Kosovo Air Operations: Combat Aircraft Basing Plans Are Needed in Advance of Future Conflicts (29-MAY-01, GAO-01-461)
In March of 1999, the United States provided military forces in
support of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) combat
operations against Yugoslavia following the failure of peace
talks and escalating violence against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.
This report reviews how well the United States was prepared for
basing its combat aircraft during this operation, called
Operation Allied Force. Specifically, GAO determines (1) whether
plans were in place to determine where and how to deploy combat
aircraft for an operation like Allied Force, (2) how combat
aircraft basing decisions were coordinated among the services and
allied nations, and (3) whether the United States had the
necessary international agreements in place to enable it to
quickly execute plans for such an operation. GAO found that the
United States had no specific and detailed advanced plans that
could be used to determine where and how to deploy its combat
aircraft during Operation Allied Force because it was a
combination of peacetime and combat operations. Overall plans for
operations in defense of NATO members did not apply to this
conflict. While part of the U.S. European Command's mission is to
plan for NATO conflicts, the Command had no prepared plan that
could be applied to the conflict in Kosovo. Neither the U.S.
European Command nor any U.S. military service coordinated combat
aircraft basing decisions for all the U.S. service components and
for all allies. While the U.S. European Command's mission is to
serve as the focal point for American support to NATO, the
services, for the most part, planned their own deployments.
Finally, the United States had general agreements with most
countries involved in Operation Allied Force to cover the legal
status and protections of U.S. citizens. However, the United
States did not have more specific agreements with many countries
addressing such issues as which host countries would provide what
airfield access and what rates would be charged for the logistics
services provided.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-01-461
ACCNO: A01065
TITLE: Kosovo Air Operations: Combat Aircraft Basing Plans Are
Needed in Advance of Future Conflicts
DATE: 05/29/2001
SUBJECT: Combat readiness
Military aircraft
Military operations
International agreements
Defense contingency planning
Military bases
Armed forces abroad
International cooperation
DOD Operation Allied Force
Kosovo
NATO
NATO Partnership for Peace Program
NATO Status of Forces Agreement
Yugoslavia
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GAO-01-461
Report to the Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives
United States General Accounting Office
GAO
May 2001 KOSOVO AIR OPERATIONS
Combat Aircraft Basing Plans Are Needed in Advance of Future Conflicts
GAO- 01- 461
Page i GAO- 01- 461 Kosovo Air Operations Letter 1
Appendix I Comments From the Department of Defense 18
Figures
Figure 1: European Land Bases Being Used by U. S. Aircraft at the Beginning
of Operation Allied Force 4 Figure 2: European Land Bases Being Used by U.
S. Aircraft at the
End of Operation Allied Force 6
Abbreviations
DOD Department of Defense EUCOM U. S. European Command NATO North Atlantic
Treaty Organization USAFE U. S. Air Forces in Europe Contents
Page 1 GAO- 01- 461 Kosovo Air Operations
May 29, 2001 The Honorable Bob Stump Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Chairman: On March 24, 1999, the United States provided military
forces in support of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) combat
operations against Yugoslavia following the failure of peace talks and
escalating violence against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Combat operations
officially ended on June 20, 1999, with the Yugoslav acceptance of a peace
plan and the United Nations? endorsement of the plan. Your Committee
requested that we examine a number of issues associated with the conduct of
these combat operations, called Operation Allied Force. This report, one in
a series responding to your requests, assesses how well the United States
was prepared for basing its combat aircraft during this operation.
Specifically, we determined (1) whether plans were in place to determine
where and how to deploy combat aircraft for an operation like Allied Force,
(2) how combat aircraft basing decisions were coordinated among the services
and allied nations, and (3) whether the United States had the necessary
international agreements in place to enable it to quickly execute plans for
such an operation.
The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of State both have roles
in planning the basing of U. S. aircraft overseas. In the European theater,
the U. S. European Command (EUCOM) is responsible for maintaining forces
ready to conduct the full spectrum of military operations, enhancing
transatlantic security through support to NATO, promoting regional
stability, and advancing U. S. interests. EUCOM?s Commander also serves as
NATO?s Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. U. S. Air Forces in Europe
(USAFE) is the air component of the U. S. European Command. In fulfilling
its NATO responsibilities, USAFE maintains combat- ready aircraft dispersed
from Great Britain to Turkey. The Department of State oversees the
negotiation of international agreements between the United States and host
nation governments.
