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The METL in FM 100-6 for the IO Cell includes establishing C2-Attack targeting and Battle Damage Assessment (BDA).(16)Information operations pose a unique challenge to the IO Cell in conducting BDA because the effects of C2W on the enemy C2may not be in the form of physical damage. Instead, the effects may well be trends, activities, and patterns in future adversary actions.(17)BDA in IO is also known as "measures of effectiveness" or MOE. TFE was challenged to develop MOE which could assess the effectiveness of IO on "soft" target C2-Attack.

C2-Attack operations can be both "hard" and "soft" kill in effect.(18)"Hard kill" operations imply physical destruction with the application of lethal combat power, while "soft kill" operations achieve effects in attitudes and decisions. In peace operations, C2-Attack operations will primarily be "soft kill" operations. The Information Operations Working Group, the IO Cell for Task Force Eagle, developed procedures to monitor the effectiveness of the radio component of the IO Campaign, a "soft kill" operation.

The MOE which TFE developed for "soft kill" IO C2-Attack operations relied on subjective approach to assessing BDA, because IO planners needed to assess the emotions and attitudes of the target audiences. One MOE technique used was to interview the element which disseminated the IO message to get their impressions as to how the message was received, and whether the intended effect was achieved. Another MOE technique employed was to observe the actions of the intended target audience to verify that it responded to the IO message as intended. Interviewing random or selected members of the target audience for the reaction to the IO message is yet another method for measuring its effectiveness.(19)And lastly, monitoring the media of dissemination to ensure the message was transmitted is yet another method to measure whether the message reached the target audience. This last technique is explained in detail below, as it was applied to Radio PSYOP which used local radio stations to broadcast prepared IO messages in the local language.

During Operation JOINT GUARD, an "affiliate network" of 43 local radio stations within the MND-N Area of Operations disseminated information, in the form of SFOR and TFE press releases, and PSYOP messages.(20)The network covered most of the AO and included stations that were marketed toward each of the three FWFs. Many of the stations in the affiliate network provided this service at no cost to TFE and were receptive to reading the PSYOP-scripted messages, play the pre-recorded music tapes with Euro-pop, or use the press releases provided by the PSYOP Task Force (POTF). Some stations, mostly in the Republika Serpska, had to be induced into playing the tapes and scripts with payments of about 9 DM per minute.

The majority of radio stations in RS were state-controlled, while those in the Bosnian Federation were privately-owned. PSYOP products delivered over the radio waves consisted of PSYOP scripts to be read by the on-air announcer, pre-recorded music shows with PSYOP messages interspersed in the music segments, and Coalition Press Information Center (CPIC) and SFOR press releases. Live interviews with MND-N TF Commanders and live talk shows involving the local people discussing themes important to SFOR were two more means of using radio as a way to support the IO Campaign.

At the direction of the Commander Task Force Eagle (COMEAGLE), the IOWG developed a procedure to measure the level of compliance of the radio stations playing the scripted messages and pre-recorded programs. Live broadcasts of Commander interviews were verified on-site and required no monitoring program. The program developed sought to answer the following questions:

• Are the radio stations playing the messages provided?
• What is the message clarity? Are the messages being modified in any way?
• Is the target audience receiving the message?
• What is the credibility of the station (i.e., does it have a reputation for honest reporting which gives equal treatment for all sides)?

The IOWG was limited in its courses of action (COAs) for compliance-monitoring as it had limited assets with which to conduct the monitoring effort. The COA selected was to monitor three-five selected stations per week and conduct listener surveys. The stations were prioritized into three categories. First priority stations were those which TFE had to "pay for play," second priority stations were those marketing to key audiences, and third priority stations were all others.

