Defense Acquisitions: Readiness of the Marine Corps' V-22 Aircraft for Full-Rate Production (20-FEB-01, GAO-01-369R)
GAO concludes that the V-22 program is not ready for full-rate
production. This conclusion is based on two factors. First, GAO's
"best practices" work has identified practices used by successful
commercial and defense programs to develop and produce quality
products in significantly less time and at lower costs. GAO
reviews of major weapons systems have shown that failure to
follow these practices results in cost increases, schedule
delays, and performance problems. Second, GAO analyzed
Department of Defense (DOD) assessments and data on the V-22
program and interviewed DOD officials. As a result of GAO's
findings, DOD postponed the full-rate production of the V-22
aircraft until the risks have been mitigated.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-01-369R
ACCNO: 164520
TITLE: Defense Acquisitions: Readiness of the Marine Corps' V-22
Aircraft for Full-Rate Production
DATE: 02/20/2001
SUBJECT: Aircraft research
Developmental testing
Military aircraft
Military procurement
Operational testing
Private sector practices
Weapons research and development
Osprey
V-22 Aircraft
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GAO-01-369R
Defense Acquisitions
United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548
February 20, 2001 The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld The Secretary of Defense
Subject: Defense Acquisitions: Readiness of the Marine Corps' V- 22 Aircraft
for Full- Rate Production
Dear Mr. Secretary: In a letter to Secretary of Defense Cohen, dated
December 15, 2000, we stated that the Marine Corps' V- 22 aircraft 1 was not
ready for full- rate production and that the Secretary had made a prudent
decision to defer that production decision until the V- 22 Blue Ribbon Panel
reports its findings. 2 On January 12, 2001, we provided the Panel with
additional details at their request. A copy of the briefing and briefing
support material that we presented to the Panel are in enclosures I and II.
Our conclusions about the program's readiness for full- rate production are
based on two factors. First, our “best practices” work, which
has identified practices used by successful commercial and defense programs
to develop and produce quality products in significantly less time and at
lower costs. 3 Our reviews of numerous major weapon systems has shown that
failure to follow these practices has led to cost increases, schedule
delays, and performance problems. Second, our analysis of Department of
Defense assessments and data relevant to the V- 22 program and interviews
with relevant Department officials.
Our best practices work over the past few years has shown that successful
system development efforts resolve major technology, design, and
manufacturing uncertainties prior to the start of production. Thorough test
and evaluation, when done early, increase the probability that systems will
achieve required performance levels within agreed- upon time and cost
parameters. In July 2000, we reported on how best commercial practices for
testing and evaluating new products offer ways to improve the way the
Department conducts test and evaluation on weapon systems. 4 In commenting
on our report, the Department stated that it is committed to
1 The V- 22 Osprey is a tilt- rotor, short- take- off- and- landing
aircraft, which was developed to satisfy various combat missions, including
medium- lift assault for the Marine Corps. 2 The Panel was appointed by
former Secretary of Defense Cohen to review the V- 22 Program.
3 See particularly, Best Practices: Successful Application to Weapon
Acquisitions Requires Changes in DOD's Environment (GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 56, Feb.
24, 1998). 4 Best Practices: A More Constructive Test Approach Is Key to
Better Weapon System Outcomes (GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 199, July 31, 2000).
GAO- 01- 369R Defense Acquisitions Page 2 establishing appropriate levels of
product maturity, validating those levels with
appropriate testing and evaluation, and providing the required mix of
testing and evaluation tools necessary to validate maturity.
In contrast to best commercial practices, our work has shown that numerous
weapon system programs suffer from persistent problems associated with late
or incomplete testing. This practice pushes the burden of discovery late in
development when problems become very costly to resolve. We also found that
testing operated under a penalty environment that creates perverse
incentives. For example, if tests were not passed, the program might look
less attractive and be vulnerable to funding cuts. Managers thus had
incentives to postpone difficult tests and limit open communication about
test results. These represent widespread and systemic problems within the
Department that must be addressed.
Our review of the V- 22 program, which is already in low- rate initial
production, revealed that the Department planned to proceed with a full-
rate production decision without knowing whether new technology could meet
Marine Corps requirements; whether the design would work as required; or
whether the design could be produced within cost, schedule, and quality
targets. This knowledge is lacking in part because of inadequate test and
evaluation. Specifically, developmental testing was deleted, deferred, or
simulated in order to meet cost and schedule goals. For example, the
original plan to test the flying qualities of the flight control system
included significant testing to be conducted in helicopter and aircraft
conversion modes at various rates of descent, speeds, and weights. This
would have provided considerable knowledge of V- 22 flying qualities
especially in areas where the Marine Corps states the aircraft is
susceptible to a sudden loss of controlled flight. 5 To meet cost and
schedule targets, the actual testing conducted was less than a third of that
originally planned.
Documents we reviewed indicated that test waivers and limitations reduced
testing for operational realism. For example, air combat maneuvering was
prohibited and the aircraft was not cleared to operate in icing conditions.
Further, major concerns about the aircraft's performance and operations
remain unresolved. These were highlighted in a report prepared by Defense's
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation. 6 For example, the report said
the aircraft (1) is susceptible to sudden loss of controlled flight under
certain conditions, (2) creates downward force from the V- 22 proprotor
blades that could potentially interfere with operations below or close to
the aircraft, 7 and (3) is far less reliable than what is required. These
known and potential problems and their associated costs, leave open the
question of the V- 22's real value- as demonstrated- for Marine Corps
operations.
In November 2000, we briefed Marine Corps, Department of the Navy, and
Office of the Secretary of Defense officials on the results of our review
and our assessment of
5 Known as “vortex ring state.” 6 Combined Operational Test &
Evaluation and Li vortex ring state.” 6 Combined Operational Test &
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