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1st and 2nd Quarters, FY 98

Organized by BOS, these are the trends submitted by NTC O/Cs for 1st and 2nd quarters, FY98. As appropriate and/or available, they provide doctrinal references and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for the needed training emphasis. Each trend is annotated with Blueprint of the Battlefield codes for use in long-term trend analysis.


(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not in any priority order.)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: (LTP) Depth of expertise in the S2 section.

PROBLEM: Within the brigade S2 sections that participate in LTP, the depth of threat knowledge normally resides primarily with the S2 but not the subordinate S2 section members. Consequently, the S2 assumes the majority of the task of analyzing the enemy. When an assistant S2 is required to assume the role of assisting in the staff planning session, the quality of input provided by that assistant is normally less accurate and less effective. This lack of depth is attributable to several factors to include:

- Experience level of the subordinates.

- New personnel within the section.

- S2's confidence in the subordinates.

- Ineffective Home-Station training.

Technique: Recommend that S2s develop an internal S2 section training program that addresses the threat. The expertise of threat knowledge will facilitate the spreading of responsibility for planning among other members of the S2 section. With the OPTEMPO of an NTC rotation, this will then ensure that the staff planning support does not rest solely on the S2. This observation is routinely identified to the S2 during the LTP session as well as being addressed in the LTP S2 seminar.

(TA.5 Intelligence BOS)

TREND 2: Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) plan development. Task Force (TF) S2s and assistant S2s continue their role as the only planners in the R&S effort.


1. Leaving the task force S2 to solely develop the R&S effort means no integrated product (i.e., no R&S OPORD).

2. Fire integration, casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), and task and purpose are often left out.

3. NAIs are often not prioritized, infiltration routes and OP repositioning plans are not addressed.

4. Weak PIRs are not linked to NAIs.

5. Scouts are often sent out late without an enemy SITEMP. Most task forces only provide the scouts with an R&S matrix, frequently giving inaccurate start and stop times.


1. R&S plans must be integrated with input from other staff planners.

2. Task forces should produce an R&S OPORD written by the S3 with input from all staff elements.

3. The S2 should include the enemy SITEMP in the R&S order for timely receipt of this information by the scouts.

4. Staff synchronization is necessary for the task force R&S plan (OPORD) to work.

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 3: Task force planning and supervision of reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) operations. task force and squadron S2s, S3s, and commanders continue to have difficulty planning and supervising R&S operations.


1. Task force staffs tend to lack an appreciation for the technical abilities of the unit's assets and the force protection and sustainment requirements for R&S operations.

2. The S2's R&S efforts are not coordinated with the staff, to include adjacent and higher headquarters.

3. Although task force S2s adequately identify intelligence requirements, the staffs are unable to identify and manage all available assets.


1. Units over task by superimposing repetitive and redundant collection requirements.

2. The inability to coordinate R&S efforts with the staff, to include adjacent and higher headquarters, often leads to the loss of lives and poorly executed or unsuccessful plans.


1. Task force commanders and S3s must recognize their role in R&S planning and supervision. This will allow task force and squadron S2s time to analyze reconnaissance data and recommend redirection of collection efforts.

2. If task force S2s are on the "blame line" for planning and supervising R&S operations, then it is essential he or she receives all required protection and sustainment support, and has full authority to execute fire missions, etc., required for success.

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 4: Engineer battalion S2/S3 employment of reconnaissance.

PROBLEM: Too often, engineer battalion S2/S3s do not incorporate engineer reconnaissance into the overall brigade reconnaissance/surveillance (R&S) plan. They are often sent out as an afterthought without clear task and purpose, or are assigned contingencies such as Modular Pack Mine System (MOPMS) strike teams.


1. The employment of engineer reconnaissance should be a critical task of the engineer battalion S2/S3.

a. They must provide increased input to the brigade plan.

b. They must develop engineer specific NAIs and decision points, and ensure that observation responsibility is assigned to the appropriate collection asset.

c. They must synchronize the battalion plan with the brigade R&S plan, and establish a system for reporting key engineer intelligence directly to the engineer battalion S2.

2. The engineer battalion S2/S3 should issue clear and complete OPORDs to the engineer reconnaissance teams and ensure they deploy with graphics, maps, reporting matrixes, and a communication plan.

3. Establish a system for tracking the location and activity of the teams, and for receiving, analyzing, and disseminating this critical information. This should be done regardless of the task organization.

