Kosovo Air Operations: Army Resolving Lessons Learned Regarding the Apache Helicopter (Letter Report, 03/02/2001, GAO/GAO-01-401)
The Army deployed its team, called Task Force Hawk, to participate in a
Kosovo combat operation known as Operation Allied Force. In this report,
GAO (1) examines how Task Force Hawk's concept of operation compared to
Army and joint doctrine, (2) reviews the lessons learned identified from
the operation and determines the status of actions to address those
lessons, and (3) examines the extent to which the Army and the Air Force
were able to operate together as a joint force. GAO concluded that Task
Force Hawk's mission to conduct deep attacks against Serbian forces in
Kosovo was consistent with doctrine, but was not typical in that the
task force was supporting an air campaign rather than its more
traditional role of being used in conjunction with Army ground forces to
engage massed formations of enemy armor. The Army identified 107 items
that require remedial action. As of January 2001, 47 of the 107 items
had been recommended for closure. Action is in process for the remaining
60 lessons. Finally, the Army and the Air Force experienced significant
problems in their ability to work together jointly and the
interoperability of the command, control, communications, computers, and
intelligence equipment used during the operation. The Army is working on
both issues aggressively. However, it will take time for results to be
seen.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-01-401
TITLE: Kosovo Air Operations: Army Resolving Lessons Learned
Regarding the Apache Helicopter
DATE: 03/02/2001
SUBJECT: Military aircraft
Helicopters
Armed forces abroad
Interagency relations
Military intervention
IDENTIFIER: Kosovo (Serbia)
NATO
DOD Operation Allied Force
Apache Helicopter
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GAO-01-401
Report to the Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives
March 2001 KOSOVO AIR OPERATIONS
Army Resolving Lessons Learned Regarding the Apache Helicopter
GAO- 01- 401
Letter 3 Appendixes Appendix I: Doctrine Change or Implementation Lessons
Learned 18
Appendix II: Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence
Lessons Learned 19
Appendix III: Training Lessons Learned 20 Appendix IV: Additional Capability
Lessons Learned 22 Appendix V: Force Structure Lessons Learned 24
Figures Figure 1: Map of the Balkans 5 Figure 2: Apache Helicopter 6
Figure 3: Status of Task Force Hawk Lessons Learned 11
Abbreviations
DOD Department of Defense HQDA Headquarters Department of Army TRADOC
Training and Doctrine Command
Lett er
March 2, 2001 The Honorable Bob Stump Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Chairman: Following the failure of peace talks and escalating
violence against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, on March 24, 1999, the United
States provided military forces in support of North Atlantic Treaty
Organization combat operations against Yugoslavia. Combat operations
officially ended on June 20, 1999, with the Yugoslav acceptance of a peace
plan and the U. N. endorsement of the plan. Your Committee requested that we
examine a number of issues associated with the conduct of these combat
operations,
called Operation Allied Force. This report, one in a series responding to
your requests, addresses the Army's participation in the operation- the
deployment of Apache attack helicopters and supporting equipment and
personnel, called Task Force Hawk. Our objectives were to (1) examine how
Task Force Hawk's concept of operation compared to Army and joint doctrine,
(2) review the lessons learned identified from the operation and determine
the status of actions to address those lessons, and (3) examine the extent
to which the Army and the Air Force were able to operate together as a joint
force. We will report separately on other matters
involving Operation Allied Force. Results in Brief During Operation Allied
Force, Task Force Hawk's mission was to use its Apache helicopters to
conduct deep attacks against Serbian forces in
Kosovo. Military officials consider the task force and its mission
consistent with doctrine, but not typical in that the task force was
supporting an air campaign rather than its more traditional role of being
used in conjunction with Army ground forces to engage massed formations of
enemy armor. According to Army officials, the Task Force Hawk mission was
not something the Army routinely trains for. The Army undertook an extensive
effort to identify the lessons learned
from Task Force Hawk. In total, it collected 107 unique action items. We
categorized the lessons into five broad themes that in our judgment
characterize the type of remedial action required: (1) doctrinal revisions;
(2) command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
improvements; (3) training changes; (4) additional capabilities needed; and
(5) force structure changes. The Army is taking remedial actions to address
these lessons. As of January 2001, 47 of the 107 lessons have been
recommended for closure either because action has been taken or the lessons
were no longer germane. However, it will take some time to complete remedial
actions on some of the lessons learned that have been recommended for
closure. Action is in process for the remaining 60
lessons. Similarly, it may take years to complete action on items in
process. The commanding generals of the U. S. Army and Air Force in Europe
have placed a high priority on taking remedial action. However, we have
reported in the past that the Army has not always been successful in
implementing lessons. The Army and the Air Force experienced significant
problems in their ability to work together jointly and in the
interoperability of the command, control, communications, computers, and
intelligence equipment used
during the operation. Both these areas emerged clearly in the lessons
learned and are the subject of many remedial actions. The Army has deemed
both issues as high- priority items and is working both issues aggressively.
