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TREND 62
SUBJECT: Pre-Combat Checks (PCCs) and Pre-Combat Inspections (PCIs)

OBSERVATION (FS): The use of PCCs and PCIs at the battery level is routinely poor and not focused on the specific requirements of the current mission.

DISCUSSION:

1. Battalion tactical SOPs (TACSOPs) either lack sufficient detail regarding both PCCs and PCIs or are not identified and followed.

2. Battery commanders routinely do not develop appropriate mission-specific PCCs and PCIs during mission analysis. The commander often specifies PCCs fromFM 6-50 or from their unit TACSOP, but does not specify PCIs.

3. PCCs are often designated and prioritized without conducting a thorough mission analysis, resulting in designated checks that do not match the battery requirements.

4. Often the PCCs and PCIs designated are not supported by realistic timelines, and responsibility is not affixed for battery-level checks.

5. Poor movement PCIs result in avoidable fratricides and breaks in contact.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Place more emphasis on conducting PCCs/PCIs and rehearsals as part of Home Station training.

2. Add refined PCCs, PCIs, and a battery rehearsal drill to battalion SOPs as appropriate. Batteries should establish useful rehearsal kits that will enhance different types of rehearsals.

3. Battery commanders should address PCCs/PCIs three times while completing their troop- leading procedures, as outlined below. (Refer to FM 6-50, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery for an overview of the troop-leading procedures and how PCCs/PCIs fit into the development of the battery plan.)

(TA.4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline)

TREND 63
SUBJECT: Engineer HHC Individual Soldier Skills

OBSERVATION (Engr): Individual force protection skills are not to standard in engineer HHCs.

DISCUSSION: HHC soldiers have difficulty executing common force protection skills such as construction of fighting positions, operation and maintenance of crew-served weapons, chemical detection with M8/M9 paper and M256 kits, and reaction to enemy indirect fire.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Units must reassess and stress their individual soldier skills training plan and ensure training is conducted to standard.

(TA.4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline)

TREND 64
SUBJECT: Supply Company Pre-Combat Checks and Pre-Combat Inspections (PCC/PCIs)

OBSERVATION (CSS): Supply company PCCs/PCIs are inadequate.

DISCUSSION:

1. Supply companies frequently do not have a standardized checklist for first-line supervisors and other unit leaders to ensure that the unit is prepared for its movement or mission. Unit leaders, in many instances, believe that their unit is ready to move or execute a mission when they are not.

2. Units that have a standardized checklist often do not enforce use of the checklist and do not tailor it based on the mission.

3. Units that do not have a checklist or do not enforce the one that exists have difficulty in moving and in initial occupation of a new operating site.

4. Elements sent outside the BSA perimeter usually do not have all of the equipment required to accomplish the mission, and are forced to make multiple trips back to the company area to retrieve mission-essential equipment.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Develop a standardized checklist for movement and occupation of operations sites.

2. Create section-specific checklists based on mission requirements.

3. Laminate and place the checklist in vehicle log record books.

4. Laminate and place a blank copy of the unit vehicle load plan in the log record book. It can be updated with either grease pencil or alcohol marker.

5. Use the checklist in garrison for all movement, for support of brigade gunnery, or whenever a mission from the unit is executed.

6. Enforce use of the checklist by first-line supervisors.

7. Senior leaders in the unit must spot-check constantly to ensure unit compliance.

(TA.4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline)

TREND 65
SUBJECT: Synchronization of Fires and Maneuver

OBSERVATION (Mech): Fire support is rarely integrated into the task force (TF) wargaming process.

DISCUSSION:

1. During the wargame, the battle staff frequently does not effectively arrange activities in time and space.

2. TF staffs frequently do not develop a scheme of fires with adequate triggers or an observation plan that is synchronized with the scheme of maneuver.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The S3 and fire support officer (FSO) should ensure the complete integration of fire support into the wargaming process of the military decision-making process (MDMP) IAW ST 100-9 and FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process.

2. During wargaming, the FSO must advise the TF commander and S3 if they ask fire support to execute unrealistic tasks.

3. The endstate of the process should be an executable scheme of fires, an observation plan, and refinement submitted to brigade. This endstate produces a plan that provides all targeting functions (decide, detect, deliver, and assess) per FM 6-20-10.

4. The activities supporting each EFST must be arranged in time and space during the action-reaction-counteraction drill addressing the enemy, terrain, and the scheme of maneuver.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 66
SUBJECT: Aviation Integration with Ground Maneuver

OBSERVATION (Avn): Air/ground integration problems generally begin during the planning process, continue through preparation, and quickly become insurmountable as the unit enters the execution phase.

DISCUSSION:

1. During operational control (OPCON) relationships, ground and air planning processes are often conducted independent of each other. They usually see each other's plan for the first time at the combined arms rehearsal.

2. The problem is not confined to OPCON relationships. Aviation units often execute operations in the brigade combat team (BCT) battle space with minimal situational awareness of the ground scheme of maneuver. The geographical distances between the aviation tactical assembly area (TAA) and the ground maneuver tactical operations center/tactical air command (TOC/TAC) further compounds the problem.

