SECTION IV - NEEDS EMPHASIS TRENDS
MANEUVER BOS (TA.1) (cont)
TREND 5
SUBJECT: Aviation Integration into the Scheme of Maneuver
| Observation frequency: | 1-2QFY96 | 3-4QFY96 | 1-2QFY97 | 3-4QFY97 | 1-2QFY98 |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
3-4QFY97
OBSERVATION 1: Commanders (air and ground) do not effectively mass the combat power of attack helicopters. (TA.4.3)
DISCUSSION:
1. Typically, commanders and their battle staffs do not accurately assess the threat, identify the decisive point, build a collection plan to confirm the threat's scheme of maneuver, and develop triggers for the employment of attack helicopters.
2. Normally, an attack battalion is assigned numerous missions encompassing the entire width and depth of the battlefield.
3. The battalion executes numerous "911" missions with poor situational awareness of the threat and friendly forces (resulting in fratricide or excessive aircraft losses).
4. The collection plan does not support the readiness condition sequencing and employment of attack aircraft, which causes the aircraft to remain at higher readiness levels than necessary and imposes unplanned refuel requirements before the mission is executed.
5. Poor triggers cause premature or late commitment of attack helicopters.
OBSERVATION 2: There is a lack of an integrated planning between the aviation and ground maneuver elements. (TA.4.4.5)
DISCUSSION:
1. The aviation and ground maneuver elements plan separately, in a vacuum.
2. Aviation is usually assigned tasks after wargaming is completed.
3. The geographical distances between the aviation TAAs and the ground maneuver TOC/TACs add to the problem.
4. Lack of integrated planning results in:
1-2QFY98
OBSERVATION 1: (Repeat of Observation 1, 3-4QFY97)
OBSERVATION 2: (Repeat of Observation 2, 3-4QFY97)
for Aviation Integration into the Scheme of Maneuver
1. Plan: Attack aviation needs to be integrated into the ground scheme of maneuver during the wargaming process.
- The air LNO must have sufficient technical and tactical competence to be a productive force in the planning process.
- If possible, the air LNO can remain with the ground maneuver TAC during mission execution.
2. Prepare: Combined arms rehearsals between the ground and air maneuver elements are essential to mission success. Attack aviation commanders need to be part of the ground rehearsal. Their maneuver graphics and decision points need to be discussed during the rehearsal to ensure all commanders understand the conditions for commitment of attack aviation and their maneuver plan. This also allows synchronization and redundant eyes on decision points and triggers.
3. Execute: The attack battalion TAC should be collocated with the BCT TAC to facilitate situational awareness and anticipate employment. Additionally, attack company commanders need to be prepared to monitor the ground maneuver units' command net to synchronize ground and air combat power and reduce the risk of fratricide.
TREND 6
SUBJECT: Actions on the Objective
| Observation frequency: | 1-2QFY96 | 3-4QFY96 | 1-2QFY97 | 3-4QFY97 | 1-2QFY98 |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 1 |
3-4QFY97
OBSERVATION 1: Units seldom maneuver at the objective to engage the enemy. (TA.1.2)
DISCUSSION:
1. Battalions and company/teams frequently occupy their initial assault-by-fire (ABF) positions at their primary engagement area and do not continue to maneuver to engage the enemy. If the enemy is not exactly where the attacking unit predicted or if the timing is incorrect, the attacking unit may not see the enemy from their initial positions.
2. When company/teams do encounter the enemy where predicted and begin the engagement, they typically do not maneuver to maintain contact and maintain security of the ABF position.
OBSERVATION 2: Maneuver units seldom have an understanding of enemy engagement areas and the actions to take upon reaching their objective. (TA.1.2.2)
DISCUSSION:
1. Company/team commanders have difficulty providing graphic representation of enemy engagement areas to their platoons.
2. The company/team is normally still moving on the battlefield when they receive first contact from the enemy main body. There is an immediate breakdown in command and control as individual vehicles and platoons begin to react to contact from the march.
3. Once the commander and platoon leaders regain control of their elements, the company has been fixed, loses combat power, and is unable to accomplish its mission.
1-2QFY98
OBSERVATION 1: (Repeat of Observation 2, 3-4QFY97)
for Actions on the Objective
WHEN THE ENEMY IS NOT WHERE PREDICTED:
1. During initial planning, the S2 must determine an intelligence handover line (IHL) where the executing unit becomes responsible for overwatch of NAIs that lead into the primary engagement area. The executing unit pushes reconnaissance assets forward which provide final guidance to attack assets.
EXAMPLE: NAI 200 is the intelligence handover line (IHL).
2. The S2 must determine early on if sensor capability, availability, and down link provide the capability to perform a precision/max destruction attack. If this capability does not exist, then the attack unit prepares to conduct movement to contact to find and destroy the enemy in a given zone. The staff determines triggers for execution of alternate engagement areas and alternate schemes of maneuver.
