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6. Mobility and Survivability BOS

* Training proficiency: Engineers continue to perform individual tasks to standard. Most sappers and heavy equipment operators are proficient at Skill Level I tasks.

6.3 Enhance Survivability

* Unit survivability, Field Artillery: Field artillery units are improving survival through careful site selection, effective use of Class IV materiels, and greater threat awareness.


  1. Units use the S2s threat analysis to make decisions on when to occupy a 6400 mil position rather than a treeline position.
  2. Essential Class IV materials are being uploaded and introduced early to facilitate position area hardening.
  3. Emphasize making maximum effective use of available engineer blade time.
  4. Emphasize the effective employment of protective minefields.
  5. Stress the importance of individual weapon marksmanship.

Needs Emphasis

6. Mobility and Survivability BOS

* Battle tracking reporting: Engineer leaders usually do not have an established system to track engineer operations. Reporting is untimely and either incomplete or inaccurate. Problems with reporting procedures are compounded by the lack of communications hardware between the brigade engineer and the task force engineers.

Techniques: Engineer leaders must develop and implement battle tracking systems to improve the tactical decision making process.

  1. TACSOPs must be revised
  2. Engineer leaders must improve knowledge and use of the communications assets normally found within task forces.
  3. Engineer leaders must implement the command and control process addressed in Chapter 2, FM 5-7-30, Brigade Engineer and Engineer Company Combat Operations to improve proficiency. Breach Obstacles

* Combined arms breaching operations:

  1. Commanders and staffs do no apply all five breaching tenets to breaching operations.
  2. Engineers rarely receive any enemy obstacle intelligence (OBSINTEL).
  3. Task forces neither mass nor synchronize their breach/assault efforts at the objective.
  4. Task forces do not conduct effective reverse sequence planning - from the objective to local assembly areas.
  5. The combined arms team does not conduct full force rehearsals.


  1. Task forces must implement into all breaching operations the five breaching tenets: intelligence, breaching fundamentals, breaching organization, mass, and synchronization.
  2. Develop and implement a combined arms breach training program in accordance with FM 90-13-1, Combined Arms Breaching Operations. Facilitate Movement on Routes

* Mobility/combined arms route clearance operations:

  1. Commanders and staffs do not appreciate the significance of the enemy mine threat.
  2. Soldiers lack mine awareness.
  3. Engineers are not proficient at detecting buried mines.
  4. Battalion task forces do not routinely conduct route clearance as a combined arms operation.
  5. Brigade and battalion task forces do not apply the five breaching tenets to route clearance operations.
  6. Engineer leaders and brigade/battalion S2s do not have systems to track OBSINTEL.


  1. Train soldiers to gain and maintain mine awareness.
  2. Use Home Station training opportunities to train route clearance as a combined arms operation.
  3. Modify the SALUTE report to include more detailed information on enemy obstacles.

Procedure: Develop and implement an enemy obstacle marking SOP.

6.2 Provide Countermobility

* Combined arms obstacle integration:

  1. Commanders and staffs do not understand the echelons of obstacle planning and execution.
  2. Obstacle plans neither attack the enemy's ability to maneuver nor multiply the effects and capabilities of firepower.
  3. Engineers continue to emplace point obstacles which the enemy easily bypasses.
  4. Staffs don't understand mine supply operations.
    RESULT: critical resources are seldom delivered on time at the right location.
  5. Task forces continue to plan situational obstacles (MOPMS, Volcano, ADAM/RAAMS) as time driven execution instead of event driven.
  6. Commanders and staffs do not understand the detailed planning process required to execute reserve obstacles.


  1. Engineers must conduct leader training with the combined arms team on obstacle integration. Focus on echelons of obstacle planning and execution (FM 90-7 Combined Arms Obstacle Integration, chapters 4,5).
  2. Task forces must conduct detailed planning for reserve obstacle groups IAW Chapter 7, FM 90-7.
  3. Task forces must conduct situational obstacle (MOPMS, Volcano, and ADAM/RAAMS) planning and execution IAW Chapter 7, FM 90-7.
  4. Engineers must emplace linear obstacles, not just point obstacles.

6.3.2 Employ Operations Security

* C3 site security:

  1. Signal personnel are assigned a general area of defense which is not well defined.
  2. Signal nodes normally take as long as 72 hours to implement a site defense plan.
  1. Brigade and battalion TOC C3 elements are often destroyed by OPFOR from infiltration of the TOC perimeter.
  2. As a result of OPFOR inflicted casualties, signal sites and retrans then, after the fact, emplace a defense.

* Improving BSA defense: Most FSBs do not plan or execute BSA defense operations efficiently.


  1. Planning the defense begins with the arrival at the new site.
  2. FSBs, along with tenant units, should conduct security sweeps and establish hasty security to receive the main body.
  3. Begin to establish the BSA commander's defense plan IAW the priorities of work.
  4. Continue to improve and upgrade the defense based on METT-T.
  5. All units and soldiers within the BSA must become familiar with the FSBs TSOP.
  6. Make maximum use of all available weapon systems to enhance the defense of the "normal" BSA tenants.
EXAMPLE: integrate tanks and IFVs into the plan. If a tank is waiting for mobility parts, but the gun system functions, that tank can be factored into a static defense plan.
NOTE: review JRTC's "Defense of the BSA" video tape.

