MOBILITY
AND SURVIVABILITY BOS &
NUCLEAR/BIOLOGICAL/CHEMICAL
(NBC)
Positive Performance
TREND 1: Military Police (MP) protective services. MP units have been effectively utilized to provide personnel security services for brigade and battalion commanders. The use of these assets in this form allows the commanders the flexibility to conduct battlefield circulation. Additionally, the use of these assets prevents brigade staffs from utilizing maneuver battalion assets to serve in this capacity.
(TA 6.3.2.1.1.1 Employ Physical Security Measures)
TREND 2: Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP). Recent observations indicate that FARPs are improving in the area of force protection and supply management. Camouflage is improving and tankers are being dug in. Class III/V platoon sergeants and platoon leaders are becoming more involved in planning FARP operations such as site reconnaissance and amounts of fuel and ammo needed to accomplish the mission.
(TA 6.3.2.2.1 Employ Camouflage)
Needs Emphasis
TREND 1: Conduct of route clearance operations. Maneuver commanders at all levels have demonstrated a lack of tactical patience and have pressured engineers into quickly conducting route sweep operations.
PROBLEM: Task force commanders do not conduct deliberate risk analysis and determine the appropriate clearance method.
RESULT: This frequently results in minefields being discovered by the destruction of lead vehicles in the route clearance team.
Technique: Commanders must exercise tactical patience during route clearance operations and allow engineer leaders to analyze the situation to determine the proper method to facilitate route clearance.
(TA 6.1.1 Overcome Obstacles)
TREND 2: Combined arms obstacle integration. Maneuver staffs and their engineers lack understanding of the integration of natural and reinforcing obstacles with fires to shape the enemy maneuver.
PROBLEMS:
1. Brigades designate belts and intents but do not resource belts with appropriate quantities of class (CL) IV/V.
2. Brigades do not designate directed obstacle groups to support either the brigade deep fight or the brigade decisive point.
3. The brigade does not refine the obstacle plan by preparing consolidated obstacle graphics from task force obstacle plans and resolving any conflicts in intents (similar to the artillery fire support planning process).
4. Direct and indirect fires are seldom integrated with the obstacle plan at any level.
RESULT: Most of the defensive obstacle emplacement time is consumed by staffs conducting planning.
Techniques:
1. Plan and execute obstacle integration principles in accordance with FM 90-7, Combined Arms Obstacle Integration.
2. Obstacle belts and groups are planned and designated in order to synchronize the brigade and battalion defensive fight and researched to allow timely acquisition, allocation, and distribution of CL IV/V.
(TA 6.2.1 Secure/Select Location of Obstacles)
TREND 3: Enemy obstacle reporting and lane marking. Brigades have placed little emphasis on route status and obstacle tracking by maneuver commanders.
PROBLEM: Enemy obstacle reporting is poorly managed at all levels.
RESULT: Information pertaining to route and obstacle locations is not disseminated down to subordinate units throughout the brigade.
Techniques:
1. Brigades must ensure that reporting procedures, specific to route and obstacle locations, are developed and incorporated into existing SOPs.
2. Information received, referencing obstacles, and route status must be disseminated down to all subordinate units.
(TA 6.2.3 Mark Obstacles)
TREND 4: Positioning of crew-served weapons. Artillery batteries and platoons
PROBLEMS:
1. Batteries and platoons routinely do a poor job of positioning crew-served weapons.
2. Position restricts movement and operation.
3. Too often the crew-served positions lack interlocking fires.
4. Units fail to clear fields of fire.
5. Units select positions with little or no consideration about dead space, enemy avenues of approach, difficulty in clearing fields of fire, hill masses that block fields of fire, etc.
6. Too many soldiers do not understand how to fill out a range card.
7. Too many soldiers do not know how the traverse and elevation mechanism functions.
8. NCOs do not proactively supervise and train their soldiers on crew-served weapons proficiency.
RESULT: Batteries and platoons are often destroyed by a dismounted attack conducted by as few as three to five enemy soldiers.
Techniques:
1. Doctrinal references: FM 6-50, chap. 3, and STP 6-13B14-SM-TG, pg. 3-6.
2. Ensure all soldiers and leaders are trained on crew-served weapons emplacement, range card construction, clearing fields of fire and, most importantly, positioning crew-served weapons to maximize effectiveness given the constraints of the terrain.
3. Consider identifying crew-served weapon positions prior to the howitzer positions. This technique can greatly facilitate battery defense without affecting the battery's subsequent occupation.
4. Crew-served weapon positions should be inspected/checked by a senior leader battle commander (BC) or 1SG to ensure the weapon is being used effectively. This check should be conducted by actually getting behind the weapon and ensuring it is set up correctly.
