SECTION IV - NEEDS EMPHASIS TRENDS
INTELLIGENCE BOS (TA.5) (cont)
TREND 3
SUBJECT: Threat Evaluation and ECOA Development
| Observation frequency: | 1-2QFY96 | 3-4QFY96 | 1-2QFY97 | 3-4QFY97 | 1-2QFY98 |
| 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
3-4QFY97
OBSERVATION 1: Task force (TF) S2s are often coming to LTP with a rudimentary knowledge of OPFOR composition and tactics. (TA.5.1)
DISCUSSION:
1. Planning processes are continually slowed down because of lengthy discussions on how the OPFOR fights.
2. Lack of a thorough knowledge of OPFOR doctrine adversely affects battle tracking during execution because the S2s have difficulty trying to identify the "big picture."
OBSERVATION 2: TF S2s have difficulty developing complete enemy COAs to assist the commander and staff to visualize how the enemy will fight using combat multipliers and the terrain. (TA.5.4.2)
DISCUSSION:
1. Mission analysis is frequently rushed by the TF. S2s usually have the competence, but often do not have sufficient time to complete their products.
2. Very few S2s are able to develop multiple enemy COAs or threat models.
3. S2s too often do not incorporate all threat combat multipliers and the terrain in the enemy COA.
1-2QFY98
OBSERVATION 1: Light infantry task force staffs are often unfamiliar with enemy tactics and composition. (TA.5.2.1.1)
DISCUSSION: S2s and staff members struggle with the current threat model throughout their planning exercise.
OBSERVATION 2: Task force S2s seldom develop several enemy courses of action (COAs). (TA.5.4.2)
DISCUSSION:
1. Most often this problem is not due to a lack of competence on the part of the S2, but rather a result of a restricted planning timeline. S2s are allowed sufficient time to develop only one threat COA, and the staff has no appreciation for the various avenues of approach or forms of contact available to the enemy.
2. The enemy often executes a COA that the task force has not planned for. When this occurs, the task force does not have the systems in place to defeat the threat and is unable to react in a timely manner.
for Threat Evaluation and ECOA Development
1. S2s should deploy to the NTC with a comprehensive knowledge of how the OPFOR fights. There are several Krasnovian threat documents available through LTP, the OPFOR, CALL Quarterly Bulletin 97-4, Decision Point Tactics, TRADOC Pamphlet 350-16, and FM 100-60.
2. Commanders must familiarize their staffs to understand the Krasnovian threat prior to an NTC deployment.
3. The task force S2 should coordinate with the brigade S2 for early receipt of the situation template (SITEMP) to allow for more time to develop task force level threat COAs.
4. The S2 must use a checklist to cover all combat multipliers, identifying the capabilities of enemy ADA, indirect fires, and engineers on the SITEMP. This will help the task force plan for various encounters with threat forces during the battle.
5. S2 sections must practice SITEMP drills at Home Station so that SITEMPs are produced quickly to address all forms of contact and battlefield conditions.
6. Develop numerous threat COAs on concept sketches to give the battle staff an opportunity to visualize the threat and plan accordingly.
TREND 4
SUBJECT: S2 Situation Template (SITEMP) Development
| Observation frequency: | 1-2QFY96 | 3-4QFY96 | 1-2QFY97 | 3-4QFY97 | 1-2QFY98 |
| 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
3-4QFY97
OBSERVATION 1: Brigade S2s have difficulty adjusting their situation template (SITEMP) as intelligence information is received. (TA.5.4.4)
DISCUSSION:
1. Initially, brigade S2 situational templates (SITEMPs) contain a generally comprehensive analysis of the threat and have multiple enemy courses of action. However, as more intelligence is provided to verify or deny a specific enemy course of action, the S2's adjusted situational templates usually become lacking in specificity.
2. Adjusted SITEMPs usually do not differentiate between actual (based on collected intelligence) versus templated enemy positions.
1-2QFY98
OBSERVATION 1: While developing updated SITEMPs, S2s often do not differentiate between the confirmed locations and situationally templated gaps in known intelligence. (TA.5.4.4)
DISCUSSION: Without a differentiation of confirmed and templated enemy locations, the staff is led to develop plans to counter a threat that may not be at that specific location.
for S2 Situation Template (SITEMP) Development
1. S2 sections should use a checklist that includes the different elements of the threat that the brigade will encounter. Such a checklist will ensure that each element is addressed. Recommend the following:
When facing a threat force, the S2's adjusted situational template should include the following components: | When facing an attacking threat, the following components of the attack should be included: |
-
Divisional Reconnaissance | -
Divisional reconnaissance team positions (DRTs) |
2. The adjusted SITEMPs should differentiate between items that are confirmed from the reconnaissance and surveillance effort and those items that remain templated. To do this, the S2's subsequent SITEMP updates can define the differences using dotted lines for templated positions and solid lines for confirmed positions.
