Military

Electronic Warfare: Comprehensive Strategy Needed for Suppressing Enemy Air Defenses (Letter Report, 01/03/2001, GAO/GAO-01-28)

To suppress enemy air defenses, U.S. armed forces use specialized
aircraft designed to neutralize, destroy, or temporarily degrade enemy
air defense systems through either physical attack or electronic
warfare. Concerns have been raised that the Air Force's decision to
retire EF-111 and F-4G suppression aircraft, combined with a growing
threat from increasingly sophisticated enemy air defenses, has created a
gap between the services' suppression capabilities and their needs. GAO
(1) examined the steps that the military has taken since 1996 to improve
its ability to suppress enemy air defenses and (2) evaluated the
services' plans to eliminate any gap between their suppression
capabilities and needs. GAO found that the services have improved their
suppression capabilities, such as increasing the size of their fleets of
F-16CJ and EA-6B suppression aircraft, improving the electronic warfare
and missile systems on these aircrafts, studying cost-effective
alternatives for suppression in the future, and reviewing electronic
warfare programs to determine if these programs are adequately managed,
prioritized, and funded. However, GAO also found that current
suppression capabilities are not adequate and that no comprehensive,
cross-service strategy exists for achieving the suppression mission.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
 REPORTNUM:  GAO-01-28
     TITLE:  Electronic Warfare: Comprehensive Strategy Needed for
	     Suppressing Enemy Air Defenses
      DATE:  01/03/2001
   SUBJECT:  Electronic warfare
	     Military aircraft
	     Weapons systems
	     Defense capabilities
	     Air defense systems
	     Surface to air missiles
IDENTIFIER:  F-4G Aircraft
	     EF-111 Aircraft
	     F-16C/J Aircraft
	     EA-6B Aircraft
	     F-117 Aircraft
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GAO-01-28
A Report to Congressional Requesters
January 2001 ELECTRONIC WARFARE
Comprehensive Strategy Needed for Suppressing Enemy Air Defenses
GAO- 01- 28
Lett er
January 3, 2001 The Honorable Curt Weldon Chairman, Subcommittee on Military
Research and Development Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives The Honorable Bob Smith United States Senate
The U. S. armed services must suppress enemy air defenses to be able to
accomplish their war fighting objectives and survive. 1 To achieve this
suppression, the services use specialized aircraft designed to neutralize,
destroy, or temporarily degrade enemy air defense systems through either
physical attack or electronic warfare. Specialized aircraft use electronic
warfare devices, called jammers, to temporarily suppress enemy air defenses
by transmitting electronic signals that disrupt enemy radar and
communications. Other specialized aircraft use anti- radiation missiles that
home in on radar used by surface- to- air missile or anti- aircraft
artillery systems to physically degrade or destroy them. Because suppression
aircraft are charged with protecting all of the services' aviation assets in
hostile airspace, the suppression mission necessarily crosses individual
service lines. You have expressed concern that a 1996 decision to retire the
Air Force's EF- 111 and F- 4G suppression aircraft, combined with a growing
threat from increasingly sophisticated enemy air defenses, has created a gap
between the services' suppression capabilities and their needs. 2 This
report
responds to your request that we (1) describe the actions the services have
taken since 1996 to improve their capabilities for suppressing enemy air
defenses and (2) evaluate the services' plans for eliminating any gap
between their suppression capabilities and needs.
1 The suppression of enemy air defenses mission increases U. S. air forces'
ability to accomplish other missions by reducing their vulnerability to air
defense missiles or guns. 2 By May 1998, all of the Air Force's EF- 111 and
F- 4G suppression aircraft had been retired.
Results in Brief Since 1996, the services have taken some actions to restore
suppression capabilities lost through the retirement of the EF- 111 and F-
4G aircraft,
mainly by increasing the number of Air Force F- 16CJ and Navy/ Marine Corps
EA- 6B suppression aircraft. These aircraft, together with their electronic
warfare equipment and high- speed anti- radiation missiles, provide limited
capability against sophisticated enemy air defenses. To enhance this
capability, the Air Force is improving the performance of the
F- 16CJ's targeting system. In addition, the Navy is upgrading the
electronic warfare equipment on the EA- 6B to improve its radar jammer
performance and is working on improvements to increase the effectiveness of
the high- speed anti- radiation missile. Also, the Navy is conducting a
study- scheduled for completion in late 2001- to determine the most cost-
effective alternatives for the future. Alternatives being considered include
modifications to manned and unmanned aircraft for replacement of the EA- 6B
by 2015.