United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO- 01- 461 Kosovo Air Operations
The United States had no specific and detailed advanced plans that could be
used to determine where and how to deploy its combat aircraft during
Operation Allied Force because it was a combination of peacetime and combat
operations. Overall plans for operations in defense of NATO members did not
apply to this conflict. While part of the U. S. European Command?s mission
is to plan for NATO conflicts, the Command had no prepared plan that could
be applied to the conflict in Kosovo. As the major supplier of combat
aircraft for this operation, the United States developed plans for aircraft
basing as the conflict was ongoing. Because force requirements frequently
changed, the deployment of aircraft did not proceed initially in a way that
took into account what might be needed later. In some cases, units already
sent to the region had to be returned to their home bases as the buildup of
aircraft in the region increased and airfields became overly congested.
Neither the U. S. European Command nor any U. S. military service
coordinated combat aircraft basing decisions for all the U. S. service
components and for all allies. While the U. S. European Command?s mission is
to serve as the focal point for American support to NATO, the services, for
the most part, planned their own deployments. Aircraft landbasing issues for
naval forces were minimal, as the majority of naval forces supporting
Operation Allied Force were pre- planned, rotationally deployed using normal
deployment/ detachment facilities. The Air Force took the lead in making
combat aircraft basing decisions because it had the largest proportion of
combat aircraft involved in the operation. However, the lack of a single
focal point caused problems in coordination and communication. For example,
the services expressed confusion about how basing arrangements should be
made and found that each U. S. request for aircraft access was treated
differently by each nation. Also, the lack of one focal point for all NATO
allies resulted in instances in which the U. S. State Department, U. S.
military, and allied partners were not aware of what the others were
arranging in terms of combat aircraft basing.
The United States had general agreements with most countries involved in
Operation Allied Force to cover the legal status and protection of U. S.
citizens. However, the United States did not have more specific agreements
with many countries addressing such issues as (1) which host countries would
provide what airfield access and (2) what rates would be charged for the
logistics services provided. DOD develops such agreements with Department of
State oversight. Because these more specific agreements were absent, the
services procured necessary airfield Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO- 01- 461 Kosovo Air Operations
access and logistics items in an ad hoc fashion and were vulnerable to being
charged excessive costs.
The European Command and the Air Force now recognize the need for better
planning for combat aircraft basing. We are recommending that the Secretary
of Defense direct the Commander of the U. S. European Command to take the
lead in the planning and coordination needed for future European theater
conflicts like Operation Allied Force. This planning should include
finalizing aircraft basing strategies and concluding supplemental
international agreements in consultation with the Department of State with
countries from which logistics services would be required.
We are making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to address combat
aircraft basing plans for future conflicts like Operation Allied Force that
do not fit into the category of a major theater war or a peacekeeping
operation. The Department of Defense concurred with our recommendations.
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has dramatically decreased
its overseas basing of military forces. The Air Force?s presence in Europe,
for example, shrank from 25 bases with 850 aircraft in 1990 to just 6 bases
1 and 174 aircraft in 1999. In preparation for Operation Allied Force, the
Air Force augmented its supply of aircraft in the European theater to 207
aircraft at 10 bases in 5 European countries (see fig. 1). 2
1 These six bases were Aviano, Italy; Incirlik, Turkey; Lakenheath and
Mildenhall, the United Kingdom; and Ramstein and Spangdahlem, Germany. 2 At
the beginning of Operation Allied Force, the Navy was using Souda Bay,
Crete, as a land base. Background
Page 4 GAO- 01- 461 Kosovo Air Operations
Figure 1: European Land Bases Being Used by U. S. Aircraft at the Beginning
of Operation Allied Force
Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data.
By the end of the operation, just 78 days later, NATO had assembled over
1,000 aircraft in the region. Of these, the United States provided over 700,
Germany France Spain
Italy United
Kingdom Atlantic Ocean
Mediterranean Sea Greenland Sea
Fairford Mildenhall
Istres Moron
Aviano Brindisi Cervia Sigonella Ramstein
Rhein-Main Serbia
Page 5 GAO- 01- 461 Kosovo Air Operations
and other NATO allies contributed the remainder. Of the more than 700 U. S.
aircraft, over 500 fixed- wing aircraft were deployed at 22 land bases in 8
countries (see fig. 2). Seventy percent of the U. S. land- based aircraft
belonged to the Air Force, and 30 percent to the Navy and the Marine Corps.