6.3.4 Provide Security and Readiness

* Force protection: Leaders are not taking all the necessary measures to protect soldiers. There is inconsistent use of active and passive measures to enhance security during offensive and defensive missions.

  1. a lack of LP/OPs and security patrols
  2. improper movement techniques
  3. inadequate fighting positions
  4. lack of dispersion, both during movement and in static position
  5. poor noise, light and litter discipline
  6. no passive air defense
RESULT: the lack of force protection costs many units unnecessary casualties.


  1. Leaders should stress force protection in all training events.
  2. Stress self-discipline since it is directly related to successful force protection.
  3. Train elements how to establish OPSEC, and how to enforce it.
  4. Integrate safety into the planning and execution of all operations.


6.3 Enhance Survivability

* Planning and coordinating chemical unit operations (brigade/battalion): Virtually no planning or coordination is being done between brigade and subordinate battalion staffs for the integration of chemical assets in support of the task force scheme of maneuver. No plans, use of graphics, trigger mechanisms, etc., are discussed or coordinated. Relationships such as OPCON or attached are seldom understood. Chemical unit leaders are often left out of the tactical decision making process, thus, they are unable to provide recommendations during COA development.

RESULT: poor plans/annexes are developed. Many times the chemical unit executes missions without a clear task and purpose.


  1. Chemical units must train at Home Station with the task force and its subordinate elements.
  2. Chemical platoon leaders should attend brigade training meetings just like the slice engineers and ADA units.
  3. Division chemical officers need to take a more active role in chemical unit training, while aggressively training brigade chemical officers on how best to use attached assets.
  4. Brigade and battalion XOs and S3s need to ensure that chemical assets are integrated early in the decision making process.

* NBC information and communication (brigade/battalion task force): While NBC information such as chemical downwind messages or threat intentions are reaching brigade, once there, the information flow stops. Battalions rarely see routine traffic such as chemical downwind messages.

EXAMPLE: during one rotation, several units were unaware that the task force had raised its MOPP status.
RESULT: those units were unprepared when a nerve agent attack occurred. Chemical staffs are not proactive in ensuring this kind of information is disseminated to all subordinate units. Chemical staffs seem to rely on the S2's Intelligence Summaries to do the job, unaware that subordinate chemical staffs and units seldom see these products.


  1. Chemical sections at all levels need to ensure that other staff members, from XO to RTO, are sensitive to what information the chemical officer should review before the information is filed away.
  2. The chemical officer should go through the staff log and talk with his higher counterpart on a regular basis.
  3. Battalion and company sections should not assume that "no news is good news."

* Plan for CDE (brigade/battalion task force): Brigade task forces rarely have a clear picture of the readiness status of their NBC and Chemical Defense Equipment (CDE). Other than the organic unit's initial report at home station, task force TSOPs usually do not have a report mechanism to enable brigade and battalion staffs to maintain a status of critical NBC equipment.


  1. Establish a standard report which can be updated daily between chemical staffs at all levels.
  2. CDE can also be included on daily LOGSTAT reports.

Technique: TRAINING - use critical chemical defense equipment such as M8A1 alarms, CAMS, protective clothing, chemical decontamination equipment, etc., in home station field training. The equipment familiarity gained and the consistent exercise of the reporting system will result in better mission execution and more accurate status reporting.

* Conduct troop leading procedures: Most chemical related missions, such as smoke or decontamination, are performed under hasty conditions. This is the result of the ineffective planning and coordination by the supported units. Those supported units, however, usually have ample time to put together an effective plan and disseminate it to soldiers. Platoon and squad leaders are not using this time effectively. Insufficient training and inadequate SOPs require leaders to spend time training tasks their soldiers should already know, ie. action on contact, ambushes, etc. Junior NCOs are unfamiliar with the procedure to turn a mission concept into a viable plan.

Procedure: Chemical company commanders need to ensure their soldiers have a good TSOP, which includes all possible platoon battle drills.


  1. At Home Station, have platoon and squad leaders devise hasty planning techniques for smoke and decontamination missions. When time is limited, for example, prior to mission execution, the platoon leader should brief the entire platoon instead of the squad leaders, in order to save time.
  2. Teach troop leading procedures down to the junior NCO level.
  3. Platoon sergeants: ensure that squad leaders conduct effective pre-combat inspections.

* Staff coordination (brigade/battalion task force): Other than with the S2 and S3 sections, the chemical staff rarely coordinates with other staff sections, ie. SI, S4, S5, CA/PSYOP, engineer, air defense, etc., on NBC functions and operations.

6.3.2 Employ Operations Security

* Secure and defend unit position (Chemical platoon):

  1. Poorly selected fighting positions
  2. Improperly constructed fighting positions
  3. Wire obstacles not emplaced
  4. Early warning devices not emplaced.

Techniques: Leaders at platoon level must take force protection seriously. Time must be allocated during Home Station training for the following tasks IAW applicable MTPs:

- occupation and security of assembly areas
- perimeter defense Company commanders must establish the standard and allocate time and resources; NCOs must enforce the standards.

Table of Contents
Section II: TA.5 Intelligence BOS Narratives
Section II: TA.7 Combat Service Support BOS Narratives

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