According to a 1998 study conducted for the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3 the services have not adapted to
the evolution of enemy air defenses from fixed, stand- alone radar systems
that could be easily suppressed to integrated air defenses incorporating
modern telecommunications links, passive sensors, and other sophisticated
means
of avoiding suppression. 4 In a follow- on 1999 study, also conducted for
the Joint Chiefs, the services were found not to have the quality or
quantity of systems necessary to protect their aircraft across the full
range of military
operations. 5 Successfully addressing the evolving threat, according to
these studies, will require innovative suppression solutions utilizing
multiple technologies and cutting across individual service lines. We found
that the
Air Force's and the Navy's efforts, while beneficial, do not reflect a
comprehensive, cross- service approach. Despite their interdependence in
carrying out the suppression mission, the services act on an individual 3
Coleman Research Corporation, Arlington, Virginia, conducted this study for
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Science and Technology)
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff between June 1996 and March 1998.
4 Integrated air defense systems use modern telecommunications equipment and
computers to create networks of early warning radar, targeting radar and
passive detection equipment that pick up aircraft communications or engine
heat or other means to track and target aircraft. 5 The Department convened
a special Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses Integrated Product Team,
sponsored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to conduct this assessment.
basis to define and prioritize suppression requirements and to develop,
manage, and fund solutions to those requirements. Within the Department of
Defense, no comprehensive, cross- service strategy for closing the gap
between the services' suppression capabilities and needs exists- and no
coordinating entity has been tasked with preparing such a strategy- to
identify, among other things, suppression mission objectives, needed
solutions, funding, timelines, and mechanisms to track progress.
Consequently, service- level decisions are, in our view, much less likely to
reflect the needed priority for closing the gap and to be the most cost-
effective solutions for the Department overall. We are recommending that the
Secretary of Defense designate a coordinating entity, including officials
from each of the services, to develop a comprehensive cross- service
strategy to close the gap between the U. S. armed services' suppression
capabilities and their needs and to evaluate progress toward achieving the
suppression objectives. In comments on a draft of this report, the
Department agreed with our findings but disagreed with our recommendation.
It maintained that it is already addressing some shortfalls, citing as
evidence, for example, the ongoing upgrade efforts described in this report.
Furthermore, the Department stated that it is performing a study- the
ongoing analysis of alternatives- to underlie a
Department- wide strategy for the suppression mission and that it will
ensure the outcome of the study leads to a balanced set of acquisition
programs between the services. We remain convinced that the Department is
not likely to close the gap between suppression capabilities and needs
without developing a comprehensive, cross- service strategy for doing so and
assigning responsibility for this task to a coordinating entity. The ongoing
analysis of alternatives is a necessary step, but a study is not a strategy.
In disagreeing with our recommendation to designate a coordinating entity,
the Department also expressed concern that such an entity may lead to the
neglect of unique service requirements but added that any such authority
should be staffed in a manner that allowed coordination of planning and
explanation of those unique requirements. To address the Department's
concern about the need for representation from
the services, we revised our recommendation to include such representation.
Background The United States experienced heavy aircraft and aircrew losses
to enemy air defenses during the Vietnam War. Since then, the services have
recognized air defense suppression as a critical component of air
operations. Consequently, when a crisis arises, suppression aircraft are
among the first to be called in and the last to leave. Suppression aircraft
such as the now retired EF- 111 and F- 4G played a vital role in protecting
other U. S. aircraft from radar- guided missile systems during Operation
Desert Storm in Iraq. In fact, Air Force strike aircraft were normally not
permitted to conduct air operations unless protected by these suppression
aircraft. The EF- 111 was equipped with transmitters to disrupt or
“jam” radar equipment used by enemy surface- to- air missile or
anti- aircraft artillery systems. The F- 4G used anti- radiation missiles
that homed in on enemy radar systems to destroy them (see fig. 1).
