Force Structure: Projected Requirements for Some Army Forces Not Well Established (11-MAY-01, GAO-01-485)
The Army has made progress to develop a sound basis for its force
structure requirements. It has improved the rigor of its analysis
through more realistic scenarios and the integration of Army
plans and initiatives. It has also expanded the analysis to
include requirements for the entire Army. However, the weaknesses
GAO identified suggest that the Army still lacks a sound basis
for its institutional force requirements and the forces needed
for the Strategic Reserve, Domestic Support, and Homeland
defense. GAO's analysis of the institutional force requirements
casts doubt on their accuracy and, by extension, the accuracy of
the shortfall that the Army identified in this element. By
developing more accurate estimates of institutional forces, this
shortfall might be entirely eliminated. A sound basis for
requirements is also hampered by the lack of criteria for the
Strategic Reserve, Domestic Support, and Homeland Defense element
of the Army's force structure. A clearer definition of their
missions is needed to accurately estimate the forces that will be
required. In addition, the Army's method of portraying the
requirements for military technicians and some National Guard
positions needs improvement because the current method
double-counts requirements for military technicians and some
National Guard positions.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-01-485
ACCNO: A00875
TITLE: Force Structure: Projected Requirements for Some Army
Forces Not Well Established
DATE: 05/11/2001
SUBJECT: Army personnel
Combat readiness
Defense contingency planning
Human resources utilization
Projections
Strategic forces
Total Army Analysis Process
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GAO-01-485
Report to Congressional Committees
United States General Accounting Office
GAO
May 2001 FORCE STRUCTURE Projected Requirements for Some Army Forces Not
Well Established
GAO- 01- 485
Page i GAO- 01- 485 Force Structure Letter 1
Appendix I Methodology for Estimating the Accuracy of Army Requirements 24
Appendix II Army Actions to Improve Total Army Analysis 29
Appendix III Comments From the Department of Defense 32
Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 35
Related GAO Products 36
Tables
Table 1: Results of Total Army Analysis 2007 by Requirement Category 6 Table
2: Manpower Analysis Agency?s Assessments of Command
Requirements 12 Table 3: Comparison Showing the Effect of Three Scenarios on
the
Size of the Base Generating Force Shortfall Identified in Total Army
Analysis 2007 14 Table 4: Training and Doctrine Command Work Centers and
Requirements below the Headquarters Level 25 Table 5: Forces Command Work
Centers and Requirements below
the Headquarters Level 27 Table 6: Army Actions to More Accurately Depict
Requirements
and Shortfalls in Its Total Army Analysis Process 29
Abbreviations
DOD Department of Defense TAA Total Army Analysis Contents
Page 1 GAO- 01- 485 Force Structure
May 11, 2001 Congressional Committees The National Military Strategy calls
for U. S. forces to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major- theater
wars. The biennial Total Army Analysis is the Army?s process for determining
the forces needed to execute this strategy. This process involves first
determining the number and type of forces needed, comparing this requirement
with the Army?s present force structure, 1 and finally reallocating forces
to minimize the risks associated with any identified shortfalls. The
analysis focuses on the Army?s future needs. For example, Total Army
Analysis 2007, which was completed in fiscal year 2000, projects
requirements for fiscal year 2007 and identifies any shortfalls that would
exist if authorized personnel levels remain the same.
Previous versions of the analysis focused on determining the forces needed
for the two- war scenario. However, the current version, Total Army Analysis
2007, is more comprehensive because it assesses, for the first time, all the
military forces, civilian personnel, and contractors needed to meet all of
the Army?s requirements - not just those military units that would actually
deploy to the war efforts. 2 In addition to determining the war- fighting
units, Total Army Analysis 2007 determines the forces committed to small-
scale contingency operations by treaty; those forces needed as Strategic
Reserves or for Homeland Defense and Domestic Support; 3 and all U. S.-
based and overseas- based military and civilian personnel required to
organize, train, equip, and maintain Army forces. (These latter forces are
referred to as Base Generating Forces and Base Engagement Forces,
respectively, and as ?institutional forces? collectively.) After determining
these requirements, Army officials then reallocate currently authorized
personnel to fill these requirements in
1 ?Force structure? is the number and types of units that comprise the
force, their size, and their composition (e. g., divisions, brigades, and
companies). 2 For this report, we used the Army?s final revised report,
referred to as Total Army Analysis 2007.1, which was completed in July 2000.
3 Strategic reserves are forces needed to augment the forces assigned to the
two major- theater wars. The terms Homeland Defense and Domestic Support
generally refer to protecting the U. S. homeland and responding to incidents
involving weapons of mass destruction.
United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO- 01- 485 Force Structure
ways that they believe will minimize war- fighting risks. Through Total Army
Analysis 2007, the Army established a requirement for 1.717 million
positions to meet all of the its requirements. After reallocating all 1.53
million authorized personnel 4 among these requirements, the Army identified
a 45,000- position shortfall in the war- fighting element of its force
structure and a 142, 000- position shortfall in its institutional forces.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 mandated that we
annually analyze, through 2001, each new version of Total Army Analysis. 5
This report addresses two questions: (1) Does the Army have a sound basis
for its projected force requirements for fiscal year 2007? (2) What actions
might the Army take to further reduce or otherwise mitigate risks associated
with any identified shortfalls in its war- fighting forces?
Although the Army has made significant progress in developing a more
rigorous and comprehensive process for determining force requirements-
especially for the war- fighting element of its force structure- the process
has not yet matured enough to provide a sound basis for all Army
requirements. The Army has created a sounder basis for its war- fighting
requirements by incorporating more realistic scenarios and assumptions and
integrating its current plans and innovations into the analysis. However,
the lack of rigor in establishing requirements for the Army?s strategic
reserves and institutional forces raises questions about the basis for these
requirements. First, the Army did not establish criteria for estimating its
requirements for the Strategic Reserve/ Domestic Support/ Homeland Defense
forces and simply sized this force at 88,000 positions to equal six National
Guard divisions. Without mission criteria, a sound basis does not exist for
these requirements. Second, requirements for the institutional force may be
substantially overstated because the Army used unreliable data from major
Army commands to establish these requirements. Independent Army assessments
indicate that the major commands reviewed to date have overstated their
requirements by about
4 These forces include the Army?s authorized endstrength for fiscal year
2000 of 480, 000 active duty personnel; 387,000 National Guard; 205, 000
Army Reserve; 182,000 civilian employees; and 199, 000 contractors. The Army
allocated 47, 000 Guardsmen to two separate missions and counted 30, 000
military technicians as both civilian employees and Guard or Reserve unit
members.
5 The reports that we issued in response to this mandate (Section 552 of
Pub. L. 104- 106) are listed in ?Related GAO Products,? which appears after
the appendixes in this report. Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO- 01- 485 Force Structure
20 percent (16,000 personnel). While this percentage of overstatement cannot
be statistically projected to the remaining commands, we used hypothetical
percentages to estimate their effect on the Army?s reported 142,000-
position shortfall in its institutional forces. We calculated that if
further reviews at the remaining commands reveal an overstatement of 17.7
percent the reported shortfall would be completely eliminated. Such
overstatements may carry over into future analyses, since the organization
tasked with conducting these independent assessments is currently behind
schedule. Furthermore, even when the results of the assessments are
available, it is unclear how the Army plans to use them to increase the
accuracy of institutional requirements. Considering these actual and
potential overstatements, there may not be a sound basis for the entire
shortfall that the Army identified in its institutional forces. Finally, the
Army?s methodology for reporting requirements does not accurately reflect
the number of personnel actually needed by the Army. In some instances, two
requirements are met by one person, but both requirements are included in
the total requirements reported by the Army. This methodology was used to
report requirements for military technicians (about 30, 000) in the
institutional force and some National Guard positions (about 47, 000) in the
Strategic Reserve/ Domestic Support/ Homeland Defense forces.
