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DISCUSSION: Most units authorized UMTs deployed with the religious support personnel necessary to perform the religious support. In Haiti, 47 chaplains and 35 chaplain assistants were deployed in country. UMTs consist of one chaplain and one chaplain assistant, doctrinally deployed as a single entity. The chaplain has two primary functions. He advises the commander and staff on unit morale, moral climate, religious welfare, ethical issues and indigenous religions. He also provides direct and general religious support to soldiers. The UMT is staffed to provide comprehensive religious support to the unit to which it is assigned or attached, and to units in its area of operation that have no integral religious support coverage. The chaplain assistant supports the chaplain in the religious support mission.

During contingency operations, one of the most critical tasks of the chaplain assistant is to provide personal security for the team. When a chaplain is deployed without the chaplain assistant, the unit must provide a soldier for personal security and to support the chaplain in the religious support mission. Besides reducing the quality of religious support, it also creates a burden on the unit that provides the soldier who serves as the chaplain's personal security and supports the chaplain in his mission.

Some units did not deploy with the appropriate religious support personnel. There were two primary reasons why units deployed without UMTs or with incomplete UMTs. The first reason had to do with UMT positions being vacant. A number of units did not have a full complement of religious support personnel assigned when they deployed; hence some chaplains deployed without chaplain assistants. Requests to fill these positions had been made. Some positions had been vacant for nine months.

The second reason involved the allocation of space or seats for deployment. Commanders decide who deploys. In some situations commanders decided to deploy their chaplains and leave the chaplain assistant at home. Chaplains need to be part of the initial planning process to ensure tactical UMT considerations are addressed.

When units deploy without their UMT, the JTF Chaplain has to task other UMTs with the additional responsibility of providing religious support to those units. Deploying without authorized UMTs can result in inadequate religious support in critical areas and units, such as hospitals and maneuver battalions. For example, the Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) that deployed to Guantanamo Bay without a UMT was the MASH that was to receive all casualties resulting from the forced entry scenario planned for Haiti, if that scenario had actually been necessary. This could have been a significant problem since, during mass casualty operations, the primary mission of UMTs is to provide pastoral care to the wounded, as part of the health-care team.

LESSONS:

• When positions are vacant, units and installations should first cross-level from within their own assets to fill the deploying unit vacancies and back-fill at home station. If they are unable to fill their requirements from assets on hand, they should request fill from outside sources. Priority of fill should be to the deploying unit.

• Supervisory chaplains should resolve at higher levels of command the issue of deploying complete UMTs.

• Deploying without authorized UMTs requires that another UMT be tasked to provide support which overburdens the UMT and degrades the overall quality and efficiency of religious support.

• Unit chaplains should remind their commanders who plan to deploy without complete UMT staffing of the negative impact it would have on providing ministry support to the unit.

OBSERVATION: Because of effective preparations for Operation RESTORE HOPE, soldiers and their families remained morally tough and spiritually strong.

DISCUSSION: Prior to deployment, unit chaplains and assistants provided support through pastoral counseling, worship, and training aimed at preparing soldiers and families in family survival skills and moral leadership. As a result, soldiers in Operation RESTORE HOPE were compassionate, well behaved, and consistently made good decisions when they faced armed bandits.

During deployment preparations, families formed support groups to exchange coping skills and to share moral support. Family Life Chaplains provided continuing professional advice and support. After deployment, in the absence of deployed UMTs, installation chaplains and assistants provided continuing coverage in garrison chapels.

LESSON: Moral leadership training enhances ethical decisionmaking and mature moral behavior.

OBSERVATION: During UNOSOM II, UMTs did not always arrive in Somalia prepared to perform their duties because of shortfalls in staffing, training, or preparation.

DISCUSSION: In at least one instance, a UMT deployed without a chaplain's assistant because the assistant did not have current weapon qualification. The issue of fully staffing UMTs was raised to Third Army which made the decision to deploy only complete UMTs.

UMTs must be maintained in a fully staffed, trained and prepared status to perform their field duties when deploying on a contingency operation. Units authorized chaplains should deploy fully staffed UMTs whenever the unit deploys. A UMT deploying with personnel shortages creates a hardship on the supported unit. Either the unit is not properly supported or some work activity within the unit must provide a soldier to the UMT, causing a shortage within the unit.