EXAMPLE: Collection breakdown at NAI 200.
- a movement to contact to locate and destroy the enemy, or
- bounding to subsequent attack-by-fire positions which correspond to alternate engagement areas.
Both methods are effective. Available time, type of terrain, and enemy situation determine the method to use -- or perhaps a combination of the two methods.
3. Regardless of the method used, battalions must plan to maneuver at the objective area. Even with perfect intelligence, our planned attack-by-fire positions may not accommodate destruction of the enemy. Battalions must be prepared to maneuver to subsequent/alternate attack-by-fire positions to initiate or continue the attack.
4. Establish triggers for this movement.
5. Conduct rehearsals.
WHEN THE ATTACK UNIT BECOMES ENGAGED WITH THE ENEMY:
1. The staff must wargame the attack unit's actions and the enemy reactions during integration of the engagement area.
2. Company commanders should attend the wargaming session to enhance their knowledge of the overall engagement area plan and how the enemy is expected to react. Through this process, the S3, S2, fire support officer (FSO), and company commanders begin to visualize how the enemy will react and can develop plans to maintain contact and shift fires to destroy the enemy.
GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF ENEMY ENGAGEMENT AREAS:
1. The unit commander must paint the picture for his subordinates. He must build a mental and physical picture of the enemy's battlespace/engagement area (or "red zone") beginning in the planning phase.
2. Plan. The commander combines the range arcs of all potential enemy locations and designates the enemy's kill-sack during the development of his order.
- Plans for visual contact and when and where it will occur.
- Plans the ranges from likely security zone locations.
- Plans likely locations for enemy air and NBC agents to be used.
3. Prepare. Rehearse the transition from movement to the company/team maneuver (platoons in overwatch; platoons bounding) and then analyze terrain in depth to determine where advantage over the enemy can be gained.
4. Execute.
The
company/team maneuver and actions on the objective begin
just
beyond where the enemy main body can influence the unit.
TREND 7
SUBJECT: Engagement Area Development
| Observation frequency: | 1-2QFY96 | 3-4QFY96 | 1-2QFY97 | 3-4QFY97 | 1-2QFY98 |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 |
3-4QFY97
OBSERVATION 1: Attack helicopter units do not adequately develop the engagement area. (TA.1.2)
DISCUSSION:
1.The overall goal of attack helicopter operations is to destroy enemy formations in a given engagement area. To accomplish this goal the battalion staff must understand and exercise the eight step engagement area development process outlined in Chapter 3 of FM 1-112, Attack Helicopter Operations.
2. Units commonly conduct an inadequate IPB which causes the attack unit to "miss" the enemy in the indicated engagement area.
3. Units commonly do not properly integrate the massed effects of direct fire systems with other battlefield operating systems (BOS) in the engagement area. As a result, the effectiveness of the attack helicopter unit is significantly reduced.
1-2QFY98
OBSERVATION 1: (Repeat of Observation 1, 3-4QFY97)
OBSERVATION 2: Task force (TF) fire support officers (FSOs) and fire support teams (FISTs) do not adequately complete engagement area (EA) development during defense in sector missions. (TA.2.1.1)
DISCUSSION:
1. Not all triggers are emplaced.
2. Time distance factors for some triggers are miscalculated.
3. Targets are not tied into obstacles.
4. All primary and alternate observers cannot see triggers.
5. Target area survey is usually inadequate.
OBSERVATION 3: Task forces are experiencing difficulty in integrating fire support into engagement area (EA) development during defensive missions. (TA.2.3)
DISCUSSION: None.
for Engagement Area Development
ATTACK HELICOPTER EA DEVELOPMENT:
1. The resources expended and risks associated with attack helicopter operations are substantial. From deep attacks behind a mature enemy front line trace (EFLT) to attacks against first echelon forces in the main battle area (MBA), success is based on detailed planning and development of the engagement area.
2. Although the process involves eight steps, the following paragraphs highlight two steps that are commonly neglected.
1)
The S2 should concentrate, initially, on answering the following five questions,
which, when answered, will yield the enemy's most probable COA:
- Where is the enemy currently located?
- Where is the enemy going?
- Where can we best engage the enemy?
- When will the enemy be there?
- What weapons systems does the enemy have that can affect the unit?
2)
It is imperative that the S2 provide the best possible prediction of the enemy's
route. This provides focus for planning and should lead to a primary COA with
branches.
3)
The S2 must also predict how the formation will look (i.e., number of vehicles,
types of formations, march speeds) during movement through NAIs and on arrival
at the EA.
4)
Finally, the S2 must predict how the enemy will react at TAIs and under direct
fire in the engagement area. The S2 provides a description of these reactions
(in detail) while wargaming integration of the EA.
5)
Upon determination of where the unit should attack the enemy, the S2 must determine
quickly the collection assets that are available. The S2 considers the following:
- Sensor capabilities (accuracy, required redundancy, etc.).
