Army Training: Improvements Are Needed in 5-Ton Truck Driver Training and Supervision (11-APR-01, GAO-01-436)
Instructor shortages are affecting the quality and quantity of
Army truck driver training. Fort Leonard Wood, which trains about
90 percent of truck drivers, is especially affected by the
instructor shortage. The end result is that student drivers are
not fully trained in all aspects of the instruction program when
they graduate. If formal schools had enough instructors on-hand,
they would presumably be able to teach the entire instruction
program. The student imbalance between the schools at Fort
Leonard Wood and Fort Bliss creates an ineffective use of
resources. If the annual student load were more equally
distributed between the two schools, student graduates from Fort
Leonard Wood might receive more complete training. The formal
schools are not adhering to the instruction program, which calls
for some training with trucks carrying cargo. Further, no
training is provided in how to pull equipment. Similarly,
students are not being trained to drive under different weather
and surface conditions. Because annual check rides and
sustainment are not always being performed, unsafe driving habits
may go undetected. Although performing and recording check rides
and sustainment may be time-consuming, these procedures can save
lives. The Army Safety Center's accident database could be used
to identify trends that may show the need for greater training
emphasis in certain driving maneuvers. A periodic analysis of the
database could assist school officials, instructors, and
supervisors in adjusting instruction programs or mentoring
drivers. However, such analysis would prove more useful if all
fields of information contained in the database were complete.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-01-436
ACCNO: A00807
TITLE: Army Training: Improvements Are Needed in 5-Ton Truck
Driver Training and Supervision
DATE: 04/11/2001
SUBJECT: Accident prevention
Military training
Traffic accidents
Military land vehicles
Data bases
Motor vehicle safety
Human resources utilization
M939 Truck
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GAO-01-436
Report to Congressional Requesters
United States General Accounting Office
GAO
April 2001 ARMY TRAINING Improvements Are Needed in 5- Ton Truck Driver
Training and Supervision
GAO- 01- 436
Page i GAO- 01- 436 Army Training Letter 1
Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 21
Appendix II GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 23
Tables
Table 1: Percentage of Students in Formal, Informal, and Reserve Programs
Satisfied With Training 10
Figures
Figure 1: Three M939 series Trucks 3 Figure 2: Number of Authorized,
Assigned, and On- hand
Instructors at Fort Leonard Wood, January- September 2000 6
Figure 3: On- hand Instructors as a Percentage of Assigned Instructors at
Three Schools, January- September 2000 8
Figure 4: Comparison of Two Formal Army Schools, Fiscal Year 2000 9
Figure 5: Percentage of Interviewees Aware of M939 Speed Limit Restriction
13
Figure 6: Some Recurring Conditions Cited in M939 Accident Reports, 1988- 99
17 Contents
Page 1 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training
April 11, 2001 The Honorable Christopher J. Dodd The Honorable Joseph I.
Lieberman United States Senate
The Honorable Rosa L. Delauro House of Representatives
In April 1997, a 5- ton M939 Army truck was involved in a fatal accident in
which two reservists died. The Army has over 30,000 of these trucks, which
are used extensively to carry personnel and pull equipment. You asked us to
report on the M939's accident history and to assess the training and
supervision received by its drivers. We broke your request into two issues.
The first dealing with the accident history and any inherent mechanical/
design defects in the truck itself. The second dealing with issues involving
the safe handling of the truck– the training and supervision of the
truck's drivers. In April 1999, we reported on the M939's accident history
and mechanical soundness. 1 For this second report, we (1) evaluated the
capacity of the Army's 5- ton truck driver training programs to fully train
drivers, (2) determined whether oversight procedures and processes for these
drivers are being followed, and (3) determined whether and how the Army uses
accident data to improve training, supervision, and safety.
The 5- ton truck driver training programs we reviewed do not graduate
drivers that are fully trained in all aspects of the instruction program and
for some tasks they may be required to perform. The main reasons for these
shortcomings are instructor shortages, limited environmental conditions
(lack of snow, ice, steep or rocky terrain, etc.) at the training sites, and
certain mission- related driving skills not being taught. There is also an
imbalance between the two formal truck driver training schools: the larger
one is understaffed to teach the number of students there, while
1 Military Safety: Army M939 5- Ton Truck Accident History and Planned
Modifications
(GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 82, Apr. 9, 1999).
United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548
Results in Brief
Page 2 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training
the other one has smaller classes, conducts fewer classes per year, and
maintains a lower student- teacher ratio. In addition, some communication
problems hinder the flow of information to instructors, students,
supervisors, and licensed drivers.
