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TREND 1: Field Artillery Battalion S-2 involvement in the brigade targeting process. Field artillery battalion S-2s are increasingly becoming involved in the brigade targeting process, particularly in analyzing, identifying, and pinpointing OPFOR mortar locations and caches. The S-2s are attending brigade targeting meetings and are becoming an integral member of the brigade targeting effort.

(TA 2.1.1 Select Target to Attack)

TREND 2: Determining critical fires. Commanders and their fire supporters are doing an excellent job of determining when fires are critical, where fires must be placed, and understanding the restrictions for fires to ensure they do not interfere with the scheme of maneuver.

(TA 2.1.2 Select Fire Support Attack System)

TREND 3: Rear area fire support. Units have shown great improvement in incorporating indirect fires in the brigade rear area. Problems still exist, but we are moving in the right direction. Establishing a fire support cell in the fire support battalion (FSB) TOC from personnel in the FA battalion field trains and incorporating them in the brigade's fire support plan is extremely effective. The best use of a brigade support area (BSA) fire support officer (FSO) is in support of main support routes (MSRs) and the BSA when they are not in a battalion's sector. When the BSA is within a infantry battalion's sector, sufficient area around the BSA must be allocated to the FSB to control fires. (One kilometer [km] is a good planning factor.)

(TA 2.2 Engage Ground Targets)

TREND 4: Commander/FSO integration. The habitual relationship of commanders and fire support officers is working well. Brigade through company commanders and their fire support officers understand the concepts of integrating and synchronizing fires to support the scheme of maneuver.

(TA 2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Use of the Precision Lightweight Global Positioning System (GPS) Receiver (PLGR).

PROBLEM: During the LIC and deliberate attack, most forward observers (FOs) turn their PLGRs off or leave them in the continuous mode while moving.

RESULT: When the lead element of the platoon makes contact, the FO is unable to utilize the PLGR to immediately and accurately determine the target location.

Techniques:

1. Ensure that the PLGR is turned on and in the continuous mode.

2. Use it upon contact to send the FO's present location and initiate a fire mission utilizing the polar plot call for fire.

3. Implement the techniques described in "The PLGR: Techniques and Procedures Forward Observers Can Use To Bring Rapid, Accurate Indirect Fires to the Close Fight," Combat Training Center (CTC) Quarterly Bulletin, 4th QTR, FY 96, No. 96-10, OCT 96.

4. Reference: TM 11-5825-29-13.

(TA 2.1 Process Ground Targets)

TREND 2: Company Fire Support Execution Matrix (FSEM).

PROBLEMS:

1. Most FSEMs used by the company FSOs are not standard.

2. Lack the sufficient detail to describe the fire support tasks to be executed without further guidance or explanation.

RESULT: FOs, company mortars, and other leaders within the company do not know what indirect fire support assets are available or how to employ what is available.

Techniques:

1. Standardize a FSEM format for all fire support teams (FIST) supporting a brigade.

2. References:

• Article #4, "Fire Support Products for the Company," JRTC FS DIV TTP, dtd. 1 OCT 96.
• FM 6-20-20, p. 2-7.
• FM 6-20-50, p. 2-15.

(TA 2.1.2 Select Fire Support Attack System)

TREND 3: Utilization of Firepower Control Teams (FCTs). Many units come to JRTC with little or no knowledge of how to employ FCTs.

PROBLEMS:

1. Most units do not train with the FCTs at home station. They train with them for the first time when they arrive at the intermediate staging base (ISB).

2. Most maneuver commanders do not adequately understand the employment capabilities of FCTs.

Techniques: Employ firepower control teams (FCTs) in one of two ways:

1. Attach the FCT to a rifle company or a scout platoon to provide responsive naval gun fires as well as a terminal close air support (CAS) control capability at the company or platoon level. This technique works well when there are limited fire support assets available (for example, during initial insertion or when operating forward of field artillery and/or mortar ranges).