3. Recommend other brigade staff officers be given individual responsibilities to assist the S2 with development of the SITEMP (i.e., the engineer should assist in templating obstacles, FASCAM, and the employment of a Mobile Obstacle Detachment/Mobile Support Detachment. The Chemical Officer should assist in templating persistent and nonpersistent strikes. The Air Defense Officer should assist in identifying the enemy air avenues of approach.)
TREND 5
SUBJECT: S2 Analysis and Reporting
| Observation frequency: | 1-2QFY96 | 3-4QFY96 | 1-2QFY97 | 3-4QFY97 | 1-2QFY98 |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0 |
3-4QFY97
OBSERVATION 1: Brigade S2s often deploy to the NTC without formatted charts, checklists and reporting materials. (TA.5.1)
DISCUSSION: Brigade S2s seldom prepare their charts and intelligence reporting materials at Home Station, requiring them to prepare these items during intelligence collection and evaluation processes. As a result, the S2 is often unable to provide timely support for the brigade planning process.
OBSERVATION 2: Brigade S2s are consistently challenged by the requirement to track the enemy battle damage assessment (BDA). (TA.5.2.2.5)
DISCUSSION:
1. There is no system in place to track enemy losses as they are identified on the battlefield.
2. There are routinely no dedicated OPs that can provide surveillance of the enemy forces during the battle.
3. Without an accurate enemy BDA, the S2 cannot identify weaknesses or vulnerabilities as they develop as a result of the actions during the battle.
for S2 Analysis and Reporting
1. Each S2 section should develop an SOP with a checklist and formatted charts.
2. Recommend the following items be developed as part of the unit S2 Home Station preparation:
3. S2s should develop enemy BDA charts that reflect an enemy in the defense by platoon positions and in the offense by each component echelon of the attacking force, rather than by gross numbers of combat systems.
4. The R&S plan should address the assets that have surveillance responsibility during the battle. These assets must be tracked and queried to provide updated combat information, to include BDA.
5. Subordinate units that have the task of destroying a particular enemy element are also responsible for providing the disposition of the threat they are required to act upon.
TREND 6
SUBJECT: Terrain Analysis
| Observation frequency: | 1-2QFY96 | 3-4QFY96 | 1-2QFY97 | 3-4QFY97 | 1-2QFY98 |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 4 |
3-4QFY97
OBSERVATION 1: Task Force (TF) S2s seldom adequately analyze the terrain in sufficient detail. (TA.5.3.2)
DISCUSSION:
1. TF S2s accurately define and incorporate enemy avenues of approach (AA) into their sectors/zones; however, they are not maximizing the MCOOs and other products for terrain analysis.
2. S2s identify enemy kill sacks, potential friendly engagement areas, defensible terrain, and specific system and equipment locations but do not integrate their product with the TF engineer.
3. S2s do not routinely use the Terrabase products or the 1:24,000 scale maps.
4. The commander and staff are denied opportunities to exploit the terrain when determining friendly and threat COAs.
OBSERVATION 2: Engineer units seldom make use of the Terrabase computer software program. (TA.5.3.2)
DISCUSSION:
1. Appendix C of FM 5-71-3 is entirely devoted to the uses and capabilities of Terrabase; however Terrabase is not routinely used at brigade level or below.
2. Most engineer units are unfamiliar with the Terrabase computer program and use either "stubby pencil" line-of-sight (LOS) diagrams or completely ignore their terrain analysis responsibility in the engineer battlefield analysis (EBA) process.
1-2QFY98
OBSERVATION 1: Assistant brigade engineers (ABEs) and engineer battalion S3s do not fully understand the Engineer Battlefield Assessment (EBA) process. (TA.5.2.1)
DISCUSSION:
1. The engineer battalion S3 and ABE rarely develop a detailed EBA based on the initial division Warning Order (WARNO).
2. The EBA is seldom developed prior to mission analysis and is not available for use in conjunction with the S2's development of the IPB.
3. Most ABEs do not assist with terrain analysis. It is normally left to the S2.
4. The engineer battalion S3 rarely helps the ABE with the EBA process.
OBSERVATION 2: Engineer units are seldom using Terrabase products to meet terrain analysis requirements. (TA.5.2.1)
DISCUSSION:
1. Some brigade engineer units are using Terrabase II to analyze the effects of terrain and assessing the impact on military/engineer operations. Unfortunately, Terrabase II has not been distributed throughout unit staffs.
2. Most primary staff officers who do not have Terrabase II or are unfamiliar with it are developing simple line-of-sight (LOS) diagrams or completely ignoring their internal responsibility to analyze terrain.
3. Most staff officers do not know that Terrabase II can create three-dimensional representations of terrain and provide LOS profiles for placement and locations of weapons, radar, and radios.