The Army could pursue several alternatives to reduce or otherwise mitigate
the risks associated with the identified 45,000- position shortfall in its
war- fighting forces, but each would pose certain implementation and
budgetary challenges. In deciding whether to pursue these options, the Army
would need to weigh whether the risk posed by the remaining shortfalls
warrants the additional funding that would likely be required, particularly
since this is the lowest level of war- fighting shortfall the Army has
reported in the last three cycles of Total Army Analysis. If the Army
determines that further risk reduction is needed, it could pursue three
initiatives to make additional forces available. First, accelerated
conversion of the Army?s plan to convert National Guard divisions to support
forces could bring 28,000 additional support positions to the force sooner
than the projected date of 2009. Second, based on the Army?s own assessment,
about 12,000 military positions in the institutional force might be
converted to positions filled by civilian and contractor personnel. These
military personnel could then be shifted to meet war- fighting requirements.
This action might require the Army to seek funding to hire additional
civilians or contractors. However, if institutional force positions are
truly overstated and could be further reduced, the resulting savings might
be used for this purpose. Lastly, the Army believes that host nations may be
able to meet some support needs in the war- fighting force. Better
Page 4 GAO- 01- 485 Force Structure
information on these potential resources from regional commanders would be
useful to the Army in assessing risk during Total Army Analysis.
To provide a sounder basis for the Army?s requirements, we are recommending
that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to
incorporate the following changes in future versions of Total Army Analysis:
(1) establish criteria for its Strategic Reserve, Domestic Support, and
Homeland Defense requirements; (2) use the results of the latest independent
Army assessments of command requirements to adjust institutional force
requirements and, related to this action, explore alternative means for
expediting the completion of these studies at the remaining commands; and
(3) establish a methodology for more accurately portraying the requirements
for some National Guard positions and for military technicians, thereby
preventing potential misunderstanding of the Army?s actual personnel needs.
Because some of the options we outline for reducing war- fighting risk may
require substantial funding, we are recommending that the Army evaluate
these options within the context of cost and risk and decide if such
mitigating actions should be taken.
The Department of Defense concurred with our recommendations, stating that
the Army will take specific actions to strengthen the manpower requirements
determination for the institutional force. Defense stated that it is
currently reviewing requirements for the Strategic Reserve/ Domestic
Support/ Homeland Defense missions, and that the Army will incorporate these
results into its planning process. Also, the Army will footnote its total
requirements to acknowledge the dual- status nature of military technicians.
Finally, options available to mitigate risk associated with shortfalls in
the war- fighting force will be evaluated within the limits of policy, end
strength and budget. (See app. III.)
The Total Army Analysis process has evolved from one that determined the
requirements for and allocated authorized personnel to units involved in
war- fighting to one that does this for the entire Army. Although Total Army
Analysis 2005 included some analysis of requirements for the
?institutional Army,? the current version is the Army?s first attempt to
identify requirements for the total Army. This analysis includes units
required to fight two major- theater wars, forces needed to meet treaty
requirements, and the institutional forces needed to augment and support
these operations. The Army?s expanded analysis is an acknowledgment that its
entire force structure supports its war- fighting element in one way or
another. To quantify and communicate these requirements, Total Army
Background
Page 5 GAO- 01- 485 Force Structure
Analysis 2007 determined the forces it needs by summing its requirements in
five categories:
War- fighting - This category includes combat and support forces that would
deploy to fight two nearly simultaneous major theater wars. The Army starts
with the combat forces specified in the Department of Defense (DOD) guidance
and then determines the support forces needed to support its combat troops
through quantitative analysis using computer modeling. For the first time,
the Army also determined the requirements for a post- hostilities phase of
the war in addition to the actual conflict stage. Subject matter experts
were used to determine these post- hostilities requirements by analyzing the
forces needed to perform an agreed- upon list of mission tasks.
Small Scale Contingencies -This category includes those forces needed to
meet certain treaty commitments since these missions would need to continue
even in wartime. 6 The Army assumes that all other forces engaged in
contingencies would be re- deployed to war- fighting if a conflict arose and
therefore does not calculate additional requirements for such contingencies
as part of its Total Army Analysis. 7
Strategic Reserve, Domestic Support, and Homeland Defense Operations -These
are the forces needed to augment the major theater war requirements, conduct
post- hostility operations, perform jobs left vacant by deploying forces,
provide national missile defense, respond to incidents involving weapons of
mass destruction, protect critical infrastructure, and provide military
assistance to civilian authorities.
Base Generating Force -This category includes those U. S.- based
institutional force positions whose personnel provide for, access, organize,
train, equip, maintain, project, redeploy, and restore Army forces.
Military, civilian, and contractor personnel fill these positions.
6 The 1979 Middle East Peace Treaty and Article 5 of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization Treaty, April 4, 1949. These forces are currently
committed to carry out missions in the Sinai Peninsula and Europe.
7 We conducted a separate analysis to determine the size of these
requirements through a different methodology and is the subject of another
report Force Structure: Army Lacks Units Needed for Extended Contingency
Operations (GAO- 01- 198, Feb. 15, 2001). It deals specifically with the
issue of whether the Army has adequate forces to conduct multiple
contingency operations.
Page 6 GAO- 01- 485 Force Structure
Base Engagement Force -This category includes those positions needed to meet
the continuous/ long- term forward presence that shapes 8 the theater in
support of U. S. interests. It includes all overseas institutional force
positions currently filled by military, civilian, and contractor personnel.
Once the Army sums up its force structure requirements from these five
categories, it then compares its currently authorized force with these
requirements to identify shortfalls. The Army then prepares a plan for
reallocating forces to fill some unmet requirements in a manner that is
expected to reduce war- fighting risk. This plan may include converting some
types of forces into other types where critical shortfalls are projected.
These reallocations and conversions will be made from fiscal year 2002
through fiscal 2007. Table 1 shows the results of Total Army Analysis 2007,
including the distribution of the Army?s requirements among the five
categories, the Army?s allocation of forces to meet these requirements, and
the specific shortfalls that were identified.
Table 1: Results of Total Army Analysis 2007 by Requirement Category
Requirement category Number of personnel required Number of personnel
authorized
Shortfall in required personnel
War- Fighting 725,000 680,000 45,000 Small- Scale Contingencies (treaty
requirements only) 17,000 17,000 0 Strategic Reserve/ Domestic Support/
Homeland Defense 88,000 88,000 0 Base Generating Force (U. S.- based)
789,000 647,000 142,000 Base Engagement Force (overseas) 98,000 98,000 0
Total 1,717,000 1,530,000 187,000
Source: Army data.
8 DOD?s 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review emphasized the continuing need to
maintain overseas presence in order to shape the international environment.
This includes strengthening and adapting alliances and coalitions that serve
to protect shared interests and values.
Page 7 GAO- 01- 485 Force Structure
The Army has made significant progress toward making the Total Army Analysis
a more credible and comprehensive process for determining requirements and
identifying shortfalls in planned force structure. In the most recent
analysis, the Army made the scenarios in its models for war- fighting forces
more realistic, revised some assumptions to reflect more current data, and
integrated the latest Army plans and innovations for reorganizing forces and
modernizing logistics. To make the analysis more comprehensive, the Army
calculated requirements for the entire Army to include civilian personnel
and contractors- not just the military personnel associated with war-
fighting. However, the Army is still refining the process and will need to
address certain shortcomings before it has a sound process in place for
determining all requirements.
Over time, the Army has enhanced its analysis to provide a sounder basis for
its war- fighting requirements. It has done this by incrementally
incorporating more realistic and stringent assumptions and planning factors.
During the most recent analysis, the Army included several changes that made
Total Army Analysis 2007 more realistic and complete, some of which are
related to our past recommendations. 9 The major changes are as follows:
In our review of Total Army Analysis 2005, we recommended that the Army
develop more realistic scenarios to use in assessing its ability to win the
two major- theater wars and in calculating the required force structure.
Total Army Analysis 2007 uses more realistic scenarios, taking into account,
for example, the effects of the enemy?s use of chemical and biological
weapons, including those delivered by theater ballistic missiles. As a
result, the Army identified the need for about 5,000 more medical personnel
to treat casualties caused by chemical and biological weapons. In addition,
the analysis allowed the Army to gauge the impact of these weapons on the
ability of the United States to move personnel and cargo through seaports
and airfields.