During UNOSOM II, some chaplains and assistants were not familiar with other-than-war and nonlinear battlefield operations. The Theater Chaplain instituted a training program to inform UMT members on the nature and unique aspects of other-than-war operations.

In areas of hostilities, the chaplain is the driver (doctrinally, a noncombatant), and the assistant is the guard. Before deploying, chaplains should have a military vehicle operator's license and be familiar with the vehicles which they might likely be assigned to operate. Assistants must be qualified with their individual weapon.

Chaplains assigned to large units should also be afforded space in proximity to the TOC so they can receive timely information affecting the priorities of religious support. Religious support, especially during contingency operations, often enables the individual to come to terms with the true conditions of his/her life and environment, serving to relieve stress and providing a means to further a soldier's personal growth.

LESSONS:

• Prior to deployment, UMTs should be staffed with fully trained, licensed, certified and qualified members. Deploying chaplains should have received certified sustainment training in addition to completion of the Chaplain Officer Basic Course.

• When positions are vacant, units and installations should cross-level from within their assets to fill deploying unit UMTs and back-fill home-station vacancies created by the cross-leveling. The priority of fill should be to the deploying unit. If units and installations are unable to fill requirements from assets on hand, they should request back-fill from outside sources.

OBSERVATION: The Installation Chaplain's Office may not be adequately staffed to perform its Base Support Operations mission during a major troop deployment.

DISCUSSION: This problem is common in all one-division posts. The division UMTs play a major role in the Installation's Religious Program. The Installation Chaplain's Office is staffed with three chaplains, one Catholic and two Protestant, and cannot provide adequate religious support to the post and the off-post housing areas. Some installations have numerous housing areas that are located off-post.

The Installation Chaplain was dual-hatted as the Installation Chaplain and the community priest. The Deputy Installation Chaplain served as pastor of the Main Post Chapel and as the chaplaincy trainer. The third chaplain was the Family Life Chaplain.

In preparing for operations in Haiti, the TF Chaplain determined that, due to the family support needs of the division, he would leave his assistant division chaplain and two chaplains assigned to non-deploying units at the installation. These chaplains assisted the Installation Chaplain with worship services and religious programs and activities. They responded to emergency calls and attended all company-level and above Family Support Group meetings. During most deployments, religious services have to be consolidated or reduced for the duration of the deployment.

The mission of coordinating the Commander's Religious Program at division and higher requires a staff of at least four personnel. A Division UMT consists of two chaplains and two chaplain assistants. The effectiveness of the UMT is degraded when it is not fully staffed.

Traditionally, UMTs deploy with 100 percent of their authorized personnel. During deployment preparations, it may be necessary to request Army Reserve religious support personnel and coordinate with local churches and ministerial associations to assist the Installation Chaplain's office with religious support to family members and stay-behind soldiers. The priority of fill should always be to the deploying unit; installation religious support should be back-filled, if deploying UMTs are filled from installation assets.

The JTF Chaplain deployed a priest from a non-deploying unit to provide Catholic coverage and to serve as his deputy. The priest also served as an ad hoc TF chaplain. Due to the shortage of priests and the need to provide religious support to Catholic soldiers, this chaplain was unable to function as the assistant JTF chaplain. During Passover, a major religious season for Jewish soldiers, the Chief of Chaplains deployed a rabbi to provide religious support in Somalia.

If the Assistant Division Chaplain had been deployed, he would have been able to assist the JTF Chaplain with his administrative and pastoral duties. The JTF UMT staffed a desk in the J1/J4, but he also needed to visit subordinate UMTs in the field. He was unable to effectively accomplish these tasks with only half of his team in country.

LESSONS:

• Consider using Reserve Component personnel, retirees, and local clergy to back-fill at installations.

• If sufficient resources are not available to cover all major faiths while deployed, consider sending (TDY) appropriate chaplains for key faith-related observances.

• Consider using the Extraordinary Ministers of the Eucharist (EME) Program to meet the needs of Catholic soldiers. This involves a concerted effort to recruit soldiers who meet the criteria to receive instruction and function as EMEs.

