircraft Program.
The Defense Logistics Agency?s major initiative to resolve aircraft spare
parts shortages is its Aviation Investment Strategy. This fiscal year 2000
initiative focuses on replenishing consumable aviation repair parts with
identified availability problems that affect readiness. Of the $500 million
that the Defense Department budgeted for this purpose, $213. 8 million was
the Air Force portion. As of December 2000, $95.3 million had been targeted
for Air Force spare parts and $22.3 million worth of parts had been
delivered. Air Force Materiel Command
Initiatives Defense Logistics Agency Initiatives
Aviation Investment Strategy
Page 20 GAO- 01- 587 Air Force Inventory
The goal of the Defense Logistics Agency?s Aging Aircraft Program is to
consistently meet the goals for spare parts availability for the Army, Navy,
and Air Force aviation weapon systems. The program?s focus will be to (1)
provide inventory control point personnel with complete, timely, and
accurate information on current and projected parts requirements; (2) reduce
customers? wait times for parts for which sources or production capabilities
no longer exist; and (3) create an efficient and effective program
management structure and processes that will achieve the stated program
goals. The Agency plans to spend about $20 million during fiscal years 2001-
2007 on this program.
We recommended in November 1999 that the Secretary of the Air Force develop
a management framework for implementing best practice initiatives based on
the principles embodied in the Government Performance and Results Act. The
Department of Defense concurred with our recommendation and stated that the
Air Force is revising its Logistics Support Plan to more clearly articulate
the relationships, goals, objectives, and metrics of logistics initiatives.
15 As a part of the Supply Strategic Plan, the Air Force included
initiatives intended to improve the availability of spare parts.
We also recommended in January 2001 that the Department develop an
overarching plan that integrates the individual service and defense agency
logistics reengineering plans to include an investment strategy for funding
reengineering initiatives and details on how the Department plans to achieve
its final logistics system end state. 16
Since the Air Force and the Department of Defense are taking actions on our
previous recommendations to improve overall logistics planning, we are not
making new recommendations at this time.
The Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel
Readiness, in commenting on a draft of this report, indicated that the
Department of Defense generally concurred with the report. The Department?s
comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix V.
15 Defense Inventory: Improved Management Framework Needed to Guide Air
Force Best Practice Initiatives (GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 2, Nov. 18, 1999). 16 GAO-
01- 244, Jan. 2001 and GAO- 01- 263, Jan. 2001. Aging Aircraft Program
Air Force Has Responded to Our Recommendations for Better Planning
Agency Comments
Page 21 GAO- 01- 587 Air Force Inventory
To determine the impact of the shortages of spare parts, we reviewed data on
the Air Force?s mission- capable goals and actual rates and goals and actual
rates for aircraft not mission capable due to supply problems for selected
months from the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Installations and
Logistics Directorate. We did not independently verify these data. From
these data, we selected three systems for review that had experienced
difficulties in achieving mission- capable goals or in the case of the F-
100- 220 engine readiness goals for the number of usable engines on hand. We
also reviewed data on cannibalizations provided by the Air Combat Command,
Hampton, Virginia; the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force,
Installations and Logistics Directorate, Washington, D. C.; and Seymour-
Johnson Air Force Base, Goldsboro, North Carolina. Using the data, we
discussed with maintenance personnel the impact of cannibalizations on spare
parts shortages. We also used data from studies conducted by the Department
of Defense regarding spare parts shortages and their impacts. Lastly, we
drew relevant information from our recently issued reports.
To determine the reasons for these part shortages, we visited the air
logistics centers at Tinker Air Force Base (E- 3), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma;
Warner- Robins Air Force Base (C- 5), Robins, Georgia; Kelly Air Force Base
(F- 100- 220 aircraft engine), San Antonio, Texas; and the Defense Supply
Center Richmond, Richmond, Virginia. To identify specific reasons, we
discussed the specific parts shortages with those who manage these items at
these locations. We also reviewed our related work on Air Force and
Department of Defense inventory management practices to identify systemic
management problems that are contributing to spare parts shortage.