Some supervisory procedures and processes designed to ensure that 5- ton
trucks are operated safely are not being performed or documented as
required. In particular, required annual “check rides” and
“sustainment
training” are either not properly performed or recorded. We reviewed
over 450 driver records and found that more than three- quarters of them did
not contain a required entry indicating that the driver had received an
annual check ride and/ or sustainment training as stipulated in Army
regulations.
The Army Safety Center maintains an accident database that has already
proven useful in developing some policies aimed at improving the safe
operation of M939 trucks. We analyzed M939 accident data from 1988 through
1999 and found trends that we believe could be used to improve driving
safety and to better focus training on problem areas. But the database is
not being periodically analyzed for these purposes, and opportunities are
thus being missed. Also, some accident reports have missing information,
thus limiting the usefulness of the database for some analytical processes
using these fields.
We are making recommendations aimed at improving the quality of truck driver
training, increasing compliance with Army regulations, and increasing the
safety of M939 truck driver operations. The Department of Defense concurred
with all our recommendations.
Page 3 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training
The Army has around 97,000 “medium tactical wheeled vehicles”
(about 57,000 5- ton trucks and 41,000 2- 1/ 2- ton trucks) in its fleet.
The M939 accounts for more than half its 5- ton trucks. The truck is used to
carry personnel or pull equipment under all weather and road conditions,
including rain, snow, ice, unpaved roads, sand, and mud (see fig. 1).
Figure 1: Three M939 Series Trucks
Source: Shane G. Deemer.
Background
Page 4 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training
The active Army uses formal and informal programs to train 5- ton truck
drivers. 2 The formal program is aimed at military personnel whose official
primary occupation will be “88M Motor Transport Operator”- or
truck driver. The program lasts 6 weeks and is taught in schools at Fort
Leonard Wood, Missouri, and Fort Bliss, Texas. Fort Leonard Wood trains
about 90 percent of all 88M students. Fort Bliss for the most part trains
the
“overflow” of students that Fort Leonard Wood cannot
accommodate. The formal instruction program calls for about 1 week in the
classroom and 5 weeks of hands- on training. Students who complete the
program do not immediately receive a license to drive a 5- ton truck; they
are licensed at their next duty station after undergoing additional training
and testing there. The Army Transportation Center and School at Fort Eustis,
Virginia, is responsible for the content of the instruction program used by
the formal training schools. It aligns under the Army Training and Doctrine
Command at Ft. Monroe, Virginia.
According to Army officials, informal programs are taught at installations
or units that need occasional 3 truck drivers but are not authorized any or
enough 88M drivers to handle their needs. Occasional drivers do not drive
trucks as their primary occupation; they do so on a part- time or as- needed
basis. Informal programs are usually 40 to 120 hours long and combine
classroom and driving time. Graduates are not automatically licensed and
must usually meet additional driving and testing requirements by their
units. Occasional drivers receive the same license as 88M drivers and,
accordingly, may be required to perform the same driving maneuvers.
The Army Reserve trains both Reserve and National Guard 88M drivers using a
two- part program that contains the same instructional material as the
formal program. The first part (81 hours) is conducted at the soldier's home
station during weekend drills. The second part (120 hours) is usually
conducted at a Reserve training center during a 2- week active duty session.
Like active Army truck drivers, program graduates must undergo additional
training and testing by their units before being licensed.
2 We define formal programs as resident training programs taught in a
school- house setting; and informal programs as those conducted by
individual Army units at many different installations.
3 We define an occasional driver as a driver licensed to operate a 5- ton
truck but not possessing the military occupation specialty designator or 88M
– Motor Transport Operator.
Page 5 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training
Graduates of the Army's truck driver training programs are not skilled
enough to safely handle 5- ton trucks in some situations for which they
should have received training. This is because of instructor shortages and
limited training conditions. Graduates are either partially trained or
untrained in some skills found in the instruction program. In addition, the
schools do not teach driving skills that are essential to performing the 5-
ton truck's primary mission.
One of the Army's two formal truck driver training schools, the school at
Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, operates with sizable instructor shortages.
Because of this Fort Leonard Wood operates at a higher student- instructor
ratio than called for in the instruction program. In fiscal year 2000, the
Fort Leonard Wood facility trained nearly 90 percent of the Army's 88M
drivers in spite of these shortages. Instructors at the informal and Reserve
programs also said that their programs suffer from instructor shortages.