OBSERVATION: In Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti), the JTF chaplain section did not have all required positions filled.

DISCUSSION: In the planning stage, the JTF chaplain section had a Command Chaplain (O-5), a Deputy Chaplain (O-4), a Senior Chaplain Assistant Supervisor (E-8) and a Chaplain Assistant Supervisor (E-6). All of these positions were filled by division personnel.

When the decision was made to add a Task Force to the JTF structure, the Deputy Chaplain and the Chaplain Assistant Supervisor were dual-hatted to serve in the TF positions. This resulted in the Command Chaplain and the Senior Chaplain Assistant Supervisor becoming solely responsible for approximately 800 soldiers in the JTF Headquarters and 43 UMTs across the Joint Area of Operations.

LESSON: When battalion TF-size units are added to the troop list, their UMT positions should be filled to avoid overloading other chaplains with additional religious support requirements. If the task organization requires ad hoc elements, ensure that additional chaplain support is requested.

OBSERVATION: The Army Chaplain Corps has a shortage of Roman Catholic priests.

DISCUSSION: The shortage of Catholic priests not only impacts on the force internally, where there is a significant number of Hispanic soldiers, but also operationally when U.S. forces are committed to areas largely Catholic in orientation. A Catholic priest, a captain, became chaplain of the U.S. Forces around D+190, only the second Catholic chaplain to serve ashore with U.S. Forces in Haiti. Relations with local communities might have been facilitated if more Catholic chaplains had been available, although many Protestant churches exist throughout Haiti.

The Brigade Protestant Chaplain coordinated with the director of a Haitian seminary in the Cap Haitian area for Catholic services for his soldiers. This arrangement continued when a Guatemalan military police company took up residence near the Pakistani Battalion on the northern coast of Haiti in March 1995. This arrangement served American soldiers well.

LESSON: The shortage of Catholic priests (and other relatively smaller denominations) continues to impact religious coverage for U.S. Forces. Deployed Army supervisory chaplains may be able to coordinate with the USAF, USN, or USMC chaplains to get Catholic services on an area basis. In some unique circumstances, a local priest in the indigenous population may be able to provide services for Catholic soldiers, if a U.S. Catholic chaplain is not available.

OBSERVATION: In Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, careful consideration was given to what could be accomplished in the limited preparation time and with the resources available.

DISCUSSION: The division UMTs began their religious support planning during their preparation to deploy. Initially, the UMTs planned for ministry in the normal field environment. As the operation continued, the Division UMT began to fine-tune the division religious area support plan. There were two important problems that needed to be overcome in the production of a viable area support plan that would meet the needs of the soldiers and stay within the guidance of the commander. First, the need to minister to the soldiers throughout the entire spectrum of the command. Second, the need to work with the Civil Affairs Groups to develop personal relationships with the civilian counter parts without becoming involved in any humanitarian outreach.

For the brigade-level UMTs, there was the added responsibility to give supervision to lower level UMTs. This required that the Division UMT, within the guidelines set down by the commander, determine the intent of ministry as well as the best method to accomplish the religious support mission.

As the plan developed, the Division UMT transitioned from a field ministry to a base cluster and area support ministry, like the Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) concept, except with a field flavor. The plan was to revolve around three main bases and three sub-bases consisting of 23 bases situated in clusters. Three of the bases were too small to include a designated tent for worship and were to be given area coverage responsibilities somewhat like the Area Support Teams (ASTs) of Germany. Because of the static restrictions of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, plans set short-term goals rather than the traditional long-term goals -- the aim became ministry within a set-base concept. This may have potential as a valid concept for study by combat developers.

LESSON: Because of the static restrictions and the unusual requirement of this mission, UMTs and the division UMT were personally involved in the area support planning process from start to finish. Future operations under peace enforcement guidelines may require a ministry based on a BSB concept.

OBSERVATION: During Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, the impact of additional religious support requirements on preparation time was overcome by assistance from the Area Support Group (ASG) or BSB UMTs.

