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Military

SECTION II

NT - NEEDS EMPHASIS TECHNIQUES, PART 3

TA.4 COMMAND AND CONTROL

TA.4 Negative Trend 5: Battle tracking and predictive analysis

  1. TOC battle tracking.
    - Develop and exercise a task force (TF) SOP at Home Station to ensure information dissemination system functions properly, including a means of verifying receipt of information by various battle staff members. Refer to CALL Newsletter 95-7, May 95, Tactical Operations Center (TOC), which contains excellent techniques and procedures covering the full spectrum of TOC operations, as well as an example TOC exercise.
    - One battle tracking board/map in the TOC is the standard. Appoint one battle captain to update the main battle board/map. All battle staff officers provide input to the battle captain.
    - The TOC should track at least the following information:
    ----- company/team troop-leading procedures (critical tasks only)
    ----- all friendly unit locations/activity within the AOI
    ----- FLOT, down to platoon level, or section level for scouts
    ----- combat power, both vehicles and the manning capability
    ----- collection, consolidation, and distribution of subordinate unit fire plans
    ----- timeline
    -----TF critical tasks list identified prior to or during the planning process
    - The S-2 must develop an adequate section SOP that spells out section members' responsibilities and specifies operating procedures during combat operations. The S-2 section SOP should, at a minimum, address the following:
    ------ SPOTREP logging procedures
    ------ SITEMP refinement procedures
    ------ individual section responsibilities
    - Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP) personnel need to be trained and competent in battle tracking skills in the event they must serve as an alternate tactical operations center (TOC).
  2. Predictive analysis. At the Main CP, the battle staff XO, S-2, S-3, S-3 Air, and FSE need to track the battle at the map board and "think one step ahead of friendly/enemy forces". Battle staff regularly provides the commander with predictive analysis products and recommendation(s) based upon the event matrix, updated SITEMP and decision support matrix. Delegate routine administrative duties to others in their sections as much as possible. Eliminate unnecessary functions from their sections and even the CP itself.

TA.4 Negative Trend 6: Employ tactical C2W

  1. The Platoon Operations Center (POC) crew should receive initial/refresher training at Home Station on the capabilities and limitations of its electronic warfare (EW) systems to enable them to properly plan for coordination and synchronization of their EW assets. Both the POC and EW teams should develop SOPs that present a clearer definition of each other's role and responsibilities.
  2. The Electronic Warfare (EW) platoon leaders and sergeant must take a more active role and interest in the traffic analysis cell function. Hold the cell accountable for what is does and does not accomplish, ensuring basic standards taught at the schoolhouse are maintained.
  3. Electronic Surveillance (ES) teams need to include thorough, written Pre-Combat Check/Pre-Combat Inspection (PCC/PCI) checklists in their SOPs, and team leaders should use these before every mission. Company commanders and platoon leaders must go forward on the battlefield on a regular basis to see the terrain, conduct pre-combat inspections, and to gauge the morale and performance of their soldiers.
  4. Jamming Effectiveness Reports (JERs) must be timely and accurate to have the desired effect.
    - The ES system tasked with monitoring the enemy frequency must be sitting on that frequency steadfastly.
    - ES system must provide timely and accurate jamming effectiveness reports (JERs) to the POC when:
    ----- the jamming is not effective (the POC directs the appropriate action to the subordinate EA team).
    ----- the jamming is effective (the POC can direct reacquisition efforts as quickly as possible).
    - Place an EW system with hearability to the target area, not collocated with the engagement area (EA) system or between it and the target area. Task it to monitor the target net to determine the effectiveness of the mission.
    - The monitoring system should assign an effectiveness rating from a pre-established scale, to provide timely and well-understood input to the POC.
    - Standardize the issuing of JERs. A two-minute interval during a jamming mission would help enforce the timeliness and importance of these reports.

TA.4 Negative Trend 7: Battle staff mission analysis

  1. The battle staff needs to conduct mission analysis integrating all of the key players as outlined in CGSC ST 101-5, Command and Staff Decision Process. See also CALL Newsletter 95-12, Tactical Decision Making: "Abbreviated Planning". Conduct mission analysis while others are at brigade CP; refine analysis upon their return.
  2. In order to provide the commander the most useful information (i.e., number and type of obstacles that can be built, rather than mine and wire quantities), units should follow a standard agenda for mission analysis briefs and situation updates.
    EXAMPLE:
    - higher HQ situation
    - enemy situation
    - mission
    - task organization/forces available
    - operations/maneuver
    ----- tasks (specified, implied, essential)
    ----- significant events
    ----- scheme of maneuver
    - other BOS
    - commander's guidance

TA.4 Negative Trend 8: OPORD and FRAGO preparation

  1. OPORDs must be produced in sufficient detail to allow company/teams to accomplish their mission. Commanders must read and understand the OPORD example outlined in
  2. FM 71-1, Appendix A. Commanders must practice writing and issuing orders. Incorporate OPORD writing and issuing training in all facets of garrison operations.
  3. Units need a disciplined process to produce timely, complete OPORDs and FRAGOs. Establish a solid doctrinal foundation for an abbreviated, time-constrained tactical decisionmaking process applicable to task force level.
  4. Task force commanders must develop and implement rigorous Home Station battle staff training programs. These programs must first establish proficiency in the deliberate process, and then progress to more time constrained execution of the tactical decision making process (TDMP).
  5. Commander's intent must be reflected in subordinates' orders. Establish systems for ensuring understanding and compliance with commander's intent early the TDMP.
    - confirmation briefs immediately following issue of orders for understanding
    - back briefs later for compliance and inclusion in subordinates' plans
    - staff visits and direct communication with counterparts on use of BOS by subordinates