Figure 1: AGM- 88 High- Speed Anti- Radiation Missile
Source: U. S. Air Force.
Since the end of Desert Storm in 1991, U. S. suppression aircraft have been
continuously deployed in support of Operations Northern and Southern Watch
protecting fighter aircraft maintaining the no- fly zones over Iraq. In
1999, during Operation Allied Force in Yugoslavia and Kosovo, EA- 6B
suppression aircraft (see fig. 2) carrying electronic jamming equipment and
anti- radiation missiles were extremely important for protecting strike
aircraft from enemy radar- guided missiles.
Figure 2: EA- 6B Prowler
Source: U. S. Navy.
Radar is the primary means used by enemy forces to detect, track, and target
U. S. aircraft. Hence, U. S. suppression aircraft focus on trying to
neutralize, degrade, or destroy the radar equipment of an enemy's air
defense system. Enemy radars in the past were often fixed in position,
operated in a stand- alone mode, and turned on for lengthy periods of time-
all of which made them relatively easy to find and suppress through
electronic warfare or physical attack. U. S. suppression aircraft, using
missiles and jammers, begin suppressing enemy air defenses after they begin
emitting radio- frequency signals. At some risk to the aircraft and aircrew,
the suppression aircraft must also be in the vicinity of the enemy air
defenses to complete their mission. In response to this suppression
capability, according to the Department, countries have been seeking to make
their air defenses more resistant to suppression. These efforts include
increasing the mobility of their surface- to- air missiles and radar
equipment (see fig. 3), connecting radars
together into networks, and adding sophisticated capabilities so that the
radar can detect aircraft while turned on for shorter periods of time.
Figure 3: Mobile SA- 6 Surface- to- Air Missile System Source: Federation of
American Scientists.
Additionally, many nations, including some hostile to U. S. interests such
as Iraq and North Korea, operate what is referred to as integrated air
defense systems. These systems use various means to track and target
aircraft, including modern telecommunications equipment and computers to
create networks of early warning radar, missile system radar, and passive
detection systems that pick up aircraft communications or heat from
aircraft engines. 6 Integrated networks provide air defense operators with
the ability to track and target aircraft even if individual radar elements
of the network are jammed or destroyed. During Operation Allied Force in
1999, according to the Defense Intelligence Agency, U. S. suppression
aircraft faced Yugoslavia's integrated air defense system and experienced
significant difficulty trying to destroy
it, as Yugoslav forces often engaged in elaborate efforts to protect their
air defense assets. These protective efforts allowed Yugoslav forces to
thwart many attacks, but they also reduced Yugoslav opportunities to track
and 6 Alternatives to radar for tracking aircraft include electro- optical,
infrared, laser, and passive means.
engage U. S. and coalition aircraft because their air defense assets could
not be utilized and protected simultaneously. Nevertheless, Yugoslav forces
managed to shoot down an F- 117 stealth fighter (referred to as stealth
because it is harder to detect with radar) (see fig. 4) and an F- 16CJ on a
suppression mission. (Specific details about the two aircraft losses and
tactics used by Yugoslav forces to avoid destruction are considered
classified by the Department.) In addition to the two losses, the inability
of the U. S. to destroy the Yugoslav air defense network forced the U. S. to
(1) fly its strike missions at higher altitudes to reduce risk; (2) fly
thousands of dedicated suppression missions, pushing its EA- 6B force in
Europe to its limits; and (3) keep many low- flying aircraft, such as the
Army's Apache attack helicopters, out of combat.
Figure 4: F- 117 Stealth Fighter
Source: U. S. Air Force.
At one point in time, advocates of acquiring more stealth aircraft believed
that the Air Force's successful fielding of F- 117 fighters and B- 2 bombers
would allow the services to reduce their suppression aircraft requirements.
However, the loss of the F- 117 over Yugoslavia in 1999 demonstrated that
stealth aircraft could also benefit from improved suppression capabilities.