4. Use the battalion command net for communications.

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 5: (LTP) Task force Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S).

PROBLEM: Although reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) planning is detailed and fundamentally sound at the task force level, task forces habitually do not follow up with their brigade on many R&S issues during the later stages of R&S planning and preparation.

- They do not plan for air movement for the COLTs that are OPCON to them.

- When planning air assault operations, they do not take into account competing demands for helicopters that would also be moving brigade assets.

- They believe that they have good terrain management in their area of operations (AO), but then find brigade R&S assets in their AO after crossing the line of departure (LD).


1. Task forces should refine the R&S plan through the execution phase to ensure that their plan is synchronized.

2. The task force staff should focus on terrain management.

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 6: (LTP) Engineer Involvement in R&S Planning. The engineer battalion rarely plays a major part in the brigade's R&S planning.


1. Routinely, the engineer effort in support of the R&S effort is inadequate. Proposed locations for the assets going forward (i.e., COLTs, scouts, command and control, ADA, IEW, etc.) are not addressed by the engineers.

2. A relationship between the assistant brigade engineer (ABE) and the R&S planning cell rarely occurs. When engineers do accompany task force scouts or COLTs with an obstacle intelligence (OBSINTEL) collection mission, they normally cross the FLOT with minimal guidance.


1. The ABE must become a key player during R&S planning.

2. Terrain products should be produced that support the R&S plan.

3. During a deliberate attack, engineer-specific NAIs should be developed and refined. Enemy obstacles invariably hold the key to how the enemy is defending.

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 7: Integration of Air Defense into the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB).


1. Task force (TF) staffs routinely omit or fail to integrate the air portion of the IPB during the TF planning process.

2. Air defense platoon leaders do not cross talk the air threat with the S2 throughout the TDMP process.

3. The air threat is seldom briefed by the S2 or the air defender during mission analysis. When it is briefed, the air defender's intelligence often completely differs from the S2's air intelligence.

4. The task force commander does not identify air defense priorities because of a lack of information on the enemy's air capability.

5. Most S2s integrate air avenues on the SITEMP, but few conduct a detailed air threat analysis.

6. The most likely COA for enemy air is rarely identified.


1. The task force commander, staff, and company commanders gain little appreciation for the enemy air threat and capabilities.

2. Air defense plans are oriented on unit movement instead of concentrating available assets to defeat the air threat.

3. The task force commander's guidance to the air defense officers (ADOs) is unfocused (Example, ADA: protect the force).


1. The S2 should draw on the ADO for expertise on enemy air threat capabilities. Begin by referring to FM 34-130, Appendix C, reference the three dimensional IPB.

2. The air-associated IPB cannot be treated separately. It must be used to show the synergy of air and ground threat. The air defense officer should cross talk with the S2 to develop the air portion of the IPB.

3. Identify who will brief the air threat during mission analysis and the OPORD. The air defender should ensure that air defense priorities are established with the air threat in mind, and ensure that the task force commander understands how the enemy will use his air assets to support his scheme of maneuver.

4. During the mission analysis, the air threat must be briefed to the task force commander up front. This allows the commander to "see" critical points on the battlefield where the unit is most vulnerable to air attack. The commander can then prioritize ADA coverage IAW the threat and his intent/maneuver scheme. ADA assets will be positioned to defeat the air threat while the force postures to take active or passive air defense measures.

5. A standard 1:250,000 map should be used to conduct a detailed analysis of the terrain and refined using a 1:50,000 map.

6. The air IPB should include:

a. Key Terrain:
- Airfields
- LAS and DZ
- Choke Points

b. Air Avenues:
- Type of Aircraft
- Max Ceiling
- Attack Profile
- Weapon Systems
- Target to be Attacked

c. Weather:
- Visibility
- Wind Speed and Direction
- Precipitation
- Cloud Cover
- Temperature

d. Threat Evaluation:
- Enemy Aircraft/Missile
- Air Order of Battle
- Aircraft Capabilities
- Ordnance
- Tactical Flight Doctrine
- Priorities of Attack
- Command and Control

e. Threat Integration:
- Air Avenues of Approach
- Determine best use terrain given aircraft's own capabilities and attack profile.

f. Event Template:
- Aerial NAIs
- Terrain constraints on air avenue to potential target
- Decision Support Template

g. Decision Support Template:
- Air Avenues
- Air Borne and Air Assault Objectives
- LZs and DZs
- Ranges of enemy systems
- Aerial TAIs
- Decision points

6. References: FM 34-130, IPB, Appendix C; FM 44-43, BSFV Platoon and Squad Operations; FM 44-64, FAAD Battalion and Battery Operations; TRADOC PAM 350-16, Heavy OPFOR Doctrine.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 8: Engineer involvement in brigade intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).