However, it will take time for the results to be seen.
To help the Army move forward with its planned remedial actions, we are
suggesting that the Congress may wish to have the Army report on progress
toward implementing Task Force Hawk lessons learned.
Background Task Force Hawk deployed to Albania in April 1999 as part of
Operation Allied Force. Originally, the task force was to deploy to the
Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. However, the government of Macedonia would
not allow combat operations to be conducted from its territory. The United
States subsequently obtained approval from the government of Albania to use
its territory to base Task Force Hawk and conduct combat operations. (See
fig. 1.) Albania did not have any previously established
U. S. military base camps as Macedonia did and was not viewed as having a
stable security environment. According to Army officials, the size of the
Task Force had to be increased to provide more engineering capability to
build operating facilities and provide force protection.
Figure 1: Map of the Balkans
Hungary Romania
Vojvodina
Area Enlarged
Croatia
Belgrade
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Sarajevo Serbia
Bulgaria
Montenegro Pristina
Solia Kosovo
Adriatic
Skopje
Sea
Albania Macedonia
Source: U. S. Army.
The task force was a unique Army organization. It was comprised of 1 attack
helicopter battalion with 24 Apache attack helicopters; 1 Corps aviation
brigade with 31 support helicopters; 1 Multiple Launch Rocket System
battalion 1 with 27 launchers; a ground maneuver element for force
protection; and other headquarters and support forces. (See fig. 2 for a 1
The Multiple Launch Rocket System is an artillery system used to provide
suppression of enemy ground forces during an operation.
picture of an Apache helicopter.) It ultimately totaled about 5,100
personnel. Its planned mission was to conduct deep attacks against Serbian
military and militia forces operating in Kosovo using Apache helicopters and
Multiple Launch Rocket Systems. The task force deployed to Albania and
trained for the mission but was not ordered into combat. Ultimately, its
focus changed to using its radar systems to locate enemy forces for
targeting by other aircraft. Additionally, the task force assumed
responsibility for the protection of all U. S. forces operating out of
Tirana Airfield, its staging base, which included Air Force personnel
providing humanitarian assistance to Kosovo refugees.
Figure 2: Apache Helicopter
Source: U. S. Army.
Concerned about the combat readiness of Apache helicopters and their
experience in Task Force Hawk, the House Armed Services Committee's
Subcommittee on Readiness held a hearing on July 1, 1999. That hearing
focused on pilot shortages, the lack of pilot proficiency, and unit combat
training. In addition, it discussed equipment that was not fully fielded at
the time of the operation, such as aircraft survivability equipment and
communication equipment. Our work was designed to address other matters
associated with Task Force Hawk and how the services plan to address them
for future operations.
Task Force Hawk Not a Doctrine is the fundamental principle by which the
military services guide
Typical Army their actions in support of national objectives. It provides
guidance for
planning and conducting military operations. In the Army, doctrine is
Operation communicated in a variety of ways, including manuals, handbooks,
and training. Joint doctrine, which applies to the coordinated use of two or
more of the military services, is similarly communicated. Doctrine provides
commanders with a framework for conducting operations while allowing
flexibility to adapt operations to specific circumstances.
According to Army and Joint Staff doctrine officials, the concept of
operation that was planned to be used by Task Force Hawk, the use of Apache
helicopters for a deep attack mission as part of an air campaign, fell
within established Army and joint doctrine. Typically, attack helicopters
are used in conjunction with Army ground forces to engage massed formations
of enemy armor. They were used in this manner in the Gulf War. 2 In the
Kosovo air campaign, Task Force Hawk's planned deep attacks differed in that
they were intended to be part of an air campaign, not an Army led combined
arms 3 land campaign. Additionally, the aircraft's planned attacks
principally would have engaged widely dispersed and
camouflaged enemy ground forces instead of massed formations. According to
Army doctrine officials, doctrine is broad and flexible enough to allow a
combatant commander to employ his assets in the manner that was planned for
the task force. However, Army officials agree that this planned usage
differed from the employment typically envisaged in Army doctrine.
