Military

However, in the finest OPFOR tradition, techniques are being honed to maximize the capabilities of this system, in conjunction with every other means already employed for basic surveillance and target acquisition techniques. For example, before being able to use these thermal sights, the normal OPFOR tactic would be to use illumination rounds to acquire enemy vehicles. Now, it should be no surprise that the OPFOR still uses combined arms tactics, where TTS is nothing more than another tool in the kit bag that can be used. TTS is an additional tool, and not a tool to supplant other tried and true acquisition and tracking techniques and procedures.

Although these sights have not been with the 60th GMRD very long yet, already some viable TTP is evolving, showing the warfighting utility of the TTS sights.

EXAMPLE:

Situation: The Krasnovians were attempting to insert their Regimental Reconnaissance into sector against a U.S. brigade that established their screening force very far forward.

OPFOR plan: Airlanding an infantry force on the southern flank, followed by the truck-borne infiltration on the northern flank, with both efforts occurring after dark. The Regimental Commander realized just how far forward the U.S. screen was and the implications it had for the success of the planned movement of truck-mounted infantry. He knew that if the infantry and other reconnaissance troops were going to accomplish their mission, he would have to force the withdrawal of the U.S. screen.

To accomplish this, the Regimental Commander formed a Reconnaissance Detachment (RD) from the second echelon MRB, using an MRC(+) consisting of a platoon of three T-80Us and eight BMPs. The Regimental Commander assigned the RD the mission to destroy the enemy screen or to seize terrain to allow the truck-mounted infantry to proceed.

Technique: The thermal-sighted T-80Us were key in locating the enemy armored vehicles that were preventing the advance of the reconnaissance effort. In a slow and deliberate operation, the T-80Us moved forward to the Report Line (RL, i.e., Phase Line, in this case, the LD), surprising and destroying several enemy M2s. To augment the thermal capability, the OPFOR used illumination in the south, near the LZ of the failed airlift, as a deception measure to draw the attention of the enemy. Note: The operation began at 2100. By 2400, two of the three thermal sights had failed.

RESULT: The airlanding force encountered a section of two M2s and had one helicopter destroyed on the LZ. A second OPFOR helicopter destroyed one M2, while the surviving OPFOR infantry attacked and destroyed the other M2. The loss of these vehicles on one flank forced withdrawal of the U.S. screen and the subsequent uncontested infiltration of the infantry.

Prior to the fielding of the thermal sight, the normal OPFOR tactic would have been to launch illumination rounds to attempt to acquire the enemy vehicles. Presently the Krasnovians equip only their tanks, not their BMPs with thermal sights. This results in a still heavy reliance on illumination missions to acquire targets for the BMPs while assisting the tanks.

The thermal sights are not considered by the OPFOR soldiers as anything more than another tool that can be used when needed, and are not a panacea for basic surveillance and target acquisition procedures.

Combating BLUFOR Thermals

Having fought against U.S. units equipped with thermals for more than 10 years, Krasnovian countermeasures work to minimize what has been a distinct U.S. technological advantage. Not having any obscurants capable of jamming BLUFOR thermal sights, the Krasnovians focus on deception tactics instead.

Techniques: Using deception to offset thermal sights.

1. The intent of this deception effort is to cause as much friction as possible within the U.S. command and control system.

2. Krasnovians thoroughly understand U.S. doctrine and technology. Therefore, the Krasnovians assume they are constantly under observation by UAVs, JSTARS, COLTs, etc.

3. Paint a false picture:

• show the BLUFOR exactly what they wish to see, confirming their template.

• confirming the template lulls the BLUFOR into a false sense of security.

EXAMPLE: The OPFOR will build deception positions, consisting of a shallow "scrape" the size and shape of a tank-fighting position -- complete with a decoy turret that has been heated to provide the "correct" thermal signature. In and amongst these deception positions, the OPFOR places several real vehicles to detect and destroy BLUFOR reconnaissance and infantry to prevent close observation of the decoy position. A Call-For-Fire Zone (CFFZ) is also placed over the position with target acquisition radar to capitalize on the U.S. tactic of firing preparatory bombardments upon defensive positions ("bearclaws") and Copperhead engagements at CSOPs.

4. The Krasnovians do not occupy their real defensive positions until the last possible minute.

5. Use false helicopter insertions to take advantage of the U.S. target fixation.

EXAMPLE: After firing a SEAD mission, the aircraft approach their false LZs with their doors closed, land and deplane their cargo of hot charcoal and chemlites, and then egress with their doors open.

RESULT: This often leads to the obvious conclusion that the troops have been airlifted into sector. Here too, a CFFZ is placed over the false LZ to acquire any fires placed on it, as well as an artillery target to destroy any patrols that move to investigate the LZ.

Tougher to Fight

The use of thermal sights by the 60th GMRD is another factor that is going to make life even tougher for U.S. forces fighting in Mojavia. The OPFOR's sights are simply another direct-fire system that can be countered using the same tactics, techniques and procedures that the OPFOR uses against the BLUFOR: move on covered and concealed routes, approaching the enemy using cross-compartmentalized terrain to close the distance and negate the advantage of these long-range sights.

Rehearsals - Ensuring Mission Success

Acknowledgements