TA.4 Negative Trend 9: Enemy COA development

  1. S-2s must have enough time during mission analysis to develop and present detailed enemy COAs. Brief mission analysis only when S-2 has completed enemy COA development.
  2. Task force S-2s must develop at least two possible enemy COAs and identify the most likely. The S-2 should identify the possible enemy branches from the most likely COA and include those on the task force SITEMP. Task forces should develop a primary plan to defeat the enemy a most likely COA but also have built-in contingency plans to defeat other possible enemy branches. As many possible enemy branches as feasible must be wargamed and a decision support template (DST) developed to assist the commander with decision making during the battle. Wargaming must be focused, with product outcomes of the wargame clearly identified.
  3. The staff must consider multiple options available to the enemy commander when developing the brigade's scheme of maneuver and the branch plans to defeat the enemy regardless of the enemy COA. Potential enemy options include:
    - variations in the type of formation
    - the axis or axes of advance
    - location of the enemy's main effort Staffs must become proficient in wargaming in order to be able to quickly wargame the most likely enemy COA and leave sufficient time to adequately wargame contingencies.

TA.4 Negative Trend 10: Timelines and time management

  1. The development of realistic timelines for critical events in the planning process is a skill that must be developed and practiced at Home Station. The numerous tasks which must concurrently occur during the planning phase of an operation require significant practice in order for a battle staff to be able to proficiently execute the tactical decision making process. Effective time management is a logical byproduct of decision-making proficiency.
  2. Time available should be analyzed to determine how much is available, how it should be allocated, and how it will affect the battle command cycle.
  3. The commander, using reverse planning, constructs a timeline to accomplish troop-leading tasks. Plan conservatively. Produce a schedule of activities that must occur; events scheduled by higher headquarters (backbriefs, rehearsals, etc.) must be included. Prepared shells that include expected events are useful.
  4. The approved schedule is incorporated into staff battle drill. Establish a tracking system to ensure critical task accomplishment IAW the schedule. Include the following events, at a minimum:
    - HHQ commitments by the command group
    - OPORD times
    - rehearsal times
    - CSS events
  5. Schedule development should always be done in the context of the 4 "S"s, i.e., sunlight, subordinates, supervise, simplicity.
  6. Timelines must be included in WARNOs and FRAGOs, and must be updated continuously.
  7. Post timelines in CPs and annotate them as events occur or change.

TA.4 Negative Trend 11: Employment and integration of a reserve

  1. FM 71-3 states that a reserve gives the commander the flexibility to deal with unforeseen contingencies. In future operations, brigades should plan for and designate a reserve, ensuring that reserve missions are sufficiently detailed to provide the reserve commander a clear understanding of the brigade commander's intent and commitment criteria for its employment. Plan and execute commitment of a reserve for decisive action to achieve a goal rather than to prevent failure or solve a problem.
  2. The brigade staff must establish commitment criteria, and then rehearse time/distance factors to ensure the reserve can maneuver to be at the right place at the right time to positively influence the battle
  3. Treat the reserve commander as separate maneuver commander in planning.
    - include him in rehearsals
    - require him to briefback brigade commander on plan(s)
  4. Give reserve a mission, to include:
    - positioning guidance
    - priority of commitment
    - communications procedures

TA.4 Negative Trend 12: Pre-combat checks / Pre-combat inspections

  1. Units should review their pre-combat check/pre-combat inspection (PCC/PCI) SOPs to ensure they are adequate, and leaders should ensure these SOPs are used.
  2. Company/team leaders should perform thorough PCCs with a checklist before every mission.
  3. Platoon sergeants or leaders should then follow-up by conducting PCI spot-checks.

TA.4 Negative Trend 13: Planning for deep operations

  1. During course of action (COA) development, the brigade staff must array the forces, both friendly and enemy, as they should be at the decisive point. This is the planned end state for the deep fight. The fire support officer (FSO), S-2 and S-3 must develop a series of fire support events for each particular COA that will get the brigade to the desired end state. Wargame each COA and define detailed tasks and purposes in the deep fire support plan.
  2. One result of wargaming should be a specific, measurable end state for deep operations.
    EXAMPLE:
    TOO GENERAL: "the COLTs will acquire targets and call for fire on them."
    SPECIFIC: "As the enemy occupies its fighting positions, COLT 4 will execute Target AJ 0016 in order to destroy two BMPs from the southern MRP which will allow task force 1-16 IN to have a 5:1 force ratio at the point of penetration and successfully breach." This SPECIFIC example would be the product of wargaming. It gives a task and purpose to the deep fire support. This is an example of the level of detail we must achieve during wargaming.

Table of Contents
Section II: NT - Needs Emphasis Techniques, Part 2
Section II: NT - Needs Emphasis Techniques, Part 4



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