In our reviews of the Army?s 2003 and 2005 analyses, we noted that the
Army had not assessed how war- fighting might be affected by DOD guidance to
redeploy forces from contingency operations to the war- fight. Thus, it did
not know if disengaging units from ongoing contingency
9 We have examined the last two iterations of this analysis and has
recommended a number of improvements to the process. A list of the more
significant changes is at appendix II of this report. Current Process Is
More Comprehensive but Does Not Provide a Sound Basis for Some Requirements
Army Has Made Its War- Fighting Analysis More Rigorous
Page 8 GAO- 01- 485 Force Structure
operations would present an obstacle to carrying out the National Military
Strategy or if its force structure contained the numbers and types of units
needed for the contingency operations. We found that the Army addressed both
questions in Total Army Analysis 2007.
We also recommended in our review of Total Army Analysis 2005 that the
Army include in its analysis all phases of the wars. In Total Army Analysis
2007, the Army added a requirement for the post- hostilities phase of the
wars. This phase was needed to recognize that, once the war was over, there
would be a continuing need for forces to provide security, handle prisoners
of war, and exercise control over the local population. In its 2007
analysis, the Army assessed the requirements for this phase and added about
12,000 personnel to its war- fighting requirements.
The analysis has also been modified to integrate more current Army plans and
initiatives. For example, advances in digital technology under the Army?s
Force XXI 10 initiative improved the lethality of Army tank units and
allowed the Army to reduce the number of tanks per unit. Fewer crews, along
with fewer vehicles to maintain, reduced the number of personnel required
for an armored division. Also, the Army is currently pursuing a major
initiative to transform the Army into a force that is more strategically
responsive to the complete spectrum of operations. Although this
transformation is still in its early stages and operational and logistical
plans have not been fully developed, the analysis did include the known
characteristics of the transformed force.
The Army has also incorporated a number of logistics planning factors and
improvement initiatives that together have reduced requirements for military
support personnel by about 7 percent, or 17,000 personnel. These factors and
improvements include the following:
Revised medical planning factors specify that 80 percent of patients will
be evacuated directly to the United States or other out- of- theater medical
facilities, thereby reducing the number of medical personnel required in the
theater.
The logistics community is fielding digitized control systems,
satellitebased movement tracking systems, and improved cargo- handling
equipment that Army officials estimate will allow a 15 percent reduction in
theater stockage levels and the personnel required to manage them.
10 Force XXI is the Army?s reorganization of its divisions to incorporate
new operational and organizational concepts.
Page 9 GAO- 01- 485 Force Structure
Improved vehicle engines are expected to reduce fuel consumption in
theater by about 25 percent, thus requiring fewer people to transport,
dispense, and guard fuel stocks.
Total Army Analysis 2007 determined that 725,000 personnel were required to
fight the two major theater wars, down from the 747,000 total reported in
Total Army Analysis 2005. The 45,000- position shortfall in the war-
fighting element of its force structure is also less than the 72,000-
position shortfall identified in Total Army Analysis 2005. Army officials
believe that this represents a reduction in war- fighting risk.
Previous Army planning analyses did not include a requirement specifically
to meet the needs of contingency operations because Army officials believed
that DOD guidance did not allow the Army to create new units for such
purposes. 11 This is because it was presumed that these forces would
disengage and redeploy to conflicts if they arose and therefore did not
represent additive requirements. During Total Army Analysis 2007, however,
the Army determined that two contingency operations would need to continue
even if conflicts arose, since they represented U. S. treaty commitments.
These commitments are for operations in the Sinai to satisfy agreements
under the 1979 Middle East Peace Treaty and for a rapid reaction force in
Europe to satisfy Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Treaty. Accordingly, 17,000 personnel needed to satisfy these two treaty
obligations were included in the Army?s total requirements.
Also included in the Army?s determination of total requirements was a
requirement for Strategic Reserve/ Domestic Support/ Homeland Defense
forces, but the Army had not yet developed criteria for determining these
requirements. DOD guidance allows force structure for these purposes but
does not specify how the size of the force should be determined. Lacking
criteria, the Army made the requirements for these missions equal to six
National Guard divisions (about 88,000 personnel), which had not been given
a specific mission in the war- fighting element.
11 Contingency operations encompass such operations as shows of force,
interventions, limited strikes, noncombatant evacuation operations,
peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. Army
Incorporated
Requirements for Certain Small- Scale Contingency Operations
Army Lacked Criteria for Strategic Reserve/ Domestic Support/ Homeland
Defense Requirements
Page 10 GAO- 01- 485 Force Structure
These National Guard forces have historically been treated as a hedge
against larger- than- expected major conflicts. However, the appropriate
size of the Strategic Reserve, and the National Guard divisions themselves,
have been debated by DOD and others. DOD?s 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review
and a subsequent congressionally mandated review panel found that the need
for a large strategic reserve had declined. 12 The Quadrennial Defense
Review identified other missions for the National Guard divisions, such as
supporting the mobilization of early deploying units and performing crisis
response for floods, hurricanes, or civil disturbances. Later, DOD assigned
the Army National Guard a role in responding to attacks using weapons of
mass destruction. However, without appropriate criteria for determining the
size of the forces needed to carry out these additional missions, the Army
has no assurance that its requirement for these missions is valid or that
the forces assigned could not be better used elsewhere.
In Total Army Analysis 2007, the Army made its first attempt to include its
institutional force requirement as part of the Army?s overall requirement.
However, the Army?s process for determining these requirements is still
evolving and, as a result, does not yet provide a sound basis for these
requirements. Because the Army used questionable data to develop some
requirements, we believe that the overall requirement for the institutional
force is, at a minimum, substantially overstated.
In general, the institutional force performs a broad range of functions for
the Army, enabling combat and support units to deploy to and fight the
theater wars. These forces support Army activities such as training,
doctrine development, base operations, supply, and maintenance. In Total
Army Analysis 2007, the institutional force requirements are in two separate
categories: (1) the Base Engagement Force for overseas requirements and (2)
the Base Generating Force for U. S.- based requirements. Both of these
forces include military, civilian, and contractor personnel.
Base Generating Force requirements were overstated because of questionable
data provided by the major commands, which are responsible for determining
their own requirements. To aggregate these requirements, the Army convened a
series of panels composed of
12 See the National Defense Panel Assessment of the May 1997 Quadrennial
Defense Review. Base Generating and
Engagement Force Requirements Are Overstated
Page 11 GAO- 01- 485 Force Structure
representatives of each command to provide their respective requirements.
This process yielded a total requirement of about 800, 000 institutional
positions, which was entered into the Total Army Analysis 2007 process. Army
officials told us that the panels reviewed the requirements and brought
about some limited changes to the requirements. However, the panels
generally accepted the requirements as submitted by the major commands,
relying on the methodologies and processes used by each of the major
commands to ensure their validity.
Historically, the Army has had difficulty arriving at valid institutional
requirements. In DOD?s fiscal year 1997 Annual Statement of Assurance to the
Congress, provided pursuant to the Federal Managers? Financial Integrity Act
of 1982 (Pub. L. 97- 255, Sept. 8, 1982), 13 the Army reported a material
weakness in its ability to properly identify institutional force
requirements. The report said that the current system lacks the ability to
link workload to manpower requirements and is not capable of determining
institutional requirements based on workload. To address the material
weakness, the Army?s Manpower Analysis Agency in April 1998 initiated a
program to certify the methodologies that major Army commands use to
determine their manpower requirements. To date, the agency has endorsed the
manpower assessment methodologies used by each command, and it is currently
assessing the accuracy of the commands? institutional manpower requirements
by conducting on- site reviews. It does this by applying an Army- approved
requirement determination process to activities within the commands. The
agency is reviewing 100 percent of the institutional requirements at each
major command headquarters and a random sample of the commands? subordinate
field activities. Where problems are found at major command headquarters,
the agency?s findings are binding and requirements must be adjusted.
Recommended changes to the requirements of each command?s field activities
are advisory.
We used the results of the Manpower Analysis Agency?s reviews to obtain an
indication of the accuracy of major commands? requirements. These results
indicate that some of the institutional requirements used in Total Army
Analysis 2007 were overstated. As of January 2001, the agency had assessed
three major command headquarters and two of the commands?
13 This act requires that the head of each executive agency provide an
annual statement of assurance to the President and the Congress stating
whether the goals of the act are being achieved. The Army reported its
material weakness in manpower requirements determination in the fiscal year
1997 report.