Moreover, even if stealth aircraft required no suppression support, and even
if the services do introduce more of them in the future, the majority of
the aircraft in the U. S. fleet will not have stealth capabilities for many
years and will still require suppression support. The Services Have
In 1996, we expressed concern about the decision to retire the Air Force's
F- 4G and EF- 111 without comparable replacements. 7 Subsequently, the Taken
Some Actions to services realized that the decrease in their suppression
capabilities had Improve Their
increased U. S. aircraft vulnerability and could potentially frustrate
Suppression achievement of U. S. military objectives and prolong future
conflicts. Capabilities
Therefore, since 1996, the services have taken a number of actions to
improve their suppression capabilities. First, the Air Force is increasing
the size of its fleet of F- 16CJ suppression aircraft (see fig. 5), and the
Navy and the Marine Corps are adding EA- 6B suppression aircraft to help
reverse the quantitative impact of the retirement of the EF- 111s and F-
4Gs.
Figure 5: F- 16CJ Aircraft
Source: U. S. Air Force.
7 See Combat Air Power: Funding Priority for Suppression of Enemy Air
Defenses May Be Too Low (GAO/ NSIAD- 96- 128, Apr. 10, 1996).
Although not comparable in capability to the F- 4G it replaced, the Air
Force F- 16CJ has an electronic targeting system and is equipped with high-
speed anti- radiation missiles to attack enemy radar. The Air Force is
acquiring 30 additional F- 16CJ aircraft to bring its total to 210. The Navy
and the Marine
Corps EA- 6B is a modified A- 6 strike aircraft outfitted with special
electronic transmitters for disrupting radar and communications. The EA- 6B
can also fire anti- radiation missiles. The Navy has brought back from
retirement 20 EA- 6Bs to increase the total to 123 aircraft, of which 104
are available for combat operations. Recent operations in Yugoslavia,
Kosovo, and no- fly zones in Iraq have required extensive use of Air Force
F- 16CJs and Navy and Marine Corps EA- 6B suppression aircraft.
Second, the services are improving the electronic warfare and missile
systems on these aircraft to enhance their limited capability against
sophisticated enemy air defenses. The Air Force is upgrading the targeting
system on the F- 16CJ. The Navy is upgrading the radar jamming equipment on
the EA- 6B to improve its performance. The upgraded EA- 6B equipment is
scheduled to be fielded beginning in 2004 and to reach Initial Operational
Capability 8 in 2005. The Navy and the Air Force are also working together
on improvements to increase the effectiveness of the high- speed anti-
radiation missile. (Further details about these upgrades are classified.)
Third, the Navy is conducting a study to determine the most cost- effective
alternatives for suppression in the future. According to the Department, it
is the most important electronic warfare study presently ongoing and has
considerable resources being applied to it. Numerous options for augmenting
the EA- 6B starting in 2010 and replacing it by 2015 are being considered,
including using a modified version of the Navy's new F/ A- 18 E/ F aircraft
equipped with electronic warfare systems, or making modifications to other
manned or unmanned aircraft. According to the Department, the study will
also identify deficiencies and/ or limitations and seek corrective actions.
It is scheduled for completion in late 2001.
Fourth, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics is conducting a Department- wide review of electronic warfare
programs, which include suppression programs. The purpose of this internal
review is to determine whether these programs are adequately
managed, prioritized, and funded. 8 Initial Operational Capability will be
reached when the first EA- 6B squadron equipped with the upgraded systems is
ready to be deployed.
No Comprehensive Despite actions taken by the services since 1996, a gap
remains between Strategy Exists to
the services' current suppression capabilities and their aircraft's need for
protection from sophisticated enemy air defenses. Without a Address Evolving
comprehensive, cross- service strategy for addressing that gap and a Threats
coordinating entity charged with developing such a strategy and evaluating
progress, it is unlikely that the actions needed to close the gap will be
taken.