DISCUSSION: The ASG/BSB began planning their assistance to units two months prior to deployment. With few exceptions, UMTs actively involved the ASG/BSB UMTs in preparation for deployment. One advantage to this early involvement was the identification of the participants early and face-to-face liaison. The ASG/BSB UMTs focused on religious support activities on Sundays. They put new deployment worship schedules into effect for families and communities.

Ministry and ministry support activities in the cantonment areas worked well. Most UMTs did not feel the ASG/BSBs were adequately staffed for the mission. Many chaplains consider a dedicated fixed facility, supplied with equipment as supplies as the only acceptable site for conducting religious services in a garrison setting. None wanted to see their chapels closed down during deployment.

Overall, the UMTs noticed that the ASG/BSB UMTs excelled in initiative and service to their communities. Their willingness to assist allowed the UMTs to better prepare for deployment by freeing them from many religious support requirements. Most of the assistance took place in the chapel. Persons with religious or family needs could enter the chapel, ask questions, and receive service, thereby freeing the UMT to give maximum to support to the soldiers.

LESSON: Identify participants early and involve them in the preparation phase as soon as possible. Plan services and coordinate the activities in written communications to the commands.

OBSERVATION: Family Support Group (FSG) requirements impacted on UMT preparation time.

DISCUSSION: Where the ASG/BSB UMTs were able to assist the UMTs in additional religious support requirements, they were not able to assist in the additional requirements of the FSGs. Commanders wanted their UMTs, especially the chaplain, involved in the FSGs. A majority of the teams noted that, as time to deploy got closer, the ability to plan FSG meetings became harder to manage. Often, it required that meetings be planned one or two days out. There was the additional requirement for two meetings, one during the day and one at night. This impacted on the UMTs own preparation time. As a result, the assistant was often left to attend meetings, training, and packing sessions alone. In units where the assistant was well integrated into the staff, this did not present a problem. The assistant overcame the problems with the aid of other staff members, and the chaplain was able to get information on meetings and training later.

In those units where the assistant was not well integrated, the assistant often was locked out of a meeting or on a detail to assist others rather than taking care of UMT business. Chaplains all agreed that the FSG meetings were important. The major concern was that the chaplain felt like "icing on the cake" or an add-on. A lot of good information was put out, but, because of time constraints, when the chaplain got up to speak with the group, someone would point to his watch or make a motion to cut it short.

LESSONS:

• FSGs provide vital information and resources to soldiers' family members. Thus, they should operate effectively throughout the year so that the additional activities caused by deployments can be easily handled.

• Commanders must manage those deployment activities carefully so that none of the FSG, UMT, or other staff personnel waste time completing them.

• The assistant can be trained to brief basic UMT information at FSG meetings. However, the assistant must be well integrated into the unit if the assistant is to work in place of the chaplain. The chaplain must be given time to present information vital to the FSG. If this does not occur, there is a negative impact on UMT preparation time.

• SOPs should be established to ensure efficient and complete UMT preparation for deployment. UMTs should have most of their personal and ecclesiastical equipment prepared for deployment at any time. By maintaining a "ready status" in these areas, the UMT can provide maximum spiritual leadership during the deployment.

• Handouts need to be prepared ahead of time on general information to allow more time to address family, social, and moral problems created by the deployment.

• UMTs are comprised of soldiers too. Their needs for preparation time to properly prepare for deployment should be considered during the planning phase.

OBSERVATION: In OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR, UMTs used a variety of information during their planning and preparation for deployment.

DISCUSSION: The information needed by UMTs to plan this mission became available about one and a half months prior to deployment. UMTs and supervisory UMTs began developing Religious Support Plans based on doctrine, training and experience from recent contingency operations. In many cases, training came from professional literature, lessons from recent military operations, emerging doctrine, and TTPs taught at the CTCs. Most of that training evolved from peacekeeping and peace enforcement and was limited at best.

The Religious Support Plans developed were successful because they permitted the UMTs to modify the plan in the field to meet environmental and operational shifts. This allowed planning for maximum ministry to soldiers within limited time constraints.

LESSON: Religious Support Operations and concepts are driven by METT-TC. Each course of action must be determined by the UMT on the ground. The best Religious Support Plans allow for flexibility in ministry. UMTs must never let planning take a tremendous amount of time.

OBSERVATION: In Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, most UMTs agreed that the level of physical and spiritual casualty care training was adequate.