OBSERVATION 3: (Repeat of Observation 1, 3-4QFY97)
OBSERVATION 4: Brigade staffs are currently unclear as to who is responsible for terrain analysis. (TA.5.3.2)
DISCUSSION:
1. Most brigades have given the responsibility for terrain analysis to either the S2 or the assistant battalion engineer (ABE). Some units require the ABE to provide the terrain analysis brief during mission analysis while other commands require the S2 to fulfill this responsibility.
2. The terrain analysis has historically been an S2 function but with the advent of the engineer battalion TOC collocated with the brigade main, additional staff planning support can be levied from the engineers. Brigade staffs seldom utilize this valuable asset.
for Terrain Analysis
1. Terrain analysis is an engineer responsibility. FM 5-71-3, Brigade Engineer Combat Operations, states that the assistant brigade engineer (ABE) has the responsibility for developing the engineer battlefield assessment (EBA).
- terrain analysis
- enemy mission
- Mobility/Survivability (M/S) capabilities, and friendly mission and M/S capabilities.
2. Terrabase or other terrain analysis tools should be required during Home Station training.
- Creates line-of-sight profiles.
- Assesses placement locations for weapons, radar, and radios.
- Displays three-dimensional representations of terrain.
3. Terrabase II became available to the Army in October 1997. Acquire it by submitting a request to the U.S. Army Engineer Center and Fort Leonard Wood, MO.
4. Give the ABE the responsibility for terrain analysis as a matter of SOP. The engineers routinely use and have terrain analysis tools, such as Terrabase and WINCATS. However, this responsibility must be identified early on and trained at Home Station. By routinely employing the ABE and the engineer TOC for terrain-related products, this association will become SOP.
5. The ABE should begin developing the EBA immediately following the receipt of the initial WARNO. The engineer battalion S3 should assist in developing and conduct a review of the EBA. Staffs must understand the significance of a timely and detailed EBA; it is the basis for the entire intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process.
6. TF S2s must improve their ability to articulate how the terrain will impact COAs. S2 use of terrain analysis during mission analysis and COA development would greatly improve their threat and friendly COAs products and those of the S3.
TREND 7
SUBJECT: Event Template/Event Matrix
| Observation frequency: | 1-2QFY96 | 3-4QFY96 | 1-2QFY97 | 3-4QFY97 | 1-2QFY98 |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
3-4QFY97
OBSERVATION 1: Task force S2s are generally not producing their event template or event matrix. (TA.5.3.4.1)
DISCUSSION:
1. S2s do not understand the use of the event template or the items that should be included on the event template.
2. Event templates and event matrices that are produced are usually incomplete.
1-2QFY98
OBSERVATION 1: (Repeat of Observation 1, 3-4QFY97)
for the Event Template/Event Matrix
1. TF S2s must learn the importance of the event template. They cannot delete this step from the planning process.
2. Read and comply with FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. Phase lines, NAIs, and enemy decision points are critical to friendly COA development.
3. Use the event matrix as a companion to the template. Use of the event matrix should also help distinguish between the enemy COAs.
4. Conduct Home Station drills to develop the S2 section's product development skills.
TREND 8
SUBJECT: Scout Platoon Execution of R&S Operations
| Observation frequency: | 1-2QFY96 | 3-4QFY96 | 1-2QFY97 | 3-4QFY97 | 1-2QFY98 |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
OBSERVATION 1: Task Forces (TFs) do not adequately train reconnaissance planning, preparation, execution, and support at Home Station. (TA.5.1)
DISCUSSION:
1. Home Station reconnaissance training is often left up to the scout platoon leader.
2. Reconnaissance training is limited to section or platoon training with very narrow objectives and no integration of other TF assets.
3. HMMWV-equipped scout platoons are often used for the reconnaissance mission; their limitations are often not discovered until the platoons are rendered combat ineffective and unable to contribute to TF success.
for Scout Platoon Execution of R&S Operations
1. Reconnaissance is a mission, not a unit. The TF must take responsibility for the integration of all available assets toward achieving the reconnaissance objective.
2. Consider the following planning factors in reconnaissance operations:
Against an armored and dedicated enemy, all of these things quickly exceed the capabilities of a HMMWV-equipped scout platoon. Bradley-equipped scouts are more likely to achieve reconnaissance objectives without TF support, but the planning factors remain the same.
3. The TF must ensure the integration of reconnaissance training at Home Station. R&S planning must be integrated into every orders drill so that usable products are produced prior to R&S execution.
4. The TF reconnaissance assets must have sufficient force to accomplish the mission.
Section
IV - Needs Emphasis Trends: Intelligence BOS, Part 1
Section
IV - Needs Emphasis Trends: Maneuver BOS
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