Furthermore, Army officials said that the Task Force Hawk experience was not
something the Army routinely trained for and was
considered to be an atypical operation. Although Task Force Hawk's mission
and operations were consistent with both Army and joint doctrine in the
broadest sense, changes to doctrine at both the Army and joint levels are
being made that will address some of the operation's lessons learned. A
total of 19 Army doctrine publications will be
developed or modified to better address the experience gained from Task
Force Hawk. Examples of new or revised doctrine include a new handbook on
deep operations; an update to the Army's keystone warfighting doctrinal
2 During the Gulf War, attack helicopters were also used as part of the air
campaign to attack Iraqi air defenses. 3 Combined arms is the integration of
the Army's combat capabilities, such as tanks, artillery, and engineer and
transportation units.
publication on conducting campaigns, major operations, battles, engagements,
and operations other than war; and an update to the Army aviation brigade
field manual that expands the role of aviation brigades and task forces with
a heavier emphasis on tactics, techniques, and procedures 4 for task force,
combined arms, and joint operations. Modifications to Army
doctrine are being made as part of the on- going established process for
reviewing and revising doctrinal publications.
A total of five joint doctrine publications will be developed or modified
based at least in part on the Task Force Hawk experience. A new joint
publication is being developed to cover the role of the Joint Force Land
Component Commander, detailing his role and responsibilities in a
“supported” and “supporting” role. (See our
discussion of this role in the Joint Operations section of this report.)
Updates to four remaining joint publications, including close air support
and fire support, will be made
during the normal 21- month joint doctrine publication and review cycle.
Army Working to
The Army has a large effort underway to collect and resolve lessons learned
pertaining to Task Force Hawk. A total of 146 Task Force Hawk Implement
Lessons
lessons learned were collected at three different sources. 5 The U. S. Army
Learned
Europe developed 64 lessons and forwarded them to the Army's Deputy Chief of
Staff for Operations and Plans for remedial action. 6 The Army's Training
and Doctrine Command developed a listing of 76 lessons and has assigned them
to their different proponent schools for remedial action. Hundreds of joint
action items were collected at the European Command on Operation Allied
Force and forwarded to the Joint Warfighting Center. Of these items, six
were specifically associated with Task Force Hawk and were sent to the Joint
Staff for remedial action. We analyzed the 146 Task Force Hawk lessons and
determined that a number of them submitted by different organizations were
the same. Of the 76 lessons raised by the Training and Doctrine Command, 38
were similar 4 Tactics, techniques, and procedures implement the fundamental
principles of military
doctrine. 5 These are the lessons learned collected to date that we are
aware of; however, there could be other initiatives. 6 The U. S. Army Europe
developed 66 lessons, but 2 of them did not have anything to do with
Task Force Hawk; therefore, we dropped them from the listing.
to those submitted by U. S. Army Europe. Of the six European Command
lessons, we determined that one was similar to an issue submitted by U. S.
Army Europe. Deleting the 39 duplicates resulted in a total of 107 unique
lessons submitted for remedial action. We categorized the 107 lessons into
five broad themes that in our judgment characterize the type of needed
remedial action. The five themes are as follows.
? The need for revisions to Army and joint doctrine, as discussed earlier.
We identified 19 such lessons. See appendix I. ? Improvements in command,
control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) equipment or
procedures. We identified 20 such lessons. See appendix II.
? Areas needing additional training. We identified 30 such lessons. See
appendix III.
? The need for additional capability in areas other than C4I. We identified
24 such lessons. See appendix IV. ? Potential force structure changes. We
identified 14 such lessons. See appendix V. We determined the status of each
of the 107 lessons learned as of January 2001. We did not evaluate the merit
of the actions proposed or completed. We placed them into one of two status
categories:
? Recommended for closure: We placed 47 items in this category. However,
there are varying degrees of closure within this category. First, there are
items that specifically have had actions completed, such as procuring night
vision goggles for Apache pilots. According to Army
officials, the goggles have been procured and fielded. Twenty- three of the
47 lessons fell into this subgroup. Second, there are lessons that have had
actions taken, but will require a long lead- time for implementation, such
as the procurement of survival radios and a
deployable flight mission rehearsal system for aviation units. For example,
while approval for the survival radios has been obtained, they will not
begin fielding until fiscal year 2003. In addition, the Army has recommended
an interim fix for a mission rehearsal system, but it is costly. The far-
term solution is the joint mission planning system, which
will not be fielded until 2007. Fifteen of the 47 lessons fell into this
subgroup. Finally, there are items that Army officials are recommending for
closure because, upon further review, they determined the lessons should not
have been submitted or events have overtaken the initial lesson and they are
no longer applicable. The remaining nine lessons fell into this subgroup.