DISCUSSION: Those UMTs interviewed described training in physical/spiritual casualty care as being adequate. Training in battle fatigue, mass casualty operations, handling stress and suicide prevention was conducted about one day per month.

UMTs assigned to combat units and forward support battalions noted that they received the additional benefit of testing the training at CMTC during their normal rotations. In each of the training events, the UMTs were given a block of instruction followed by a discussion period where UMTs were encouraged to tell how they ministered in each of the areas under discussion. Following the discussion, UMTs were given scenarios requiring them to consider the physical/spiritual condition of soldiers and how they would give care to the most serious first. Soldiers, on the other hand, noted that they received somewhere between two and four hours of training per year on these subjects. UMTs recommended that FM 16-1 give greater detail in this area of ministry.

Most soldiers interviewed could not properly describe the signs or symptoms of stress or suicide. Most did know to notify their supervisor of any unusual behavior noted in a soldier. When questioned, most of the junior leaders stated that, in such cases, they notified the commander or 1SG who, in turn, either notified the chaplain or sent the soldier to see the doctor. In most cases, no action was taken until the soldier's behavior began to impact on mission accomplishment. Most soldiers noted that by the time the behavior was noted, the soldier was already in trouble or on the verge of it.

LESSON: The training provided to UMTs was adequate. Training for units should be increased. Soldiers need to have quick access to proper care if they are to be helped in overcoming the stress or suicidal tendencies in time to return the soldier to productive duty. Stress and suicide-prevention training for soldiers and leaders should be a minimum of four hours per year, more if unit training time permits.

OBSERVATION: During Operation ABLE SENTRY, the TF Chaplain provided predeployment support to the deploying TF.

DISCUSSION: The U.S. TF chaplain set up a desk in the predeployment preparation line and supplied the soldiers with bibles, prayer books, crosses, rosaries and other religious items. The chaplain verified the religious data on the soldiers ID Tags and discovered that many soldiers didn't understand that "No Preference" didn't mean "no Christian preference," but included all religions. Many soldiers who had "No Preference" ID tags changed their ID tags to reflect a specific religious faith.

The chaplain deployed with a prepacked hymn chest with 60-days of consumable ecclesiastical supplies from home station. Before deploying, the chaplain ordered five chaplain resupply kits through the S-4.

Chaplains should not anticipate supplies from the UN or Coalition headquarters in charge of the contingency operation. For example, the UN does not supply anything to the chaplaincy. Each participating UN country must provide its own chaplain and religious materials through its own supply system. However, once deployed to Macedonia, the Chaplain of the U.S. TF contacted the Nordic chaplains in Skopje, and participated in sharing information on religious activities, retreats, and tours for soldiers.

LESSONS:

• Chaplains should attend soldiers during predeployment preparation to specifically check soldiers ID tags and query soldiers about "No Preference" tags.

• Preparations for deployment ensure adequate religious supplies are on hand and facilitate religious activities during the contingency operation.

OBSERVATION: The Division UMT made a special effort to identify those individuals with special skills that would enhance mission accomplishment.

DISCUSSION: Pages 1-1 to 1-3 of Joint Publication 1-05, Religious Ministry Support for Joint Operations, notes that "Based upon commander's guidance and other requirements....Mission requirements may involve application of any number of chaplain (i.e., UMT) special skills..."and"....Their skill and experience in public relations allows them to bring an added dimension and perspective to the command's total mission."

During preparation for deployment, the Division UMT got all of its UMTs together to identify special skills that would enhance both mission accomplishment and continued training while deployed. The Division UMT also met with all incoming chaplains and assistants to continue identifying those special skills that could be cross-leveled or passed on through training to meet critical mission requirements.

Some of the more common skills identified were Clinical Pastoral Education (CPE) and Family Life Training, Counseling, Suicide Prevention and Stress Training, and Critical Event Debriefing Training. Among the chaplain assistants were found such skills as Combat Life Saver, CPR Instructor, LIFO (communication) Instructor, and Suicide Prevention Instructor/Briefer, trained through the Menninger Institution. Many of the UMTs had developed soft skills, such as counseling and listening, as well as human behavioral, relationship, and interaction skills.