During the first 9 months of 2000, Fort Leonard Wood operated with an
average of 53 percent of its authorized instructors on- hand to teach the
program. The main reasons were 1) fewer personnel were assigned to teach
than were authorized and 2) even fewer were available (on- hand) than were
assigned due to other commitments (such as bus driving, funeral and parade
duty, leave, etc.). Authorized refers to the number of instructors the Army
determines are needed to teach a program; assigned refers to the number of
instructors the Army allocates to teach a program; and on- hand refers to
the number of instructors that are present and teaching a program. Figure 2
shows the number of instructors authorized, assigned, and on- hand at Fort
Leonard Wood in the first 9 months of 2000, when on average about 45 of 84
authorized instructors were available. Some Essential
Driving Skills Are Not Taught
Instructor Shortages
Page 6 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training
Figure 2: Number of Authorized, Assigned, and On- hand Instructors at Fort
Leonard Wood, January- September 2000.
Source: Our analysis of Army data.
Assuming that (1) the Army continues assigning instructors at about 85
percent of authorized levels and that (2) the number of instructors on- hand
remains constant at about 53 percent of those assigned, the Army would have
to increase its present authorized level of instructors from 84 to158, an
increase of 88 percent, in order to have a full complement on- hand.
The formal instruction program calls for a 6- to- 1 student- instructor
ratio- and Fort Leonard Wood is structured to operate at this ratio when
staffed at 100 percent of its authorized level. In the first 9 months of
2000, our review showed that Fort Leonard Wood operated overall at a higher
ratio of about 9 to 1. Nonetheless, training officials stated that the
school has been conducting the behind- the- wheel (hands- on) training
portion of the program at the 6- to- 1 ratio the instruction program calls
for. This means one instructor overseeing 3 trucks with two students per
truck. However, Army regulations stipulate a 1- to- 1 truck- instructor
ratio when a student driver is behind the wheel. In December 1998, Fort
Leonard Wood requested a waiver to allow the 6- to- 1 ratio when students
were driving
Page 7 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training
trucks. While the request has yet to be officially approved, school
officials claim that if required to maintain the 1- to- 1 ratio, each
student might drive as little as 30 miles during the entire course, instead
of the present target of about 100 miles per student on average.
Effects of Instructor Shortages
Instructor shortages affect the quantity and quality of training. Students
do not get sufficient hands- on driving experience and are not trained in
all the skills required by the instruction program.
Program officials at Fort Leonard Wood said that at times, instructors could
fully teach only about three- quarters of the instruction program's required
tasks. For example, in the second half of fiscal year 1999 two training
modules- driving off- road and basic vehicle control- were often carried out
only in part or demonstrated but not practiced. These two modules account
for almost 93 percent of the 85.5 hours students are supposed to spend
driving trucks. Because of instructor shortages during these two quarters,
the average number of miles driven by each student at Fort Leonard Wood
dropped from nearly 100 to less than 50. In addition, hands- on training is
presently limited to mostly driving in controlled settings only. Students
drive in convoys on unpaved but graded and regularly maintained training
routes at no more than 25 mph – receiving almost no training in how to
drive on public highways or in suburban settings. One group of trainers
stated that with more instructors, they could take students on some
realistic training rather than the “follow- theleader” driving
students now receive.
Students are also not being taught all the tasks that 5- ton- truck drivers
are expected to perform. Training officials at the two formal programs
stated they thought drivers should be trained in hauling loads or pulling
equipment- the primary mission of 5- ton trucks. While the instruction
program calls for 20 percent of all vehicles to operate with a load in the
cargo area, this is not being done, according to training officials, because
of logistical problems that make it difficult to train this skill. Pulling
equipment is not taught because it is not specified in the instruction
program. Therefore, students must learn these essential skills after
graduation and rotation to their next duty stations.
Neither the Marine Corps, which co- trains its 5- ton truck drivers with the
Army at Fort Leonard Wood, nor the smaller Fort Bliss school, which mostly
trains the overflow from Fort Leonard Wood, experience as severe Comparison
of On- hand
Instructors
Page 8 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training
instructor shortages as Fort Leonard Wood. Thus, neither encounters problems
teaching the instruction program in its entirety. According to Marine Corps
training officials, its detachment is authorized 76 instructors, and in the
first 9 months of 2000, averaged having 70 instructors assigned and 65 on-
hand (93 percent). During that same period of time, Fort Bliss training
officials stated its school was authorized 17 instructors but actually had
18 assigned and on- hand (106 percent).
During the first 9 months of 2000, the Marine Corps program averaged a
higher percentage of its assigned instructors on- hand than the Fort Leonard
Wood Army program – 93 percent versus 63 percent (see fig. 3). This,
according to Marine Corps training officials, was mostly because their
instructors did not have other commitments or assignments as did Army
instructors. Also, the average class size for the Marine Corps was much
smaller than that for the Army (44 versus 70 students), and they had more
instructors available to teach (65 on average versus the Army's 45). Because
of the smaller class size and larger number of on- hand instructors, the
Marine Corps can staff each truck at the 1- to- 1 instructorto- truck ratio
regulations call for. This, according to them, allows students to gain
driving skills in uncontrolled settings such as driving off- post, on public
highways, and in various urban settings.