Lessons learned that were recommended for closure
are indicated as such in appendixes I- V. ? In progress: We placed 60
lessons in this category. These items are still considered open issues by
the Army officials tracking Task Force Hawk lessons learned and they have
been assigned to responsible bodies for resolution. Seventeen of the 60 in
progress lessons reside with the Department of the Army- Headquarters, 10
with the Joint Staff or Joint Forces Command, 27 with the Army's Training
and Doctrine Command,
and 6 with U. S. Army Europe. Many issues remain open because they require
efforts that are being incorporated into much larger overall Army projects,
such as transformation 7 or Flight School XXI, 8 that will require a much
longer time frame to implement. Other lessons learned remain open because
efforts to address them are just beginning. Lessons learned where solutions
are in progress are indicated as such in appendixes I- V. Figure 3 shows the
107 lessons learned issues by category and by status
grouping. 7 The Army Vision, announced in October 1999, encompasses people,
readiness, and transformation. The goal of the Army vision is to transition
the entire Army into a force that is strategically responsive and dominant
at every point of the spectrum of operations. 8 Flight School XXI is the
Army's project to realign flight training to meet warfighting requirements
by producing aviators who arrive at their initial duty station basic mission
qualified and ready to begin unit training.
Figure 3: Status of Task Force Hawk Lessons Learned
Number of lessons
c s Closed In progress Note: C4I = Command, Control, Communications,
Computers, and Intelligence. Source: GAO analysis of Army and joint lessons
learned data.
The Commanding General of U. S. Army Europe has emphasized the need to
capitalize on the lessons learned from Kosovo and to focus on partnership
with the Air Force. He is personally involved with the lessons learned
process and considers the process and follow- up a personal commitment to U.
S. Army Europe soldiers. During our visit to U. S. Air Forces in Europe,
we were told that their commanding general has also placed a high priority
on working together with the Army to address the lessons learned in
conducting joint operations. While both commands have taken steps to resolve
the issues, some of the remedial actions will require years to complete. In
addition, over time the services assign new commanders and reassign the
current commanders. We reported in 1999 that while the Army had established
a program to validate that remedial action on past lessons
learned were implemented, the program has not been very successful. 9
Lessons Learned
Two key themes emerged from the lessons learned collected. One was the
Highlight Problems
need for the Army and the Air Force to work together better jointly. The
other theme was the interoperability of the two services' command, With
Joint Operations
control, communications, computers, and intelligence equipment. and
Equipment Interoperability Improvements Are Being The Task Force Hawk
experience highlighted difficulties in several areas Made in the Ability to
pertaining to how the Army operates in a joint environment. One area was
Conduct Joint Operations determining the most appropriate structure for
integrating Army elements into a joint task force. Doctrine typically calls
for a Joint Force Land
Component Commander or an Army Force Commander to be a part of a joint task
force with responsibility for overseeing ground elements during an
operation. The command structure for the U. S. component of Operation Allied
Force did not have a Joint Force Land Component Commander. Both Army
officials and the Joint Task Force Commander in retrospect believe that this
may have initially made it more difficult to integrate the Army into the
existing joint task force structure. The lack of an Army Force Commander and
his associated staff created difficulties in campaign
planning because the traditional links with other joint task force elements
were initially missing. These links would normally function as a liaison
between service elements and coordinate planning efforts. Over time, an ad
hoc structure had to be developed and links established. The Army has
conducted a study to develop a higher headquarters design that would enable
it to provide for a senior Army commander in a future Joint Task Force
involving a relatively small Army force. This senior commander would be
responsible for providing command, control, communications, computers, and
intelligence capability to the joint task force. The study itself is
complete, but testing of the design in an exercise is not scheduled until
February 2002.
9 Military Readiness: Full Training Benefits From Army's Combat Training
Centers Are Not Being Realized (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 210, Sept. 17, 1999).
A second area that the Army had difficulty with during its mission training
was including its aircraft in the overall planning document that controls
air attack assets. The plan, called an air tasking order, assigns daily
targets or missions to subordinate units or forces. Air Force officials in
Europe told us that they had difficulty integrating the Army's attack
helicopters into the air tasking order. According to U. S. Army Europe
officials, there were no
formalized procedures for how to include Army aviation into this planning
document and they had little or no training on how to perform this function.
The Army and the Air Force in Europe are developing joint tactics,
techniques, and procedures for integrating Army assets into the air
tasking order and are beginning to include this process in their joint
exercises. A third area that the Army and the Air Force had difficulty with
was targeting. As previously discussed, once the decision was made that Task
Force Hawk would not conduct deep attacks, its resources were used to locate
targets for the Air Force. According to U. S. Army Europe documentation,
Army analysts in Europe had little or no training in joint targeting and
analyzing targets in a limited air campaign. As a result, in the early days
of the Army targeting role, mobile targets nominated by the Army did not
meet Operation Allied Force criteria being used by the Air Force for
verifying that targets were legitimate and, therefore, were not
attacked. As the operation progressed, the two services learned each other's
procedures and criteria and worked together better. The Army and the Air
Force in Europe are now formalizing the process used and are developing
tactics, techniques, and procedures for attacking such targets and sharing
intelligence. They are including these new processes in their joint
exercises.
