Military

When will the task organization take effect? (At least narrow it down to before or after LOGPAC.)
What attachments will the task force receive from outside the organization (e.g., GSR, chemical smoke, Fox reconnaissance or decontamination assets, treatment teams from C/FSB, ADA, engineer)? These attachments will affect the entire LOGPAC composition, to include number of meal breaks, fuel trucks, barrier and ammunition packages, etc.

4. If the HHC commander plans to transmit the WARNO using the task force FM A/L net, the CTCP should conduct a net call beforehand, to allow the 1SGs and specialty PSGs to monitor it. If the WARNO is transmitted via MSE, the CTCP must transmit it on the A/L net as soon as possible. By using the brigade Rear CP as an information conduit "shortcut," the logistics WARNO may be the first information the task force receives on the upcoming mission. In any case, the HHC commander becomes a liaison to the brigade from the task force.

5. To be effective, the OPORD produced by the HHC commander must be an aggregation of three sources:

Brigade Service and Support Annex. (Get this early from the brigade Rear CP.)
FSB OPORD. (Get this early from the brigade Rear CP.)
Task force OPORD.

WHO (the task organization).
WHAT (support his task force via echeloned or unit trains, unit or supply point distribution).
WHERE (BSA and MSR locations).
WHEN (attack/defend times, through backward planning gives LOGPAC/LRP times).
WHY (brigade subunit instructions to his task force).

6. Meanwhile, at the task force CTCP, the S4, S1, battalion maintenance officer (BMO) and Medical Platoon Leader issue WARNOs (based on the HHC commander's WARNO) to their platoons and staff sections. They can now answer the following questions and begin preparing a hasty logistics estimate for the upcoming mission analysis:

7. After receiving a heads-up on the mission from the HHC commander, and having completed their logistics estimate, the task force S4 and S1 can now begin their planning phase at the task force CTCP.

The unit main collection point (UMCP).
The battalion aid station (BAS).
The combat trains command post (CTCP) itself.

Point Support Concept: Units move to a central location, such as the LRP or Combat Trains to receive support.
Area Support Concept: Units are tasked (and resourced where necessary) with supporting other units that operate in their vicinity.

Not complicated.
Does not place an additional burden on the TMs.

Instills a great deal of trust by the support units in the 1SGs under which they are operationally controlled.
Gives the Scouts and AD sections a shorter distance to move for hot chow or evacuation by a supporting TM.
Frees those PSGs to concentrate on command rather than focusing solely on CSS of those scattered sections.
Frees the HHC 1SG to concentrate his efforts on either the field trains, the task force Main CP, or any of the far-flung platoons of HHC.
Eliminates the time-consuming "cross-decking" of supplies from the HHC Supply Sergeant's truck to the PSGs at the LRP.
The support platoon leader can supply the combat trains, and the HHC Supply Sergeant (or HHC 1SG) can deliver to the Main CP. This provides the dual benefits of dedicated supply support assets to the CPs, as well as an opportunity for updates between the support platoon leader and S4, and the HHC 1SG and the CSM.

8. Whether an offensive or defensive mission, the S4 uses the information given to him by the HHC commander's WARNO to conduct IPB of the AO, selecting possible locations for logistical control measures throughout the sector to be defended, or the zone or axis of attack.

The S4 can plan LRPs.
The Support Platoon Sergeant can conduct a route reconnaissance of part or all of the proposed MSR.
The HHC XO can reconnoiter future field trains locations or dispersal sites.

9. When the S4 participates in the planning process at the task force Main CP, he should be accompanied by the S1, BMO, and Field Medical Assistant for the mission analysis and remain until the restated mission and commander's guidance are issued. This technique results in good synchronization by the CSS staff, both among themselves and integration with the maneuver staff and also allows them to gain first-hand knowledge of the mission and commander's guidance.

10. The CSS staff can now return to the combat trains to continue their troop-leading procedures with the CTCP crew, the UMCP and the Battalion Aid Station.

Preparation:

MISSION: Deliberate Attack.

• Order bangalore torpedoes now. Do not wait until the task force OPORD to designate the exact company for the mission, and then order the bangalores for the attack or they will never arrive in time. Issue them to whichever company will be assigned to conduct the breach.

• Move the mine rollers or mine-clearing blades to the company team that is tasked with conducting the breach, or the engineer company, or at the very least, to the task force UMCP.

MISSION: Defend.