3 These numbers exclude all helicopters, including the Army Apache
helicopters that were deployed to Albania. 4 According to an after- action
report by USAFE, in terms of size and resource allocations, Operation Allied
Force was the equivalent of a major theater war for the U. S. Air Force.
3 Aircraft land- basing issues for naval forces were minimal, as the
majority of naval forces supporting Operation Allied Force were located at
bases the Navy was already using. 4 The Army deployed Apache helicopters in
support of Task Force Hawk. We addressed Task Force Hawk in a separate
report: Kosovo Air Operations: Army Resolving Lessons Learned Regarding the
Apache Helicopter (GAO- 01- 401, Mar. 2, 2001).
Page 6 GAO- 01- 461 Kosovo Air Operations
Figure 2: European Land Bases Being Used by U. S. Aircraft at the End of
Operation Allied Force
Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data.
Germany France Spain
Italy Hungary
Turkey Atlantic Ocean
Mediterranean Sea Greenland Sea
Greece Istres
Mont de Marsan Ferihegy
Taszar Geilenkirchen
Ramstein Rhein-Main Spangdahlem
Bandirma Incirlik
Souda Bay Moron
Aviano Brindisi Cervia Gioia del Colle Sigonella Trapani
Serbia United
Kingdom Brize-Norton
Fairford Lakenheath Mildenhall
Page 7 GAO- 01- 461 Kosovo Air Operations
Arranging for combat aircraft basing involves much planning. This planning
generally includes
working with the host countries and U. S. embassies to obtain permission
to base aircraft in specific locations;
conducting extensive site visits to determine what improvements must be
made to foreign airfields and arranging for the improvements to be
completed;
ensuring that U. S. aircraft have adequate ramp space, hangars, and fuel;
and
obtaining all the logistics services necessary to sustain and house the
personnel who will be deployed at foreign airfields.
Because the United States no longer has the large number of established
bases it had during the Cold War, experience has shown that it is in the
best interest of the United States to work out as many of these details in
advance as possible. According to USAFE officials, Status of Forces
Agreements with many countries in Europe are very general and provide
adequate protections and privileges for official visits, small unit
activities, and most short- term exercises and operations. Supplemental
agreements, which may be negotiated by DOD in consultation with the
Department of State, are useful in addressing the more detailed protections
and privileges required for operations approaching the scale of Operation
Allied Force.
According to EUCOM officials, there was no prepared plan that could be used
for executing Operation Allied Force because it was a combination of
peacetime and combat operations. At the time of the operation, DOD had
detailed war plans for joint military operations written in advance only for
two specific major theater wars, neither of which included the European
theater. NATO had detailed plans only for what it considered wars in defense
of its member partners or for peacetime operations. Thus, the Air Force did
not have the benefit of specific advanced determinations of where it could
place its combat aircraft quickly and efficiently for Operation Allied
Force. The lack of a plan for such operations resulted in ad hoc
deployments. Developing detailed plans for every possible contingency
throughout Europe would be impractical, but both EUCOM and NATO now
recognize that better planning is needed. Detailed Plans Did
Not Apply to Operation Allied Force
Page 8 GAO- 01- 461 Kosovo Air Operations
Because the conflict surrounding Kosovo evolved rapidly, Operation Allied
Force required not only that plans be quickly developed but that aircraft
basing decisions be repeatedly revised. In fact, the plan for conducting the
air campaign was changed 70 times during the 78- day operation, according to
EUCOM officials. Each time a change was made, adjustments to basing
decisions were also necessary. According to a USAFE after- action report,
these constant changes in plans prevented decisionmakers for the initial
deployments of aircraft from taking into account what deployments of other
aircraft might be needed later. In some cases, aircraft units were deployed
only to be moved back to where they had come from. For example, early in the
conflict, units from the 48th Fighter Wing, at Lakenheath, England, were
deployed to Cervia, Italy, but later on, as additional forces were added,
these units were sent back to Lakenheath. Similarly, the 52nd Fighter Wing,
located in Spangdahlem, Germany, was initially deployed to Aviano Air Base,
Italy, until that base filled to capacity and the wing was returned to
Spangdahlem.