Improvements Are Needed The second major theme that emerged from the lessons
learned was the in Interoperability
interoperability of the command, control, communications, computers, and
intelligence equipment. The Army is transitioning from a variety of
battlefield command systems that it has used for years to a digitized suite
of systems called the Army Battlefield Command system. During Operation
Allied Force, Army elements used a variety of older and newer battlefield
command systems that were not always interoperable with each other. The
mission planning and targeting system used by the Apache unit in Albania
during Task Force Hawk was one of the older systems and was not compatible
with the system being used by the Army team that provided liaison with the
Air Force at the air operations center. The Army liaison team used the new
suite of Army digitized systems that will ultimately be
provided to all Army combat forces. However, at the time of Task Force Hawk,
the suite of systems was not fully fielded and not all the deployed
personnel were trained on the new systems. Consequently, the Apache unit in
Albania used the older systems, making it difficult to communicate with the
liaison team and requiring the manual as opposed to electronic transfer of
data.
The older mission planning and targeting system used by the Apache unit in
Albania was also not compatible with the Air Force system. The Air Force has
a single digital battlefield command system. The Apache unit in Albania,
using its older equipment, could not readily share data directly with the
Air Force. In addition, the intelligence system being used by the
Army at the unit level and at the liaison level could not directly exchange
information with the Air Force. As was the case within the Army, personnel
had to manually transfer data. This was time consuming and introduced the
potential for transcription errors.
The Army is continuing to field the new suite of systems. We have previously
reported that the schedules for fielding these systems have slipped and the
Army in Europe is not scheduled to receive the complete suite of new systems
before 2005. 10 When it is eventually fielded, this new suite of systems is
expected to reduce if not eliminate the inability of the Army's and the Air
Force's systems to work together.
Conclusions The commanding generals of the U. S. Army and U. S. Air Forces
in Europe have made resolving the lessons learned identified from Task Force
Hawk a
high priority. They have already made progress in taking remedial action on
a number of the lessons. However, many of the lessons will require a
significant amount of time, sometimes years, for implementation. In
addition, over time senior military leadership changes and we have found
in the past that the Army has not been very successful in ensuring that
remedial actions are brought to closure. 10 Battlefield Automation:
Performance Uncertainties Are Likely When Army Fields Its First Digitized
Division (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 150, July 27, 1999) and Battlefield Automation:
Army Needs to Update Fielding Plan for First Digitized Corps (GAO/ NSIAD-
00- 167, July 25, 2000).
Matter for To ensure that the Army maintains the momentum to take actions to
Congressional resolve Task Force Hawk lessons learned, the Congress may want
to consider requiring the Army to report on remedial actions taken to
Consideration implement Task Force Hawk lessons. This could be in the form
of periodic
progress reports or another appropriate reporting approach that would meet
congressional oversight needs.
Scope and To determine how Task Force Hawk's concept of operation compared
to Methodology
existing Army and joint doctrine, we reviewed Army and Joint Staff doctrine
publications and were briefed on existing deep attack doctrine at the Army's
Training and Doctrine Command and the Army's Aviation School. We then
compared this information to Task Force Hawk's concept of operation. We
discussed which doctrine publications would be revised
based on the Task Force Hawk experience with officials at the Army's
Training and Doctrine Command and the Joint Warfighting Center. To determine
the number of Task Force Hawk lessons learned, we collected and reviewed
Army lessons learned from the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
and Plans, the Army's Training and Doctrine Command, and the Center for Army
Lessons Learned. We collected and reviewed joint lessons learned at the
Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Warfighting Center. To
obtain an understanding of the lessons and their status, we discussed them
with individuals directly involved with the Task Force Hawk operation or
those directly involved in addressing the individual lessons. We discussed
the lessons with individuals at the Army's Aviation School, the Army's
Artillery School, U. S. Army Europe, U. S. Air
Forces in Europe, and the U. S. European Command. To determine how well the
Army and the Air Force worked together in Operation Allied Force, we
collected documentation on joint operations and interoperability of
equipment and interviewed personnel at the U. S. European Command, U. S.
Army Europe, and U. S. Air Forces in Europe.
We conducted our review from June 2000 through January 2001 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. We reviewed the
information in this report with the Department of Defense
(DOD) officials and made changes where appropriate. DOD officials agreed
with the facts in this report.
We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld,
Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Greg Dahlberg, Acting Secretary of the
Army; and the Honorable Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., Director, Office of
Management and Budget.