• Begin now to move Classes IV and V toward the planned BPs and drop it to their rear. Do not wait for eight-digit grids of FSPs and Pre-stock Points (PSPs, or caches). Even if you are off by 5 kilometers, that is still 20 kilometers closer than it was sitting in the BSA. Use the FSB assets, such as PLS or S&P trucks, for the long haul from the BSA to the vicinity of the BP, and then use the Support Platoon's HEMTTs or company supply trucks to move it around the task force AO. Empty or idle trucks are wasted assets as long as they remain in that state.

• Have those mine rollers or mine-clearing blades dropped at a central point (such as the LRP or UMCP) for eventual pickup. Either way, get the blades and rollers off the low-boys as soon as possible to enable the 22-ton trucks to be used to haul other supplies.

• Rehearse to make sure all the players understand their mission.
• Rehearse to find potential execution problems and make adjustments accordingly.
• Rehearse to make sure the plan will work.

Rehearsals are critical to mission success and should be conducted by all of the task force's CSS elements.

1. To assist the task force CSS operators in maximizing their time during the troop-leading procedures, construct a terrain model at the combat trains. Base the model on the knowledge of the mission gained from the CSS staff's participation in the task force planning process. Because the CTCP crew is usually too austere to construct this alone, recommend augmentation by (or delegation to) the BAS to complete this task. As the soldiers in the CTCP and BAS medics are usually not well trained in this skill, cross-training them with the Main CP crew is recommended. The S4 (or S1 if the S4 has not returned from the Main CP) can issue the OPORD to the combat trains personnel using the terrain model, and the BAS and UMCP can subsequently do the same.

2. Another technique is to build the terrain model at the LRP (which is usually in the vicinity of the combat trains). Have the various units of the combat trains "proof" it by conducting their OPORDs and rehearsals on it.

3. Having been issued the OPORD, the CSS operators can begin their reconnaissance in detail. In some cases, rehearsals and reconnaissance can be conducted simultaneously. For example, platoons can rehearse their casualty evacuation drills from the anticipated point of injury and then reconnoiter the route(s) to the platoon and company casualty collection points.

4. If the task force mission is to attack and driving the routes is not possible, the CSS operators at all levels must then rely on other means of reconnaissance and rehearsals. Just as a company commander should bring his platoon leaders and FSO to a vantage point that allows them to identify the locations of the company team's axis of attack, support-by-fire positions, or objectives, so too should the 1SG load up his senior medic and maintenance team chief. The 1SG would concentrate on the casualty collection points, LRPs, evacuation routes, and the like. The soldiers of the combat trains must do the same; because of the decentralized nature of their duties, ambulance section and support platoon supply truck drivers must be included.

5. Participants in a task force rehearsal should include:

• The 1SGs.
• The companies' senior medic.
• The companies' maintenance team chief, the scout, mortar and air defense PSGs.
• The CSM.
• The chaplain.
• The BMO, BMT and recovery section sergeants.
• The medical platoon's surgeon, physician's assistant (PA) and field medical assistant.
• The ambulance section and treatment team sergeants.

6. The task force S4 should conduct the rehearsal, but the S1 or CSM should be prepared to do so in his absence. If the terrain model technique is selected, the best location of the task force CSS rehearsal is at the LRP, beginning about an hour prior to the LOGPAC's arrival.

EQUIPMENT PREPARATION.

1. Preparation of equipment should be conducted concurrently with the LOGPAC. This allows the task force to be postured for its mission in terms of commodities and units at the conclusion of its resupply and has the added benefit of cutting down on "moving parts."

2. To augment the ambulances in the BAS, company supply trucks can be tasked as non-standard evacuation vehicles. This can be accomplished by dropping off one of the two company trucks at the return LRP for pick up by a leader from the BAS. The implied task is that all the personnel and equipment needing to be back-hauled to the BSA is cross-leveled from the tasked truck so it will be ready to transport patients IAW FM 8-10-6, Medical Evacuation in a Theater of Operations, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. Use the trucks to transport patients from the BAS to the BSA, or to augment the ambulance section in evacuating casualties from the Company Teams' collection points to the BAS.

3. The technique of augmenting the BAS with supply trucks can be emulated at the company team level.

4. As part of combat trains preparation, the S4 should assemble the fuel and ammunition trucks to form the emergency resupply. This can be accomplished upon the return of the LOGPAC to the LRP.