3. Lack of air and ground integration results in:

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. In his guidance to the battle staff, the commander should identify the decisive point and the task and purpose of aviation assets.

2. Based upon the commander's guidance and the wargame results, the S2 should refine the collection plan to support the commitment of aviation assets.

3. A competent liaison officer (LNO) who has authority to speak for the aviation commander should participate in the BCT battle staff's military decision-making process (MDMP) to ensure proper employment of aviation assets. The LNO should assist the ground maneuver element in planning all base orders and, on a case-by-case basis, specific follow-on missions. The LNO should have sufficient technical and tactical competence to be a productive force in the planning process. If possible, the LNO should remain with the ground maneuver TAC during mission execution. If a company or troop is in an OPCON relationship without its higher headquarters staff, it should provide an LNO as well.

4. Combined arms rehearsals between the ground and air maneuver elements are essential to mission success. Air routes, aviation decision points, assault-by-fire positions, holding areas, and Forward Arming and Refueling Points (FARPs) should be depicted on the sand table.

5. Prior to mission execution, the aviation TAC should be collocated with the BCT TOC/TAC to facilitate situational awareness and anticipate employment.

6. Aviation company/troop commanders should monitor the ground maneuver unit's command net to synchronize ground and air combat power and reduce the risk of fratricide.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 67
SUBJECT: Army Airspace Command and Control (A2C2)

OBSERVATION (Avn): Aviation units are not using Air Coordination Orders (ACOs) when they are published, or urging their higher headquarters to publish ACO abstracts that deal with deconflicting airspace during force-on-force operations.

DISCUSSION:

1. The lack of an ACO requires O/C intervention to ensure missions are accomplished safely and successfully.

2. Indirect fire assets are unable to strike critical targets because airspace control measures are not synchronized.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Every unit is required to develop and implement an airspace control plan for airspace lying within its boundaries. Doctrinally, the brigade is the lowest level that is required to implement an Army airspace command and control (A2C2) plan. This does not alleviate the responsibility of aviation units to ensure its aircraft are deconflicted from airspace users within the brigade's boundaries.

2. The brigade must use its A2C2 cells to both formulate the ACO and then deconflict its airspace plan continuously.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 68
SUBJECT: Synchronization of Fires and Maneuver

OBSERVATION (FS): Fire support is rarely integrated into the task force's (TF's) wargaming process.

DISCUSSION: During the wargame, the battle staff frequently does not effectively arrange activities in time and space. As a result, the TFs frequently do not develop a scheme of fires with adequate triggers or with an observation plan that is synchronized with the scheme of maneuver.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The TF S3 and fire support officer (FSO) should ensure that fire support is fully integrated into the wargaming process of the military decision-making process (MDMP) in accordance with:

3. Fire support tasks and events are arranged in time and space in relation to terrain, the enemy, and the TF scheme of maneuver in order to develop adequate triggers.

4. The endstate should be a complete scheme of fires, an observation plan, and refinement submitted to brigade. This endstate produces a plan that provides all targeting functions (decide, detect, deliver, and assess) per FM 6-20-10.

(TA 4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 69
SUBJECT: Building of Combat Power During Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSO&I)

OBSERVATION (FS): FA units too often do not integrate their battalions into the brigade's plan to build combat power.

DISCUSSION:

1. FA units are not identifying their own glide path to incrementally build platoons, batteries, and the battalion.

2. FA battalions are not including radar, survey, metro, command and control headquarters, and CSS assets.

3. Without an integrated brigade plan, field artillery units find themselves with no priority to draw classes of supply or receive maintenance support.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Plan early with the brigade. Remember that RSOI is an operation heavy with logistical implications. Battalion XOs and S3s need to take an early interest in the plan and not totally depend on the battalion S4 to "make it happen."

2. Organize requirements in a logical sequence and assign responsibilities.

3. Establish priority vehicles and units, manage and supervise the plan, and adjust as necessary.

4. A recommended force package 1 to be ready NLT RSOI 02 would consist of:

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 70
SUBJECT: Engineer Battalion Rear Command Post (CP) Operations

OBSERVATION (Engr): The engineer battalion rear CP often does not perform the rear area engineer function or integrate operations with the forward support battalion (FSB).

DISCUSSION:

1. Engineer units regularly do not provide command and control over engineer operations behind the task force (TF) rear boundaries.

2. Engineer units do not provide the FSB with engineer expertise in planning and executing logistics operations in support of the brigade combat team (BCT). As a result:

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Chapter 2 of FM 5-71-3, Brigade Engineer Combat Operations (Armored), clearly identifies rear area engineering and staff engineer support to the FSB as secondary functions of the battalion rear CP. The support to the FSB is similar to the support given to a TF by the TF engineer.

2. Engineer battalion rear CPs must fulfill their role as the rear-area engineer and FSB staff engineer. FM 5-71-3 recommends that the HHC commander be closely involved in support to the brigade rear CP. During the FSB's planning process, the HHC commander must provide staff input to the FSB order.

3. If a conflict develops between support requirements to the brigade rear CP and the FSB main CP, the battalion should consider providing a liaison officer (LNO) to provide the support to the FSB, under the coordination of the HHC commander.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TA.4 Command and Control BOS, Part 5

Acknowledgements