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Organized by BOS, these narratives amplify the bullet listings in Section I. As appropriate and/or available, they provide doctrinal references and techniques and procedures for the needed training emphasis. These narratives are labeled IAW the Blueprint of the Battlefield system for reference and long-term trend development.


Positive Performance

1.1.1 Position/reposition forces

* Firing battery movement order: The use of the movement order by the battery leadership is being briefed IAW with the XO's Handbook, addressing specific and implied tasks.


  1. Battery leaders brief movement routes, start points, check points and release points.
  2. When higher HQs does not specify control measures such as start points, check points and release points, the battery leadership identifies their own to facilitate movement command and control. Prepare For Movement

* Soldier's load: Leaders continue to do an outstanding job of managing soldier loads. They establish and enforce combat and sustainment loads within their units. Leaders cross-level critical squad supplies and consolidate cold weather gear to minimize the weight soldiers carry. They do an outstanding job of establishing fighting loads (rucks) and approach march loads (assault and butt packs) during contact. Because soldiers are not hindered by heavy loads in contact, they are better able to quickly maneuver against an enemy force.


  1. Establish and then enforce combat and sustainment loads.
  2. Cross-level critical squad supplies.
  3. Consolidate cold weather gear to minimize soldier carried weight.
  4. Establish fighting loads (rucks) and approach march loads (assault and butt packs) for use during contact.


  1. Cache rucks in patrol bases.
  2. Use butt packs or assault packs for fighting loads.
  3. Pack one ruck per squad with essential cold weather gear for the squad.
  4. Conduct leader Pre-combat inspections (PCI) to enforce load discipline.
  5. Push forward duffel bags from the field trains during extended lulls in contact to allow soldiers to cross-level clothing and equipment.
  6. Doctrinal references: FM 7-10 (chapter 8, section III) and FM 21-18 contain detailed discussion on load planning, calculating and management.

* Precombat inspections: Aviation company level.


  1. New crews routinely conduct preflight, runup, and communications checks prior to beginning their mission cycles.
  2. Flight crews also routinely inspect and test fire their respective weapon systems prior to mission execution.

1.1.2 Negotiate terrain

* NVG qualified crews: Units continue to improve their ability to fight during hours of darkness. The majority of units have one-hundred percent available NVG aircrews, resulting in greater flexibility in managing 24 hour coverage and fighter management.

* Use of Night Vision Devices (NVDs): Leaders and soldiers are properly wearing NVDs on head/ helmet harness and properly mounting night sights on weapon systems during limited visibility operations. This greatly facilitates movement and security at night. Additionally, soldiers are using their AN/PAQ-4s in conjunction with their NVDs during night engagements to assist in target acquisition.


  1. Key leaders and selected individuals should wear NVDs during night movement.
  2. Soldiers not wearing NVDs should use the off-center scanning technique during movement at night.
  3. Begin wearing NVDs before EENT to assist in the transition during twilight when it is too light to use NVDs but too dark to see without them.
  4. Remember that it takes about two minutes to completely adapt to the dark after removal of the NVDs
  5. Using NVDs inhibits the ability to hear, smell and feel because of the concentration required to use the NVDs effectively.
  6. Integrate NVDs into sector sketches and coverage plans; plan for overlapping NVD coverage at night.
  7. Ensure proper use head/ helmet harnesses; this prevents soldiers having to use their hands to hold NVDs during movement.
  8. Do not wear PVS-7 flush against face with head harness; off-set about 1/4 inch from face to retain peripheral vision at night.
  9. Leaders must enforce AN/PAQ-4 discipline during night movements; AN/PAQ-4s indiscriminately turned on will give away the unit's position to a NVD-equipped enemy. Engage Direct Fire Targets

* Marksmanship: many soldiers now routinely register "kills" at 200 meters and beyond.


  1. Zeroing weapons to any deployment or operation.
  2. Record soldiers zero in the M-16 hand-grip.
  3. Zero all weapons in the ISB before deployment into the area of operation.
  4. Re-zero weapons in the patrol base.
  5. CTC: ensure MILES laser is secured to end of weapon and is cleaned during PCIs.
  6. Practice and enforce good firing positions during all engagements.
  7. Enforce fire control/fire discipline and ammunition management.

1.2.2 Conduct close combat

* Air assault operations: Aviation task forces are conducting increasingly successful battalion-sized air assaults. During execution, the first serial is always "on time-on target." Subsequent serials are frequently ahead of schedule.

Needs Emphasis Prepare for movement

* Pre-Combat Inspections (PCI): Stinger team PCIs are rarely conducted to standard or supervised by key leaders.