To determine what overall actions are planned or under way to address
overall spare parts shortages for Air Force aircraft and the management
framework for implementing the overall initiatives, we visited the Air Force
headquarters, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Logistics Directorate, and the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, located in the Washington, D. C. area;
the Defense Logistics Agency located at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and the
Defense Supply Center located in Richmond, Virginia; the Air Force Materiel
Command, Dayton, Ohio; and the air logistics centers at Tinker Air Force
Base, Oklahoma (E- 3), Warner- Robins Air Force Base, Georgia (C- 5), and
Kelly Air Force Base, Texas (F- 100- 220). We discussed with officials at
each of these locations Air Force initiatives regarding spare parts, their
progress and results to date, the planned completion dates for some
initiatives, and additional steps needed to address spare parts shortages.
We also compared the reasons for the shortages we found with Scope and
Methodology
Page 22 GAO- 01- 587 Air Force Inventory
the overall initiatives under way or planned to determine if there were any
areas that were not being addressed. We did not review these plans or the
specific initiatives.
Our review was performed from February 2000 to April 2001 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Secretary of the Air Force; the Director, Office of Management and Budget;
and the Director, Defense Logistics Agency. We will also make copies
available to others upon request.
Please contact me at (202) 512- 8412 if you or your staff have any questions
regarding this report. Key contributors to this report were Lawson Gist Jr.,
John Beauchamp, Willie Cheely Jr., and Nancy Ragsdale.
David R. Warren Director Defense Capabilities and Management
Page 23 GAO- 01- 587 Air Force Inventory
List of Congressional Committees The Honorable Carl Levin Chairman The
Honorable John Warner Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
The Honorable Daniel Inouye Chairman The Honorable Ted Stevens Ranking
Minority Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations United
States Senate
The Honorable Bill Young Chairman, Committee on Appropriations House of
Representatives
The Honorable Bob Stump Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking Minority
Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives
The Honorable Jerry Lewis Chairman The Honorable John Murtha Ranking
Minority Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations House of
Representatives
Appendix I: Management Weaknesses Have Contributed to Spare Parts Shortages
Page 24 GAO- 01- 587 Air Force Inventory
Our high- risk reports over the past several years have noted that
Department of Defense inventory and financial management weaknesses have
contributed to parts not being available when needed. 1
In January 2001, we reported on Department of Defense management challenges
and noted it has had serious weaknesses in its management of logistics
functions and, in particular, inventory management. 2 Although not
specifically identified with the systems we reviewed, these management
weaknesses directly or indirectly contribute to the shortages of spare parts
the Air Force is facing, as the following examples show.
We reported in January 2001 that nearly half of the Department?s inventory
exceeded war reserve or current operating requirements and that the
Department had inventory on order that would not have been ordered based on
current requirements. 3 Purchasing items that exceed requirements use funds
that could be used to purchase needed parts.
We reported in April 1999 that because the Air Force had reduced the
supply activity group?s budget by $948 million between fiscal year 1997 and
1999 to reflect efficiency goals and because these goals were not achieved,
fewer items than projected were available for sale to customers. As a
result, military units had funds to purchase spare parts, but the supply
group did not always have sufficient funds to buy new spare parts or pay for
repair of broken parts that customers needed. 4
We also reported that because of poor management practices, over $2
billion worth of spare parts in the Air Force?s ?suspended inventory
category,? which cannot be issued because of questionable condition, was not
reviewed for years. 5 As a result, the Air Force is vulnerable to incurring
unnecessary repair and storage costs and reducing its readiness. Better
management of these parts could increase the number of spare parts
available.
1 Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Defense (GAO-
01- 244, Jan. 2001) and High Risk Series: An Update (GAO/ HR- 01- 263, Jan.
2001). 2 GAO- 01- 244, Jan. 2001.