The lack of a stable plan for combat aircraft basing also affected how
airfield space and supplies were provided to U. S. forces deployed during
the operation. For example, according to an after- action report by USAFE
civil engineers, the lack of a combat aircraft basing plan resulted in the
forces first on the ground simply taking the space they needed on a
firstcome, first- served basis- without thought given to land use, safety,
utilities access, or airfield obstructions. An after- action report by USAFE
transportation officials said that they had to dramatically tailor the
packages of equipment and supplies sent to support troops deployed to combat
aircraft bases. This tailoring was necessary because these packages had been
planned for operations the size of a major theater war and were not
structured into blocks that could be built up as the conflict grew. Finally,
details had to be worked out after the conflict began regarding how
equipment and supplies destined for aircraft bases could be transported
through the countries where U. S. troops were deployed.
Exhaustive plans cannot be developed for every possible future contingency.
However, EUCOM officials agree that more detailed planning should be done in
advance of conflicts such as Operation Allied Force. At the time of our
visit, EUCOM was planning to revise a generic plan for operations in support
of NATO but said that completing this plan could take 2 years. EUCOM was not
yet in a position to state how this new plan would solve problems like the
ones encountered during the conflict in Kosovo. The goal is for EUCOM to
have a plan that it can use for a future Kosovo- type conflict. Lack of
Detailed Plans for
Operation Allied Force Resulted in Disjointed Deployments
EUCOM and NATO Proposals to Prepare Plans for Future Contingencies
Page 9 GAO- 01- 461 Kosovo Air Operations
NATO has also recognized the need for more planning for future operations
like Operation Allied Force and has issued a new strategic concept. At its
50th Anniversary Summit in Washington, D. C., in April 1999, while the
conflict was ongoing, NATO addressed the likelihood that future Alliance
military operations would be smaller in scale than those that were the basis
for Alliance planning during the Cold War. According to DOD?s after- action
report, NATO?s new strategic concept reflects the realistic view that the U.
S. role in future NATO operations is likely to fall somewhere between full-
scale combat operations in defense of the Alliance and peace support
activities.
Despite EUCOM?s role as the U. S. focal point in the European theater, EUCOM
officials told us that they had neither the resources nor the responsibility
to work out detailed combat aircraft basing arrangements for the individual
services. Also, during Operation Allied Force, no other organization was
tasked with responsibility for directing and coordinating the combat
aircraft basing for all U. S. military services and the allies. As a result,
the services, for the most part, planned their own deployments and worked
out individual arrangements with the host countries. While the services did
their best to quickly plan all the details necessary to base their aircraft,
the lack of a focal point to coordinate the plans resulted in at least some
duplication of effort, in last- minute work that could have been done before
the conflict began, and in communications problems among U. S. services and
agencies and NATO allies concerning what their individual plans were for
basing aircraft. The Air Force has recognized the need to do more
preparatory work such as airfield site surveys before future conflicts
begin. To address this need, it plans to develop a database of airfield
information.
In countries where the United States has a permanent presence, DOD and the
Department of State have generally negotiated agreements with the host
countries stipulating which bases may be used in what circumstances.
However, during Operation Allied Force, the United States did not have such
agreements worked out in advance with many of the countries involved. EUCOM
officials maintained that the services should arrange their own aircraft
basing because only they knew their detailed basing needs. However, joint
doctrine requires that EUCOM?s Commander review the requirements of the
various service component commands and establish priorities through the
deliberate planning process to use supplies, facilities, mobility assets,
and personnel effectively. Such coordination should prevent the unnecessary
duplication of facilities and No One Organization
Directed and Coordinated Combat Aircraft Basing
Basing Arrangements Were Not Coordinated
Page 10 GAO- 01- 461 Kosovo Air Operations
overlapping of functions among the services and should include establishing
bases and coordinating other logistics requirements.