Current Suppression In the mid- 1990s, the Joint Chiefs of Staff found in
its Joint Tactical Aircraft Capabilities Are Not
Electronic Warfare Study that the services' suppression capabilities were
Adequate diminishing while the proliferation and modernization of enemy air
defenses were increasing. Recognizing this, in 1996 the Deputy Secretary of
Defense directed that a Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses mission
area architecture study be conducted. The purpose of the study was to
develop well- grounded bases for decisions regarding platform, weapon, and
support system modernization and to explore new ways and means for
conducting suppression operations.
The study, completed in 1998, found that the services had not adequately
adapted to the evolution of enemy air defenses from fixed, stand- alone
radar systems that could be easily suppressed to integrated air defenses
incorporating modern telecommunications links, passive sensors, and other
sophisticated means of avoiding suppression. It also found that maintaining
an effective suppression capability will require the development of
innovative and nontraditional solutions cutting across
individual service and functional (e. g., suppression, reconnaissance, and
command and control) lines.
The willingness to adopt innovative approaches has provided the armed
services with large suppression dividends in the past. For instance, during
Operation Desert Storm against Iraq in 1991, the U. S. launched unmanned
aircraft as decoys from beyond the reach of enemy air defenses to cause the
Iraqis to turn on their radar and/ or fire, thereby revealing their
positions
to suppression aircraft so they could be attacked. These attacks were highly
successful when the Iraqi air defense forces remained fixed in position with
their radar sites emitting signals that could be tracked by anti- radiation
missiles fired from U. S. suppression aircraft such as the F- 4G and EA- 6B.
As demonstrated in Yugoslavia in 1999, however, these tactics cannot succeed
if enemy air defense forces choose not to reveal
themselves or move quickly after firing.
To address these shortcomings, the 1998 study envisioned the leveraging of
advances in sensor and data link technologies to build a multifunctional U.
S. suppression mission “network” in which loitering decoys and
other unmanned aircraft, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft,
suppression aircraft, command and control aircraft, and strike aircraft are
all interconnected by high- speed data links. Military commanders could then
use this network to locate targets and launch coordinated Army, Navy, and
Air Force attacks on the enemy air defense forces' positions.
According to the study, suppression weapon development is also ripe for
innovation. Future weapons could include, for instance, unmanned loitering
drones with high- explosive warheads waiting silently high above to dive on
enemy air defense forces before they can fire, or precisionguided munitions
or anti- radiation missiles fired from unmanned aircraft that track enemy
air defense forces as they move. By using unmanned
aircraft, the suppression mission controller could take risks that would be
unacceptable using manned aircraft. The potential loss of the unmanned
aircraft or decoys in these scenarios is far preferable to the risk the
services face today of losing manned EA- 6B and F- 16CJ aircraft conducting
suppression missions (such as the F- 16CJ lost over Yugoslavia in 1999).
The results of the mission area architecture study also led to a follow- on
mission needs assessment to identify suppression mission deficiencies and
technological opportunities to address them. According to the mission needs
assessment completed in 1999, the services' overriding suppression mission
deficiency is that they do not have the quality or quantity of systems
necessary to protect U. S., allied, and coalition air forces across the
full range of military operations. In terms of technological opportunities
to address these shortcomings, the assessment concluded that a mix of manned
and unmanned aircraft and lethal and nonlethal weapons (e. g., anti-
radiation missiles and jammers) will be required to meet current and future
operational objectives. 9 To provide near- term relief until these new
systems can be acquired, the mission needs assessment proposed the
appointment of a single entity to conduct joint suppression mission
experiments involving assets from air, land, sea, information, and space-
based forces. The objective of these experiments would be to try to develop
joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures to aid in the
suppression mission. 9 The Department today has no lethal or nonlethal
weapons- equipped unmanned aircraft with which to conduct suppression
missions.