LESSON: Identify special skills during the preparation phase or early in the execution phase to enhance mission accomplishment and add to the UMT training. These skills should be tracked at the division level to get maximum usage during contingencies.

OBSERVATION: In Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Family Support Group Programs were activated and were relevant to the needs of the families.

DISCUSSION: The transfer of Family Support Group programs to real elements began two weeks prior to deployment. The final handoff was completed 48 hours prior to deployment of the unit. Most UMTs and family members interviewed recommended that the programs be activated one or two months prior to deployment. Commanders wanted their UMTs to remain involved with the families as long as possible. Their initial attitude was to "Do whatever it takes to support the families and soldiers."

As preparations for deployment continued, the attitude for family support shifted to "Make every problem a learning experience for families to better prepare the families to help themselves" as resources became more limited. As the deployment began, four Family Assistance Centers were opened. The centers were open 24 hours a day and were staffed by unit personnel and family members.

LESSONS:

• Family Support Programs should be activated one to two months prior to deployment. Once a training program is developed for family members, it should be continued rather than emphasized just prior to deployments.

• Commanders want their UMTs involved in Family Support Programs.

• The most successful programs train family members to care for themselves and conserve limited unit resources for significant issues that arise during deployment.

• Units should strive to have family members staff Family Assistance Centers along side unit personnel. Family Assistance Centers that are co-sponsored are more effective because they are better received by family members.

OBSERVATION: Joint and Army Religious Support Doctrine does not deal specifically with specialized contingency operations.

DISCUSSION: Religious support tasks remain constant, only the conditions change. The doctrine laid out in Joint and Army manuals is more than adequate for Stability and Support Operations. As stated in the Joint Religious Support Publication, "...religious ministry support activities cover a wide range of professional functions accomplished across the entire operational continuum. Because there may be no precise boundary where one condition (peace, conflict, and war) ends and another begins, changes in religious ministry support activities will be more a matter of changing intensity and emphasis than dramatically altered duties."

In all operations, the primary mission of religious support personnel is to advise the commander and provide religious support to servicemembers. During Stability and Support Operations, there is an added emphasis to assist humanitarian agencies and civil affairs elements with humanitarian and disaster-relief programs. Chaplains coordinate with Host-Nation Civil or Military religious representatives to facilitate positive and mutual understanding. This should always be coordinated with Civil Affairs personnel.

Supervisory UMTs must have a working knowledge of Joint Religious Support doctrine. They interface with religious support personnel from other services routinely. Battalion-level UMTs also need a working knowledge of joint doctrine. In Haiti, all UMTs were familiar with their service's religious support doctrine. However, most were unfamiliar with Joint Religious Support doctrine and had not seen the manual. Battalion UMTs have been deployed to Haiti and Saudi Arabia with less than battalion-sized elements, while their supervisory UMTs have remained at home station. Hence, Battalion UMTs need to be familiar with Joint Religious Support doctrine. Supervisory UMTs or outside experts can provide this training to subordinate UMTs.

LESSON: During preparations for deployment, ensure that supervisory UMTs have a thorough knowledge of Joint Religious Support doctrine. UMTs should also be trained on Joint Religious Support doctrine since contingency operations are normally Joint operations. This is especially important if the supervisory UMT does not deploy.

Chaplain Donna Weddle with Orthodox Priests

OBSERVATION: UMTs can benefit from Joint cooperation in developing information about religious groups or factions in an area of operations.

DISCUSSION: During the initial briefing for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School received numerous requests for information. The Combat Development Directorate prepared a Commander's Guide to Religious Groups in Bosnia. This led to a working relationship with the USMC Chaplaincy. In a spirit of cooperation, the USMC paid the TDY for one of their chaplains (Orthodox Priest), who had worked in Bosnia for four years, to go to the U.S. Army's Chaplain Center and School.

In a Joint action, the USMC chaplain and the U.S. Army's Chaplain Center and School chaplains prepared an information paper and got it to the field in a timely manner. Reports from the field noted that it was one of the best small handouts available and was well received by both chaplains and commanders.

LESSON: Cooperation between services allows maximum use of limited resources and enhances mission accomplishment. During times of reduced resources, Joint cooperation allows the best use of available resources.