Absent coordination by EUCOM, service officials expressed confusion during
the operation about how basing arrangements should be made. A
?huge challenge? in making basing arrangements, according to USAFE
officials, was in first determining the chain of command to request the use
of airfields from host nations. The services did not always know how or when
to coordinate with other services, EUCOM, or allied countries. The services
also found that each U. S. request for aircraft access was treated
differently by each nation. While most countries accepted a U. S. request at
the bilateral level, some countries asked that a formal request originate
from NATO headquarters.
Further confusion arose as countries received requests from individual
service components for basing arrangements. Section 112b of title 1 of the
United States Code requires that Department of State personnel be kept
informed of all agreements being made with host countries. Cases arose,
however, in which host nation and U. S. Department of State personnel were
not aware of what individual service components were doing. For example:
In one case, U. S. aircraft flying from one allied country to another had
to turn around in midair because they had not been approved for landing at
their destination.
In another case, host country officials complained to the U. S. embassy of
incessant coordination telephone calls made by U. S. servicemembers.
In a third case, confusion arose because Air Force personnel were trying
to arrange for aircraft basing just as U. S. State Department personnel were
trying to negotiate with the host country themselves.
A fourth situation involved a case in which Air Force deployment of
fighter aircraft to an allied base was almost underway before the Air Force
learned that adequate space was not available because this ally was not
planning to move its own aircraft out.
The services were expected to do their own site surveys of possible airfield
locations to determine where units could base their aircraft. No one
organization maintained a database of combat aircraft bases that the
services might be able to use. According to USAFE officials, there was
relatively little information on many of the airfields within EUCOM?s area
of responsibility. Some information was available from the U. S. National
Imagery and Mapping Agency, but much of this information was obsolete. Site
Surveys Had to Be
Done After the Conflict Began
Page 11 GAO- 01- 461 Kosovo Air Operations
As the major supplier of aircraft, the Air Force consequently took the lead
in doing these site surveys.
The process for site surveys entailed determining what information needed to
be collected and who should be on the survey teams. After the operation had
begun, between April 8 and May 24, 1999, USAFE used over 200 persons to form
teams to travel to potential sites and complete 27 site surveys. The USAFE
group that took the lead in doing these site surveys said in their after-
action report that host nation support was largely undefined and that, as a
result, they had to operate under numerous constraints. For example, in
anticipation of going into the host countries, site survey teams had to
first obtain host country approval for their visits. Also, host countries
usually allowed teams only one day to survey airfield sites. In addition,
according to USAFE officials, many of the personnel on the teams had never
before participated in a site survey.
In addition to the efforts of the USAFE teams to do last- minute site
surveys, the Marine Corps did its own site surveys. For example, one Marine
Corps commanding officer who was planning his unit?s deployment to Operation
Allied Force formed his own nine- member team to do site surveys of two
locations in Hungary. His teams also had only one day to do each site
survey, and the commander made his own arrangements with embassy staff to
prepare for his unit?s deployment. Although this commander told us that he
did have access to USAFE?s site surveys on these airfields, he found that he
still needed to perform a second survey because the Air Force had not
gathered all the needed information.
Servicemembers throughout the military services worked long and hard to
overcome the obstacles cited in this report and to achieve U. S. and NATO
objectives in Operation Allied Force. Nevertheless, in response to aircraft
basing problems encountered during Operation Allied Force, USAFE officials
realized that they needed a better basing strategy. During the conflict,
they found that their existing basing structure had not been methodically
planned in a way that tied it to probable threats. They decided to do a
review of where aircraft should be based in the European theater in
anticipation of future threats. As part of this effort, USAFE plans to
collect information on each potential air base. The information will include
a site survey, base support plans, and host nation agreements. As part of
this effort, USAFE also plans to determine what locations could be used as
operating bases in the event of future contingency operations. Service
Actions to Improve
Aircraft Basing Plans and Information Available on Airfields in the Theater
Page 12 GAO- 01- 461 Kosovo Air Operations
At the time of our visit to Europe, USAFE officials had just briefed EUCOM
officials on their proposal for developing a basing strategy, and EUCOM
officials had decided to form a working group to develop a similar proposal.
According to EUCOM?s planned approach, dated November 2000, EUCOM hopes to
investigate the leasing of specific facilities, airfields, and equipment for
future contingencies, among other things, to establish a theater basing
strategy.