On the other hand, the Fort Bliss school actually had a surplus of
instructors: it had 106 percent of its assigned instructors on- hand (see
fig. 3). According to program officials, their instructors also did not have
other commitments and assignments as did Fort Leonard Wood Army instructors.
Figure 3: On- hand Instructors as a Percentage of Assigned Instructors at
Three Schools, January- September 2000
Source: our analysis of Army data.
Page 9 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training
During fiscal year 2000, Fort Bliss also graduated fewer students, utilized
less of its overall available classroom capacity, averaged smaller class
sizes, and conducted about one- third the classes that Fort Leonard Wood
conducted (see fig. 4).
Figure 4: Comparison of Two Formal Army Schools, Fiscal Year 2000
Source: Our analysis of Army data.
Student Opinions Show Varied Satisfaction With Training Received
We surveyed 139 students at the two formal school programs, 72 students at
10 informal programs, and 98 students at 1 Army Reserve training program. We
asked them to rate their satisfaction with the type of training there were
receiving in various driving techniques and conditions. As table 1 shows,
students at Fort Bliss felt better about the training they received in many
driving skills than their counterparts at Fort Leonard Wood. Students in the
Reserve program were the most satisfied overall with the training they
received, while students in the informal programs were generally the least
satisfied. Imbalances Between the
Two Formal Army Schools
Page 10 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training
Table 1: Percentage of Students in Formal, Informal, and Reserve Programs
Satisfied With Training
Fort Bliss Fort Leonard Wood Informal Reserve
Backing empty truck 92 55 69 87 Overall wheel time 100 64 55 80 Small
inclines/ slopes– empty truck 38 66 15 50 Wheel time in different
weather/ surfaces– empty truck 08 07 09 57 Load in cargo area/ pulling
equipment a N/ A N/ A 02 04 Driving at night 00 23 09 32 a N/ A (not
applicable). The formal schools do not teach driving with a load, and the
instruction program does not call for training while pulling equipment.
Source: Our analysis of survey responses.
According to the instruction program, the majority of driving training time
(about 65 hours) should be dedicated to driving on and off roads through
woods, streams, brush, sand, mud, snow, ice, rocky terrain, ditches,
gullies, and ravines. However, we found that neither of the two formal
schools provides all these conditions in its training routes.
Students at Fort Bliss are well trained to drive in sand because the
school's training routes have sand. But the school seldom sees snow or ice
because these conditions seldom occur there. And the school's training
routes we observed were for the most part flat and unchallenging. One route
we drove offered few or no opportunities to drive through woods and brush,
over rocky terrain, or through gullies and ravines. The problem, according
to school officials, is that the land the training routes are on is too flat
and lacking in undergrowth. Training officials also told us that money
constraints and the fact that Fort Bliss' mission is to handle the overflow
of students from Fort Leonard Wood impede the development of more
challenging driving routes.
Training routes at Fort Leonard Wood also offered limited obstacles or
challenges. We drove what school officials said was the most difficult
training route and found that it did go through some woods and rocky terrain
and over some hills and inclines. However, it contained no sand and
engineering units maintained the surface the trucks drove on by routinely
smoothing out bumps, ruts, and other obstacles. Environmental Limitations
at Formal Training Schools
Page 11 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training Simulators Can Be Useful Training Tools
When adverse weather, dangerous road conditions, or other problems arise,
the formal schools hesitate to allow students to drive because of safety
concerns. However, the Army has determined that simulators can be used to
teach some driving skills that cannot be taught in high risk driving
conditions because of the dangers involved.
Because of safety concerns, the Fort Leonard Wood command has issued an oral
directive prohibiting students from driving off the installation. As a
result, students do not learn to drive trucks in traffic at highway speeds
or in urban settings. Furthermore, the training command frequently cancels
hands- on driver training in the presence of ice, snow, or fog because it
believes the risk of student drivers having a serious accident outweighs the
benefits of the driving experience.
Not training under adverse weather and road conditions limits the ability of
drivers to handle a truck safely in these situations when they rotate to
their new duty stations and begin to drive. In May 2000 the Analysis Center
at the Army Training and Doctrine Command completed a study that concluded,
among other things, that students graduating from the formal schools were
only about 15- percent proficient 4 in skills needed to drive in fog, ice,
or snow and 27- percent proficient in skills needed to drive on sand.