No Comprehensive, CrossService Although Air Force and Navy suppression
aircraft are charged with
Strategy Exists for protecting all of the services' aviation assets in
hostile airspace,
Achieving Suppression suppression mission requirements are defined and
prioritized by the
Mission individual services. Also, the material and nonmaterial solutions
that address these requirements are developed, managed, and funded by the
individual services. The services' ongoing decisions to add F- 16CJ and
EA- 6B aircraft and to improve the EA- 6B aircraft and the high- speed anti-
radiation missile, while beneficial, do not reflect a comprehensive, cross-
service approach to improving their suppression capabilities. Within the
Department, no comprehensive, cross- service suppression mission strategy
exists that identifies, specifically,
the suppression objectives, preferably measurable, to be achieved; the
actions, including material and nonmaterial solutions, needed to
achieve those objectives; special technologies to be developed; funding,
timelines, and responsibilities; and evaluation mechanisms to track progress
or signal the need for
adjustments. Also, while it tasked the Joint Chiefs of Staff with conducting
the mission area architecture study and mission needs assessment, the
Department did not give responsibility to the Joint Chiefs or any other
entity for
(1) developing a comprehensive strategy and (2) evaluating to what extent
suppression mission objectives are being achieved.
Without such a strategy or coordinating entity, service- level decisions
are, in our view, much less likely to reflect the needed priority or the
most cost- effective solutions for the services overall. For instance, in
July 1999, the Commanding General of the Army's 101st Airborne Division
wrote to Army headquarters that, due to the retirement of the Air Force's
EF- 111 and the shortage of Navy EA- 6B suppression aircraft, there were
insufficient suppression assets to meet the Army's needs. He expressed
concern that the lack of required suppression support and failure to degrade
enemy air
defenses could result in catastrophic losses of his soldiers and equipment.
The Commanding General's proposed solution to this shortfall was for the
Army to develop its own suppression mission aircraft.
Conclusions Since retiring the EF- 111 and F- 4G, the Air Force and the Navy
have been acquiring additional suppression aircraft to restore some lost
suppression
capabilities and have begun improving their existing suppression systems.
However, recent studies have pointed to a number of suppression mission area
deficiencies. In our view, the development of a comprehensive, cross-
service strategy for suppressing enemy air defenses is the best- and,
perhaps, the only- way to really know whether the services are
successfully closing the gap between suppression capabilities and needs. And
the designation of a coordinating entity would provide the necessary
institutionalized leadership to develop a strategy and evaluate its
implementation. Until the gap is closed, U. S. aircraft will remain
vulnerable in future conflicts, possibly resulting in the loss of lives and
expensive assets and forcing U. S. aircraft to continue modifying their
tactics (as they had to do in Yugoslavia in 1999) to reduce their exposure
to increasingly sophisticated enemy air defenses.
Recommendation to To significantly increase the likelihood that needed
actions are taken to the Executive Agency improve the ability of U. S.
aircraft to suppress enemy air defenses, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense designate a coordinating entity,
including officials from each of the services, to develop a comprehensive,
cross- service strategy for closing the gap between the services'
suppression
capabilities and their needs and to evaluate progress toward achieving
suppression objectives.
Agency Comments and In written comments on a draft of this report, the
Department of Defense
Our Review agreed with our findings regarding shortcomings in suppression
capabilities but did not concur with our recommendation. The Department
maintained that the services are already addressing some shortfalls, citing
as evidence, for example, the ongoing upgrades of F- 16CJ and EA- 6B
aircraft and the high- speed anti- radiation missile as described in this
report. Furthermore, the Department stated that the ongoing analysis of
alternatives will underlie a Department- wide strategy and that it will
ensure the outcome of this study will lead to balanced, joint suppression of
enemy air defense acquisition programs between the services. In disagreeing
with our recommendation to appoint a coordinating entity, the Department
expressed concern that such an entity may neglect unique service
requirements, but it also added that any such entity should be staffed in a
manner that allows coordination of planning and explanation of those unique
requirements.
Although the Department asserted that it would ensure that the outcome of
the ongoing alternatives analysis would lead to a balanced program for
addressing the shortfalls, it did not explain how it would do so. We remain
convinced that the Department is not likely to eliminate the gap between
suppression capabilities and needs without assigning responsibility to a
coordinating entity to develop a comprehensive strategy and evaluate
progress toward achieving suppression objectives. The ongoing analysis of
alternatives is a necessary step, but a study is not a strategy. As
emphasized in this report, a comprehensive, cross- service strategy would
increase the likelihood that actions would be taken. Among other things, it
would identify objectives, material and nonmaterial solutions, funding,
timelines, and mechanisms to track progress in closing the gap. Regarding
the
Department's concern that the coordinating entity would neglect unique
service requirements, we revised our recommendation to include
representation from the services.