According to Air Force headquarters officials, it took 17 days to complete
each site survey, from its initiation to the host country?s approval to use
the site. The Air Force believes that these site surveys took far too long
to complete. The Air Force has therefore undertaken an effort to build the
?Employment Knowledge Base,? a database of site surveys that can be accessed
when planning a deployment. At present, this is an Air Forceonly initiative,
though the Marine Corps has expressed interest in it. Part I of a ?Survey
Tool for Employment Planning? has been developed by a contractor and was
fielded in April 2000 to be used as a checklist for persons conducting site
surveys. The site survey team can input data into the checklist using a
laptop computer. The goal is to have part II of the site survey completed by
October 2001. Efforts to update the Employment Knowledge Base from field
locations have not yet been funded by the Air Force.
The lack of supplemental international agreements during Operation Allied
Force made the United States vulnerable to hastily made ad hoc arrangements
with some host countries. A USAFE official believes that the United States
could have paid excessive prices for supplies and services purchased ?in the
heat of battle? during Operation Allied Force because the United States had
not negotiated supplemental agreements with countries in Europe where the
United States based combat aircraft and purchased logistical support.
Supplemental agreements addressing basing and logistics details were not in
effect with some host nations during Operation Allied Force. Such agreements
between the United States and host countries often contain provisions
stipulating that the United States will not be charged for airport landing,
parking, or overflight. These agreements also often contain a provision
stating that U. S. forces will be charged the same rates for logistics
supplies and services as the foreign nations? own military forces are
charged. Lack of Supplemental
International Agreements Resulted in Ad Hoc DecisionMaking and Vulnerability
to Excessive Costs
Page 13 GAO- 01- 461 Kosovo Air Operations
While we did not attempt to independently determine whether or not any costs
charged the United States during Operation Allied Force were excessive, a
USAFE official cited one case in which U. S. aircraft were already enroute
when an Air Force sergeant paid a NATO member?s airport authority $1.5
million for the use of the destination airport. If a supplemental agreement
had been in place prior to Operation Allied Force allowing the United States
the use of this airfield, the United States would not have had to pay this
fee at all if the airfield was government owned, and any other fees for
logistics supplies would have been the same as those charged the host
nations? own military forces. The DOD official who is responsible for
managing DOD?s supplemental agreements worldwide told us that it is not
unusual for countries with whom the United States does not have agreements
to charge airfield landing and takeoff fees. He cited a case in which a U.
S. airplane was not allowed to take off until the United States paid landing
fees. This official said that supplemental agreements also typically cover
such issues as exemptions from payment for goods and services at rates
higher than those charged a country?s own armed forces.
While generally the United States did not use Partnership for Peace
countries for combat aircraft basing, some of these countries provided
logistics services for allied forces and may be even more important in
future conflicts. Most Partnership for Peace countries had only a very
general Status of Forces Agreement with the United States. 5 According to an
after- action report written by USAFE?s Judge Advocate staff, the
Partnership for Peace Status of Forces Agreement does not address the
detailed matters required for sustained operations that can be provided in
supplemental, country- specific agreements. The agreement provides adequate
protections and privileges only for official visits, small unit activities,
and most short- term military exercises and operations. The agreement does
not include supplemental protections and privileges required for operations
approaching the scale of Operation Allied Force, particularly as they relate
to the following issues:
the status of U. S. contractors and provisions for their logistical
support;
the use of U. S. contracting procedures for U. S.- funded procurements;
exemption from value- added and similar taxes; 5 Partnership for Peace is
a major initiative by NATO directed at increasing confidence and cooperative
efforts to reinforce security. It offers participating states the
possibility of strengthening their relations with NATO in accordance with
their own individual interests and capabilities. At present, there are 27
Partnership for Peace countries.
Page 14 GAO- 01- 461 Kosovo Air Operations
the automatic waiver of host country criminal jurisdiction over U. S.
personnel;
exemption from landing fees, navigation fees, and overflight charges;
expedited customs inspection procedures for U. S. forces? property;
the right to operate post exchanges; banks; post offices; commissaries;
and morale, welfare, and recreation activities;
responsibility for the perimeter defense of installations and facilities
used by U. S. personnel;
payment of residual value for improvements to facilities financed by the
United States; and
privately owned vehicles? licensing and registration. Because of the lack
of supplemental agreements establishing arrangements for the purchase of
goods and services, U. S. military components used the Acquisition and Cross
Servicing Agreement Program during Operation Allied Force. This program
allows military- to- military exchanges of logistics services and supplies
for cash, equal value exchanges, or payment in kind. USAFE officials
stressed the value of the program in that it allowed deployed commanders to
obtain the necessary host nation support. The program was successfully used
to provide parts and services to allies and to the United States.