The monitoring elements for TFE were the PSYOP Brigade PSYOP Support Elements (BPSEs) and Tactical PSYOP Teams (TPTs), the Joint Commision Observers (JCOs) under the direction of the Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE), and the G-2 Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) teams and Force Protection Teams (FPTs). The IO Cell produced the weekly FRAGO that assigned the monitoring elements the specified tasks. The PSYOP elements were tasked to conduct surveys of the target audiences of the radio stations being evaluated and, when possible, have supporting interpreters monitor the radio stations as part of the collection effort. The SOCCE was directed to have the JCO teams in the vicinity of the target radio station being evaluated monitor the station and document the accuracy of the messages and instances of false reporting or biased treatment of the issues. The G-2 OSINT and FPTs were directed to monitor specified stations in the same manner as the JCOs.

With these procedures, the IOWG was able to monitor and measure the effectiveness of the Radio component of the Information Campaign. Based on the results obtained, the DPSE could commend those stations which demonstrated compliance, and criticize those not in compliance, or, in the cases of "pay for play," withhold payment.

The technique employed by the TFE IOWG had the minimum impact on operations, using the same approach used to inspect weapons storage sites on a scheduled basis. Prioritizing the radio stations by category facilitated focusing the monitoring efforts on the high-payoff targets first. By providing feedback on radio operations, the DPSE could modify tactics, techniques and procedures where necessary to improve effectiveness. By monitoring radio station performance, the DPSE could ensure compliance for paid and free programming. The listener surveys provided feedback on whether or not the target audience was being reached. The figure below shows the number of PSYOP radio messages aired over a one-week period and the category of the messages.

"Given the advances in technology.it is easy to become awash in data. For this reason, a critical aspect of IO is getting the relevant information and intelligence (RII) that enables commanders to focus their efforts. Information operations are predicated on the right person receiving the right information in the right place and at the right time."(21)

Effective IO requires the fusion of information from a variety of sources. Technological advances in command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems (C4ISR) confer an unprecedented ability to collect information from the battlespace. "The Army has transitioned from a time when the commander fought for information to a time when the commander is inundated with data even before he begins to fight for needed information. Information flow within the organization is complex yet vital to creating a clear picture for the commander. Optimum information flow within the organization requires both speed and clarity of transfer without creating an overabundance of fragmented or useless data. The organization designs an information management plan (IMP) to establish responsibilities and provide instructions on managing information."(22)

Information management has both procedural/organizational and technical aspects. From a procedural/organizational perspective, our ability to generate vast amounts of information from C4ISR systems and reporting will make identification of the CCIR, PIR, routine unit status information, and the other kinds of information needed to make decisions more important to focus both collection and reporting.(23)Establishing effective procedures for managing and displaying reports and information inputs can reduce the phenomenon of "information overload" and improve C2. Several BCTP Warfighter exercises have shown that C2problems experienced by division staffs are often attributed to information processing and management.(24)

From a technical perspective, "managing information includes managing the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS); deciding what sources and systems to use; ensuring a reliable flow of information between nodes and levels (horizontal and vertical integration); and resolving differences among information from multiple sources."(25)In peace operations where the force is multi-national in composition, information managers must establish a means and a plan to provide the RCP to all forces. Partners of the multi-national force with incompatible or less advanced C4systems may require interpreters, liaison officers (LOs), or augment these partners with equipment, operators and support to maintain the RCP effectively.(26)

Effective Information Management from both the procedural/organizational and technical aspects will enable the commander to fully leverage the capabilities of his INFOSYS to achieve information superiority and control the situation.

This template for planning, implementing, and evaluating IO focuses on the "perception management" piece of IO, also known as the "soft kill." C2-Attack operations can be both "hard" and "soft" kill in effect.(27)"Hard kill" operations imply physical destruction with the application of lethal combat power, while "soft kill" operations achieve effects in attitudes and decisions. In peace operations, C2-Attack operations will primarily be "soft kill" operations.