If you have any questions, please call me on (757) 552- 8100. Key
contributors to this report were Steve Sternlieb, Laura Durland, and Frank
Smith.
Sincerely yours, Neal P. Curtin Director, Defense Capabilities and
Management
Appendi xes Doctrine Change or Implementation Lessons
Appendi x I
Learned In progress Lessons learned Source proponent Recommended closed
The Army and the Air Force use different terms to define strategic airlift's
mission U. S. Army Europe status. Joint logistics doctrine needs to be
examined with respect to ordnance input. Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC)
Review Field Manual (FM) 100- 17- Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment and
TRADOC
Demobilization- to ensure that it meets the requirements of a strategic
responsive Army. Review FM 100- 17 for joint doctrine disconnects and
implement the required changes
TRADOC to the pertinent field manuals. Review FM 100- 17 and FM 100- 17- 4
to make sure the responsibilities of the major
TRADOC commands are adequately discussed. Conduct a mission analysis to
determine if doctrine supports the goal of sustaining TRADOC
overmatch capabilities across the spectrum of conflict. Determine the
operational impact of the Roberts Amendment, which prohibits use of U. S.
European funds for the deployment of U. S. armed forces to Yugoslavia,
Albania, and Macedonia Command without congressional consultation, on
alliance and coalition warfare. Recommended closed but requiring a long
implementation period
Revise publication FM 100- 6 entitled Information Operations. TRADOC
Accelerate the implementation of doctrine and associated tactics,
techniques, and
TRADOC procedures related to FM 3- 13 action plan. In progress
Peace support operations doctrine needs to be updated and more fully
developed. U. S. Army Europe TRADOC General support aviation doctrine and
tactics, techniques, and procedures need to be U. S. Army Europe and TRADOC
developed and/ or updated. TRADOC There is no available mission- training
plan for the Tactical Terminal Control System. U. S. Army Europe TRADOC
Aviation war- fighting doctrine for the unmanned aerial vehicle employment
with Army U. S. Army Europe TRADOC aviation is needed. Review the need to
develop multi- service tactics, techniques, and procedures for Army TRADOC
TRADOC
aviation to support other services or functional components. Refine doctrine
to enable better integration of Army units into joint command and TRADOC
TRADOC control architecture. Develop joint tactics, techniques, and
procedures for the employment of aircraft
TRADOC TRADOC survivability equipment. Revise publication FM 100- 5 entitled
Operations. TRADOC Headquarters
Department of Army (HQDA) Revise publication FM 100- 1 entitled The Army.
TRADOC HQDA Revise doctrine to include the use of echelons above division
elements in the deep TRADOC TRADOC attack mission.
Command, Control, Communications,
Appendi x II
Computers, and Intelligence Lessons Learned In progress Lessons learned
Source proponent Recommended closed
Joint Force protection command and control procedures in Albania were not
clear. U. S. Army Europe Procedures for video teleconference integration as
a command, control, and intelligence structure U. S. Army Europe need to be
developed. Albania/ Kosovo regional maps were unavailable at the outset of
the operation. U. S. Army Europe Tactical human intelligence reconnaissance
is lacking in current organizations. U. S. Army Europe
Counter and human intelligence needs to be expanded to a joint operating
system. U. S. Army Europe The public affairs strategy in Kosovo was not
coordinated. U. S. Army Europe
Recommended closed but requiring a long implementation period
All Source Analysis System, which gathers and fuses battlefield information
to produce a correlated U. S. Army Europe threat picture, is incompatible
with other systems. Accelerate the timetable for fielding the next
generation digital series of communications equipment.
U. S. Army Europe A 10- year fielding cycle is too slow. TRADOC Improved
survival radios are needed for aviation units. U. S. Army Europe
In progress
Upgrade Army aircraft communications capabilities to include satellite
communication capabilities. U. S. Army Europe HQDA TRADOC The Army requires
an airborne battlefield command and control center to conduct deep attack U.
S. Army Europe HQDA
missions over extended distances. TRADOC Joint intelligence tactics,
techniques, and procedures are lacking. U. S. Army Europe Joint Forces
Command Joint analysis is lacking. The primary problem in joint intelligence
operations is a lack of service/ joint
U. S. Army Europe Joint Forces interoperability of intelligence systems.
Command Additional facilities and capabilities to increase bandwidth within
the intelligence and signal U. S. Army Europe Joint Forces communities are
needed. Command Joint intelligence, doctrine, and training need to be better
coordinated and integrated. U. S. Army Europe Joint Forces Command Second
generation forward- looking infrared sensors are needed. TRADOC TRADOC The
Dual Datalink, which supports intelligence operations, must be replaced.