The study concluded that simulators could overcome these and other
shortcomings in driver training. It reviewed 31 critical driving tasks
taught at the formal schools and concluded that simulators could help
students obtain higher proficiency levels in as many as 22 of them. The
study also concluded that simulators might help reduce the potential for
accidents both during training and- most importantly- during the first year
after training by increasing driving proficiency in fog, snow, or ice.
4 The study defined proficiency as how well a school graduate performed a
specific driving task when compared to a driver with 1 year of post-
training experience, as assessed by qualified instructors.
Page 12 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training
Formal training program personnel agreed, stating that they cannot teach
students to drive under some of the more common hazardous conditions 5
because it is too dangerous. Other Army officials also said that simulators,
especially more advanced ones, can recreate such situations and give
students a sense of driving under these conditions without putting lives at
risk. Training personnel at both formal schools, Army Transportation School
officials, as well as the simulator study itself strongly cautioned,
however, that simulators should not replace actual behind- the- wheel
driving time.
The private sector uses simulators in its truck driving schools and
considers them very useful. Officials at two commercial driving schools
stated that their simulators help students learn to drive under various
high- risk driving and weather conditions, including braking with a load on
steep inclines or on wet and icy surfaces.
Some safety rules relating to M939 trucks are not being communicated
effectively. Moreover, many informal training programs seem to be unaware of
available assistance from the Army Transportation School. Better
communication is key to improving the flow of this type of information.
The M939 series trucks are not supposed to be driven over 40 mph, even under
ideal conditions. However, we found that some licensed drivers, students,
instructors, and supervisors alike were either unaware of the speed limit,
had forgotten about it, or did not know this restriction is still in effect
for M939s without anti- lock brake systems 6 . Two- thirds of licensed
drivers we interviewed, as well as about one- third of student drivers in
formal training programs and over two- thirds of student drivers in informal
training programs, did not know or could not recall the 40- mph limit. And
none in a group we interviewed from a recently graduated formal program
class were able to tell us the correct maximum speed
5 In 1995 the Army Deputy Director of Safety concluded that M939 trucks were
involved in a disproportionately high number of accidents in which a panic
stop on a wet surface with a partially loaded truck going over 40 mph were
among the factors that contributed to the accident.
6 For all M939s having been outfitted with anti- lock brake kits, the speed
limit restriction of 40 mph is no longer in effect. However, we did not
observe an M939 equipped with such during our on- site visits. Some
Information Not
Reaching Its Target
Page 13 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training
limit. Although nearly all the 65 formal and Reserve program instructors we
interviewed could state the correct speed limit, only about two- thirds of
informal program instructors and driver supervisors could do so. By
contrast, all of the nearly 100 students we interviewed at the Army Reserve
training program knew of the speed limit, and for a simple reason: all the
M939 trucks used for training had a dashboard sticker to remind the driver
of the speed limit. (See fig. 5.)
Figure 5: Percentage of Interviewees Aware of M939 Speed Limit Restriction
Source: Our analysis of interview responses.
There also appears to be a communication problem between informal program
instructors and the Army Transportation School. Although the instructors
believe their training programs are good ones, they also stated they do not
have enough time to focus on improving and upgrading these programs and
would like more input from “knowledgeable personnel,” such as
those at the Fort Eustis Transportation School who developed the formal
training program. Some said they could have avoided difficulties they
encountered in developing a high- quality informal program if such expertise
had been available. Many suggested that standardized, Armywide training
packages tailored for each type of vehicle would be an efficient and
economical way of training informal drivers.
However, none of the instructors we interviewed knew that the Transportation
School has a program available designed specifically for informal training
of M939 drivers. In November 1999, the Transportation School distributed a
CD- ROM driver training program 7 , which includes
7 Army Model Drivers Training Program M939, 5- ton Tactical Cargo Truck.
Page 14 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training
lessons on driving and performing operator maintenance on the M939 to Army
standards. Transportation School officials stated that the program was sent
to around 1,800 different Army locations (according to the number and
location of M939 trucks) and is also available through the Army's web site.
While facing similar instructor shortages and limited driving conditions,
the informal and Reserve training programs we reviewed must also try to
train drivers in a shorter time than the formal programs. The reserves also
have problems with their equipment.
The 10 informal programs we reviewed ranged between 40 and 120 hours
(compared to 6 weeks for the formal program). As a result, instructors focus
mostly on teaching the basics (driving on surfaced roads, backing up on flat
surfaces, and performing some required maintenance and service). Instructors
teach more difficult skills only if time and circumstances allow. Several
instructors questioned how their 40 to 80 hour programs could possibly teach
as much as was taught in the 6- week formal course.