PROBLEM: Engineer battalions are doing little to define the battlefield environment.

RESULT: An inability to "see" the terrain severely restricts the brigade's ability to understand the battlefield situation.


1. The brigade S2, battalion S2, and assistant battalion engineer (ABE) should begin the IPB process prior to deployment to the theater. Develop the following items prior to deployment:

a. Modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO).

b. Analysis of time and distance in mobility corridors.

c. Engineer threat model, to include threat mines.

2. Further refine these initial estimates during reception, staging, and onward integration (RSOI) and combat operations.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 9: (LTP) Understanding of the Engineer Battlefield Assessment (EBA) process.

PROBLEM: Assistant brigade engineers (ABEs) and engineer battalion S3s do not fully understand the Engineer Battlefield Assessment (EBA) process.

- The engineer battalion S3 and ABE rarely develop a detailed EBA based on the initial division Warning Order (WARNO).

- The EBA is seldom developed prior to mission analysis so that it can be used in conjunction with the S2's development of the IPB.

- Most ABEs do not assist with terrain analysis. It is normally left to the S2.

- The engineer battalion S3 rarely helps the ABE with the EBA process.


1. FM 5-71-3, Brigade Engineer Combat Operations, states that the assistant brigade engineer (ABE) has the responsibility for developing the engineer battlefield assessment (EBA).

a. It lays out specific requirements for the development of the EBA.

b. Chapter 2 states that the EBA consists of three parts, all of which must be analyzed in detail:

- terrain analysis

- enemy mission

- Mobility/Survivability (M/S) capabilities, and friendly mission and M/S capabilities.

2. To get the desired detail in the EBA, the ABE should begin immediately following the receipt of the initial WARNO.

3. The engineer battalion S3 should assist in and review the EBA.

4. Understand the significance of a timely and detailed EBA: It is the basis for the entire intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 10: (LTP) Using Terrabase products to meet terrain analysis requirements.

PROBLEM: Engineers across the brigade are now commonly using Terrabase II and are routinely analyzing the effects of terrain and assessing the impact on military/engineer operations. Unfortunately, Terrabase II has not been distributed throughout unit staffs. Thus, most primary staff officers who do not have the program, or who are unfamiliar with the program, are either doing the old "stubby pencil" line-of-sight (LOS) diagrams, or completely ignoring their internal 'analysis of terrain' responsibility. Most staff officers do not know that

Terrabase II can create three-dimensional representations of terrain and provide LOS profiles for placement and locations of weapons, radar, and radios.


1. The most important step in the engineer battlefield analysis (EBA), as defined in FM 5-71-3, Brigade Engineer Combat Operations (Armored), page 2-16, is the Terrain Analysis. FM 101-5 refers to it as terrain visualization. Even though terrain analysis is an engineer responsibility, it is also an individual staff officer's responsibility, because the assistant brigade engineer (ABE) and the task force engineer rarely have the time or knowledge of system capabilities to properly analyze the terrain for every system.

2. As of Oct 97, Terrabase II became available to the Army as a whole. You can now receive it simply by requesting it from Fort Leonard Wood.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 11: (LTP) Air defense officer (ADO) development of the aerial IPB.


1. The ADO rarely understands the required time to adequately develop the aerial IPB and rarely gets his analysis incorporated into the maneuver S2's IPB prior to mission analysis or COA development.

2. ADOs have a tendency to wait until receipt of a formal order from higher headquarters before they begin the process. They rarely begin the process based on a warning order (WARNO).


1. The brigade ADO should be able to develop the aerial portion of the IPB prior to mission analysis upon receipt of the division WARNO, which provides the area of operation (AO), an enemy lay-down, the mission, and the higher headquarter's mission and intent.

2. Refer to FM 44-100, Air Defense Operations, which has dedicated Appendix A to the aerial IPB process. It emphasizes that the aerial IPB is an integral part of the IPB process at all levels. The aerial IPB results in a predictive analysis of when and where the brigade will most likely see enemy air.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 12: (LTP) Light infantry task force knowledge of the enemy.

PROBLEM: Light infantry task force staffs are too often unfamiliar with enemy tactics and composition. S2s and staff members struggle with the current threat model throughout their planning exercise.