2. Treat the FCTs independently during reconnaissance operations. Assign the FCT a named area of interest (NAI) or some other area in which to operate. This gives the maneuver commander more sets of eyes forward to cover more area. This forward employment requires detailed planning for communications, resupply, casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), and potential extraction/exfiltration of the FCTs when they operate independently and far and/or forward.

(TA 2.1.2 Select Fire Support Attack System)

TREND 4: Q36 operations.

PROBLEMS:

1. Field artillery planners too often do not have an adequate understanding of the firefinder radar system to successfully plan and then execute using the system.

2. Too often the targeting technician, the firefinder subject matter expert, is not consulted about employment considerations beyond site selection until after the battle has begun.

3. Too many field artillery Tactical Operations Centers (TOCs) tend to expect more from the radar than the system can actually deliver.

RESULTS:

1. Units lose critical time and miss key opportunities trying to execute unrealistic plans.

2. The lack of planning and execution knowledge hampers unit planning for future operations.

Techniques:

1. Conduct extensive home station training with the system so that both operators and planners understand and accept the system's capabilities and limitations.

2. Conduct professional development classes for both officers and NCOs at home station. Gauge the level of detail to the target audience.

3. At home station, conduct Tactical Exercise Without Troops (TEWT) terrain walks to highlight the unique requirements of the system; i.e., optimum mask angles, positioning considerations, and the effects of vegetation and the terrain.

4. Make the targeting technician an integral member of the field artillery battalion staff. Bring the targeting technician into the planning process early.

(TA 2.1.2.1 Determine System Capabilities)

TREND 5: Call for fire procedures - forward observer (FO).

PROBLEM: Too many FOs initiate calls for fire using non-doctrinal, incomplete formats. EXAMPLE: calling in a grid location and nothing more.

RESULT: Critical loss of time as the firing unit must then request target size, description, and direction.

Techniques:

1. Fire support NCOs and officers must train FO teams in accordance with (IAW) FM 6-30, chapter 4.

2. All members of the battalion fire support element (FSE) must know the proper call for fire format and the six elements required to properly initiate a voice fire mission.

3. FIST training should include radio rehearsals and use of the training set forward observer (TSFO); emphasize proper calls for fire formats.

4. Ensure soldiers understand the necessity of providing the fire direction center with accurate and proper information the first time to increase mission processing times and ensure faster rounds on target.

(TA 2.1.3 Prepare Order to Fire)

TREND 6: Howitzer range cards.

PROBLEMS:

1. Too many firing batteries either have no howitzer range card at all or only a partially completed one.

2. Frequently howitzer range cards do not contain direct fire targets or data for antipersonnel ammunition (APERS) or Killer Junior.

Techniques:

1. Battery leadership should inspect howitzer range cards during pre-combat checks and inspections to ensure the range card is done to standard.

2. Reinforce the value of the direct fire range card for howitzer engagements.

3. Doctrinal references: FM 6-50, Chap. 3, pp 3-12.

(TA 2.1.3 Prepare Order to Fire)

TREND 7: Out of traverse/6400 mil missions. Firing units often experience difficulty executing out of traverse missions.

PROBLEMS:

1. Executive officers (XOs) too often fail to derive the minimum quadrant elevation (QE) for each octant.

2. Fire direction centers (FDCs) often fail to compute terrain gun position correction (TGPCs) for each octant.

3. Often howitzer section equipment, such as the prime mover and/or camouflage netting, prohibits true 6400 mil capability.

4. Howitzer sections routinely do not emplace their aiming posts correctly.

5. Lack of aiming reference points and pick-up displacement for all possible azimuths further inhibits crews from executing out of traverse/6400 mil missions.

6. Gunners and section chiefs are not comfortable using aiming posts to pick up displacement.

7. Units are not using distant aiming points (DAP) despite their availability.

RESULT: Slow fire mission response times, particularly when responding to counter fire missions.