The reserves have problems not only with instructor shortages, but also with
training equipment. Reserve officials said their 5- ton truck driver
training programs are generally understaffed because of a lack of available
senior noncommissioned officers to teach. Also, because programs are usually
not authorized a fleet of trucks exclusively for training, units must borrow
trucks from the installation where training is taking place or from other
nearby Army installations. The training unit is responsible for picking up
and returning the trucks or for paying to have the trucks delivered and
returned. They also pay an established usage fee to the units that lend the
trucks. This is costly, especially if a borrowed vehicle needs repair work
before it can pass the required safety inspection so that it can be used for
training. Reserve training officials told us that this happens frequently
and adversely impacts training. Additional Challenges
Facing Informal and Reserve Training Programs
Page 15 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training
Army regulations 8 require that truck drivers undergo a so- called
“check
ride” and “sustainment training 9 ” once a year (once
every 2 years for the Army Reserve and National Guard). Performing these
procedures- which are aimed at identifying and correcting poor driving
habits, maintaining high driving proficiency levels, and ensuring safe
driving- is the responsibility of the driver's assigned unit. Both
procedures must also be documented in personnel driving records. However, we
found that they are either not being performed or are not being recorded as
required.
We reviewed over 450 driving records and found that over 80 percent did not
contain an entry indicating a check ride had been performed every year and
for each type of vehicle in which the driver was licensed to drive. Eighty-
five percent of records also did not have an entry documenting that
sustainment training had been given annually as required. Seventy percent of
the drivers we interviewed (both 88M drivers and occasional drivers) stated
they either did not know what a check ride was or had not been given one
annually. Three- quarters of the drivers we interviewed also said they had
not attended an annual sustainment training course.
Supervisors 10 are responsible for administering check rides to assess a
driver's capabilities and overall driving habits. According to Army
officials, unit commanders and supervisors must also develop and implement
annual sustainment training programs, in part, on the basis of the results
of check rides. A number of supervisors told us that they do not always
conduct formal check rides because of personnel shortages and high operating
tempo; rather, they try to assess drivers' skills and give correctional
guidance- a sort of “informal” check ride- whenever they ride
with a driver. None of them knew about the Transportation School's informal
driver training program, which includes guidelines for sustainment training.
8 ArmyRegulation 600- 55, Army Driver and Operator Standardization Program
(Selection, Training, Testing, and Licensing). 9 Instruction and practice to
ensure that mastery of specific skills are maintained.
10 Supervisors are those in the driver's immediate chain- of- command who
oversee and direct the driver's day- to- day activities. Some Supervisory
Procedures Are Not Being Performed or Documented
Page 16 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training
The Army Safety Center maintains a ground accident database 11 that has been
used in the past to identify accident anomalies that in turn led to safety
improvements involving the operation of M939 series 5- ton trucks. The
database, however, is not complete because not all data fields in accident
investigation reports are always filled in. The database is also not being
analyzed on a regular basis to identify trends or recurring problems.
One of the purposes of the ground database is to provide demographic
information that can be used for statistical comparisons. The Army Safety
Center did so in 1998 when it compared accident rates of different Army
trucks 12 and found that the M939 series trucks had a much higher serious
accident rate than other similar trucks. In other, earlier studies, the
Center reviewed M939 accident data and found a series of recurring accident
conditions. On the basis of these studies, the Army Tank- automotive and
Armaments Command in December 1992 issued the first of several Army- wide
messages 13 warning of these problems and imposing the 40- mph speed limit
on the M939. Also on the basis of these studies, the Command conducted
additional studies on the M939, which in turn led to an estimated $122.4
million in recommended design modifications. 14
We analyzed nearly 400 M939 accident reports dating from 1988 through 1999
contained in the Safety Center's database and found that four of the 36 data
fields of information we requested for our analysis were often not filled
in. Safety Center personnel acknowledged that the missing data could weaken
any conclusions reached using these fields. Two fields –
Was the Driver Licensed at the Time of the Accident and What was the
Driver's Total Accumulated Army Motor Vehicle Mileage – contained no
information 45 and 50 percent of the time respectively, and because of this,
could not be included in the analyses we performed. Two other Fields
–What Was the Mistake Made and Why Was the Mistake Made- were also
often left blank.
11 Army regulations require that an accident investigation report be filled
out for all class A through C occupational injury accidents and all class A
through D property damage accidents. The classes denote the severity of the
accident, with “A” as the most serious or costly.