3 GAO- 01- 244, Jan. 2001. 4 Management Actions Create Spare Parts Shortages
and Operational Problems (GAO/ NSIAD/ AIMD- 99- 77, Apr. 29, 1999)
5 Defense Inventory: Inadequate Controls Over Air Force Suspended Stocks
(NSIAD- 98- 29, Dec. 22, 1997). Appendix I: Management Weaknesses Have
Contributed to Spare Parts Shortages
Appendix I: Management Weaknesses Have Contributed to Spare Parts Shortages
Page 25 GAO- 01- 587 Air Force Inventory
In addition, the Department of Defense?s long- standing financial management
problems may also contribute to the Air Force?s spare parts shortages. As we
recently reported, existing weaknesses in inventory accountability
information can affect supply responsiveness. 6 Lacking reliable
information, the Department of Defense has little assurance that all items
purchased are received and properly recorded. The weaknesses increase the
risk that responsible inventory item managers may request funds to obtain
additional, unnecessary items that may be on hand but not reported.
6 GAO- 01- 244, Jan. 2001.
Appendix II: E- 3, C- 5, and F- 100- 220 Engine Parts and Part Function
Page 26 GAO- 01- 587 Air Force Inventory
Spare part Part function
C- 5 tension regulator Cable tension regulator that tightens or loosens the
tension on cables F- 100- 220 machine bolt Retains augmentor nozzle on the
augmentor duct F- 100- 220 metallic seal Retains number one bearing in place
on the inlet fan case F- 100- 220 blade lock
retainer Retains third stage blades to the rotor
E- 3 hydraulic valve Opens the inlet and outlet valve for the auxiliary
power unit C- 5 aircraft turbine Provides air for heat and cooling plus
aircraft pressure C- 5 visor seal assembly Keeps moisture out and ensures a
secure fit F- 100- 220 dual ignition
exciter Sends message to start engine and when afterburner is needed
F- 100- 220 augmentor nozzles
Provides aviation fuel to combustion chamber F- 100- 220 augmentor fuel
control Supplies fuel into the segment, core, and duct systems
C- 5 skid detector Sends wheel speed to main computer F- 100- 220 augmentor
duct Houses augmentor section of engine F- 100- 220 engine core Compresses
air in the engine E- 3 generator Provides electrical power to the aircraft
E- 3 receiver transmitter Provides altitude data and trip signals to crew E-
3 vaneaxial fan Supplies air to the crew compartment E- 3 control indicator
Provides means of controlling the frequency of the flight deck radio
equipment F- 100- 220 straight pin Secures the short links to the augmentor
nozzle convergent segments, which opens and closes the
nozzle E- 3 temperature indicator Reads temperature of integrated drive
generator C- 5 axle beam Bushing for the landing gear to control turning the
aircraft
Source: Air Force.
Appendix II: E- 3, C- 5, and F- 100- 220 Engine Parts and Part Function
Appendix III: Spare Parts Reviewed and Reasons for Shortage
Page 27 GAO- 01- 587 Air Force Inventory
Spare part Reason for shortage E- 3 aircraft
Rotodome door actuator Parts production problem, contracting issue Floating
deck pulser Changes in location of repair High voltage regulator Changes in
location of repair Low chain klystron power amplifier Component reliability
Door Actual demands were greater than anticipated and parts production
problem Aircraft door Actual demands were greater than anticipated Landing
gear door Actual demands were greater than anticipated and other- repair
facility capacity/ priority and
incomplete technical order Waveguide coupler Parts production problem and
component reliability Central processing Other- repair facility capacity/
priority and test equipment software problem Nitrogen fill valve Actual
demands were greater than anticipated Temp indicator Parts production
problems and contracting issues Regulator, oxygen Changes in location of
repairs, actual demands were greater than anticipated, and parts
production problems Connecting link, rig Actual demands were greater than
anticipated Vaneaxial fan Other- shipping time Receiver transmitter Actual
demands were greater than anticipated and other- repair facility capacity/
priority Regulator, current Actual demands were greater than anticipated
Auxiliary power supply Changes in location of repairs Gas turbine engine
Other - shipping time Control indicator Other- no spares purchased for
modifications Generator Changes in location of repairs and other- repair
facility capacity/ priority Interface unit Contracting issues and other-
incomplete technical data for modification Voltage regulator Changes in
location of repairs and actual demands exceeded anticipated Circuit card
assembly Actual demands were greater than anticipated Regulator Actual
demands were greater than anticipated and other- suitable substitute not
linked to
master Hydraulic valve Changes in location of repairs Spare part Reason for
shortage
C- 5 aircraft
Hydraulic servo valve Component reliability Skid detector Component
reliability Aircraft turbine Parts production problem Cylinder assembly a