  1. PCIs typically verify accountability only, not serviceability.
  2. PCIs are not standardized and are not tailored to specific missions.

RESULT: Dismounted Stinger teams frequently carry excess equipment and fall behind their supported unit.

Technique: Standardize and verify PCI checklists and include them in unit SOPs.

* Pre-combat Inspections - communications equipment: Communications equipment users do not inspect their equipment prior to deployment.

RESULT: Once deployed, users discover missing parts, broken equipment, and/or the incorrect parts packed.

Techniques: PCIs should require complete installation of all communications systems and an operational test in accordance with the equipment TMs.

1.1.3 Navigate

* Land navigation (Use of GPS):


  1. Over dependence upon GPS by too many unit leaders.
  2. Too many leaders fail to use basic map reading and navigational skills, such as terrain association.
  3. Too few leaders conduct detailed map reconnaissance to determine the best covered and concealed routes.

RESULT: When GPS breaks down or there are insufficient satellites available to triangulate a position, units become mis-oriented because they have not been tracking their movement on the map.


  1. Practice basic land navigation skills at Home Station.
  2. Conduct orienteering meets and soldier skill stakes that reinforce this basic task.
  3. When using a GPS, cover it with a poncho when checking grids at night; the back light creates a signature that can be clearly seen from several hundred meters.
  4. Program way points into the GPS to assist in controlling movement.
  5. The FSO should be the only exception to the ban on continual GPS use. He should be continually tracking his position with GPS to facilitate accurate calls for fire.

1.2.2 Conduct Close Combat

* Actions on the objective:

PROBLEM: Most unit plans do not include details about actions on the objective, the most crucial part of the mission.

RESULT: While sufficiently planning and executing maneuver from the line of departure to the probable line of deployment, most attacks culminate in failure because of an uncoordinated assault and poorly synchronized direct and indirect fires.


  1. Use the backward planning technique to plan all attacks. Plan actions on the objective first and then plan back in reverse sequence all other actions.
  2. Begin rehearsals with actions on the objective.
  3. Time is critical. Because actions on the objective are conducted by teams, squads and platoons, specific generic attack battle drills (Drills 1, 1A, 2, 5, 7, and 8) should be rehearsed after the company warning order and before the company operation order.
  4. Non-habitually associated slice elements must be introduced to the offensive planning early; aggressively seek them out and integrate them into your unit quickly.
  5. Conduct aggressive reconnaissance early to confirm or deny the plan. Do not be reluctant to change the plan based on reconnaissance (fight the enemy, not the plan).
  6. Plan and rehearse branches and sequels to actions on the objective to build flexibility into the plan.
  7. Doctrinal references: FM 7-8, pp. 2-58, 4-4; FM 7-10, pp. 4-23 thru 4-25; FM 7-20, pp. 3-32 thru 3-34.

1.2.3 Integrate Direct Fire with Maneuver

* Direct fire planning: Units consistently experience the following problems with direct fire planning and execution:


  1. Weapon positioning that does not optimize systems' effectiveness.
  2. Failure to clear sectors of fire.
  3. Anti-tank engagements inside of the minimum arming range of the weapon system.
  4. Inconsistent use of range cards and sector sketches
  5. Ineffective use of direct fire control measures (e.g. TRPs, trigger lines, engagement priorities and criteria, fire distribution, sector stakes, etc.).

RESULT: Direct fire weapons not being employed to the maximum extent of their effectiveness.


  1. Familiarize leaders at all levels with their weapons capabilities.
  2. Determine where best to kill the enemy; then begin positioning weapons.
  3. Know, based on IPB and wargaming, the enemy's most probable and most dangerous courses of action. Use this information to prioritize engagement areas selection and weapon system emplacement to cover the engagement area.
  4. Train at Home Station, the basic skills essential to direct fire planning: aiming stakes, range cards, sector sketches, and fire control/fire distribution measures (TRPs, maximum engagement lines, trigger lines and fire commands).
  5. Use the six elements to the fire commands (alert, direction, description, range, method of fire, and command to fire) to direct a unit's fire.
  6. Integrate NVDs and illuminating aids into every direct fire plan. Fire control planning is extremely important during limited visibility operations.
  7. Use CALFEXs to build soldier confidence in his weapon and to provide real-time feedback on the integration of direct and indirect fires on a target.
  8. Doctrinal references: FM 7-8, pp. 2-82, 2-158, 5-28 thru 30; FM 7-10, p. 5-10.

Table of Contents
Section I, TA.7 Combat Service Support BOS
Section II, TA.2 Fire Support BOS

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