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Breaching minefields under fire is extremely difficult. Numerous breaching techniques exist, yet each is effective only under limited METT-T conditions. Many units have not trained to breach the standard Soviet minefields. This lack of training may result in high casualties when breaching actual threat minefields. This article describes the Soviet minefield threat, alternate breaching techniques, and the situation under which each technique is most effective.

Soviet Minefield Threat

U.S. units will encounter Soviet minefields in all combat operations. Minefields are the primary Soviet obstacle. All Soviet vehicles carry a basic load of mines. Soviet units immediately emplace minefields when the attack fails, even if mine laying troops are under direct observation and fire. During the attack, mobile obstacle detachments emplace minefields on all flank armored avenues of approach.

Each Soviet regiment and division has a mobile obstacle detachment (POZ). Each POZ :

• can emplace one kilometer of triple row, surface laid, antitank mines in15 to 30 minutes with their basic load
• reloads its mine basic load in 30 to 60 minutes
• is normally with the antitank reserve

The offensive nature of Soviet doctrine and their prolific use of mines mandate rapid emplacement and recovery of minefields. The typical Soviet minefield consists of surface laid, blast (not tilt rod) antitank mines. Buried mines, killer mines (e.g., tilt rods), antihandling devices, and antipersonnel mines normally indicate extensive defensive preparation. (See Figure 1)

Unlike NATO, the Soviets lay mines in 200-300 meter wide strips with a low density (.5 mines per meter). Note that a Soviet minefield is normally 60 meters deep, but may be up to 300 meters deep. This should be compared to minefields on many U.S. exercises, which normally are 15 to 30 meters deep and has at least one mine per meter. Soviet minefield strips:

• facilitate counterattacks through numerous gaps
• maximize the depth of the obstacle system
• allow siting only where direct fires are most effective

Alternate Breaching Techniques

There are currently six possible breaching techniques available to the maneuver task force. These breaching techniques are listed in Figure 2. Only the most critical situational characteristics required to employ each method are described. Any method employed must be well drilled to understand all its technical limitations. Also note that mine plows/rollers are not mentioned as methods, since very few units have these.

There are a number of additional considerations inherent in these breaching methods. Method one, explosive line charges, is the preferred breaching method. TC 5-101, pp 2-18 to 23, describes employment of the M173 line charge. Limited numbers of these older charges (M173) are available until the M58A1 mine clearing line charge (MICLIC) is fully fielded.

Method two, skimming, must be done as shown in Figure 3. If this technique is not used, the blade will ride over the spoil and the mines after five to ten meters of skimming.

Using method three, engineers detect surface laid mines visually and buried mines with mine detectors. Grapnels clear tripwires. Mines are destroyed with hand-placed explosives.

In method four, infantry detect surface laid mines visually and buried mines by probing. First, grapnels clear tripwires, then they lift the mines to clear antihandling devices. Normal mines are then removed by hand. Scatterable mines must be destroyed in place or pulled by rope out of the minefield.

Method five is the same as method three, except grapnels are not used to clear trip wires.

Method six is the same as method four, except grapnels are not used to clear trip wires or antihandling devices.

Methods five and six are extremely dangerous. Due to potential abuses of these options, USAES does not support them as viable options. Mine casualties will occur if:

• the minefield reconnaissance is inaccurate
• the threat doesn't employ their doctrine
• units habitually use methods five and six

Employ methods five or six only if:

• Methods one through four failed due to enemy fire inflicting heavy casualties on the breaching force
• Speed and continuing the attack are paramount to task force success
• Soldiers breaching fully understand the risk they are taking

The uncertainty regarding requirements is a major problem with engineer Class IV/V. Current planning factors are outdated. They provide only a minimal guide to the type and quantity of supplies needed.

Most units are unaware of how many U-shaped pickets, concertina rolls, or mines are required to build an obstacle of given size and type. The task force often requests an apparently adequate amount of material for its obstacle plans only to find it is inadequate once the project has begun. The task force wastes assets making additional resupply runs to the field trains, Class IV yard, or ASP.

The engineer officer is responsible for providing an engineer estimate to the commander/S3. It provides Class IV/V requirements, time and manpower estimates, and the recommended obstacle prioritization. Unfortunately, the engineer platoon leader is often inexperienced in developing an estimate. His lack of experience prevents accurate determination of Class IV/V requirements.

Another problem involves the control of engineer assets and Class IV/V. Most brigades consider barrier material an engineer asset and allocate it to the engineer company. The engineer company is often tasked with internal distribution of Class IV/V barrier materials throughout the task force sector resulting in:

• reduced engineer capability to support the task force.
• the commander, S3, and S4 losing control of Class IV/V barrier material

An additional consideration is the determination of a Class IV/V engineer load for the task force. Mission loads should be with the S4 prior to movement. The task force should routinely request the FSB to move significant amounts of its engineer Class IV/V material forward. This arrangement requires a task force representative to be at the drop-off point to control receipt from the FSB and subsequent issue to the task force. Control at the forward supply/drop-off point is essential to successful Class IV/V barrier material management.

The obvious remedies from the CSS standpoint are preparation, coordination, and knowledge of engineer and Class IV/V requirements. The task force engineer should prepare a database outlining the materials required for common obstacle missions. It should indicate, for example, how much Class IV is required for 100m of triple-strand concertina barrier.

Coordination is the natural complement to this preparation. S4s can determine requirements based on the commander's concept and warning order. By knowing the number and type of fighting positions and obstacles required, the engineer can compute task force requirements, allocate resources to the companies, and determine additional resources needed to execute the plan. The S3, S4, and engineer must work together to quickly and accurately determine the task force engineer's Class IV/V requirements.

The Vulcan platoon leader faces a demanding task when conducting tactical operations. In addition to his duties as a platoon leader, he also serves as a special staff officer on all air defense matters to the task force commander. He is the expert on all air defense related matters within the task force sector.

AirLand Battle doctrine is moving toward explicit delineation of the engineer/task force relationship. The July 1986 coordinating draft of FC 5-71-2 says that engineers in the tank and mechanized infantry task force are ". . . always responsible for providing the engineer materials necessary to support the engineer operations in its sector for both offensive and defensive missions. Even though the engineer determines requirements and uses the materials, supplying it remains a task force responsibility regardless of command and support relationships." (Page 3-9; see also FM 5-100, page 5-7)

Table of Contents

Section III: Fire Support

Section V: Air Defense