Changes in location of repairs Manifold assembly a Changes in location of
repairs and parts production problems Track assembly Actual demands were
greater than anticipated Manifold assembly a Changes in location of repairs
and parts production problems Visor seal assembly Contracting issue and
parts production problem Direction slide Actual demands were greater than
anticipated Manifold assembly a Component reliability Variable feel unit
Changes in location of repairs Tension regulator Actual demands were greater
than anticipated Temperature transmitter Actual demands were greater than
anticipated and parts production problems Test adapter Component reliability
Appendix III: Spare Parts Reviewed and Reasons for Shortage
Appendix III: Spare Parts Reviewed and Reasons for Shortage
Page 28 GAO- 01- 587 Air Force Inventory
Spare part Reason for shortage
Linear valve a Component reliability and parts production problem Cylinder
assembly a Changes in location of repairs Electric actuator Changes in
location of repairs and component reliability Axle beam fitting Component
reliability, contracting issue, and parts production problem Manifold
assembly a Changes in location of repairs and parts production problem
Hydraulic cartridge Actual demands were greater than anticipated Linear
valve a Component reliability and parts production problems Cylinder
assembly a Changes in location of repairs Alarm- monitor Contracting issues
Linear valve a Component reliability Flush valve Parts production problem
F- 100- 220 engine
Ignition weight Parts production problem Machine bolt a Actual demands were
greater than anticipated Machine bolt a Actual demands were greater than
anticipated Fan Contracting issue and parts production problem Spare part
Reason for shortage Augmentor nozzle a Contracting issue Augmentor nozzle a
Contracting issue Lower pressure turbine Actual demands were greater than
anticipated and parts production problem Divergent seal Actual demands were
greater than anticipated Static probe Actual demands were greater than
anticipated Jet engine fuel pump Actual demands were greater than
anticipated Augmentor duct Component reliability Plate spacer Component
reliability 220 core Component reliability and other- information system
problem Sleeve spacer Actual demands were greater than anticipated Fuel
control a Changes in location of repairs 220e core Component reliability and
other- information system problem Fuel control a Changes in location of
repairs Blade lock retainer Changes in location of repairs and other-
information system problem Transmitter Component reliability Tube assembly a
Changes in location of repairs and demands were not anticipated Bearing unit
Actual demands were greater than anticipated Tube assembly a Changes in
location of repairs and demands were not anticipated Metallic seal Changes
in location of repairs Turbine rotor Changes in location of repairs Straight
pin Contracting issue
a The spare parts with the same name have different stock numbers. Source:
Air Force.
Appendix IV: Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Installations and Logistics,
Directorate of Supply, Spare Parts Initiatives
Page 29 GAO- 01- 587 Air Force Inventory
Initiative Objective Estimated completion date
Implement spares requirements review board Identify total spares requirement
May 31, 2002 Use ?total cost of goods? vs. ?total cost of goods sold? in
budget estimates Enhance cost recovery for Working Capital Fund Dec. 31,
2002 Change point- of- sale policy Enhance Working Capital Fund cost
recovery Feb. 28, 2002 Use actual pipeline times instead of goals in
requirements computation Increase spares availability Oct. 31, 2001 Enhance
process for determining aircraft goals Increase safety levels of spare parts
Dec. 31, 2001 Review retention policy Improve low/ variable usage spares
support by retaining more
parts longer Oct. 11, 2002 Change consumable parts reorder point policy
Improve mission capability by lowering the reorder point for
consumables May 31, 2001 Change policy to reduce base- level excess
instances of ?awaiting parts? Make more serviceable assets available by
reducing the
credit a base will receive for turning in excess parts Sept. 28, 2001 Expand
use of air logistics centers? EXPRESS prioritization system Improve repair
and distribution decisions for spares by
including more parts in the EXPRESS prioritization system Nov. 30, 2001
Align annual readiness spares packages review cycle and budget cycle
Recognize readiness spares packages requirements in
budget Oct. 31, 2002 Field fighter readiness spares packages updates
Increase range/ depth of fighter readiness spares packages
for aerospace expeditionary force operations Nov. 9, 2001 Field strategic
airlift and C- 130 readiness spares packages Recompute strategic lift/ C-
130 readiness spares packages Nov. 9, 2001 Field high- priority contingency
mission support kits Pre- position spares for split operations and ?Rainbow
Unit?