While cross- servicing agreements were critical for U. S. forces to obtain
needed host nation services, USAFE officials believe that the use of such
agreements made hastily by many different individuals resulted in many
inconsistencies in the agreements made. According to the USAFE Judge
Advocate?s report on Operation Allied Force, as a result of the absence of
supplemental agreements with Partnership for Peace nations, some individual
services? agreements with host nation individuals and companies were
favorable to the United States, but some were not. Often, the terms and
duration of these agreements differed from one country to another.
According to a DOD official, in 1995 the State Department granted DOD the
authority to negotiate supplemental agreements with Partnership for Peace
countries that would cover issues that are not included in their Status of
Forces Agreements. At the time of Operation Allied Force, DOD had sent out
model agreements to various Partnership for Peace countries as the
beginnings of negotiations. According to one DOD official, negotiations have
taken so long because of limited staff and other priorities. For USAFE
officials, Operation Allied Force highlighted the dire need for in- place
status and stationing arrangements for immediate use
Page 15 GAO- 01- 461 Kosovo Air Operations
during future military operations in countries where the United States has
no permanent presence.
Recent history demonstrates that air campaigns are likely to be significant
portions of future conflicts the United States can anticipate. While we
agree that the Commander of the U. S. European Command cannot prepare
detailed plans that cover the specifics for every possible contingency, the
kind of ad hoc basing of combat forces that occurred during Operation Allied
Force demonstrates that the lack of at least some planning has the potential
to result in costly and unnecessary problems and inefficiencies, as was the
experience in this operation. Also, because the European Command did not
coordinate the movement of all service and host nation participants,
confusion arose over who was planning deployments, where airfields were
available for basing in the region, and how arrangements should be made.
Finally, without supplemental agreements with host nations from whom the
United States is likely to request aircraft basing and logistics services
during a future contingency, the United States will probably again be in the
position of being vulnerable to paying excessive costs for these fees and
services.
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander of the
European Command to develop the most detailed combat aircraft basing plans
possible for future conflicts, like Operation Allied Force, that do not fit
into the category of a major theater war or a peacekeeping operation. These
plans should consider existing NATO plans and entail the appropriate
coordination between DOD and the Department of State. They should also
address the following issues, as discussed in our report:
development of a strategy for basing aircraft that is tied to probable
future threats,
coordination of all service and host nation arrangements for basing their
aircraft during contingencies, and
maintaining a database of complete information on available airfields in
EUCOM?s area of responsibility and providing this information to all the
services as needed.
To ensure that U. S. forces have access to airfields and bases from which
they will need to conduct operations in likely future conflicts, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct EUCOM?s Commander to work
with the Department of State to finalize as many supplemental agreements
with host nations as possible. These supplemental agreements should include
provisions exempting the United States from being charged Conclusions
Recommendations for Executive Action
Page 16 GAO- 01- 461 Kosovo Air Operations
overflight, airfield access, and aircraft landing and parking fees. These
supplemental agreements should also include a provision stating that U. S.
troops should be charged rates for logistics supplies that are comparable to
the rates charged the host nation?s own armed forces.
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with the contents
of the report and concurred with the recommendations. DOD stated that future
aircraft basing plans need to consider operational and political issues that
must be overcome with each host nation. Also, host nation agreements should
consider existing NATO basing plans. Technical changes were made as
appropriate throughout the report. The comments are presented and evaluated
in appendix I.
To determine what plans were in place to determine where and how to deploy
combat aircraft for Operation Allied Force and how combat aircraft basing
decisions were coordinated among the services and allied nations, we visited
the U. S. European Command in Stuttgart, Germany, and interviewed officials
who had participated in the operation. We also visited the U. S. Air Forces,
Europe, at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, and interviewed officials in the
Offices of Strategy and Deliberate Plans/ Engagements, Plans and Doctrine,
Logistics, Civil Engineering, Financial Management, and the Air Operations
Squadron Plans Division. In addition, we reviewed documentation on Operation
Allied Force planning and coordination efforts at these locations.