For an offensive mission, one fuel truck and one ammunition truck per company team are best as this allows all the units to be refueled and rearmed simultaneously during a pause in the attack. Load at least one truck with mortar ammunition as well.
The drivers of the trucks must be carefully briefed, using the combat trains sand table, as they will be expected to be sent individually across a battlefield to find a company that may be engaged with the enemy.
Each pair of trucks is assigned in support of a designated company and teamed up with that unit's supply truck (in the combat trains for the non-standard casualty evacuation role). This will greatly ease the burden of the truck drivers so they can concentrate on a single unit's planned axis of advance. This will also help the supported 1SG as well by letting him know for which vehicles he should be looking. To help the 1SGs identify the trucks, an 8" X 10" metal placard or acetated construction paper can be attached to the bumper or in the window, respectively, with the company's color code (use chemlights at night).

5. The S4 should integrate the combat trains into the fire plan of the task force. Sectors of fire and observation are delineated to the subordinate parts of the combat trains.

Vehicles in the UMCP should be placed where they can cover likely avenues of approach and fulfill their part of the task force R&S plan. The covering of mounted, dismounted, and air avenues of approach are assigned to those vehicles whose main and secondary armaments, sights and crews are operational.
Combat vehicles that are down for automotive reasons can be powered via slave cables from tool trucks, generators or vehicles with inoperable armament.

The combat trains (or "support teams") are assigned sectors of observation and fire in the same manner as a platoon or company. The UMCP CP controls these actions by requiring the crews of evacuated vehicles to report their mechanical, personnel and supply status upon their arrival, and assigning tasks based upon these reports.
Special skills (master gunner, combat lifesaver, etc.) of crewmen can be utilized by the BMS/BMT, and shortages of supplies of fuel, ammunition or Class VIII can be made good by assets in the combat trains.
Crews of inoperable vehicles in the UMCP can serve as OPs, patrols, litter bearers, EPW guards, and augmentation for NBC decontamination teams and patient decontamination teams.
An empty pallet ("honeycomb") for tank main gun ammunition should be kept in the UMCP to allow downloading of vehicles needing turret or electrical repair.
Crews of vehicles that have been repaired must again report to the UMCP CP and be given a full briefing (to include issue of operations overlay) on the tactical situation before they are returned to duty. This prevents the crew, who is eager to get back into the fight, from driving into a minefield, chemical strike, etc. The UMCP should notify the vehicle's parent 1SG of its imminent return and ensure that the returning crew does a radio check with him prior to departure.
The BMO must establish cut-off times whereby vehicles will no longer be repaired and are either readied to fight, evacuated or rigged for demolition. The disposition of the crews of those vehicles must be part of the unit's SOP.
Requirements for extra towing vehicles or HET lift must be identified by the BMO to the S4 so that the latter may request the assets from the FSB SPO.

Based on the Threat COA developed by the S2, the S4 and Medical Officer designate which treatment team will handle contaminated casualties.
The task force decontamination equipment and operators must be positioned forward early enough to take part in at least the CSS rehearsal.
Personnel to augment the task force's patient and vehicle decontamination points must be identified and trained. Augmenting personnel can include crews of vehicles in the UMCP, as well as the cooks and KPs who can come forward from the field trains on the LOGPAC. As early as possible, the HHC commander should take control of any brigade decontamination assets that are task-organized to support the task force. He should either send them forward with the task force decontamination operators or with the LOGPAC.
Push all assets as far forward as early as possible to maximize their time to rehearse and reconnoiter.

Execution:

Seize a motarized rifle company-prepared defensive position to allow a second task force to envelop the remainder of the MRB.

A balanced task force will conduct a deliberate attack. The attack is a four-phased operation: Phase I is reconnaissance and infiltration; Phase II is from the Line of Departure (LD) to occupation of SBF positions; Phase III is the breach, and Phase IV is consolidation and reorganization. The attack is preceded by 36 hours by the infiltration of the Scouts and COLTs to gain reconnaissance and surveillance of the objective.

Phase I: The Scouts and COLTs cross the LD and move along planned infiltration routes to their planned observation posts (OPs). The S4 has planned for Casualty Collection Points (CCPs) along the infiltration route based upon the S2's template, and the medical platoon leader has located the CCPs in the vicinity of where the Scouts nor the COLTs are likely to make contact. The Scouts plan to recover their casualties to these points for treatment and further evacuation. (See Phase I diagram.)