Techniques:

1. Doctrinal references: FM 6-40, 6-50 and the appropriate howitzer -10.

2. Ensure the XO and FDC understand the requirements necessary for the conduct of out of traverse missions, especially setting up the chart in the FDC to facilitate 6400 mils.

3. Ensure howitzer sections are trained on how to position their alternate aiming reference points and are completely proficient at picking up displacement.

4. Frequently rehearse out of traverse dry fire missions in each octant to ensure the firing unit is capable of providing fast, accurate fires.

5. Ensure all unit equipment is positioned to facilitate 6400 mil operations.

(TA 2.1.3 Prepare Order to Fire)

TREND 8: Observer plans and use of triggers. Company FSOs are not developing observer plans and trigger points during defensive operations.

PROBLEM: Too many observers are unable to see the target area and do not establish or rehearse a trigger point.

RESULT: Planned fires normally impact after the target has passed through the target area, allowing an enemy element to successfully pass through the defensive sector.

Techniques:

1. Company FSOs must position observers in order to support the defense:

• In restrictive terrain, place the FO well forward of the Company/Team (CO/TM) defensive position.
• Establish an identifiable trigger point, based on a projected rate of enemy movement through the sector.
• Rehearse the optimal position of the FO relative to the trigger once the enemy enters the target area.

2. Read FM 6-30, page 5-25, on the establishment and use of triggers.

(TA 2.2 Engage Ground Targets)

TREND 9: Mortar employment in close contact. Few units are using mortars when contact with the enemy is established.

PROBLEMS:

1. Maneuver unit leaders (platoon and company) are allowing their observers and FSOs to fight with fires prior to maneuvering on the enemy.

2. Company FSOs and Platoon FOs are not establishing priority targets with 60 mm and 81 mm mortars along the unit's route.

Techniques:

1. FOs and FSOs should establish targets along the unit's route as they template enemy positions and likely ambush sites.

2. As the unit moves along the route, the FO should cancel one target and establish the next target. Use the minimum safe distance of the weapon system designated to fire the target as the trigger or signal to shift to the new target.

3. When the unit comes in contact with the enemy, the FO can initiate his priority target or shift from his priority target, placing his fires on or behind the enemy.

4. See "Fast, Accurate Fires in the Close Fight" by LTC David L. Anderson in CTC Quarterly Bulletin 96-4, 2d Quarter, FY 96, March, 1996.

(TA 2.2.1 Conduct Lethal Engagement)

TREND 10: Accuracy of mortars.

PROBLEMS:

1. FSOs are not providing timely meteorological (MET) data or coordinating for survey (declination) support for the task force's organic mortars.

2. Mortar platoons and sections are not aggressively conducting registrations as a means to improve their accuracy.

Techniques:

1. The battalion FSO should coordinate with the FA Battalion S-3 to get meteorological (MET) messages (computer MET if the unit is using the Mortar Ballistic Computer) and survey support. Include the maneuver task force in the FA battalion's priorities of survey support (with the priority going to the main effort task force).

2. The FSO, with the maneuver task force S-3, should establish which units should register the mortars and ensure this tasking is included in the operations order.

(TA 2.2.1.1 Conduct Surface Attack)

TREND 11: Indirect fires during small unit contacts. Infantry platoon leaders and forward observers are reluctant to use indirect fires during small unit contacts.

PROBLEMS:

1. There is a tendency to be overly cautious for fear of fratricide, since the enemy is often only 200-300 meters away.

2. Most fire support teams do not have an established battle drill for this situation. They are not well trained in the adjustment of fires onto rapidly moving mounted and dismounted enemy forces.

3. De-centralized "fast" fire missions are rarely seen, particularly during the search and attack phase of operations.

RESULTS:

1. Reduced opportunity to kill the enemy.
2. Most units do not fire the required volume of ammunition in effect to achieve the desired effects on the target.