To determine whether the United States had the necessary international
agreements in force to enable it to quickly execute plans for Operation
Allied Force, we interviewed officials in the Operations Law Division of the
Judge Advocate General?s Office at the U. S. Air Forces, Europe. We also
interviewed officials in the Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Assistant
Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs). To discuss issues
involving who may be granted the authority to negotiate supplemental
international agreements, we interviewed officials in the Office of Treaty
Affairs in the U. S. Department of State. We also reviewed documentation on
supplemental international agreements.
We conducted our review between September 2000 and June 2001 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation Scope and Methodology
Page 17 GAO- 01- 461 Kosovo Air Operations
We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld,
Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Joseph W. Westphal, Acting Secretary of
the Army; the Honorable Robert B. Pirie, Jr., Acting Secretary of the Navy;
the Honorable Lawrence J. Delaney, Acting Secretary of the Air Force;
General James L. Jones, Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Honorable Colin
L. Powell, Secretary of State; and the Honorable Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr.,
Director of the Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies
available to others upon request.
Please contact me at (757) 552- 8111 if you or your staff have any questions
concerning this report. Key staff who contributed to this report were
William Cawood, Donna Rogers, Beverly Schladt, and Nancy Ragsdale.
Sincerely yours, Neal P. Curtin Director Defense Capabilities and Management
Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 18 GAO- 01- 461 Kosovo Air Operations
Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the end
of this appendix.
Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 19 GAO- 01- 461 Kosovo Air Operations
See comment 1.
Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 20 GAO- 01- 461 Kosovo Air Operations
See comment 4. See comment 3. See comment 2.
Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 21 GAO- 01- 461 Kosovo Air Operations
See comment 10. See comment 9.
See comment 8. See comment 7.
See comment 6. See comment 5.
Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 22 GAO- 01- 461 Kosovo Air Operations
The following are GAO?s comments on the Department of Defense?s (DOD) letter
dated May 10, 2001.
1. We were aware that the military services used Acquisition and Cross
Servicing Agreements during Operation Allied Force to purchase host nation
goods and services, and we discuss this usage in the body of our report (see
p. 14). However, as we state there, U. S. Air Forces in Europe officials
told us that the use of such agreements made hastily during Operation Allied
Force resulted in inconsistencies in agreements with different countries,
some of which were favorable to the United States and some of which were
not. We continue to believe that more uniformity and advanced planning for
purchasing such items and services could result in lower costs to the United
States in future conflicts.
2. We agree that arranging issues of combat basing rights are politically
sensitive. We also agree that such arrangements cannot be made on a purely
cost savings basis. We did not state in our draft report that cost should be
the only consideration, nor do we here.
3. We agree that U. S. European Command?s (EUCOM) combat basing plans should
consider existing North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) basing plans and
have included this wording in our recommendation (see p. 15).
4. We have added language to our recommendation stating that, when making
combat aircraft basing plans, including conducting site surveys, DOD should
appropriately coordinate with the Department of State (see p. 15).
5. As noted in our draft report, because Operation Allied Force did not fit
into the definition of conflicts for which NATO had prepared combat plans,
NATO?s structure did not apply to Operation Allied Force, and the United
States prepared plans for its own participation in the operation after the
conflict arose.
6. While we did not evaluate aircraft rebasing in this report, we recognize
that a certain amount of rebasing will occur during any conflict. We
continue to believe, however, that more advanced planning could have
minimized such rebasing during Operation Allied Force. GAO Comments
Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 23 GAO- 01- 461 Kosovo Air Operations
7. We expect that, as part of its effort to create a database of available
airfields, EUCOM will make use of already available resources to minimize or
eliminate any duplication of effort.
8. Our recommendation states that the Secretary of Defense should direct
EUCOM?s Commander to work with the Department of State to finalize as many
supplemental agreements as possible. With the Department of State?s
oversight, DOD can ensure that the scope of possible agreements is weighed
against their expected cost and any operational security implications.
9. This statement is added in a footnote on p. 5. 10. This statement is
added in a footnote on p. 3.
(702079)
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