IO Process

The IO process is a 12-step method that forms a template for planning, implementing, and evaluating IO. In applying this process, the reader should keep in mind that what Joint Pub 3-58 says of deception planning is true of the IO Process: "Although diagrams of planning processes are useful in aiding the understanding of the individual elements of the process, it must be remembered that processes are seldom as linear as diagrams or flow charts may imply. Planners must be prepared to respond to the dynamics of the situation and of their own headquarters." What follows are the 12 steps that the IO cell and the IOWG must follow to achieve effective Information Operations.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES

1. Analyze the Mission. The Division IO officer (this may be the LIWA FST Commander) and his cell analyze the mission to determine the military and political objectives and commander's intent. The IO cell collects all available Relevant Information and Intelligence (RII) and begins to formulate the questions that will need to be answered. If not already created, the G2 develops an IO Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. The Division IO Officer presents the work the IO cell completed to the Information Operations Working Group (IOWG). The other members of the IOWG analyze the mission to determine how they can best contribute to achieve the commander's objectives. In the IOWG, the LIWA FST Commander serves as a facilitator. His task is to exploit the creativity, talent, and experience of all the members. It is a team effort. And, although following the IOWG meetings the members will go back to their individual work sites to plan and manage their activities, it is through the IOWG that the Division IO Officer gains synergy by ensuring that IO is fully coordinated and synchronized. For the rest of the IO process, the reader can assume that the steps are carried out by the IOWG functioning as a team.

2. Seek RII. Relevant Information and Intelligence (RII) is the key to effective IO. It is needed to plan, implement, monitor, and evaluate. The G2 representative is the IO officer's link to RII. The IOWG develops Request for Intelligence (RFI), which the G2 representative works. He ensures RFIs are properly submitted, monitored, and answered, providing feedback to the IOWG. This does not mean the other members can sit back and wait for the "answers." They will be using their sources to collect RII. PSYOP, Civil Affairs (CA), CI, and SOCCE teams in the field will be collecting RII. The IO cell is aggressively exploiting the unclassified internet and the various military nets. The POLAD also has sources. The PAO will provide the IOWG with information on the media environment in which friendly forces are operating. Maintenance contact teams, logistics teams, engineers, reconnaissance elements, and Infantry and Military Police patrols are exploited for RII. The point is that the myriad of sources are fully exploited, and RII is shared within the IOWG.

3. Determine IO Objectives. An IO objective is a specific and operational statement regarding the desired accomplishments of the IO program. For each IO objective, the planner strives to use strong verbs, states only one purpose or aim, specifies a single end-product or result, and specifies the expected time for achievement.(28)It is important to remember that the closer the objectives are to outcomes that can be directly measured, the more likely it is that a competent evaluation will result. Using our scenario, the IO cell determines as an IO objective the following: "Within 90 days, dissuade the populace of town X from rioting." Dissuade is the strong verb. The IOWG has the one aim of dissuading the populace from rioting, and the specified outcome is the lack of rioting - the outcome that can be easily measured. The populace either riots or they do not. This IO objective becomes the overarching objective for each of the IOWG members. They will develop objectives for their individual elements of C2W and Public Affairs (PA) and Civil Affairs (CA).

4. Determine Objectives for Each Element. The IO Staff Officer needs to know what the objectives of the elements of C2W and PA and CA are and how they will aid in achieving the overarching IO objectives. Although members will come to the IOWG with objectives already in mind, it is important to go through a brainstorming process. Brainstorming takes up valuable time, but is time well spent. It fosters team ownership of the objectives; it provides a sanity check; and it allows the members to know each other's intent, creating opportunities for synergy. Brainstorming will ensure that the IO and the elements' objectives are clear, distinct, and focused, and, more importantly, will assist the members in understanding the connectivity between the elements' objectives and the overarching IO objective.