12 The M34/ 35 trucks, the M939 trucks, and the Family of Medium Tactical
Vehicle trucks. 13 The Army uses Ground Precautionary Messages and Safety of
Use Messages to disseminate service- wide safety information. 14 See
Military Safety: Army M939 5- Ton Truck Accident History and Planned
Modifications (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 82, Apr. 9, 1999). Accident Database
Not Used Effectively
Page 17 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training
Our analysis also revealed patterns that, if studied further, might be
useful in improving training programs. For example, many of the reported
accidents occurred on wet or slippery surfaces or when the truck was hauling
cargo or pulling equipment. Furthermore, three- quarters of accidents
involved occasional drivers (those trained at informal schools). Some
patterns we identified are illustrated in figure 6.
Figure 6: Some Recurring Conditions Cited in M939 Accident Reports, 1988- 99
Source: Our analysis of Army Safety Center ground accident database.
Instructor shortages are affecting the quality and quantity of truck driver
training, especially at Fort Leonard Wood. The end result is that student
drivers are not fully trained in all aspects of the instruction program when
they graduate. This places an additional burden on the drivers' assigned
units, which must further train these drivers, and on supervisors, who must
be more vigilant in identifying drivers' shortcomings. If formal schools had
enough instructors on- hand, they would presumably be able to teach the
entire instruction program.
The student imbalance between the schools at Fort Leonard Wood, which is
understaffed, and Fort Bliss, which has smaller class sizes and a lower
student- instructor ratio, creates an ineffective use of resources. This
imbalance places an unnecessarily heavy burden on Fort Leonard Wood. If the
annual student load were more equally distributed between the two schools,
student graduates from Fort Leonard Wood might receive more complete
training. Conclusions
Page 18 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training
The formal schools are not adhering to the instruction program, which calls
for some training with trucks carrying cargo. Further, no training is
provided in how to pull equipment. With a high percentage of M939 accidents
taking place under these two conditions, the formal schools should provide
some training in these areas.
Similarly, students are not being trained to drive under different weather
and surface conditions. While it is understandable why formal schools
hesitate to take the risk of having students drive under hazardous or
highrisk conditions, it is also necessary that students receive such
training. An army study concluded that simulators can provide an effective
means of safely training drivers in high- risk weather and different road-
surface situations.
Because annual check rides and sustainment training are not always being
performed, unsafe driving habits may go undetected. Further, if corrective
oversight or training is not recorded, unit commanders and supervisors
cannot know which drivers need attention. Although performing and recording
check rides and sustainment training may be time- consuming, these
procedures can save lives.
Some important safety information, such as M939 speed limit restrictions, is
not always being passed on to or remembered by drivers, supervisors, and
trainers. Using inexpensive devices, such as dashboard stickers, is a simple
way to remind these personnel of the speed restrictions.
The Safety Center's accident database could be used to identify trends that
may show the need for greater training emphasis in certain driving
maneuvers. A periodic analysis of the database could assist school
officials, instructors, and supervisors in adjusting instruction programs or
mentoring drivers. However, such analysis would prove more useful if all
fields of information contained in the database were complete.
We recommend that the Secretary of the Army direct the Commander of the
Training and Doctrine Command to
? review and modify, as needed, instructor levels for the formal training
programs to ensure that the programs are adequately staffed to teach the
anticipated class size;
? balance the student load between the two schools by bringing the Fort
Bliss school up to fuller capacity and/ or increasing the number of classes
Recommendations
Page 19 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training
annually taught there, thereby reducing the student load and associated
problems created by such at Fort Leonard Wood;
? enforce the instruction program used by the two formal schools to ensure
that students receive hands- on training in driving trucks loaded with cargo
and also modify the program to include driving when pulling equipment- two
essential skills in performing the primary mission of the 5- ton tactical
fleet; and
? consider using simulators at the two formal schools to safely teach known
training shortfalls such as driving under hazardous conditions, with the
understanding that simulators not be used to replace hands- on driving
conducted under less risky conditions.
We also recommend that the Secretary of the Army issue instructions to all
applicable major army commands to
? require adherence to Army regulations on check rides and sustainment
training of licensed truck drivers and
? require that warning stickers indicating speed restrictions be prominently
displayed in the cabs of all M939 trucks not equipped with anti- skid brake
systems.
We further recommend that the Secretary of the Army direct the Commander of
the Army Safety Center to
? ensure that all information fields in accident reports are properly filled
in and
? periodically review accident data for the presence of trends or anomalies
for the purposes of informing trainers and supervisors of any information
that may help them perform their duties or help improve safety.
In oral comments on a draft of this report, Department of Defense officials
concurred with all our recommendations.
We are providing copies of this report to the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld,
Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Joseph W. Westphal, Ph. D., Acting
Secretary of the Army; and interested congressional committees. Copies will
also be made available to other interested parties upon request. Agency
Comments
and Our Review
Page 20 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training
If you or your staff have questions concerning the report, please call me at
(202) 512- 5559. Our scope and methodology is explained in appendix I. GAO
contacts and staff acknowledgments to this report are listed in appendix II.