Technique: There are several Krasnovian threat documents available through LTP, the OPFOR, CALL Quarterly Bulletin 97-4, Decision Point Tactics, TRADOC Pamphlet 350-16, and FM 100-60. Commanders must familiarize their staffs to understand the Krasnovian threat prior to an NTC deployment.

(TA. Collect Threat Information)

TREND 13: (LTP) Mechanized task force development of the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). Mechanized task force staffs are not developing IPBs with sufficient detail.


1. Products produced do not provide the task force commander with sufficient information regarding the terrain and friendly/enemy use of that terrain.

2. Little emphasis is placed on developing a viable IPB prior to mission analysis. RESULT: A flawed commander's guidance that pays little credence to the terrain in the area of operations and no credence to the terrain in the area of interest.

3. Senior staff members (XO/S3) do not insist on each staff member participating in the IPB process. The mission is normally given to the most inexperienced member of the staff.the S2. Even if the S2 understands OPFOR tactics and techniques, he has neither the time nor resources to produce all the required products.

4. Staffs do not analyze weather. It is usually given in the mission analysis brief as a "weather forecast."

5. Staffs do not analyze terrain, state whether each terrain feature has a positive or negative effect on the mission, or develop threat models based upon the terrain.

6. Staffs do not come to LTP or the NTC with the products to complete a good assessment of the threat.

a. Few staffs create and bring with them different threat models based upon terrain and missions.

b. They fail to identify HVTs and where/when they will appear on the battlefield.

c. The targeting process is usually nonexistent due to the FSO's lack of involvement in the IPB.

d. Few staffs develop possible enemy COAs based upon the terrain and OPFOR doctrine.

e. Staffs fail to develop SITEMPs for those COAs prior to arrival at NTC. SITEMPs can be modified easier than starting from "scratch" after their arrival.

f. Units do not develop operational control graphics until late in the planning process. Operational graphics usually do not support flexibility and simplicity based upon enemy, actions, reactions, or counteractions.

7. Commander's guidance is normally weak and very general. Few understand the tactical necessity of a thorough IPB, and base their guidance on a faulty mission analysis brief that is lacking in a detailed analysis of the enemy and terrain.


1. Task force staffs must prepare for their NTC rotation at Home Station. This includes developing threat templates/models and doing a thorough terrain analysis of each corridor.

a. A simple MCOO does not provide the necessary detail.

b. The terrain at the NTC is not going to change, and the way the enemy fights will change very little. The missions will remain somewhat similar to those in the past. With the advent of terrain analysis computer programs, units can accomplish a detailed library of the NTC terrain.

2. The complete staff can accomplish a large portion of any mission analysis prior to their arrival. Staffs know the facts and they certainly have the ability to make assumptions. Some suggested techniques follow:

a. Task force engineers should accomplish a detailed terrain analysis of each NTC corridor using computer programs. Early identification of advantageous terrain is critical. This procedure must include identification of inter-visibility lines that can provide a platoon fire and maneuver advantage. The same procedure can be used to develop observation plans and enhance the effects of all BOS.

b. S2s should develop threat models based upon the different missions that occur at the NTC. Those models must be related to the terrain in the different corridors. The models could then be transferred to templates, which could provide staffs with enemy COAs and lessen the time required to produce a good SITEMP.

c. Task force S3s can develop flexible but simple operational control graphics. Each unit can tailor those graphics to fit a specific mission. It would also provide a common base from which other graphics could be tailored to the scenario. This should eliminate the current trend of "reinventing the wheel" for each rotation.

d. Air defense officers (ADOs) can easily identify air corridors by doing a Home-Station terrain analysis of each corridor.

e. High-value target (HVT) lists can be produced at Home Station and incorporated into threat models. Planned position areas (PAs) can be templated based upon the existing models, and perhaps Copperhead use will become a norm instead of a rarity. The FA community cannot continue to place the use of Copperhead in the "TOO HARD TO ACCOMPLISH" task category.

f. Task force commanders should develop a detailed commander's guidance checklist. The commander cannot expect to provide precise guidance based upon a 30-minute mission analysis brief. He must have assistance in this endeavor. A good checklist can provide that assistance.

g. S2s must understand the effects of weather in relation to the terrain, enemy, and mission. The effects of the sun, wind, inversion times, etc., are critical at certain times and in certain locations. The S2 must explain the advantages and disadvantages of the predicted conditions.