Page 12 GAO- 01- 485 Force Structure
field activities. 14 These results show that one activity understated its
requirements by about 9.5 percent, while the other activities overstated
their requirements by percentages ranging from about 5 to 22 percent. Table
2 shows the activities reviewed and the results of the Manpower Analysis
Agency?s assessments.
Table 2: Manpower Analysis Agency?s Assessments of Command Requirements
Activity reviewed
Commands? estimate of requirement
Manpower Analysis Agency?s estimate of
requirement Commands?
overstatement (understatement)
Percentage of overstatement (understatement)
Forces Command Headquarters Field Activities a
1,574 806 1,499
647 75 159 4.8
19.7 Training and Doctrine Command
Headquarters Field Activities a
1,460 1,551 1598
1,207 (138) 344 (9.5)
22.2 National Guard
Headquarters 1,340 1,049 291 21.7 a The findings are from a random sample of
work centers in the command?s field activities.
Source: Data provided by the Army Manpower Analysis Agency.
We projected the results from the sample of field activities in table 2 to
the modified population of field activities in the two commands reviewed by
the Manpower Analysis Agency. 15 We then combined these projections with the
agency?s findings related to its 100- percent review of headquarters
requirements. In this way, we determined that the three commands reviewed
had overstated their overall institutional force requirements by about
16,000 personnel positions, or about 20 percent.
The Manpower Analysis Agency?s on- site analyses varied from the commands?
own requirements determination for various reasons. For one activity, the
agency reported that manpower standards had not been updated in a timely
manner, the activity had not applied the standards in several years,
workloads had increased/ decreased since the last standards
14 The Manpower Analysis Agency has yet to complete on- site reviews of
overseas institutional forces (Base Engagement Force) but plans to do so in
the future. 15 The findings can be projected to only a portion of each
command?s field activities because many work centers were excluded from the
studies. The excluded work centers are likely to be considered for A- 76
contracting. Appendix I provides details on the projections and precision
levels.
Page 13 GAO- 01- 485 Force Structure
application, and work center missions had changed since the standards had
been developed. In another instance, the agency noted that manpower
standards had not been updated in 10 years. Another reason why the Manpower
Analysis Agency?s results varied from the Commands? results is that the
agency assessed whether realignments or more efficient work procedures would
save positions. For example, in one study report, the agency recommended a
realignment of two activities on the grounds that like- type functions
should not be separated if the result is additional overhead positions.
Given these known overstated requirements and the Army?s acknowledged
weakness in determining these requirements, we assessed the potential effect
of such inaccuracies on the reported 142,000- position shortfall in
institutional forces. Recognizing that the results of the Manpower Analysis
Agency?s reviews could not be statistically projected to the remaining
commands not yet reviewed, we used three hypothetical levels of overstated
requirements to estimate the effect. As shown by the first column of table
3, if the 20 percent overstatement that the Manpower Analysis Agency found
in five activities were applied to the remaining Base Generating Force, the
remaining commands may have overstated their requirements by about 143,000
personnel. Together with the 16,000- positions already found to be in error,
these latter adjustments would be more than enough to totally eliminate the
shortfall and actually result in a 16,000- position excess. The second
column shows this same comparison if one assumes that the institutional
force requirements were overstated by only 10 percent (one- half the
percentage of overstatement found to date). It results in a shortfall of
only 55,000. Finally, the third column shows a breakeven point. That is, we
calculated that if the remaining commands? estimates turned out to be
overstated by 17.7 percent, the shortfall would be completely eliminated.
Page 14 GAO- 01- 485 Force Structure
Table 3: Comparison Showing the Effect of Three Scenarios on the Size of the
Base Generating Force Shortfall Identified in Total Army Analysis 2007
Scenario 1: Assumes hypothetical 20- percent overstatement (same as found by
Manpower Analysis Agency)
applies equally to remaining commands
Scenario 2: Assumes hypothetical 10- percent overstatement is found by
Manpower Analysis Agency in remaining
commands a Scenario 3: Assumes
overstatement of 17. 7 percent (GAO- computed
breakeven point)
Shortfall in Base Generating forces identified in Total Army Analysis 2007
142,000 142,000 142,000 Less:
Adjustment for overstated requirements in commands reviewed by Manpower
Analysis Agency
-16,000 -16,000 -16,000
Adjusted shortfall 126,000 126,000 126,000
Less:
Adjustment to total requirements in commands not yet reviewed -143,000
-71,000 -126,000 Shortfall or excess after adjustment -16,000 b
(excess forces) 55,000 (shortfall) 0
a One- half the percentage of overstatement found to date. b Does not add
because of rounding.
Source: Our analysis of Army data.
In general, the requirements data resulting from the Manpower Analysis
Agency?s assessments were not available in time to be included in Total Army
Analysis 2007. Army force planners agreed that there were inaccuracies in
the institutional requirements used in Total Army Analysis 2007, but the
data were used because they were the best available. Army planners told us
that the requirements may be reduced in future analyses as the Manpower
Analysis Agency completes additional reviews of the major commands?
requirements determination processes. Although these officials expected
these reviews to result in better data from the major commands in time for
use in Total Army Analysis 2009, the Army has no firm plans for adjusting
requirements on the basis of these results.
Furthermore, the Manpower Analysis Agency has made limited progress in
reviewing the major commands. The Army?s original plan said it would
complete all actions necessary to ensure valid institutional requirements by
March 2000. Army officials determined that this goal was ambitious, and in
the 1999 Annual Assurance Statement the Army revised the completion date for
all manpower studies to March of 2002. However, as of January 2001, the
Manpower Analysis Agency had completed reviews of
Page 15 GAO- 01- 485 Force Structure
only two major commands, and Army officials told us that because of staffing
limitations and the volume of workload, they do not expect to complete their
work by the scheduled date. In our 1998 report on the Army?s institutional
forces, we noted that a lack of staff could delay the completion of the
Manpower Analysis Agency?s quality assurance reviews.
The total requirements (1.717 million positions) and total resources (1.530
million) reported in Total Army Analysis 2007 do not accurately reflect the
actual number of personnel needed by the Army. For example, a military
technician employed by a National Guard unit fills a requirement for a
civilian employee in that unit. However, the technician is also required to
be a member of the Guard unit, and thus also fills a military requirement in
that unit. 16 Thus, when requirements are totaled, they include both
requirements, even though only one person fills both positions. As a result
of this methodology, Total Army Analysis 2007 showed that the Army needed
about 30,000 more personnel (the approximate number of military technicians
employed by the reserve components) than the actual number of people
required for the Base Generating Force. A similar situation exists in the
Strategic Reserve/ Domestic Support/ Homeland Defense category, where about
47,000 National Guard personnel are ?dual tasked? to meet requirements in
that category as well as in one of the other categories. These special
situations were not fully discussed in the Army?s presentation of
requirements and resources, potentially leading to misunderstandings as to
the number of personnel the Army needs to fully meet its requirements.
However, this methodology does not affect the reported 142,000- position
shortfall, because the Army also allocated these resources twice when
matching available forces against requirements.
In reviewing the Army?s analysis, we identified several actions that the
Army could take to lessen the risk that is seemingly posed by the 45,000 gap
between requirements and resources in the war- fighting category. While this
is the lowest shortfall the Army has identified in the last three cycles of
Total Army Analysis, we believe there is even greater potential for reducing
this gap or mitigating the risks it entails. These actions include (1)
accelerating the Army?s plan to convert some Army National
16 Military technicians are dual- status employees of the reserve component.
The technician is a full- time civilian employee of a unit, and is required
to also be a military member of the unit. See 10 U. S. C. 10216 (d). Army
Reporting
Methodology for Some Requirements Lacks Clarity
Various Actions Might Be Taken to Mitigate Risk in the Army?s War- Fighting
Force
Page 16 GAO- 01- 485 Force Structure
Guard combat forces to support forces; (2) converting about 12,000 military
positions to civilian positions, as the Army has already identified; and (3)
examining more fully how host nations could meet some of the unmet support
requirements. Each of these actions would pose certain implementation and
budgetary challenges, and the Army?s leadership would need to carefully
weigh whether the risk reduction it achieves by reducing these shortfalls
further is worth the extra resources required. Since the Army takes war-
fighting risk into account when deciding what requirements should be filled,
the Army may determine that it has already met its most critical needs and
that driving down the remaining 45,000- shortfall to even lower levels, via
these options, is not the best investment the Army can make with its
available resources.
