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The ability to efficiently resupply the task force in extended operations is just as critical to mission accomplishment as tactical planning. Here are two training tenets that have been used to improve task force logistical operations:

• Combined Arms Logistic Packages (LOGPACs), wargamed and verified at home station
• NCOs responsible for LOGPAC operations

Battalion logisticians should wargame their daily resupply rates prior to deployment. The historical standard usage rates found in FM 101-10-1 should be updated and adjusted based on the recent experiences of the deploying unit and other units with similar equipment. This data can then be used to tailor a standardized LOGPAC load which contains all of the varied munitions, from 120mm to .45 cal., necessary for combat operations in a combined arms task force. The wargaming sessions should consider the specialized needs of both organic and attached units such as mortars and anti-tank platoons. DS units, such as Stingers and Vulcans, should also be considered.

To minimize these problems, some units used combined arms training periods to determine task force logistical requirements. For example, one S-4 determined the quantity of Class V, by type, that a company team would use on a daily basis for offense and defense. All ammunition types normally used by that unit were then weighed and measured in their crates. The haul capabilities and interior dimensions of the support platoon trucks and trailers were researched and measured.

Using the S-4's daily resupply rate as a goal, the support platoon leader mixed and matched ammunition crates with trucks and trailers until he determined the optimum load. Realizing that trucks might be deadlined or destroyed, he worked out load lists for alternate vehicle types. This provided contingency planning so his NCOs knew that if a HEMMT was down, they could still make the mission by substituting a given number of 5-ton or 2 1/2-ton trucks. Packages were worked out for individual and special platoons, such as scout and Vulcan.

Each package was then verified by an actual upload at the ASP. The load plan was carefully diagrammed and recorded. Copies went to the driver, truck master, and ammo NCO. Load lists reflecting the various task organizations and special platoons were provided to the S-3 and commanders, so they could anticipate their daily resupply and make line item changes in a timely fashion. An abbreviated example appears below:

CSS NCOs were able to accomplish their upload procedures in the absence of additional guidance. As soon as trucks arrived at the field trains, support personnel could begin preparing the LOGPAC for another run. This automatic reaction gave both the ammo NCO and truckmaster time to verify load plans and make corrections or additions prior to departure. This created a sense of pride in the NCOs, as they knew the mission and were given the time and responsibility to accomplish it.

By forcing responsibility downward to NCOs, the support platoon leader had additional time to coordinate with the ALC and stay abreast of the tactical situation. This delegation enhanced continuous operations.

The S-4 became proactive because he knew ahead of time what classes and quantities would be delivered. When ammunition shortages or a mistake in delivery occurred, it was a problem, not a crisis. The S-4 was able to devote his energies to planning and advising the commander instead of reacting to crises.

These techniques require training at home station. However, the potential benefits include a reduction in time and confusion and improved forward support. Both of these can save lives for a unit deploying into combat.

Fuel Consumption Data Update

Many units and agencies have requested standard or historical usage data figures from the NTC. The following data is provided to give units some estimates for fuel expenditure at the NTC. Class III is based on estimated operations time and 10 kph movements. Average movement per day at the NTC is 30 km, and average idle time per vehicle is approximately 6 hours (estimate only).

A. M60A3
(30km)x(1.92gpk)+(6hr)x(2.8gph) =

45 gal/vehicle/day

Editor's Note: These figures are not based on a sufficient number of samples to be declared statistically valid. They are provided merely as a guide to unit logistics planners.

Jump Aid Station
(Memorandum thru Commander, Operations
Group, 23 June 1986; TRADOC Pam 525-50)

A successful technique used at the NTC establishes a jump aid station forward of the combat trains, but to the rear of the task force. It moves along the MSR, approximately one to four kilometers behind the trail/reserve company. Doctrinally, the aid station should always be established on or very near the task force MSR. The main aid station remains at the combat trains, continuing to provide medical support but prepared to move when the jump aid station has been established. FM 71-2J refers to this technique in general terms, but it has been further refined at the NTC.

An M577 and an M113 should be used as the jump aid station. This method provides the vehicles for establishing a fully operational treatment station, and enables them to provide additional casualty evacuation assistance. The senior enlisted medic and a driver should accompany the task force surgeon or physican's assistant.

In an offensive mission or during movement to contact, the jump aid station must be prepared to move into a covered and concealed location quickly. The senior enlisted medic should constantly scan the terrain for possible jump locations. When the task force begins taking casualties, the jump aid station immediately halts and prepares to receive them. The aid station located with the combat trains moves in conjunction with the combat trains.

During defensive missions, the requirement for the jump aid station anticipates lateral displacement. Lateral displacement is effective because it provides flexibility; i.e., the aid station is able to move out of the way of an oncoming enemy attack. The aid station in the sector that receives the main attack can displace to avoid contact with the enemy, while the other M577 remains forward and sets up. This technique enables the aid stations to continue to provide medical support to the task force at a time when they may need it the most.

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Section V: Air Defense

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