-- Higher headquarters' collection plan and priorities for sensors.
-- Sensor scheduling (Do the JSTARS, UAV, SOF, etc., schedules coincide
with the attack unit's requirement for coverage?)
-- Is there real-time downlink to the requesting unit?
-- Is there overlapping coverage on critical NAIs, and do we have the
capability to shift sensor orientation as the formation proceeds to subsequent
NAIs?
- Where is the intelligence handover line (where will higher headquarters
hand over the NAI tracking responsibility to the attack unit - this is critical
in determining scheme of maneuver).
- Do the NAIs support Redcon level upgrades?
-- Do the NAIs support time/distance requirements from the AA/HA to
initial ABF positions?
-- Are NAIs covered by ground maneuver brigade assets, and, if so, do
we have appropriate links?
6)
Answers to these considerations allow the S2 to establish a realistic decision
support template for employment of the attack battalion.
1)
Intelligence: As discussed earlier, the S2 must provide accurate predictions
of how the enemy formation will look when it enters the engagement area. The
S2 must be prepared to present enemy actions during the staff's wargame of
events at the engagement area:
- Rates of march (how long the enemy will be visible).
- Key terrain (that gives the enemy advantages for specific avenues of
approach).
- When and how the enemy will conduct counter-engagements.
- When and where indirect fire can affect ABFs.
- Where the dead space is in the engagement area.
2)
Maneuver: The battalion S3 determines where and when direct fire systems can
best be used against the enemy formation the S2 describes.
- The S3 establishes initial ABFs at a primary weapon range (i.e., Hellfire
missile) that will ensure a 75 percent probability of hit (Ph).
- The S3 must consider alternate and subsequent ABFs in the objective
area.
- If ground maneuver forces are attached or OPCON and will attack into
the same engagement area as air maneuver forces, then the S3 must consider
fire distribution and deconfliction of fire between the two forces.
- Finally, the S2 and S3 wargame friendly actions versus enemy reactions
and determine where in the engagement area artillery, CAS, mortars, obstacles
etc., are needed to shape the battlespace for the direct fire fight.
3)
Following the wargame: The following questions must be considered:
- What is the end state of the indirect fire plan?
- How much artillery/CAS/mortars are available for employment in the engagement
area?
- Who will initiate fires?
- How will the unit shift fires?
- Who will clear fires once the direct fire fight begins?
4)
Additional considerations: The staff must also consider and integrate the company
commander's direct fire plan from given ABFs and the effects of obscurants
in the engagement areas.
5)
Extended range deep attacks: Employment of joint nonlethal EW may be the only
direct fire complement to the extended range engagement area. Commo and radar
jamming can be very effective in and around the engagement area particularly
during ingress to initial ABFs and attack of critical ADA targets and in support
of movement to subsequent ABFs.
3. Attack battalion staffs should practice wargaming given engagement areas using large scale terrain models.
4. The S2 should keep a battle book of sensor capabilities and enemy orders of battle to expedite the IPB process.
5. The FSO should record potential essential fire support tasks that become evident during practice engagement area wargaming.
FIELD ARTILLERY EA DEVELOPMENT:
1. The task force FSO should develop a scheme of fires to support the task force commander's decisive point. This includes:
2. Tasks must be prioritized with an established timeline and the status of preparation reported. This must be a coordinated effort between the task force FSO/FSE and company/teams. Execution can be centralized or decentralized.
3. The task force fire support sergeant is the SME and should supervise and coordinate the overall effort.
4. Trigger kits must be standardized and resourced.
TREND 8
SUBJECT: Integration of Light and Heavy Forces
| Observation frequency: | 1-2QFY96 | 3-4QFY96 | 1-2QFY97 | 3-4QFY97 | 1-2QFY98 |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
3-4QFY97
OBSERVATION 1: Task forces (TF) do not adequately integrate heavy and light forces. (TA.1.4)
DISCUSSION:
1. Light task forces (TFs) are having difficulty integrating heavy units for which they have operational control (OPCON) into their scheme of maneuver.
2. Operations graphics lack the necessary control measures to reposition heavy forces during combat operations.
3. Light TF staffs generally do not understand heavy forces' capabilities and limitations.
4. Heavy company team commanders do not receive clear and defined tasks and purposes.
1-2QFY98
OBSERVATION 1: (Repeat of Observation 1, 3-4QFY97)
for Integration of Light and Heavy Forces
1. Consider having an armor officer serve as a LNO to the light task force staff during light-heavy rotations. Light TF staffs should include the heavy force commander or a heavy force LNO in the planning process.
2. Have more detailed discussion on employment of heavy forces during light-heavy classes at LTP.
Section
IV - Needs Emphasis Trends: Maneuver BOS, Part 1
Section
IV - Needs Emphasis Trends: Fire Support BOS
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