One action that the Army could take to fill some of the requirements
represented by the war- fighting shortfall would be to accelerate its plan
to convert some National Guard combat forces to support forces. The Army is
in the process of implementing Phases I and II of the plan, which, together,
will convert six National Guard combat brigades to support forces to help
meet a chronic shortfall in certain types of forces. 17 These conversions
are expected to be completed by fiscal 2007 and were included in Total Army
Analysis 2007. As a result, the war- fighting shortfall was reduced by about
20,000 positions. Under current plans, the Army would not complete Phases
III and IV of this program- representing a conversion of about 28,000
additional combat positions- until 2009.
In order to accelerate its conversion schedule, the Army would need to
budget additional funds as well as overcome some implementation challenges.
Currently, the Army has not identified the units it intends to convert under
Phases III and IV. Army officials said that three points must be addressed
before additional units can be converted. First, the Army?s initiative to
transform itself into a lighter, more mobile force makes it likely that the
specific types of support units needed will change significantly in the near
future, making it difficult to identify the types of conversions needed.
Second, the National Guard is concerned that converting combat units to
support units may decrease the rank structure (the number of senior vs.
junior positions available in the units) and limit
17 These conversions stemmed from the National Guard Division Redesign
Study, which the Secretary of the Army approved in May 1996. The plan
contains four phases and converts up to 12 combat brigades and elements of 2
divisions to the types of support units required for war- fighting. Explore
Feasibility of
Accelerating Conversion of National Guard Forces
Page 17 GAO- 01- 485 Force Structure
the potential for progression of its officers and enlisted personnel. The
concern is that this might make it harder for the National Guard to attract
and retain personnel. Third, the Army?s ability to convert combat units to
support units hinges, to a large extent, on the willingness of state
National Guard officials to accept conversion to the specific types of units
the Army needs. With respect to funding, the Army would need to budget
additional funds to carry out the variety of tasks related to these
conversions, such as procurement of equipment and construction of
facilities. While the Army has not estimated the total costs of all
conversions, it budgeted about $2.4 billion to pay for conversions under
Phases I and II. The costs for Phases III and IV would likely be of a
similar magnitude.
The Army may be able to reallocate some military end- strength to fill
positions in the war- fighting element if it follows through in converting
identified military positions in commercial- type activities to civilian or
contractor positions. Defense guidance states that the services should
reduce forces not required to support missions envisioned by the National
Military Strategy and minimize the number of military personnel assigned to
support organizations. The guidance further states that positions that do
not meet military essential requirements will be eliminated or converted to
civilian positions. In fiscal year 1998, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
issued Department of Defense Reform Initiative Directive No. 20, which,
among other things, directs the services to identify military positions that
are candidates for conversion to civilian/ contract employee jobs.
During the Total Army Analysis 2007 process, the Army identified 11,757
active duty military positions at 15 major Army commands that were
conversion candidates. Army officials told us that they had already
converted about 582 of these positions, freeing this military end- strength
to meet other Army needs. Officials said that more analysis might be needed
before proceeding with more conversions, since varying degrees of risk are
associated with the conversion candidates. Moreover, officials estimated
that about $1.04 billion in additional funding would be necessary to hire
the civilians and contractors needed to replace the military positions.
Assessing the risks associated with the conversions is important, however,
this much additional funding may not be required if further Manpower
Analysis Agency reviews yield more overstated requirements in the Army?s
institutional force, thereby allowing personnel to be reallocated.
Converting Military
Positions to Civilian Positions Could Free EndStrength to Meet WarFighting
Requirements
Page 18 GAO- 01- 485 Force Structure
A final factor that could mitigate the Army?s reported shortfall is the
potential for host nations to provide some unmet support requirements. While
some positions could be filled only by U. S. personnel, Army and theater
command officials agree that, in the event of war, host nations can provide
some types of war- fighting support. Also, DOD guidance and Army regulations
18 state that the Army should consider the availability of this support to
reduce unmet requirements. However, only a small portion of the host nation
support estimated to be available was included in Total Army Analysis 2007.
Specifically, the Army concluded that anticipated host nation support would
offset the need for about 1,300 positions in its warfighting requirement and
factored this into its analysis. This is a small proportion of the 30,000
positions that Army officials have estimated that host nations might be able
to provide in the two most likely areas for war.
The issue of how host nation support should be treated with respect to
requirements is one of continuing debate within DOD. Regional commanders
generally consider such support as potentially available to augment U. S.
forces but do not believe it prudent to rely on host nation support as a
substitute for Army units in case the support does not materialize. Army
officials said that they would not consider host nation support as filling
requirements without the concurrence of the regional commanders. Currently,
at least one regional commander is attempting to produce validated lists of
host nation support commodities and services available from host nations. 19
The Army would need to fully weigh the risk that anticipated host nation
support may not materialize in deciding whether to offset more positions.
However, better information on these potential resources from all regional
commanders would be useful in assessing risk during Total Army Analysis.
The Army has made progress in developing a sound basis for its force
structure requirements. It has improved the rigor of its analysis through
more realistic scenarios and the integration of Army plans and initiatives,
and made the analysis more comprehensive by expanding it to include
requirements for the entire Army. However, the weaknesses we identified
suggest that the Army still does not have a sound basis for its
institutional force requirements or the forces needed for the Strategic
Reserve,
18 Total Army Analysis (Army Regulation 71- 11, Dec. 29, 1995), para. 2- 2.
19 For example, U. S. Central Command has an ongoing effort to produce a
validated list of host nation support commodities and services required from
host nations, organized by location and operations plan. Fuller Analysis of
Host
Nation Support Is Needed Conclusion
Page 19 GAO- 01- 485 Force Structure
Domestic Support, and Homeland Defense. Our analysis of the institutional
force requirements casts doubt on their accuracy, and, by extension, the
accuracy of the shortfall that the Army identified in this element of the
force. By developing more accurate estimates of institutional forces, this
shortfall might be entirely eliminated. The fact that the Manpower Analysis
Agency has already identified an average overstatement of 20 percent in
three commands is significant, as it suggests that inaccuracies remain in
the institutional force requirements, which comprise over half of the Army?s
total requirements. It is, therefore, important that the agency
expeditiously complete its review of major commands and that the Army
resolve its material weakness in requirements determination. Because the
program to accomplish this lags well behind schedule, additional staff or
contractors might be needed to complete these reviews by 2002 as planned.
The sooner these reviews are completed, the sooner the Army will know
whether it can reduce positions in the institutional forces and apply any
savings to cover some of the shortfall in its war- fighting forces.
Furthermore, this significant potential to improve the accuracy of
requirements data can be realized only if the results of the Manpower
Analysis Agency?s reviews are actually used in the Total Army Analysis
process to adjust requirements. A stronger Army commitment to use these
results in this way is needed if the Army is to overcome the material
weakness it has identified in establishing institutional force requirements.
A sound basis for requirements is also hampered by the lack of criteria for
the Strategic Reserve, Domestic Support, and Homeland Defense element of the
Army?s force structure. A clearer definition of the missions involved is
needed to accurately estimate the forces needed for these missions. The risk
of not setting criteria for this force is that the Army may not have enough
of these forces or the right types. Conversely, if too many forces have been
committed for this purpose, the Army may be unnecessarily diverting forces
to this mission that could be better used elsewhere.
The Army?s method of portraying the requirements for military technicians
and some National Guard positions needs to more accurately reflect the
actual number of personnel needed. Because one person fills more than one
requirement, the actual number of personnel needed is misstated by about
77,000.
