DEFENSE TECHNIQUES
Since it is not possible to be strong everywhere across a wide format, a key to defeating an attacking regiment with a much smaller force is timely movement in response to enemy action. Piecemealing needs to be avoided in the defense as in the offense. To be successful, the defender must bring the vast majority of his combat power to bear, irrespective of the routes the enemy chooses. Threat offensive tactics are geared to isolate and penetrate a portion of the defense. These tactics are designed to defeat a defender to the front. The way the battle typically develops, the flanks and rear of attacking formations are uncovered to some extent. The defender should strive to get weapons on the flanks, thereby forcing the enemy to turn off his axis or better still -- to fight in two directions. To make this a practical and not just a theoretical advantage, the defender must know where the attacker is and is not, he must slow him down, he must plan and prepare for maneuver, and his units must be able to disengage from enemy fixing forces. The ability to maneuver is a function of effective preparation. Routes and battle positions must be identified, reconned, and marked. Movement and occupation must be rehearsed. Ideally, routes and unoccupied positions should be covered by observation to preclude meeting engagements enroute. Experience shows a requirement for up to three rehearsals with at least one at night -- in MOPP IV -- buttoned up.
Partial breakthroughs often occur even when the majority of the attacking regiment has been destroyed and the defending force remains a viable fighting organization. Forward battalions must reorganize their remaining forces quickly. Effective units must be reformed and resupplied and the defense adjusted to be ready for the next echelon. Other brigade and division elements should be used to track down and destroy the penetrating enemy. Combat support and combat service support activities certainly must be ready for immediate self-defense even if this means positioning that does not optimize the support function.
Threat leaders are vulnerable. They have set positions in formations and more antennas. They can be picked out and killed by good gunners who know where to look. Loss of leaders disrupts attacks.
Detailed defensive planning must be done on the ground. Planning off a map is too general, predictable, and targetable. Quality weapon and obstacle positions surprise the enemy from unexpected locations. Whenever possible, positions and routes in and out should be set in (not just checked later) by leaders looking at them from the locations where the enemy is to be engaged. Besides gaining a better perspective on the adequacy of defensive positions, movement along enemy approaches gives leaders a better sense of the enemy's alternatives.
Heavy direct fire attrition of the attacker seldom occurs at extended ranges. Threat tactics -- to include deployment drills, smoke, and supporting fires -- limit vulnerability, and early identification of the defender's positions provides increased opportunities for maneuver. Opening the battle at maximum ranges is desirable because it disrupts the attacker's timing. However, the defeat of the enemy almost invariably occurs at close range (less than 1500 meters) in a web of fire from quality positions. The decision as to when each specific weapon will open fire should, of course, be based upon a thorough METT-T analysis. But in our experience, it is frequently best to design the main defense with the intent of not shooting until the enemy can be hit with a high volume of fire from multiple directions. Selected weapons engage early, but they are located well away from primary positions. A barrier system which prevents the enemy from rapidly assaulting the principal killing systems is key to this overall concept.
Table
of Contents
Tank
Positioning
Mobility,
Countermobility and Survivability
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