A PSYOP objective might be: Inform the target audience of the ramifications of any rioting. If ramifications include military response, it is imperative that the military and diplomatic agencies are capable and have the resolve to follow through on the military actions. This example illustrates why PSYOP themes must be approved by higher headquarters. (The approval process should not be that cumbersome. The objectives and themes for PSYOP, deception, and the other pillars of C2W will be rolled into the IO program, which can easily be shown to support the CINC's IO campaign plan.) One might argue that "inform" is not a strong verb, and, admittedly, "inform" is a long way from "dissuade," but to simply inform is a necessary step toward achieving the IO objective, and is measurable. The military deception objective might be: Convince the target audience that certain areas will be heavily patrolled and monitored by ground and air assets. When in reality, the friendly assets are not available to conduct such operations as described. Electronic Warfare (EW) might have the objective to "Degrade and disrupt the capability of faction leaders to communicate electronically during a certain period of time." The time might be triggered by some event that indicates rioting is imminent. It must be remembered that the purpose of these objectives is to achieve the IO objective. Achieving an individual element's objective and not achieving the IO objective is a failure for the IOWG.

5. Identify IO Targets. The IO cell identifies IO targets and presents this list to the IOWG for additions and deletions; other IOWG members will have targets that the IO cell did not have. Targets will, of course, be quite diverse. They could be key communicators, a certain segment of the population, or a set of radio towers that are being used to encourage people to riot. The probability of success is increased if a target can be attacked by more than one pillar of C2W.

6. Obtain Detailed Information about the Target Audience. As a minimum, RII about the target audience should consist of the following:

• Political agendas.
• Biographic information.
• Decisionmaking processes.
• Demographic information: age, sex, race, religion, economic income, cultural likes and dislikes.
• The target's perceptions of friendly capabilities and possible courses of action.
• The target's IO capabilities and processes.
• Estimates of target's actions under differing scenarios.
• How the audience prefers to send, and especially to receive, their information, e.g., what percentages come from TV, Radio, and newspapers respectively?

PSYOP personnel are trained in target audience analysis -- the process by which potential target audiences are identified and analyzed for effectiveness, accessibility, and susceptibility. This type of analysis prepares the IOWG for the next step -- developing themes.

7. Develop Friendly Information Themes.Army psychological operations doctrine defines a theme as a subject, topic, or line of persuasion used to achieve a psychological objective.(29)Themes to use and avoid will often be passed down from higher. However, that is not to say themes could not be developed at the Land Component level. The SFOR Information Campaign Themes during the fall of 1997 and Operation JOINT GUARD were:

• The Establishment of a Secure Environment;
• Demining;
• Economic Recovery;
• The Rights of Displaced Persons, Refugees and Evacuees (DPREs);
• Acceptance of Election Results;
• The Proper Roles and Conduct of Civilian Police Forces;
• Arms Control; and
• Common Institutions supported by the Dayton Peace Accord.(30)

PSYOP personnel have the skills, expertise, and experience to develop themes. But again, as with objectives, themes should be discussed within the IOWG for possible improvement and to ensure that all members are thoroughly familiar with them. Examples of possible themes include: "Peaceful protests is the appropriate way to communicate your desire for political change." "Violence will be met with force to protect lives and property." "Rioting will delay and possibly stop the rebuilding of roads and homes and the inflow of economic aid."

It is important to remember that IO themes are not necessarily PSYOP themes. Providing the right piece of information to the right audience with the purpose of reinforcing or creating perceptions or to cause ambiguity is the goal. However, thinking in terms of themes allows the IOWG to develop, identify and create that "right piece" of information.

8. Identify Pressure Points. A pressure point is an important, essential, or primary factor that can be influenced to control behavior. As with objectives and themes, the IO officer should facilitate an IOWG discussion with the purpose of identifying pressure points and ways that they can best be exploited. If the local population desperately needs economic aid, then such aid is a pressure point. In this case then, IO should communicate the message that the delivery of aid will depend on whether or not the political leaders support democracy.