The actions suggested in this report to mitigate the risks of the identified
45,000- position shortfall in war- fighting forces must be considered within
the context of both cost and risk. A clear understanding of the risks that
this shortfall represents is necessary to decide what actions should be
Page 20 GAO- 01- 485 Force Structure
taken or whether actions should be taken at all. Accelerating the conversion
of National Guard combat forces to support forces may pose challenges for
the Army and would require added funding. Similarly, converting additional
military positions to civilian positions should be done only after a careful
consideration of the risks. This action may or may not require added
funding, depending on the Army?s success in achieving more accurate
estimates for its institutional force requirements. Fully identifying and
acknowledging all available resources, including potential support from host
nations, would provide a more accurate portrayal of the risks associated
with the shortfall and allow Army planners to be better equipped to decide
the types of units to build or maintain.
To improve the accuracy of the Army?s force structure requirements, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to
incorporate the following changes into future versions of the Total Army
Analysis process:
Use the results of completed Manpower Analysis Agency reviews to adjust
requirements for the Base Generating Force and Base Engagement Force.
Furthermore, explore alternative means of expediting the completion of these
studies at the remaining Army commands, whether by expanding the existing
Manpower Analysis Agency team or through the use of contractor personnel.
Establish mission criteria to provide a firmer basis for Strategic
Reserve, Domestic Support, and Homeland Defense requirements.
Establish a methodology for more accurately portraying requirements for
military technicians and other National Guard positions where one person is
filling more than one requirement, thereby precluding a potential
misunderstanding of the personnel needed.
We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the
Army to examine the options we outlined to address the 45,000- position
shortfall in the Army?s war- fighting force within the context of costs and
risks, and decide if mitigating actions should be taken. These actions
include the accelerated conversion of National Guard forces to support
forces, the conversion of military positions to civilian or contractor
positions, and the consideration of how host nations could meet some unmet
support needs. Recommendations for
Executive Action
Page 21 GAO- 01- 485 Force Structure
In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense
concurred with our recommendations. Recognizing a need for improvement, the
Department said it would advise the Army to strengthen the manpower
determination process, regularly update manpower standards, review
institutional requirements more frequently, and incorporate the re- sized
requirements into Total Army Analysis. The Department commented, however,
that we used the Army?s limited review findings to estimate the total number
of requirements overstated, and that extending the results of the Army?s
sample across the institutional force might be misleading. To clarify, we
did not project the results of the Army?s two samples to the entire
institutional force. Rather, we projected these results only to selected
work centers within the two commands from which the sample was drawn.
Concerning the lack of criteria for estimating its requirements for the
Strategic Reserve, Homeland Defense, and Domestic Support missions, the
Department of Defense said that it has an ongoing strategic review to
establish such requirements and that the results will be incorporated into
the Army?s planning process. In order to be of value to Total Army Analysis,
we believe Defense?s study will need to provide enough specificity that the
Army can project the number and types of units that will be needed to carry
out these missions. To improve reporting of requirements, the Department
will advise the Army to footnote the results of its planning process to
acknowledge the dual- status nature of the manpower requirements associated
with military technicians. We believe this footnote should clearly identify
those instances where two requirements may be filled by one person. The
Department also agreed to assess the options for mitigating the risk of
shortfalls in war- fighting forces that were outlined in the report, stating
that it will continue to optimize war- fighting capabilities within the
limits of policy, end strength and budget. We believe these actions by
Defense and the Army, once implemented, will improve the Army?s process for
determining and reporting its force structure requirements and the
allocation of resources against those requirements. Defense?s comments are
reprinted in appendix III.
To assess the basis for the Army?s projected force requirements and the
validity of reported shortfalls, we reviewed pertinent documents related to
the Total Army Analysis 2007 process, including the total requirements it
identified, the forces available to meet those requirements, and the
shortfall in forces reported by the Army. We also obtained data on the key
assumptions and factors used in the analysis, and identified improvements in
the process. We visited the Center for Army Analysis at Fort Belvoir,
Virginia, to document the incorporation of these factors into the analysis.
Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation Scope and Methodology
Page 22 GAO- 01- 485 Force Structure
We also visited the Combined Arms Support Command at Fort Lee, Virginia, to
discuss its input to the Army?s analysis.
To assess the validity of the shortfall in institutional forces and explore
alternatives for reducing it, we visited the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Army, Manpower and Reserve Affairs to discuss efforts to
resolve the material weakness previously reported in this area. We also
visited the Army?s Manpower Analysis Agency at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and
obtained the results of manpower assessments they had completed. We analyzed
the agency?s data and used it to assess the validity of the Army?s
institutional force requirements.
To identify factors that could mitigate the risk posed by shortfalls in
warfighting forces, we met with Army National Guard officials responsible
for implementing the Army National Guard Division Redesign Study
recommendations, and with the Army force planning officials who tracked
decisions reached during the Total Army Analysis process.
We conducted our review from March 2000 through February 2001 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. For further
information on our scope and methodology, see appendix I.
We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld,
Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Joseph W. Westphal, Acting Secretary of
the Army; and the Honorable Mitchell E Daniels, Jr., Director, Office of
Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others upon
request.
Please contact me at (202) 512- 5140 if you or your staff have any questions
concerning this report. GAO contact and staff acknowledgements are listed in
appendix IV.
Carol R. Schuster Director, Defense Capabilities
and Management
Page 23 GAO- 01- 485 Force Structure
List of Congressional Committees
The Honorable John W. Warner Chairman The Honorable Carl Levin Ranking
Member Committee on Armed Services United States Senate
The Honorable Tim Hutchinson Chairman The Honorable Max Cleland Ranking
Member Subcommittee on Personnel Committee on Armed Services United States
Senate
The Honorable Bob Stump Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking
Democratic Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives
The Honorable John M. McHugh Chairman The Honorable Martin T. Meehan Ranking
Minority Member Subcommittee on Military Personnel Committee on Armed
Services House of Representatives
Appendix I: Methodology for Estimating the Accuracy of Army Requirements
Page 24 GAO- 01- 485 Force Structure
In fiscal year 1997, the Secretary of the Army declared that the Army?s
manpower requirements determination for its institutional force was a
material weakness under the Federal Manager?s Financial Integrity Act. As a
result of the declared weakness, the Army is using its Manpower Analysis
Agency to certify the requirements- determination process in all Army major
commands. As part of the certification, the Manpower Analysis Agency is (1)
examining all requirements at the headquarters and (2) examining all
requirements in a randomly sampled 2 percent of the work centers in most
major functional areas below the headquarters level. For each command the
agency has reviewed, the Army provided the requirements originally stated by
the major command and the subsequent requirements that the Manpower Analysis
Agency recommended while certifying the major commands? requirements-
determination process. Such information is available for only the
headquarters- and- below level of the Training and Doctrine Command and
Forces Command, and the headquarters for the National Guard Bureau.
The agency sampled all 1,460 requirements for the Training and Doctrine
Command headquarters. Data gathered as part of the certification process
showed that the agency recommended 1,598 requirements. That is, the agency
recommended increasing the command?s requirements by 138, or 9.5 percent,
from the level originally reported by that major command. Because all
headquarters requirements were sampled, no sampling error is associated with
the agency?s recommended 1,598 requirements.
Table 4 shows the population and sample for the work centers below the
Training and Doctrine Command headquarters level. Although the command
reported 19 major areas with 6,474 work centers and 80,162 requirements, 7
major areas were not included in the certification process (indicated by the
shaded areas in table 4). The largest number of work centers and
requirements eliminated from the certification process were in base
operations, an area that will be reviewed later because of concerns about
some of the jobs possibly being privatized. After the 7 major areas were
eliminated, there were 3,337 work centers and 49,123 requirements in the
modified population. Appendix I: Methodology for Estimating the
Accuracy of Army Requirements Training and Doctrine Command
Appendix I: Methodology for Estimating the Accuracy of Army Requirements
Page 25 GAO- 01- 485 Force Structure
Table 4: Training and Doctrine Command Work Centers and Requirements Below
the Headquarters Level Work centers Requirements Major area Population
Sampled Population Sample:
original Sample: recommended
Base Operations 2,535 27,185 Battle Labs 27 281 Combat Development 317 7 3,
693 163 68 Confinement Facility 82 4 998 57 48 Foreign Military Sales/
Security Assistance 90 3 853 26 17 HQ- AMHA 135 1,056 Intelligence 6 28
Military Entrance Processing 395 2,053 Modernization 7 1 178 5 0 Provost
Marshal 37 434 Reception Station 44 5 468 55 58 Reserve Officers Training
Corps 353 5 3, 953 68 67 Training Development 248 7 3, 970 91 61 Training
Event Support 4 1 26 9 7 Training Support- Units 158 6 3, 805 54 49 Training
Support 2 2 Training- Reserve Unit/ Personnel 83 4 526 42 40 Training 1,592
34 25,782 745 602 Training Support 359 13 4,871 236 190
Total Command 6, 474 90 80,162
Excluded major areas -3,137 0 -31,039
Total Manpower Analysis Agency Study 3,337 90 49,123 1, 551 1,207
Training and Doctrine Command records show there were 1,551 requirements in
the 90 sampled work centers. After completing its certification process, the
Manpower Analysis Agency recommended staffing the 90 work centers with 1,207
requirements- a decrease of 22.2 percent. When the sample- based
recommendations were weighted and projected to the modified population, we
found that the Training and Doctrine Command needs 37,923 requirements (with
a precision of ± 3, 562 requirements) for the subgroup of work centers in
the modified population. No projection can be made to the 3,137 work centers
and 31,039 requirements that were excluded from the Manpower Analysis
Agency?s certification study.