Techniques:

• A BAS (-) Advanced Trauma Management Team accompanies the infiltration and establishes a concealed first-echelon care point at the CCP nearest the LD. From this point, patients can be stabilized for either evacuation or held until the task force catches up in its attack. Evacuation of patients from the CCP, if not by internal assets, can be either by air or from assets of the forward-most company team. Implied tasks: A planned cross-FLOT operation with SEAD, AD status changes, et al.

• The ground option requires tasking the lead company team and reinforcing the trains with at least an ambulance, in the same manner as the screening company team in the "area support" concept discussed earlier. The company team commander should plan this as a combat operation in the form of a raid, and either escort the evacuation vehicle with a tank or BFV platoon or by using M2s to evacuate the patients. These are not simply "dust-offs." They are complex combat operations requiring detailed combined arms planning.

• If half of a task force's advanced trauma management capability (the surgeon or PA) is committed to establishing a BAS (-) Advanced Trauma Management Team (or any other task that will prevent it from providing care to the task force mission), then the S4 must immediately request an augmenting aid station from the FSB. The HHC commander must closely follow this up and facilitate the augmenting aid station's move forward from the BSA to the task force BAS(-).

• Prior to LD (as early as the previous day's LOGPAC), the "two support teams" move to their positions in the assembly area or attack position. This will allow the support teams to be in place to provide support to the company teams and platoons prior to LD. Some tanks will inevitably need to be topped off, and enemy phase I or counter fires may cause casualties.

Phase II: The task force crosses the LD in its box formation, the "support teams" following the trail company teams. The S4 has planned along the axis of advance MSR/ASRs and "support team" locations, the CSS graphic control measures each having a task and purpose to support the maneuver graphics. (See Phase II diagram.)

Techniques:

• Actions at these locations will include security by all (sectors designated for air and ground search on the move are maintained or adjusted).

• The treatment team marks a hasty LZ.

• Casualties of personnel and vehicles during this phase will be evacuated to a single, designated "support team" to allow the other team to continue to move with the task force main body toward the objective.

• When the company teams maneuver into the support-by-fire (SBF) positions, at least one of the support teams is set up to their rear. From here this support team will push forward Class V and receive any casualties. The other support team will continue to handle the casualties suffered along the axis of advance. Once the patients are evacuated from that support team's treatment team, it can join the assault force for actions on the objective.

Phase III: The task force begins its actions to reduce the obstacles at the objective, and its "support team" joins the assault force. (See Phase III diagram.)

Techniques:

• As the assault force attacks and clears the objective, the support team moves through the lane to sustain it.

• The recovery section recovers damaged vehicles from the lane to maintain the assault's momentum. It is especially critical for the assault force to maintain combat power once it seizes the objective as the enemy may close the lane via FASCAM or chemical strike, counterattack, or both.

• The other support team continues to sustain the task force elements on the friendly side of the lane and prepares to assist the forward passage of the remainder of the brigade.

• Vehicles and positions that have been hit and contain casualties must be marked. The brigade should have a SOP for marking positions and vehicles. The two techniques used most commonly at the CTCs are:
  1) Mark the presence of casualties. To do this, the crew or squad raises a flag or panel to advertise the presence and category of casualties to guide the treatment or evacuation vehicles to their location.

  Advantage: The presence of the marker attracts attention, day or night, to the location of casualties. A simulated battlefield has flashing MILES lights and other ROE effects, whereas an actual combat-damaged vehicle may not be so obvious, particularly from the rear, and so must be clearly marked.

  Drawbacks:

  The crew or squad should focus on the battle drill of treat and evacuate and not on marking the vehicle.
  If the marker is not removed (in the haste to evacuate, particularly if under fire), subsequent evacuation assets will continue to investigate the position and waste time.
  The crew or squad may be unable to mark their position because they are all too badly injured, or the marker is lost or destroyed.
  The crew's current position or situation makes raising a flag tactically unsound.

  2) Mark vehicles or positions that have been cleared of casualties.

  Advantage: Marking cleared vehicles/positions allows the ambulance crews to concentrate on those that still have casualties.

Phase IV: The support teams rejoin to form the combat trains on the objective. (See Phase IV diagram.)

Techniques: Support teams continue to:

• Treat and evacuate casualties.
• Recover and repair vehicles.
• Replenish empty fuel tanks and ammunition racks.

Foreword

RSO& Operations for the MSB and the CSB