European
Joint Forces Command Command The Army space support team needs improved
technologies, including a direct satellite downlink
European Joint Forces capability, to provide satellite imagery to the
warfighter. Command Command Command, control, communications, computers, and
intelligence operations, organizations, and
TRADOC TRADOC materiel for the Army in a supporting role needs to be
analyzed. (TRADOC has expanded this single issue to 32 separate issues.)
Determine the appropriate design and augmentation required to enable a
division or corps to act as TRADOC TRADOC an Army Force Commander, which
would provide command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
to the forces.
Appendi x II I Training Lessons Learned In progress Lessons learned Source
proponent Recommended closed
Obtain required airspace allocations for conducting Guardrail training in
Europe. U. S. Army Europe Develop over- water and alpine training areas in
Europe. U. S. Army Europe Require annual under- wire flight training and
have local commanders establish areas to U. S. Army Europe perform training.
Aviation training manuals should be modified to include asymmetrical
threats, special U. S. Army Europe
instructions on how to use air tasking orders, unit integration into North
Atlantic Treaty TRADOC
Organization operations, annual joint air attack team training, and a
minimum planning time mission rehearsal exercise. Find an integrated,
complex air defense range for conducting electronic warfare training or U.
S. Army Europe obtain the necessary waivers for use of the range at Polygon,
France. Conduct mission analysis to determine if deployment requirements are
covered in unit
TRADOC training programs. Provide a product that describes the roles,
missions, and functions of the U. S. Transportation TRADOC
Command to all Army schools for inclusion in their training opportunities.
Continue emphasizing military decision- making process training. TRADOC
Incorporate task force operations instruction in professional military
education. TRADOC
Recommended closed but requiring a long implementation period
The current Battle Command Training Program fails to adequately address the
joint/ combined U. S. Army Europe operational environment of current and
future contingencies. TRADOC
Increased individual, crew, and junior leader development training is
needed. U. S. Army Europe TRADOC
Platoon Leader/ Company Commander certification and training is inadequate
as currently U. S. Army Europe executed. TRADOC
Increase the level of survival, evasion, resistance, and escape training. U.
S. Army Europe TRADOC
A joint/ combined multinational training event is required. U. S. Army
Europe TRADOC
In progress
Increased officer, noncommissioned officer, and advanced individual training
is needed. U. S. Army Europe TRADOC TRADOC Revise training to ensure new
Apache helicopter pilots are basic mission qualified. U. S. Army Europe
TRADOC TRADOC There is a need for signal intelligence survey teams in the
Army. U. S. Army Europe HQDA
Fully fund ammunition requirements for appropriate aviator training to
include advanced U. S. Army Europe HQDA gunnery. Provide a realistic radar
threat generator for flight training. The current system only replicates U.
S. Army Europe HQDA
a minimal amount of threat systems. Fund travel costs associated with U. S.
Army Europe units attending required training schools. U. S. Army Europe U.
S. Army Europe
In progress Lessons learned Source proponent
U. S. Army Europe needs to continue efforts to remove, extend, or modify the
current night U. S. Army Europe U. S. Army Europe flight, frequency
management, and radar utilization restrictions in Germany to support
training.
Simplify procedures for obtaining identification of friend or foe
interrogation training. a U. S. Army Europe U. S. Army Europe Require and
resource for each attack squadron a complete Combat Maneuver Training
U. S. Army Europe U. S. Army Europe Center force- on- force rotation.
Emphasize how the major commands fit into the Joint Deployment Process.
TRADOC Joint Forces Command
The services need to continually reinforce and train on joint deep
operations in order to U. S. European
Joint Forces maximize warfighting capabilities. Command Command Integrate
high gross weight operations and complex terrain training in simulation
mission TRADOC TRADOC scenarios. Utilize simulation to drive training
scenarios. TRADOC TRADOC
Aviation mission planning systems rehearsal tool for individual and crew
utilization does not TRADOC TRADOC meet training requirements. Review and
ensure applicability of digitized systems. TRADOC TRADOC
Develop a deployment training exercise with the objectives of understanding
the deployment TRADOC HQDA process and developing synchronized movement
plans. a In February 2001, U. S. Army Europe advised us that it had moved
this lesson learned to the
recommended closed category.