(TA 6.3.1 Provide Battlespace Hazard Protection)
TREND 5: Force protection. Protecting the force is every leader's concern and essential to sustaining the force.
PROBLEMS:
1.
Individual and crew-served weapon positions are not completed to standard,
often lacking overhead cover.
2.
The use of obstacles is non-existent.
3.
Camouflage of personnel, tents, vehicles, and equipment are seldom to standard.
RESULT: The continual improvement of assembly areas fails to occur after initial occupation.
Techniques:
1. All leaders and soldiers should review FM 7-8 and FM 5 -103 for techniques and standards for defensive measures.
2. FM 20-3 gives company level leaders an understanding of camouflage principles.
3. An assembly area plan must be developed and continually improved upon.
4. Constructing survivability positions for all soldiers enhances combat survivability.
5. Leaders must ensure force protection is a priority and the aviation task force is included in the brigade task force defensive plan.
(TA 6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND 6: Damaged aircraft repair and recovery team procedures. Units habitually arrive with no battle damage assessment and repair (BDAR) kits, manuals, or trained personnel. Units also tend to combine search and rescue (SAR) and disabled aircraft repair/recovery team (DARRT).
Technique: Unit leaders should be familiar with FM 1-513, FM 1-500, FM 20-30, and the joint publication on search and rescue.
(TA 6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND 7: Base defense. Base defense for combat service support (CSS) units is what service support is for combat arms units. They know what it is but do not do it very well.
PROBLEMS:
1. Base defense is the painful process by which soldiers can increase their chances of surviving. Even so, it is neglected.
2. The CSS soldier has to provide support while at the same time work on base defense. These actions compete for the same resource--in this instance, the soldier. It requires a careful balance, and normally support gets more attention at the expense of base defense.
3. CSS commanders need to realize that a good solid base defense is a force multiplier. Initially, base defense is going to require lots of manpower, but after the set has been completed, it will take less soldiers to maintain.
RESULT: Solid base defense will help CSS soldiers survive, thus increasing, if not sustaining, effective and efficient support to the customers.
Techniques:
1. Base defense must be factored into the service support equation.
2. CSS units must have a plan and aggressively execute it shortly after occupation and prior to getting totally immersed in providing support.
3. NCOs as the doers must ensure maximum use of available time prior to getting involved in mission support.
(TA 6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND: 8 Emphasis on nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) Operations.
PROBLEMS:
1. Recent observations tend to support a lack of emphasis on NBC Operations at the brigade task force level.
2. Subordinate units consistently have performed poorly during the execution of both collective and individual level NBC-related tasks.
RESULT: Brigade staffs generally do not pay particular attention to NBC input until forced to go into mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) gear.
Techniques:
1.
Brigades must place more emphasis on NBC operations and better incorporate
the BOS into mission planning.
2.
Attention needs to be paid to collective and individual level NBC training
at home station.
(TA 6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND 9: Force protection Forward Support Battalion (FSB). Forward Support Battalion Commanders typically define force protection in terms of base security measures.
PROBLEM: Force protection is often measured quantitatively and not qualitatively. Successful force protection is often defined in terms of the number of pickets pounded, the amount of wire strung, and the number of crew-served weapons employed.
RESULT: This narrow definition of force protection does not include the integration and synchronization of all the BOS into an overall force protection plan.
Technique:
1. Force protection includes: the construction of patient bunkers to protect wounded soldiers from indirect fire; the initiation of field sanitation and preventive medicine measures to protect soldiers from becoming casualties from non-battle diseases/injuries; and the integration of a intelligence collection plan for convoy operations in order to protect soldiers from driving/walking into minefields.
2. Force protection is a thought process that must become culture--a way of life--for a unit.
(TA 6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND 10: Reconnaissance & security.
PROBLEMS:
1. Units fail to protect the force through aggressive reconnaissance and security patrolling during defense preparation and patrol base activities.
2. Only a small percentage of the force, if any at all, is dedicated to security operations.
3. Very little analysis of the threat goes into where to position security elements. LP/OPs are normally positioned too close to the friendly trace to provide adequate early warning.
RESULT: Enemy stay-behind elements are able to establish overwatch of obstacles, fighting positions, and other high-value targets with little fear of compromise.
Technique: Outlined in FM 7-10, pp. 5-12 to 5-14. The techniques must be applied and rigidly enforced. The FIRST PRIORITY of work.
(TA 6.3.2 Employ Operations Security)
TA.3
Air Defense BOS Narrative
TA.7
Combat Service Support BOS Narrative
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