deployment Reported as completed Develop method to incorporate readiness
spares packages in resource- constrained environment
Release squadron- level readiness spares packages authorizations instead of
entire model design series at once Sept. 30, 2002
Influence Defense Logistics Agency Aviation Investment Strategy Increase
Defense Logistics Agency critical item inventory July 31, 2003 Improve
pipeline times Reduce customer wait time by more efficiently locating and
shipping parts Oct. 31, 2001 Use e- business strategies Reduce costs and
wait time using reverse auctions via
Internet to improve support Jan 4, 2002 Complete paperless contracting for
spares Achieve Department?s directive on electronic procurement Apr. 30,
2002 Implement purchasing and supply management practices Improve
performance and reduce cost of supply June 11, 2003
Source: Air Force.
Appendix IV: Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Installations and Logistics,
Directorate of Supply, Spare Parts Initiatives
Appendix V: Comments From the Department of Defense Page 30 GAO- 01- 587 Air
Force Inventory
Appendix V: Comments From the Department of Defense
Related GAO Products Page 31 GAO- 01- 587 Air Force Inventory
Defense Inventory: Opportunities Exist to Expand the Use of Defense
Logistics Agency Best Practices (NSIAD- 00- 30, Jan. 26, 2000).
Air Force Depot Maintenance: Analysis of Its Financial Operations (AIMD/
NSIAD- 00- 38, Dec. 10, 1999).
Defense Inventory: Improvements Needed to Prevent Excess Purchases by the
Air Force (NSIAD- 00- 5, Nov. 1, 1999).
Air Force Depot Maintenance: Management Changes Would Improve Implementation
of Reform Initiatives (NSIAD- 99- 63, June 25, 1999).
Department of Defense: Status of Financial Management Weaknesses and Actions
Needed to Correct Continuing Challenges (T- AIMD/ NSIAD- 99- 171, May 4,
1999).
Defense Inventory: Status of Inventory and Purchases and Their Relationship
to Current Needs (NSIAD- 99- 60, Apr. 16, 1999).
Defense Inventory: DOD Could Improve Total Asset Visibility Initiative With
Results Act Framework (NSIAD- 99- 40, Apr. 12, 1999).
High Risk Series: An Update (GAO/ HR- 99- 1, Jan 1999). Air Force Supply:
Management Analysis of Activity Group?s Financial Reports, Prices, and Cash
Management (AIMD/ NSIAD- 98- 118, June 8, 1998).
Defense Depot Maintenance: Use of Public- Private Partnering Arrangements
(NSIAD- 98- 91, May 7, 1998).
Defense Inventory: Management of Surplus Usable Aircraft Parts Can Be
Improved (NSIAD- 98- 7, Oct. 2, 1997). Related GAO Products
(709530)
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U. S. General Accounting Office P. O. Box 37050 Washington, DC 20013
Orders by visiting:
Room 1100 700 4 th St., NW (corner of 4 th and G Sts. NW) Washington, DC
20013
Orders by phone:
(202) 512- 6000 fax: (202) 512- 6061 TDD (202) 512- 2537
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Info@ www. gao. gov or visit GAO?s World Wide Web home page at: http:// www.
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Contact one:
Web site: http:// www. gao. gov/ fraudnet/ fraudnet. htm
E- mail: fraudnet@ gao. gov
1- 800- 424- 5454 (automated answering system) Ordering Information
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
*** End of document. ***
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