Techniques:

1. Plan for and use artillery and mortar fires to rapidly isolate, block, or defeat enemy forces upon contact.

2. Use priority targets for both the mortars and artillery. Selectively use quick fire channels to assist the observer in obtaining "fast, accurate" fire missions.

3. Establish battle drills that immediately get a round on the ground upon contact. Once the round is on the ground, observers should be trained to make one bold, accurate shift and fire for effect.

4. Always give accurate target descriptions and make sure that the attack guidance is fully understood.

5. FIST training: include engaging close-in targets with fire support while the observer is moving.

6. Train FOs on rapidly determining a target location and initiating a complete call for fire while on the move and under attack.

7. Train FOs on the use of the Precision Lightweight GPS Receiver (PLGR) to rapidly determine a target location in restrictive terrain. See "The PLGR: Techniques and Procedures Forward Observers Can Use to Bring Rapid, Accurate, Indirect Fires to the Close Fight," CTC Quarterly Bulletin, October 1996.

(TA 2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 12: LTACFIRE (light tactical fire direction system) Operations.

PROBLEMS:

1. Although rotational units consistently maintain digital communications, they rarely exploit the capabilities of the LTACFIRE/initial fire support automation system (IFSAS) system.

2. Few units use the LTACFIRE/IFSAS to manage targets, conduct fire planning, and conduct tactical fire direction.

RESULTS:

1. The common results are fire plans that are not disseminated or fired, inefficient use of resources, and failure to meet the commander's attack criteria.

2. Inexperienced operators, along with failure of the chain of command to force the use of the system, are the primary reasons. While units often have excellent LTACFIRE SOPs, they are rarely used.

3. Digital fire control systems greatly facilitate and ease target management, fire planning, tactical fire direction, and the dissemination of information.

Techniques:

1. To exploit the system, both operators and leaders must fully understand the capabilities of the system. Effective LTACFIRE/IFSAS sustainment training using realistic and demanding operational scenarios should be established and enforced to instill the necessary confidence to use the system.

2. Incorporate and enforce the use of LTACFIRE/IFSAS during all home station training events to ensure that this becomes the primary means of fire control and planning.

(TA 2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 13: Survey operations.

PROBLEMS:

1. Survey support is not maximizing the use of all assets.

2. Initial Field Artillery Support Plans (FASP) have done a good job in directing survey support in order of priority to all assets requiring survey control. Unfortunately, the trend is for survey support to cease after the firing batteries and radar are complete.

RESULT: Units exert minimum effort or consideration to assets in the task force; i.e., 81mm mortars, OH-58D, combat observation and laser team (COLTs) targets, routes, and obstacles.

Techniques:

1. Ensure planning in the survey annex in the Field Artillery Support Plan (FASP) encompasses all assets in the task force that require survey.

2. Review FM 6-2, specifically Chapters 14-2, 14-7, 15, and figure 15-1 (fire support coordination [FSCOORD] checklist).

3. Conduct extensive officer and NCO professional development at home station, focusing on the importance of effective survey.

(TA 2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 14: Integration of indirect fires into the maneuver plan.

PROBLEMS:

1. Units regularly develop the indirect fire plan separately from the maneuver plan.

2. The lack of initial coordination is compounded by the lack of an established and rapid method for clearing fires when units are in contact.

RESULTS:

1. These factors combine to result in missed opportunities and fratricides.

2. Inadequate fire support plans are frequently the product of the FSO's failure to effectively coordinate and integrate with the commander and staffs during the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).

Techniques:

1. Planning for fire support suffers, along with all other BOS planning, because of command and battle staff difficulties meeting all the requirements of the current military decision-making process (MDMP). Evidence points to the execution of the MDMP as the source of planning problems; because the staffs are so consumed by the process, they do not integrate or coordinate actions.

2. Fire support units should incorporate the techniques described in CALL Newsletter Update 95-12, Military Decision Making Process: "Abbreviated Planning."

(TA 2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TA.1 Maneuver BOS Narrative

TA.3 Air Defense BOS Narrative