(TA.5.3 Process Information)

TREND 14: Task Force (TF) S2 terrain analysis. TF S2s often inadequately analyze the terrain in sufficient detail.


1. TF S2s accurately depict enemy avenues of approach (AA) into their sectors/zones; however, they are not maximizing the MCOOs and other products for terrain analysis.

2. S2s identify enemy kill sacks, potential friendly engagement areas, defensible terrain, and specific system and equipment locations but do not integrate their product with the task force engineer.

3. S2s do not routinely use the Terrabase products or the 1:24,000 scale maps.

RESULT: The commander and staff are denied opportunities to exploit the terrain when determining friendly and threat COAs.


1. S2s should train to produce detailed terrain analysis using Terrabase products and 1:24,000 scale maps. Use of these products would allow the commander and staff to "see the terrain" in greater detail prior to mission execution.

2. S2s should guard against making general assumptions regarding the "open terrain" in the desert.

3. TF S2s must improve in their ability to articulate how the terrain will impact COAs. S2 use of terrain analysis during mission analysis and COA development would greatly improve both their and the S3 threat and friendly COAs products.

(TA.5.3.2 Evaluate Physical Environment Information)

TREND 15: (LTP) Responsibility for terrain analysis. Brigade staffs are currently unclear as to who has the responsibility for terrain analysis.


1. Most brigades have given this responsibility to either the S2 or the assistant battalion engineer (ABE). Some units require the ABE to provide the terrain analysis brief during mission analysis while other commands require the S2 to fulfill this responsibility.

2. The terrain analysis has historically been an S2 function but with the advent of the engineer battalion TOC collocated with the brigade main, additional staff planning support can be levied from the engineers.

Technique: Give the ABE the responsibility for terrain analysis as a matter of SOP. The engineers routinely use and have terrain analysis tools, such as Terrabase and WINCATS. However, this responsibility must be identified early on and trained at Home Station. By routinely employing the ABE and the engineer TOC for terrain-related products, this association will become SOP.

(TA.5.3.2 Evaluate Physical Environment Information)

TREND 16: Event templates and matrices.


1. Task force S2s are generally not producing their event template or event matrix.

2. Those that are produced are incomplete.

3. S2s do not understand the use of the event template or items incorporated on the event template.


1. S2s do not include a friendly COA development product.

2. S2s omit the R&S Plan product.


1. TF S2s must learn the importance of the event template. They cannot delete this step from the planning process.

2. Read and comply with FM 34-130. Phase lines, NAIs, and enemy decision points are critical to friendly COA development.

3. Use the event matrix as a companion to the template. Use of the event matrix should also help distinguish between the enemy COAs.

4. Conduct Home Station drills to develop the S2 section.

(TA. Develop Enemy Intentions)

TREND 17: Enemy Course of Action (ECOA) development. Task force S2s seldom develop several enemy courses of action (COAs). This is most often not because of a lack of competence on the part of the S2, but rather a result of a restricted planning timeline. S2s are only allowed sufficient time to develop one threat COA, and the staff has no appreciation for the various avenues of approach or forms of contact available to the enemy.

RESULT: The enemy executes a different COA than what is planned for by the task force. The task force does not have the systems in place to defeat the threat and is unable to react to it in a timely manner.


1. The task force S2 should coordinate with the brigade S2 for early receipt of the situation template (SITEMP) to allow for more time to develop task force level threat COAs.

2. The S2 must use a checklist to cover all combat multipliers, identifying the capabilities of enemy ADA, indirect fires, and engineers on the SITEMP. This will help the task force plan for various encounters with threat forces during the battle.

3. S2 sections must practice staff drills at Home Station so that SITEMPs are produced in a timely fashion to address all forms of contact.

4. Develop numerous threat COAs on concept sketches to give the battle staff an opportunity to visualize the threat and plan accordingly.

(TA.5.4.2 Prepare Reports on Enemy Intentions)

TREND 18: (LTP) Updating situational templates (SITEMPs).

PROBLEM: While developing updated SITEMPs, S2s often do not differentiate between the confirmed locations and situationally templated gaps in known intelligence.

RESULT: The staff is led to develop plans to counter a threat that may not be at that specific location.

Technique: Identify this shortfall to the S2. The S2's subsequent SITEMP updates can define the differences using dotted lines for templated positions and solid lines for confirmed positions.

(TA.5.4.4 Prepare Reports on Enemy Situation)

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