Appendix I: Methodology for Estimating the Accuracy of Army Requirements
Page 26 GAO- 01- 485 Force Structure
The agency sampled all 1,574 requirements for the Forces Command
headquarters. The data gathered as part of the certification process showed
that the agency recommended 1,499 requirements- a reduction of 75, or 4.8
percent, from the requirements originally reported by that major command.
Because all headquarters requirements were sampled, no sampling error is
associated with the agency?s recommended 1,499 requirements.
Table 5 shows the population and sample for the work centers below the
Forces Command headquarters level. The 2- percent sampling was performed
somewhat differently for Forces Command than for the Training and Doctrine
Command. All major functional areas except Training Support Brigade were
included in the sample, but work centers subject to possible privatization
were excluded from almost every functional area. As shown in the table 5
(next to the last line), 2,107 of the 4,711 Forces Command work centers and
19,026 of its 42,222 requirements were excluded from the Manpower Analysis
certification study. Forces Command
Appendix I: Methodology for Estimating the Accuracy of Army Requirements
Page 27 GAO- 01- 485 Force Structure
Table 5: Forces Command Work Centers and Requirements Below the Headquarters
Level Work centers Requirements Major area Population Sampled Population
Sample:
original Sample: recommended
Army Signal Command Brigade 96 4 515 15 12 Army Signal Command Battalion 256
11 2,539 88 75 Army Signal Command Company 162 3 803 16 16 Augmentation 114
3 801 22 16 Command Group/ Support Staff 238 10 2,043 60 36 Civilian
Personnel Advisory Center 22 1 295 9 10 Combat Training Center 16 1 262 44
48 Directorate for Community Activities 163 2 1, 766 46 40 Directorate for
Contracting 40 2 547 21 20 Directorate for Information Management 125 2 1,
235 26 21 Directorate of Logistics 110 3 1, 358 35 20 Directorate of Plans,
Training, Mobilization, and Security 223 7 2, 353 66 50 Directorate of
Public Works 85 1 1,205 36 36 Directorate for Resource Management 84 3 673
30 24 Adjutant General Staff 133 3 1, 276 46 39 Mission Unit 141 4 1, 051 33
10 Non- Commissioned Officer Academy 66 1 486 17 20 Other 115 2 862 18 18
Provost Marshall 126 5 1, 902 42 22 Subordinate Headquarters 289 4 1, 944
136 114
Total Manpower Analysis Agency 2,604 72 23,916 806 647
Excluded work centers in major areas 2, 107 19,026
Total Command 4, 711 42,222
Forces Command records show there were 806 requirements in the 72 sampled
work centers. After completing its certification process, the Manpower
Analysis Agency recommended staffing the 72 work centers with 647
requirements- a decrease of 19.7 percent. When the samplebased
recommendations were weighted and projected to the modified population, we
found that the Forces Command needs 19,801 requirements (with a precision of
± 1,538 requirements) for the subgroup of work centers in the modified
population. No projection can be made to the 2,107 work centers and 19,026
requirements that were excluded from the Manpower Analysis Agency
certification study.
Appendix I: Methodology for Estimating the Accuracy of Army Requirements
Page 28 GAO- 01- 485 Force Structure
The agency sampled all 1,340 requirements for the National Guard Bureau
headquarters. The data gathered as part of the certification process showed
that the agency recommended 1,049 requirements- a reduction of 291, or 21. 7
percent, from the requirements originally reported by that major command.
Because all headquarters requirements were sampled, no sampling error is
associated with the agency?s recommended 1,049 requirements. National Guard
Bureau
Appendix II: Army Actions to Improve Total Army Analysis
Page 29 GAO- 01- 485 Force Structure
In progressing from its Total Army Analysis (TAA) 2003 through its TAA 2007
analyses, our reviews show that the Army has improved its process for
determining its force structure requirements and for alleviating force
shortfalls. Notwithstanding the problem areas identified in our report, the
Army has taken a number of steps to more accurately reflect the Army forces
needed to carry out the National Military Strategy of fighting and winning
two major- theater wars. The Army has also found ways to make better use of
existing resources to minimize war- fighting risks. Table 6 summarizes some
of the actions the Army has taken.
Table 6: Army Actions to More Accurately Depict Requirements and Shortfalls
in Its Total Army Analysis Process Process improvements Description
TAA 2007 Determined Total Army Requirements The TAA 2003 and 2005 processes
only determined the forces needed to fight and win the
two major theater wars. They did not consider the Army as a whole- the
forces and activities in other theaters and in the United States that would
be needed to deploy and sustain the forces engaged in the two wars. TAA 2007
determined requirements for the entire Army and allocated all authorized
military, civilians, and contractors among five categories of forces
encompassing all Army requirements. Institutional Force Requirements
Determination Declared a Material Weakness
In our report on the TAA 2003 process we noted that the Army, despite
numerous initiatives, was still unable to allocate its Table of Distribution
and Allowances, or ?institutional Army? personnel, on the basis of the
workload to be performed. a While the Army was taking action to streamline
and reduce its institutional force, the lack of workload- based requirements
hampered those actions. The Army subsequently reported the deficiencies in
its manpower requirements determination system as a material weakness under
the Federal Managers? Financial Integrity Act. It first reported the
weakness in its fiscal year 1997 report, and it has provided the Congress
updates on it progress each year since. Updated Inputs And Assumptions Were
Used Our review of the TAA 2003 process b indicated that not all computer
model inputs were
scrutinized to ensure their accuracy. Participants in the process detected
errors in inputs such as water and fuel consumption rates that brought into
question the accuracy of some results. Additionally, our separate review of
the Army?s process for developing logistical support data showed that the
process lacked adequate procedures for developing and reviewing the logistic
support data used in the TAA process. c We noted that the Army more
rigorously reviewed its data for TAA 2005. Model inputs were reviewed and
approved by a General Officer Advisory Group, a Study Advisory Group, and
consultants prior to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army?s review and
approval. In addition, the Army obtained input from the regional commanders-
in- chief. Additionally, the Army published specific guidance on how
logistics data for the force planning process should be validated and
maintained. Hostile Chemical Weapons Effects Were Taken Into Account
According to the Quadrennial Defense Review, an adversary?s use of chemical
or biological
weapons is likely in future warfare. U. S. forces, if unprepared, could
suffer higher casualties. Also, because of the contamination such weapons
would cause, U. S. forces could be denied ready access to the seaports and
airfields necessary for the buildup and sustainment of U. S. forces.
