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Positive Performance

TREND 1: Evaluate threat information. Commanders at all levels are becoming more aware of the importance of conducting crater analysis after the receipt of opposing forces (OPFOR) indirect fires. The information being provided in the shell report is being passed to the S-2 to conduct predictive counter-mortar analysis.

Techniques:

1. The information provided enables the S-2 to conduct predictive counter-mortar analysis of the enemy situation.

2. This analysis has increased the probability of the successful capture of several OPFOR mortars during the low intensity conflict (LIC) phase at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC).

(TA 5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

Techniques:

1. When terrain analysis products are combined with good light and weather effects analysis and the consideration of the effects of the civilian populace on the current situation, the opportunities and challenges presented by friendly units on the JRTC battlefield are identified.

2. These same factors help define the enemy situation on the JRTC battlefield and both are honed as a result of good home station training.

(TA 5.2.1.2 Collect Physical Environment Information)

TREND 3: Initial Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) - Air Defense Artillery (ADA). Battery commanders are conducting a thorough initial IPB with the brigade S-2.

Techniques:

1. They identify the threat air order of battle, their mission, suspected air avenues of approach, and Helicopter Landing Zones (HLZs).

2. They are becoming more adept at templating the locations of enemy air defense assets.

3. Battery commanders conduct analyses of how the enemy air supports the ground effort.

4. They have developed a greater understanding in correlating the distance factors of HLZs to battalion trains, and company trains has led to more effective templating of enemy HLZs.

(TA 5.3 Process Information)

TREND 4: Analysis of threat doctrine and order of battle. S-2s understand the enemy's tactics and the capabilities of enemy systems and transmit this information to units preparing for JRTC.

Techniques:

1. Success at JRTC requires a thorough analysis training and preparation at home station.

2. Participation in JRTC's Leader Training Program (LTP) was a major factor in success and a key factor in pre-rotation training.

3. Individual soldiers often receive their understanding of probable enemy activities through a series of "JRTC Smart Books" produced by units preparing for their rotation. Successful units supplement these books with classes taught by the brigade S-2 shops.

(TA 5.3.1 Evaluate Threat Information)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Intelligence collection and analysis. The analysis control team (ACT) soldiers lack the basic skills necessary to provide the commander with consistent predictive analysis based on incoming Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) reports.

PROBLEM: The breakdown of priority intelligence requirements (PIR) into specific information requirements, serious incident report (SIR), and dissemination of indicators, and reporting criteria for specific orders and requests (SOR) to deployed assets are two key weaknesses.

RESULTS:

1. Critical reports needed for the decision making process do not reach the S-2 in a timely manner and are often historical.

2. Critical information regarding enemy timelines, threat situation, and target composition/disposition are not consistently pushed down by the S-2s and the analysis and control team.

3. Predictive analysis is rarely attempted. SALUTE reports are generated and passed to the Brigade S-2, but with little analysis.

Techniques:

1. The commander should review SIR and SOR as a part of his mission back briefs from subordinate leaders.

2. The military intelligence (MI) company team commander should require signal intelligence (SIGINT), traffic analysis (TA team), and human resource intelligence (HUMINT) analysts to produce a summary of activity every 12 hours.

3. Team leaders and above need to review FM 34-3 (Intelligence Analysis) to clearly understand their responsibilities concerning the breakdown of priority PIR into SIR/SOR and subsequent indicators.

(TA 5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 2: Intelligence Collection Processing.

PROBLEMS:

1. Just as it is critical to integrate all task force elements, hospital and clinical staffs must not be left out.

2. Because of location and separation of function, information flow between hospital elements and the tactical operations center (TOC) is limited.

RESULTS:

1. Hospital staff who often obtain intelligence information from casualties cannot pass this information to the S-2.

2. Clinical personnel are not usually incorporated into operational planning and therefore cannot anticipate or forecast upcoming demands on the hospital system.

Techniques:

1. Commanders need to force integrate all staff and task force elements prior to deployment in order to develop a task force focus on arrival.

2. S-2s need to develop within the unit standard operating procedures (SOP) a system that allows for the reporting of information taken from casualties and the processing of that information.

(TA 5.3 Process Information)

TREND 3: Analysis and Control Teams (ACT) Responsibilities.

PROBLEMS:

1. Individuals on the ACT are not sure of their responsibilities and duties.

2. Other soldiers in the headquarters and headquarters company HHC are not assisting in maintaining communications or battle tracking over a 24-hour period.

RESULTS:

1. Communications are not maintained for 24-hour periods.
2. Battle tracking is not thorough and complete.

Techniques:

1. Duty descriptions for each member of the Analysis and Control teams must be established and understood by each member.

2. An effort must be made to incorporate other non-96B soldiers with the HHC to assist with maintaining communications and battle tracking over 24-hour periods.

3. Sleep plans must be developed and enforced to allow for 24-hour operations.

(TA 5.3 Process Information)

TREND 4: Synchronization of Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW).

PROBLEMS:

1. The IEW scheme of maneuver is rarely planned and executed in such a way that it can adequately support brigade movement and future operations.