9. Develop Measures of Effectiveness (MOE). Developing MOE for IO is, in my opinion, the most difficult step in the IO process. Without MOE, the IOWG will not be able to evaluate the effectiveness of the IO program. A commander has the right and the responsibility to ask his IO staff officer this simple question: "How do we know this IO stuff is helping me achieve my overall objectives?" Thus, the IOWG needs to build MOE into the IO plan so that the following three critical metrics can be measured:

• Effectiveness. Describes the relationship between outputs and objectives.Were the IO objectives achieved? If not, why not?

• Efficiency. Describes the relationship of inputs and outputs. Although the IO program may have been effective, could there have been ways to accomplish it quicker and cheaper?

• Adaptability. Describes the ability of the IOWG to respond to changing demands. Was there sufficient flexibility to adjust a PSYOP program or deception plan to react to an unexpected event?

MOE can be classified as either quantitative or qualitative. "Quantitative methodology assumes the necessity, desirability, and even the possibility of applying some underlying empirical standard to social phenomena. By way of contrast, qualitative methodology assumes that some phenomena are not amenable to numerical mediation.(31)

10. Quantitative Research is Desirable When:

• A picture of the environment at a given point in time is needed.
• Data that can be projected to a larger universe is needed.
• The target audience is difficult to reach.
• A large amount of specific information from the target audience is sought.
• The data must be statistically representative of a very large geographic area.
• Modifications need to be made in an idea before it is finalized.
• Very fast feedback from the targeted audience is needed.
• The research budget is limited.
• There is a need to probe deeply into the cause of some observed behavior.(32)

The point here is that different kinds of assessments require different types of MOE. The IOWG should not get locked into thinking that if MOE are not quantifiable they are of no use.

11. Write the IO Plan. With the information obtained thus far, the IO cell is now ready to write the IO plan. The written document might be in the format of an IO Annex to a CONPLAN or OPLAN. In addition, the IO cell uses a series of worksheets, matrices, and giant charts to record and display objectives, pressure points, tasks, milestones, and timelines. Products used in TFE IO included:

• Pressure Point Identification Worksheet (PPIW). The PPIW provides the IO planner with a systematic way to identify ways to influence target audiences.

• IO Planning Worksheet (PW). The IO planner uses the PW to determine how and when to influence each pressure point.

• Synchronization Matrix (SM). The SM is used to deconflict and synchronize IO activity.

• IO Implementation Worksheet (IW). The IW is used to record additional information about each IO event found on the SM. In addition to identifying the attack "subsystem," the worksheet identifies the specific information themes that will be used for each IO audience.

• IO Implementation Matrix (IM). The IM chronologically lists all IO executions for each IO function. Information from the IM is carried forward to the optional IO Implementation Graphic.

12. Implement and Monitor the IO Campaign Plan. During this step, the plan is executed. The plan is monitored and feedback begins to be collected. The collection of RII continues. A Synchronization Matrix is used to deconflict and synchronize IO activity. The members of the IOWG are constantly using RII, MOE, and feedback to evaluate the effectiveness of their individual activities, allowing them to fine-tune the plan and adjust to unexpected events. The focus is on coordinating, adapting, and achieving synergy.

1. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Field Manual 100-6, Information Operations, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 27 August 1996), p. D-0.

2. David L. Grange, Maj. Gen., U.S. Army, and James A. Kelley, Col., U.S. Army, "Information Dominance," Army, March 1997, p. 37.

3. Craig Jones, Lt. Col. (Ret.), U.S. Army, "The IO Process," News from the Front!, Center for Army Lessons Learned, March-April 1998, pp. 1-8.

4. Center for Army Lessons Learned, B/H CAAT V Initial Impressions Report - Task Force Eagle Transition, (Unclassified, Distribution Limited, Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL), May 1997, p. 22.

5. Ibid., p. 6-7.

6. Ibid.

7. Jeffrey P. Jones and Michael P. Mathews, "PSYOP and the Warfighting CINC," Joint Forces Quarterly," Summer 1995, No. 8, p. 32.

8. Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA), Introduction to Information Campaign Planning and Execution, Student Materials prepared for the LIWA by SYTEX Inc., Vienna, VA, May 1998.

9. Center for Army Lessons Learned, B/H CAAT XIII, Initial Impressions Report (DRAFT), (Unclassified, Distribution Limited, Fort Leavenworth, KS: In Press), June 1998, CALLCOMS observation 10000-85008.

10. See Observation: "Task Force Eagle's DTOC is not organized like a normal heavy division's TOC," Center for Army Lessons Learned, BH CAAT 2 Initial Impressions Report, (Unclassified, Distribution Limited, Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL), September 1996, p. C-67.

11. See Center for Army Lessons Learned, B/H CAAT 3-4 Initial Impressions Report, (Unclassified, Distribution Limited, Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL), March 1997, p. 5.

12. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Information Operations, Field Manual 100-6, 27 August 1996, p. D-2.

13. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Student Text 101-5, Command and Staff Decision Processes, Fort Leavenworth, KS: CGSC Press, 20 February 1996, p. 4-20.

14. Ibid., p. 4-7.

15. Ibid., pp. 4-20 to 4-21.

16. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Information Operations, Field Manual 100-6, op. cit., p. D-3.

17. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, Field Manual 34-1, op. cit., p. 7-2. See also, Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Information Operations, Field Manual 100-6, op. cit., p. 4-7.

18. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Information Operations, Field Manual 100-6, op. cit., p. 2-4.

19. Center for Army Lessons Learned, B/H CAAT XIII, Initial Impressions Report (DRAFT), (Unclassified, Distribution Limited, Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL), In Press, June 1998, CALLCOMS observation 10000-29594.

20. The collection of radio stations was not a network in the sense that they were under one controlling authority; rather, they represented that portion of available radio stations which cooperated with the DPSE-managed PSYOP radio message program. The "network" included stations representing all three of the FWFs, and expanded as the DPSE was able to induce radio station owners or managers to cooperate.

21. David L. Grange, Maj. Gen., U.S. Army, and James A. Kelley, Col., U.S. Army, "Information Dominance," Army, March 1997, p. 34.

22. Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (formerly Corps and Division Doctrine Directorate), U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Operations, Field Manual 100-5, Final Draft, 5 August 1997, Chapter 19, "Information Operations," p. 19-3.

23. James M. Dubik, Col., U.S. Army, Creating Combat Power for the 21st Century, The Land Warfare Papers, Arlington, VA.: Association of the United States Army, Institute of Land Warfare, No. 25, October 1996, p. 6.

24. Thomas D. Morgan, Lt. Col. (Ret.), U.S. Army, "BCTP: Training Leaders," Military Review, July 1990, Vol. LXX, No. 7, pp. 42-52.

25. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Information Operations, Field Manual 100-6, op. cit., p. 2-13.

26. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, The Army in Multinational Operations, Field Manual 100-8, op. cit., p. A-4.

27. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Information Operations, Field Manual 100-6, op. cit., p. 2-4.

28. Peter H. Rossi and Howard E. Freeman, Evaluation, Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE Publications, 1982, p. 59.

29. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Psychological Operations, Field Manual 33-1, (Unclassified, Distribution Limited), op. cit., p. Glossary 12.

30. Center for Army Lessons Learned, B/H CAAT XI, Initial Impressions Report, (Unclassified, Distribution Limited, Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL), April 1998, p. A-18, CALLCOMS observation 10000-13978.

31. Michael Quinn Patton, Utilization-Focused Evaluation, Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE Publications, 1978, p. 212.

32. Thomas L. Greenbaum, The Handbook for Focus Group Research, New York, NY: Lexington Books, 1993, p. 30.

Chapter Six, IO Staff Organization, Actions, Processes, and Products, Part 1

Acknowledgements