The Department's written comments are reprinted in appendix II. Scope and To
describe the actions taken to improve the U. S. armed services' Methodology
capabilities for suppressing enemy air defenses, we interviewed Office of
the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force, and Navy
officials responsible for electronic warfare requirements, EA- 6B aircraft
requirements, and F- 16CJ aircraft requirements. We interviewed officials
from the EA- 6B, F- 16CJ, and high- speed anti- radiation missile programs.
We interviewed Defense Intelligence Agency officials and reviewed
performance data related to the Department's current suppression
capabilities and the capabilities of enemy air defense systems. To evaluate
the services' plans for eliminating the gap between U. S. suppression
capabilities and needs, we reviewed the results of the Department's Joint
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses Mission Area Architecture Study and
follow- on Mission Needs Assessment and compared them to the actions taken
by the Department to improve its suppression capabilities since 1996. To
determine whether successful fielding of stealth aircraft has affected
overall suppression requirements, we interviewed Air Force officials
knowledgeable about stealth aircraft and stealth operations.
We conducted our work at Office of the Secretary of Defense, Air Force,
Army, Marine Corps, and Navy locations. We visited requirements,
acquisition, logistics, and testing offices of the military services; field
commands and operating units; various program offices; government
organizations involved in developmental efforts or military studies; and
contractor facilities. Specific locations we visited are listed in appendix
I.
We performed our review from December 1998 through November 2000 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We are
sending copies of this report to Senator John Warner, Chairman, and Senator
Carl Levin, Ranking Minority Member, Senate Committee on Armed Services, and
Representative Floyd Spence, Chairman, and Representative Ike Skelton,
Ranking Minority Member, House Committee on Armed Services. We are also
sending copies to the Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army; the
Honorable Richard Danzig, Secretary of the Navy; the Honorable F. Whitten
Peters, Secretary of the Air Force; and the Honorable Jacob Lew, Director,
Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available to
others upon request. We are also sending copies of this report to other
interested congressional committees. The report will also be available on
our home page at http:// www. gao. gov.
If you have questions, please contact me on (202) 512- 4841. Major
contributors to this report were Michael Aiken, Terry Parker, Charles Ward,
and Neil Wickliffe.
R. E. Levin Director, Acquisition and
Sourcing Management
Appendi Appendi xes x I
Locations Visited During This Review Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Washington, D. C. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D. C. Headquarters
Elements, Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Navy, Washington, D. C.
Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D. C. Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency, Arlington, Virginia Institute for Defense Analyses,
Alexandria, Virginia
Center for Naval Analysis, Alexandria, Virginia Naval Research Laboratory,
Washington, D. C. U. S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida U.
S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia Air Combat Command, Langley Air
Force Base, Virginia U. S. 9th Air Force and 20th Tactical Fighter Wing,
Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina
Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland Marine Corps Warfighting
and Development Division, Quantico, Virginia U. S. Air Force Aeronautical
Systems Center, Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
U. S. Air Force Air Armament Center, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida U. S. Air
Force Air Warfare Center, Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada Naval Strike and Air
Warfare Center, Fallon, Nevada Naval Aviation Depot, Jacksonville, Florida
Warner Robbins Air Logistics Center, Robbins Air Force Base, Georgia
Electronic Attack Wing, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Naval Air Station Whidbey
Island, Washington
38th Marine Air Control Group, Miramar, California 355th Operations Group,
Davis- Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona 33rd Tactical Fighter Wing, 53rd Test
Wing, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida 169th Air National Guard, McEntire Air
Force Base, South Carolina RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California
Coleman Research Corporation, Alexandria, Virginia
Appendi x II Comments From the Department of Defense
(707389) Lett er
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GAO United States General Accounting Office
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Appendix I
Appendix I Locations Visited During This Review
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Appendix II
Appendix II Comments From the Department of Defense
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Appendix II Comments From the Department of Defense
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