2. A breakdown of IEW coverage usually occurs as these assets prepare for follow-on operations.

3. Most team members do not know or understand the brigade's scheme of maneuver nor the commander's intent.

4. Ground surveillance system (GSS) missions are seldom synchronized to counter the brigade S-2's depicted stay-behind threat.

RESULTS:

1. Poor IEW coverage for the brigade movement.

2. Follow-on operations are usually not satisfactorily executed.

3. Most IEW soldiers feel isolated and not fully utilized as part of the operation.

4. Sensors are used primarily for local security.

5. Electronic Attack (EA) missions are poorly planned and not thoroughly coordinated through the S-3/FSO.

Techniques:

1. Commanders must review the requirements for the IEW sync-matrix FM 34-2, chapter 2.

2. The ACT must review and disseminate the friendly and enemy situations prior to moving collection teams.

3. IEW coverage must be seamless, by bounding assets forward or by coordinating with higher headquarters to receive down link from QUICKFIX during information downtime.

4. Update the traffic analysis SOP with a "jamming checklist" which includes all the coordination and planning factors involved in executing Electronic Attack (EA) operations.

(TA 5.3.1 Evaluate Threat Information)

TREND 5: Analysis Control Team (ACT).

PROBLEMS:

1. The ACT has difficulty executing all-source analysis in support of the brigade.

2. Soldiers are unsure of their role in the ACT and the function of their section of the TOC.

3. Shift changeovers are not conducted smoothly or with a focus toward the incoming shift.

4. Lack of an ACT "battle rhythm" hinders most sections from producing products the S-2 could use if presented in a timely manner.

RESULTS:

1. Predictive analysis is rarely attempted. SALUTE reports are generated and passed to brigade, but with little analysis.

2. Soldiers are completely unfamiliar with the all-source analysis system and its capabilities.

3. Junior analysts work well with the S-2, but do not routinely execute "reverse battlefield operating systems (BOS) IPB" with other members of the battle staff.

4. 24-hour operation suffers with proper sleep plan and staff brief associated with shift changeover. These staff changeovers disrupt "battle rhythm" necessary for battle tracking and tempo of operations.

Techniques:

1. Conduct weekly training with the ACE to increase soldier knowledge and future use of all-source analysis system (ASAS).

2. The ASAS can be used to assist with radio line-of-sight (RLOS) planning, threat database, upkeep, and graphic intelligence summaries, to name only a few uses.

3. Utilize ACE-generated reports to update the brigade S-2 on developments outside the area of operations (AO) but within the area of interest (AI) to familiarize him with the capabilities.

4. Integrate the ACT into the brigade TOC set-up preferably between the S-3 and S-2, and update the company SOP, clearly outlining the tasks of the ACT.

(TA 5.3.1 Evaluate Threat Information)

TREND 6: Electronic Attack (EA).

PROBLEMS:

1. Electronic attack missions are poorly planned and not thoroughly coordinated through the S-3/FSO to weigh the effectiveness of jamming versus the importance of collection.

2. Units task their ground-based jammers but do not give them on/off time in accordance with the target synchronization matrix or an updated template of enemy radio receivers.

RESULTS:

1. MI company team commanders are seldom able to inform the S-3/FSO of hour-by-hour collection capabilities of deployed assets.

2. Deployed IEW assets are usually either over tasked or under tasked.

Techniques:

1. The intelligence system can provide the answers to intelligence requirements in time to influence decisions. Read FM 34-2, Collection Management and Synchronization.

2. Commanders must review the requirements for IEW synch-matrix (FM 34-2, Chap. 2).

3. Target Analysis Teams must become familiar with EA operations in support of light infantry scheme of maneuver.

4. The TA SOP should be updated with a "jamming list" which includes all coordination and planning factors involved in executing EA operations.

(TA 5.3.4 Integrate Intelligence Information)

TREND 7: Intelligence products.

PROBLEM:

Products that can help the brigade S-2 maintain and disseminate intelligence information, like the IEW incident map based on SIGINT, HUMINT, and measurement and signature intelligence MASINT analysis over a 12-hour period, are not available.

RESULT:

The S-2 is deprived of essential intelligence data needed to project enemy intentions and to provide the commander with information he needs in decision making.

Technique:

The analysts working at the ACT are the best source of analytical assistance for SIGINT and HUMINT databases; they are responsible for providing the most timely products to the S-2.

(TA 5.4 Prepare and Disseminate Intelligence Reports)

TREND 8: Determine threat Courses of Action (COA).

PROBLEMS:

1. S-2s understand threat capabilities, doctrine, and effects of the battlefield but often do not translate this baseline knowledge into clear and complete depictions of enemy COAs.

2. Limited planning time always presents problems for S-2s.

RESULTS:

1. Commanders and their planning staffs are not being presented with timely situation templates (SITTEMP), descriptions of enemy COAs based on friendly plans, or listings of HVTs.

2. Some products prepared are incomplete.

Techniques:

1. Review Chapter 2 of FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, July 1994.

2. Successful S-2s operate under time constraints but focus on presenting the staff and commander with a complete SITTEMP as a minimum. The S-2 can reduce the other elements of a complete enemy COA to bullet notes or brief them.

(TA 5.3.4.1 Develop Enemy Intentions)

TA.1 Maneuver BOS Narrative