Appendi x I V
Additional Capability Lessons Learned In progress Lessons learned Source
proponent Recommended closed
Field night vision goggles. U. S. Army Europe TRADOC Institutionalize the
concept of tiered force provider packages to support Army units, including
U. S. Army Europe force protection materials. The aerial weapon scoring
system needs further development and refinement. U. S. Army Europe
The Army needs to conduct additional deployment training and buy additional
C- 17 mock- up U. S. Army Europe trainers for Europe. TRADOC Procure and
field the transportation coordinator's automated information movement system
II. TRADOC The Army needs to continue to support and deploy systems, such as
the Deployable Weather
U. S. European Satellite Workstation, that autonomously process weather
satellite imagery and data. Command
Recommended closed but requiring a long implementation period
Field a deployable flight mission rehearsal system. U. S. Army Europe TRADOC
Field a night vision system compatible with nuclear biological chemical
masks. U. S. Army Europe Develop and field a new time- phased force and
deployment data system. U. S. Army Europe TRADOC
Upgrade Army aviation mission simulators. U. S. Army Europe TRADOC Procure
and field the aviation combined- arms training suite into brigade and below
training. TRADOC
In progress
Develop, resource, train, and sustain a combat search and rescue capability.
U. S. Army Europe Joint Forces Command
The Apache helicopter requires extended range/ self- deployment fuel tanks
that are U. S. Army Europe HQDA crashworthy. TRADOC Upgrade Army aviation
aircraft survivability equipment. U. S. Army Europe HQDA
TRADOC Modify Apache Longbow to meet specific theater requirements to
include better night vision U. S. Army Europe HQDA systems, more powerful
engines, increased communications, and better aircraft survivability
equipment.
The Army requires a self- contained lethal and non- lethal joint suppression
of enemy air U. S. Army Europe Joint Forces defenses capability. Command
Field additional tactical engagement simulation systems to the Combat
Maneuver Training U. S. Army Europe HQDA Center as well as what is currently
funded for the Apache Longbow. Fund the Apache helicopter self- deployment
capability to include instrument flight rules and
U. S. Army Europe HQDA an approved global positioning system. Fund the
procurement of aviation life support equipment for over- water operations.
U. S. Army Europe TRADOC
The closed loop facility at Ramstein, Germany, requires additional equipment
for major U. S. Army Europe U. S. Army Europe strategic air deployments.
In progress Lessons learned Source proponent
U. S. Army Europe requires an alternate strategic deployment airfield. U. S.
Army Europe U. S. Army Europe Fund Robertson fuel tanks and rotor blade
anti/ de- ice capability. U. S. Army Europe HQDA Procure system to track
flight experience. TRADOC TRADOC Continue research and development of
imagery transmission systems. TRADOC TRADOC
Appendi x V
Force Structure Lessons Learned In progress Lessons learned Source proponent
Recommended closed
Public affairs staff support is inadequate. Additional units are required.
U. S. Army Europe Guardrail units need to be filled at 100 percent. U. S.
Army Europe Need to review Army guidance to determine if multifunctional
logistics officer qualifications need TRADOC to be modified. Authorize
tactical operation officers for electronic warfare officer positions. TRADOC
In progress
Revise the Apache helicopter squadron's force structure to include a fire
support officer and an air U. S. Army Europe HQDA defense artillery officer.
Field unmanned aerial vehicle units at corps level. U. S. Army Europe HQDA
Add sufficient personnel to the force structure of the corps and division
headquarters to allow for U. S. Army Europe TRADOC commanders to conduct
split- based operations. TRADOC Add an Apache helicopter qualified field
grade officer in the executive officer or operations officer
U. S. Army Europe HQDA position of the battlefield coordination detachment.
The Army requires the ability to rapidly deploy forces to anywhere in the
world and sustain
TRADOC TRADOC overmatch capabilities across the full spectrum of operations.
The Infantry School is developing an interim brigade combat team that has
greater tactical and strategic agility. The Army needs to look into a
redesign of what is needed at echelons above division in terms of
TRADOC TRADOC ordnance combat service support to enhance joint and combined
operations. New materiel requirements for the Ordnance Corps can be
anticipated as a result of the Army's TRADOC TRADOC
development of the initial brigade combat team. To support rapidly
developing contingencies and promote efficiency, the Army needs to evaluate
TRADOC TRADOC consolidating combat service support. Continue to build
support for fielding a cargo transfer company. TRADOC TRADOC Formalize a
tactical operations career field for electronic warfare officer. TRADOC
TRADOC
(702078) Lett er
Figure 1: Map of the Balkans 5 Figure 2: Apache Helicopter 6 Figure 3:
Status of Task Force Hawk Lessons Learned 11
GAO United States General Accounting Office
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Appendix I
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Appendix II
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Appendix III
Appendix III Training Lessons Learned
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Appendix IV
Appendix IV Additional Capability Lessons Learned
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Appendix V
United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548- 0001
Official Business Penalty for Private Use $300
Address Correction Requested Presorted Standard
Postage & Fees Paid GAO Permit No. GI00
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*** End of document. ***
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