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Organized by BOS, these narratives amplify the bullet listings in Section I. As appropriate and/or available, they provide doctrinal references and techniques and procedures for the needed training emphasis. The narratives are labeled IAW the Blueprint of the Battlefield system for reference and long-term trend development.


Positive Performance

1.1.1 Position/Reposition Forces (Units and Equipment)

* Pick-up zone (PZ) operations: PZ operations have improved considerably during the last two quarters. Contributing factors include:

- limited changes to the Air Movement Table (AMT) after the Air Movement Brief (AMB)
- quality control in checking load rigging
- communications at PZ control
- trained hook-up teams

* Conduct a tactical roadmarch: player units are meeting SP times and following routes specified in the order. They are better at maintaining proper interval and formation until contact is made. Dispersion during movement is generally good.

* Use of night vision goggles (NVGs):there is a significant increase in usage at platoon level over the last two quarters. This results in platoons better able to execute missions during hours of limited visibility.

1.1.2 Negotiate Terrain

* Vehicle maneuver: vehicle maneuver at the section and platoon level continued to improve over the last two quarters. The use of terrain to mask movement and allow mutual support from wingman vehicles has significantly increased. Vehicles use more off-road movement rather than sole reliance on roads.

* Land navigation/movement: Long Range Surveillance Detachment (LRSD) conduct land navigation and movement techniques to standard.


  1. Teams rely heavily on basic skills, such as azimuth and pace count during their movements.
  2. Team members always know their location within 100 meters.
  3. They use GPS to verify their location, but they did not completely rely on GPS.
  4. During movement, team members maintained good dispersion and adapted their movement formations to the terrain and to visibility.
  5. Teams restricted movement during daylight hours.
  6. Team leaders used experienced soldiers at point to enhance command and control.

1.2.2 Conduct Close Combat

* Battle drills: Platoons continue to execute the Knock out a bunker battle drill successfully as part of a movement to contact live-fire exercise. They also successfully execute the Enter and clear a trenchline battle drill during the deliberate attack of a trenchline live-fire exercise. Both missions require soldiers to employ fragmentation grenades to clear bunkers and on entry into and around comers in the trenchline. Platoons have executed these battle drills as specified in FM 7-8.

Needs Emphasis

1.2.2 Conduct Close Combat

* Actions on contact:

  1. Platoons and squads are slow to react to contact.
  2. Units are slow initiating battle drills.
  3. Leaders are not quickly analyzing the situation and issuing clear and concise orders to synchronize their units' reactions.
  4. Platoons and squads solely rely on verbal communications to command and control actions on contact.
RESULT: The enemy is able to gain the initiative on contact and maintain the initiative as they develop the situation.


  1. Focus platoon and squad training on basic battle drills.
  2. Work to reduce reaction time, while building teamwork.
  3. Standardize combat actions, and then train them until elements can unhesitatingly execute the drills to standard.

* Force protection: Force protection continues to be a weakness during ground movements and in the tactical assembly area. Soldiers are not trained in common or individual skills, ie. actions on contact, move under indirect fire, etc. required for force protection. No unity of command is apparent in the attempts to synchronize assembly area defense.


  1. While conducting company and task force FTXs exercise procedures on ground movement, occupation and security of the tactical assembly area.
  2. Put one individual (recommend HHC commander) in charge of the overall assembly area defense.
  3. Develop an R& plan for the assembly area and aggressively patrol the perimeter.
  4. Require aircraft to check the perimeter as they depart and/or return from missions.

* Heavy-team security:

  1. Heavy teams typically are not adapting well to the close terrain and the enemy dismounted threat.
  2. Terrain analysis using OCOKA tends to be weak at company/team level.
  3. Establishing OPs and conducting local security patrols tend to be weak.
RESULT: large numbers of casualties from snipers and from dismounts in "close in" combat.

* Breaching a mined, wire obstacle: Units are not properly executing the principles of SOSR. They do not provide sufficient suppression or obscuration at the point of the breach. Most infantry units are unfamiliar with the battle drill and are taking far too long to execute the breach once members of the engineer squad become casualties.


  1. Units need to train on providing infantry support to the engineers during breaching operations.
  2. Train to be able to provide both local security for the engineers and to assume the engineer's mission if required.
  3. Provide suppressive fire from a base of fire element.
  4. Train to use smoke to obscure the breach site.

* React to contact/ambush: Elements caught in the kill zone of an ambush are not laying an effective base of fire in an attempt to break contact. Platoons are slow to react and often hesitate before sending an element to flank the ambushing element.

RESULT: the ambushing element has time to break contact before it is effectively engaged by the platoon.

Technique: Platoons and squads should rehearse the execution of basic battle drills.

Focus on:
- initial actions on contact
- laying down an effective base of fire
- seeking cover

Leaders must be prepared to rapidly execute these drills in order to be able to flank the ambushing force quickly.

1.2.3 Integrate Direct Fire with Maneuver

* Employment of support by fire element: Leaders are not directing the emplacement of the support by fire element. Platoon maneuver is rarely overwatched by effective fire. At squad and team level, support by fire positions are rarely established. There is also a general lack of knowledge about the M-60 machine gun, evidenced by weak crew drills and little or no operator maintenance.

RESULT: lack of coordination between support and assault elements; most squad maneuver is unsupported.

1.3.1 Control Terrain through Fire or Fire Potential

* Direct Fire Planning: Units at all levels do not take steps to ensure effective direct fires.

  1. inconsistent use of aiming stakes
  2. poor range cards
  3. few sector sketches
  4. very few control measures, ie. TRPs, max engagement lines, fire commands
  5. failures engaging targets at locations leaders direct
  6. direct fire planning not integrated with obstacle plans
  7. poor leaders' reconnaissance
  8. lack of understanding of the mission or the commander's intent


  1. Leaders at all levels must learn the capabilities and limitations of their weapons.
  2. Leaders must learn to employ weapons against targets where the weapons will be effective.
  3. Develop and use control measures that mass fires and control fires in engagement areas.
  4. TRAINING: TEWTs can be effective in leader training for direct fire planning for both offensive and defensive missions.

Table of Contents
Section I: TA.7 Combat Service Support BOS
Section II: TA.2 Fire Support BOS Narratives

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