However, our review of TAA 2005 found that the Army assumed enemy forces
would make only limited use of chemical weapons in both theaters and, thus,
did not increase war- fighting requirements. d Additionally, the analysis
assumed that U. S. forces would have immediate and unrestricted access to
seaports and airfields. In TAA 2007, the Army modified its analysis to take
into account the effects of the enemy?s use of chemical weapons. The
analysis considered the effects of these weapons delivered
Appendix II: Army Actions to Improve Total Army Analysis
Appendix II: Army Actions to Improve Total Army Analysis
Page 30 GAO- 01- 485 Force Structure
Process improvements Description
both by theater ballistic missiles and by other means. As a result of the
analysis, the Army identified the need for about 5,000 more medical
personnel to treat the casualties caused by the chemical weapons. In
addition, the analysis allowed the Army to gauge the impact of chemical
weapons on the United States?s ability to move personnel and cargo through
the seaports and airfields. The Analysis Included All Campaign Phases In TAA
2005, the Army modeled requirements for three campaign phases. e It did not
determine the forces needed in the last two phases. As a result, it did not
know the total forces needed to fight and win the two major- theater wars
and could not fully assess its risk in implementing the National Military
Strategy. The Army included all campaign phases in its TAA 2007
determination of the forces needed for the two major theater wars, including
the forces required for the post- hostilities phase. TAA 2007 Addressed the
Effect of Contingency Operations Since the end of the Cold War, the Army has
been, and will continue to be, engaged in
contingency operations, using forces justified for fighting the two major-
theater wars. If the two major- theater wars were to occur, the forces
engaged in contingency operations would have to be withdrawn from those
operations, retrained for their wartime mission, and deployed to the major-
theater wars. However, as we noted in our review of the TAA 2003 and TAA
2005 analyses, f the Army had not assessed the impact of these operations on
its ability to fight two major- theater wars. Additionally, it had not
analyzed the force requirements to determine if the numbers and types of
units needed for contingency operations could be drawn from those required
for the two major wars. Thus, it did not know if disengaging units from
ongoing contingency operations would present an obstacle to carrying out the
national military strategy or if its force structure contained the numbers
and types of units needed for the contingency operations. We found that the
Army addressed both questions in TAA 2007. g The Army analyzed the impact of
withdrawing forces engaged in contingency operations on its ability to fight
the two major- theater wars as an excursion to the normal modeling process.
While Army officials said the excursion was not a definitive study, they
indicated the Army would still be able to carry out the national military
strategy. Additionally, on the basis of Defense guidance, the Army
identified the numbers and types of units needed for seven contingency
operations. However, the Army did not then compare the numbers and types of
units required for those operations with the numbers and types of units in
the Army?s force structure. TAA 2007 Incorporated Some Force XXI Concepts
Under its Force XXI redesign, the Army sought to create a more deployable
and sustainable
force using emerging technologies and incorporating new operational and
organizational concepts to increase its capabilities. The process also
included the redesign of institutional forces. The Army found that it could
reduce the size of its heavy divisions while also increasing the area
covered by those divisions. However, the TAA 2005 modeling did not include
redesigned divisions or corps as envisioned in Force XXI, even though two
divisions and one corps were to be redesigned by 2005. In its TAA 2007
analysis, the Army incorporated the planned Force XXI divisions in its
campaign modeling. However, Force XXI concepts for corps and higher levels
had not yet been developed. Thus, TAA 2007 only addressed Force XXI at the
division level. TAA 2007. 1 Incorporated Transformation Concepts In late
1999, the Army announced a long- term ?Transformation? initiative with the
goal of
transforming the Army?s forces into forces that are more rapidly deployable,
yet still lethal and survivable. A key component of the effort is the
formation of five to eight Interim Brigade Combat Teams, which have a new
force composition, by 2008. The Army had essentially completed its TAA 2007
analysis when the Transformation initiative was announced. However, it
conducted a supplemental analysis incorporating the interim brigades
expected to be in the force by 2007 into the combat models. Based on the
results of that analysis, the Army revised its TAA 2007 requirements and was
able to reduce the number of forces required for the two major- theater
wars.
Actions to reduce the shortfall
Army National Guard Divisional Units Assigned To Fill War- fight Shortfalls
Total Army Analysis is a two- step process. The first determines the
requirements, and the
second matches available resources to those requirements. However, our TAA
2003 review
Appendix II: Army Actions to Improve Total Army Analysis
Page 31 GAO- 01- 485 Force Structure
Process improvements Description
found that the Army had not considered all available units when making its
resourcing decisions. Notwithstanding that the TAA process resulted in a
personnel shortfall for the two major- theater wars, the Army did not take
advantage of units and personnel in the eight existing National Guard
divisions to fill some of those requirements. h Since then, the Army has
moved on two fronts to allocate some of those personnel to meet war-
fighting needs. In the TAA 2005 process, the Army identified and assigned
about 3,600 personnel in the National Guard divisions to war- fighting. As
part of Total Army Analysis 2007, the Army identified an additional 2,200
personnel within the Guard Divisions to be used for war- fighting missions.
The units involved include attack helicopter battalions, field artillery
battalions, and chemical companies. The second front concerns converting
combat units in the divisions to the types of support units needed to
alleviate the two- major- theater war- fighting shortfall. Under the Army
National Guard Division Redesign program, the Army plans to convert about
48, 000 positions in up to 12 Guard combat brigades from non- war- fighting
missions to war- fighting support by fiscal year 2009. We noted in our March
1999 report that if successful, the program will halve the Army?s reported
support force shortfall. The first two phases of the program are under way
and, when completed by the end of fiscal year 2005, should result in the
conversion of about 20,000 of the planned 48, 000 personnel support spaces
that the plan is expected to provide. Phases three and four of this program
are to be completed by 2009, thereby adding another 28, 000 positions to the
Army?s support forces. Military Positions That Could Be Filled by Civilian
or Contractor Personnel Have Been Identified
Our March 1999 report noted that, in TAA 2005, the Army did not assess
whether civilian personnel or contractors could perform the functions of
institutional or unique military forces. By reducing the number of military
institutional forces, more military personnel could be allocated to
alleviate shortfalls in the forces needed to support the war- fighting
mission. During the TAA 2007 process, the Army identified about 12, 000
active military positions in institutional forces whose duties could be
performed by civilian personnel or contractors. The military personnel thus
freed up could have been used to fill unresourced war- fighting positions or
to fill some of the early deploying war- fighting positions. However, the
Army converted only about 582 positions. Officials said the Army could not
currently fund the remaining conversions.
a The institutional force conducts Army support activities, including
training, doctrine development, base operations, supply, and maintenance.
These forces, in general, do not deploy to a war- fighting operation.
b Force Structure: Army Support Forces Can Meet Two- Conflict Strategy With
Some Risk
(GAO/ NSIAD- 97- 66, Feb. 28, 1997). c Force Structure: Army?s Support
Requirements Process Lacks Valid and Consistent Data
(GAO/ NSIAD- 95- 43, Jan. 30, 1995). d Force Structure: Opportunities for
the Army to Reduce Risk in Executing the Military Strategy
(GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 47, Mar. 15, 1999). e GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 47, Mar. 15, 1999.
f GAO/ NSIAD- 97- 66, Feb. 28, 1997 and GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 47, Mar. 15, 1999. g
Force Structure: The Army Lacks Units Needed for Extended Contingency
Operations (GAO- 01- 198, Feb. 15, 2001). h The eight divisions are not part
of the forces designated to fight the two major- theater wars.
Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 32 GAO- 01- 485 Force Structure
Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense
Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 33 GAO- 01- 485 Force Structure
Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 34 GAO- 01- 485 Force Structure
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
Page 35 GAO- 01- 485 Force Structure
Gwendolyn R. Jaffe (202) 512- 5140 In addition to the name above, James
Mahaffey, Leo Jessup, Ron Leporati, Tim Stone, Jack Edwards, and Susan
Woodward made key contributions to this report. Appendix IV: GAO Contact and
Staff
Acknowledgments GAO Contact Acknowledgments
Related GAO Products Page 36 GAO- 01- 485 Force Structure
Force Structure: Army Support Forces Can Meet Two- Conflict Strategy With
Some Risks (GAO/ NSIAD- 97- 66, Feb. 28, 1997).
Force Structure: Army?s Efforts to Improve Efficiency of Institutional
Forces Have Produced Few Results (GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 65, Feb. 26, 1998).
Force Structure: Opportunities for the Army to Reduce Risk in Executing the
Military Strategy (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 47, Mar. 15, 1999).
Force Structure: Army Is Integrating Active and Reserve Combat Forces, but
Challenges Remain (GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 162, July 18, 2000).
Force Structure: Army Lacks Units Needed for Extended Contingency Operations
(GAO- 01- 198, Feb. 15, 2001). Related GAO Products
(702051)
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