Derek B. Stewart Director Defense Capabilities and Management
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Page 21 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training
Our objectives were to (1) evaluate the capacity of the Army's 5- ton truck
driver training programs to fully train drivers, (2) determine whether
oversight procedures and processes for these drivers are being followed, and
(3) determine whether and how the Army uses accident data to improve
training, supervision, and safety.
To evaluate the capacity of the Army's 5- ton truck driver training programs
to fully train drivers, we reviewed applicable training programs in terms of
compliance and completeness at both of the Army's formal schools (Fort
Leonard Wood and Fort Bliss) and 10 different informal training facilities
located at 4 installations. We also reviewed the training provided at one of
eight Army Reserve training centers. Reserve training centers all use the
same Program of Instruction. We reviewed these programs for compliance with
existing regulations and standard operating procedures established by the
various training components. To assess the completeness of training, we made
observations and collected documentation relating to the actual training
being conducted and compared that documentation to the training specified in
each training schools/ program's instruction program and also in relation to
the primary mission of the 5- ton truck fleet. We also discussed these
issues with officials responsible for designing the training programs,
training command personnel, driving instructors, and student drivers to gain
their perspectives. Lastly we compared the formal Marine Corps 5- ton
training program and two commercial sector training programs to the Army's
formal program to identify any training techniques and/ or devices that
might benefit 5- ton training curriculums.
To determine whether oversight procedures and processes for these drivers
are being followed, we documented the duties of supervisors of medium
tactical vehicles as found in Department of Defense and Army guidance,
instructions, procedures, and regulations. Through observations and
discussions with nearly 80 driver supervisors and nearly 200 truck drivers
stationed at 12 different Army and National Guard units, we then assessed
the degree to which they accomplished these responsibilities or followed
required documentary procedures. In addition, at the units visited we
collected over 450 historical driving records for truck operators and
reviewed them for required annual supervisory annotations relating to check
ride and sustainment training specified in Army regulations.
To ensure we collected information representative of the universe of
existing 5- ton truck informal training programs and the administering of
driver supervision responsibilities, we selected- for review and observation
purposes- four installations aligned under the U. S. Army Appendix I:
Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Page 22 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training
Forces Command. This major command, according to the Army Materiel Command's
Logistic Support Activity, controls 94 percent of the active army's M939
series 5- ton trucks in the continental United States. Because Army
automated record- keeping systems cannot provide 5- ton truck densities or
locations below the major command level, we engaged the services of Army
Internal Review personnel to assist us. Within the four installations, we
requested that Internal Review personnel set up meetings with subordinate
commands conducting the majority of 5- ton truck driver training and with
commands maintaining the largest concentrations of 5ton trucks and/ or
drivers.
In discussing accident data with Army Safety Center personnel, we learned of
Army notifications currently in effect and relevant to the safe handling of
5- ton trucks that resulted from past analyses performed on the Center's
ground accident database. We reviewed these notifications, including
existing Army regulations and procedures pertaining to how this information
is to be disseminated Army- wide. We then queried 5- ton truck driver-
trainers, student drivers, supervisors, and licensed drivers to gain an
understanding of how knowledgeable they were of restrictions imposed by
these notifications.
To determine whether and how the Army uses accident data to improve
training, supervision, and safety, we interviewed safety center personnel
and obtained and reviewed past studies and analyses conducted by the Center.
In addition to identifying data that could be useful in improving training
or supervision, we analyzed 12 years of demographic accident information
pertaining to M939 series 5- ton tactical cargo trucks. Our analysis of this
information, compiled for us by Army Safety Center personnel, included Class
A, B, and C accidents occurring from January 1988 through December 1999 and
for which some degree of fault was attributable to an M939 driver. This
truck series accounts for about onehalf of the Army's 5- ton fleet and is
the series specifically mentioned in the request letter. We focused on
identifying the presence of any demographic anomalies or commonality factors
that, when compiled statistically, might prove beneficial to trainers,
supervisors, or the safer operation of M939 series trucks. We also discussed
the results of our accident analysis with Army Safety Center officials,
trainers, and supervisors to obtain their input and/ or concurrence.
We performed our work from May 1999 through July 2000 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
Page 23 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training
Reginald L. Furr, Jr. (202) 512- 5426 In addition to those named above,
Aisha A. Mahmood, Stefano Petrucci, William R. Simerl, Lorelei St. James,
and Gerald L. Winterlin made key contributions to this report. Appendix II:
GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgments GAO Contact Acknowledgments
(702001)
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