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Intense, continuous combat over extended distances characterizes the AirLand Battlefield. Therefore, unit personnel must ensure that their on-hand equipment is maintained in a high state of combat readiness. The cutting edge of this maintenance effort lies with the operators and crews. They are tasked with the responsibility of performing preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS), which include inspecting, lubricating, cleaning, preserving, tightening, spot painting, and making minor adjustments. Consequently, they keep on-hand equipment working, identify failures, take corrective action within their capability and report failures beyond their repair capability to unit mechanics.

The -10 operator's manual, commander's guidance, and the factors of METT-T will ultimately determine priorities for this effort. Successful units stress the following preventive maintenance checks and services:

• Check tightness of bolts more often because rough terrain loosens everything. Check the wear of track vehicle drive sprockets and the tightness of roadwheel mounting bolts before, during, and after operations. Sand, rocks and gravel tend to break or damage lube fittings and relief valves. Rough terrain causes hardware to work loose if it's not properly torqued.

• Check wheeled vehicle tires frequently for cuts and wear. Abrasive rocks and sand increase tire wear.

• Leave plenty of space around radio cooling fan intake and exhaust vents. Taping slabs of styrofoam to the top of the radio will insulate it against direct sun rays. To prevent heat build-up, insure heat exchanges (vents) are kept clean, IAW paragraph 5-5, chap 5, TM 11-582-401-12.

• Equipment stored or parked for extended periods should have all fire control equipment covered because the optical elements of periscopes, telescopes, sights, etc. are subject to sun discoloration.

• Sand and grit will stick to all lubricants on small arms and can cause stoppages. Daily cleaning, as a minimum, is required. Cover all openings on weapons to aid in reducing sand and grit maintenance problems, as long as it doesn't affect the functioning of the weapon.

Leaders should routinely spot check unit tracked vehicles for:

• Proper track tension.
• Cleanliness of air filters.
• Boresight of main guns.
• Check weapon sights for mildew, condensation, foreign matter, etc.

M109 Recommended Leader Checks:

• Battery water level.
• Proper fluid levels.
• Roadwheels for proper oil level in the sight gage, leaks, and rubber missing.
• Hydraulic system for leaks in the lines and hoses.
• Elevating mechanism for leaks.
• Variable recoil cylinder for proper gage pressure during firing and leaks.
• Operational firing mechanism and breechblock.
• Fire control equipment is firmly secured, sight reticles are aligned, counters and knobs do not bind.

M113/M548/M577 Recommended Leader Checks:

• Battery water level.
• Engine oil leaks.
• Proper fluid levels.
• Exhaust leaks (particularly M113, M577).
• Fuel leaks.
• Operational ramp (M113, M577).

The Class V ATP section is part of the supply company of the forward support battalion (FSB). For safety, the ATP should be separated from other resupply activities by at least 500 meters. (This dispersion is only a guide and is not listed in current doctrinal manuals. Base defense planners must weigh dispersion against the need for mutual support.)

Because the ATP is a high payoff target to the enemy and vulnerable to the effects of indirect and direct fires, the FSB commander must evaluate the threat to determine the location that best supports the force. This is normally close to the main supply route and survivable. The FSB commander must standardize ATP operations to insure:

• Its location is camouflaged and protected from enemy fires.

• It is only moved based on METT-T

• It is manned for continuous operations.

• Its layout facilitates the sorting and picking up of ammunition; e.g., a yellow chemical light means HE and a red one for WP ammunition.

The ATP is vitally important to sustaining the force. It could be a high value target to the enemy because of its critically to the sustainment effort. Proper security and smooth operation of the ATP should be emphasized in training.

Few units develop adequate fire support plans for rear operations. Some common violations are a failure to fix responsibility, to request fires, to coordinate, and to train CSS personnel on fire support tasks.

Current doctrine, FM 90-14, states that "rear battle in the brigade is the responsibility of the brigade commander" and that the "brigade fire support element (FSE) is responsible for preparing and executing all fires in the brigade rear area." There is no one in the field artillery battalion designated to perform fire support planning for the FSB commander. The brigade rear command post is not in the brigade fire support net. The brigade FSE's responsibility for the fire support of the entire brigade area makes it difficult to execute and clear fires in the rear. This fact has lead to poor execution of fire support for rear operations.

Demand for artillery fires will exceed supply. In battle, this problem will be even more crucial. CSS units are critical to overall task force success and should request and receive fire support.

Coordination of fire support, as well as direct fires, could prove difficult given the heavy concentration of CSS units in the rear area. The FSB commander must carefully weigh the advantages and disadvantages of dispersion versus concentration. Once the FSB commander evaluates the threat, he allocates terrain to subordinates. The brigade FSE, in conjunction with the FSB S3, needs to coordinate a fire plan for the BSA based on CSS unit locations, major supply routes, and integration of the FSB's overall base cluster defense.

Few CSS units have the opportunity to practice fire planning during training. CSS personnel rarely practice calls for fire. Maneuver units do not require a rear operation fire plan; thus, one is not prepared. Practice in rear operations fire planning is needed now to avoid self-inflicted casualties or damages.

Fire support for rear operations is equally as important as fire support for the close and deep operations. Specific recommendations include:

• Develop the fire support plan based on IPB.

• Develop a fire support plan which is coordinated by the FSB S3 and brigade FSO.

• Establish procedures to clear fires in the rear.

• Train CSS personnel on adjustment of fires and preparation of a fire plan. (Training Set, Fire Observation [TSFO] is a good training aid for this class).

The CG, Logistics Center, has sent a message to all DISCOMs requesting input on CSS unit responsibilities in rear operations. This topic will be discussed at the DISCOM Commander's Conference in October 1986.

Table of Contents

Section VII: Air Defense