OBSERVATION: Until deploying units established their MWR program, the demand for inspirational books, literature, and videos quickly depleted UMT stocks during the initial stages of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.

DISCUSSION: The initial weeks of the operation proved to be trying to some soldiers during their off-duty time. Units requested books, Bibles, and literature that the UMT had on hand. The supply of UMT resources was quickly depleted. The chaplain resupply channel was slow in responding to the need to replenish UMT stocks. However, by the time resupply was received, the units had established their own MWR programs. The task for UMTs is to assist in meeting the MWR needs of deployed units while simultaneously providing religious ministry with inspirational books, literature, and videos.

LESSONS:

• During deployment preparations, units should stock MWR kits in coordination with S1/S4 elements so that an initial supply of MWR resources are available when the unit arrives in the AO. This package should be marked "TAT" (to accompany troops).

• Historically, MWR requirements are best met from the bottom up. Units know what their soldiers desire from MWR resources. The UMT can augment the MWR effort by providing literature and videos of a religious and inspirational nature which is in line with its religious support mission.

OBSERVATION: During Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, UMTs deployed with different levels of supplies on hand.

DISCUSSION: The JTF UMT directed UMTs to deploy with at least 90 days of ecclesiastical supplies. Some UMTs deployed with six months worth of supplies, others with a very limited amount of supplies. The amount of supplies taken on a deployment is METT-TC dependent. These supplies are necessary for sustained religious services.

The Resupply kit consists of Chaplain's Kit, Book of Worship, Broadman Hymn Player, communion wafers, host wine, dehydrated grape juice, bibles in English and Spanish, Jewish Prayer Book, Bible Study Booklets, Celtic Crosses, and rosaries. The dehydrated grape juice in the resupply kit was unusable. It was much like the dehydrated peaches found in MREs. UMTs were unable to rehydrate the grape juice.

Because of a lesson in recent deployments, some supervisory UMTs submitted requisitions for the Chaplain's Resupply Kit when they deployed. They initiated the paperwork through normal supply channels as soon as they were alerted of the deployment. In the past, UMTs had waited until they were low in supplies before requesting resupply - which was never received.

The JTF chaplain contacted the home installation to push needed supply items forward, while UMTs were waiting for resupply kits and other expendable items ordered through the supply system.

LESSONS:

• During preparation for deployment, senior UMT personnel should inspect supply levels of subordinate UMTs to ensure adequate supplies are on hand.

• UMTs should deploy with powdered or canned grape juice. They can also order it through the Class I supply system or coordinate with the dining facility NCOIC for powdered grape juice from the T-ration supplement.

• UMTs should consider local procurement for resupply, if practicable.

OBSERVATION: In Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, notification and preparation times were adequate for UMTs.

DISCUSSION: Most UMTs stated that they were notified of deployment far enough in advance to give them ample time to prepare for the contingency deployment. Training and planning intensified. The biggest problem was that the deployment date kept changing. This caused UMTs to rush to get something accomplished and then have to change directions as the deployment date was changed. Even with the increased ministry requirements, most UMTs reported having ample time for preparations.

LESSON: Early notification is important to properly prepare for deployment. Changes should be kept to a minimum to maximize preparation time.

OBSERVATION: In Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, the unit supply was not prepared to support the Port-A-Talk Field Speaker System.

DISCUSSION: Prior to deployment, the UMTs were issued a new field speaker system which included a Port-A-Talk speaker, CD player with accessories, hand-held mike, wireless mike, power conversion box, and carrying case. The system required ten C batteries, two AA batteries, and one 9-volt battery to operate in the field for five hours.

All but two units informed their UMTs that they were not prepared to support the system with the required batteries. This left the UMTs with a system that could not be operated in the field because of a lack of proper power. Most of the UMTs elected to buy their own batteries rather than lose the opportunity to employ such a valuable addition to the field ministry. While commendable and worthwhile, soldiers should not have to purchase supplies out of their own funds to operate Army-issued equipment.

LESSON: During the preparation phase of a contingency operation, ensure that the proper resources are on hand and packed for deployment.

Section I: Planning

Section III: Execution