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(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not in any priority order.)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: DA Form 2404/5988E tracking from the company/team to the UMCP.

PROBLEM: CSS units consistently experience serious problems with their maintenance information flow. A breakdown in the maintenance system is often caused by inadequate flow of DA Form 2404/5988E from the company/teams to the UMCP:

- No daily tracking system by the ULLS clerks.

- No leadership emphasis at the company/team level.

- No verification of deficiencies by company/team level maintenance mechanics.

- Inaccurate reports provided to the task force commander.


1. Develop a daily tracking system for the ULLS clerks.

2. Promote leadership emphasis at the company/team level.

3. Make sure the mechanics verify all deficiencies at the company/team level.

4. The team chief must ensure that all parts on the DA Form 2404/5988E are looked up prior to turning the paperwork into the ULLS clerk.

5. Refer to the article "Redesigning PMCS to Build Combat Power," page 28 of CALL Pub No. 97-18, CTC Quarterly Bulletin, 4th Qtr FY 97.

(TA.7.3.2 Fix/Maintain Equipment)

TREND 2: Engineer unit preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS). A majority of engineer units deploy to NTC with non-mission capable (NMC) VOLCANO and MICLIC systems.


1. Units too often arrive at NTC with the wrong PMCS -10 manual and no change updates, and then claim they are unable to get the manual or did not know there was a change published.

2. Units do not know what seemingly minor mechanical faults will deadline their key weapons systems.

3. Most leaders do not take the time to understand the specific mechanical requirements of the VOLCANO and MICLIC warfighting systems, and the proper conduct of -10 PMCS is not enforced to standard during their Home Station training.

RESULT: When units show up to the NTC thinking their systems are fully mission capable (FMC), they are surprised to have their system deadlined due to improper conduct of -10 PMCS.


1. The majority of these problems would be solved if leaders would enforce the standard of "by the book" PMCS for their weapons systems.

2. Most units know 6 to 12 months out they will be coming to the NTC. They should establish maintenance "hot pits" that focus on the proper analysis of the -10 for the VOLCANO system, to include the prime mover (HEMTT/M548) and the MICLIC system. Ensure the operator conducts the proper PMCS and then verify it through company/battalion hot pit programs.

3. The battalion must have an aggressive publications program that keeps up with the latest publications and their changes. The establishment of a GTA card that focuses on specific VOLCANO/MICLIC maintenance checks may be one approach or revitalizing the technical manuals with all the latest changes may be the other solution.

(TA. Perform Preventive Maintenance)

TREND 3: Casualty reporting and tracking within the combat engineer battalion Administrative and Logistics Command Post (ALOC).


1. Recently, engineer battalion Administrative and Logistics Command Posts (ALOCs) have not used tracking methods that maintain detailed and accurate accountability of casualties on the battlefield.

2. Units have relied solely on FM casualty reports that lack the detail necessary for PAC personnel to generate required feeder reports and awards. Reports usually include little more than battle roster numbers.

3. Engineer units, which usually rely on supported unit assets to evacuate casualties, often send formal feeder reports only through those supported unit channels, bypassing engineer channels altogether.


1. Units should accurately track casualties by event and type as well as by individual.

2. Units must receive formal Casualty Feeder Reports/Witness Reports as well as the initial FM report. Initial reports need to include the details necessary to allow ALOC personnel to track casualty by type (i.e., return to duty, litter, or killed) and by incident. Brief, but detailed information in initial casualty reports provides a tool by which ALOC personnel can better track losses, generate reports and awards in a timely manner, and provide immediate analysis and feedback to the commander. A suggested method is shown below.

a. Subunits should send an initial report via FM with the necessary data for ALOC personnel to anticipate the movement of casualties on the battlefield and to begin planning for replacement operations. This information allows the ALOC to assess combat losses, not only in terms of individual personnel, but also in terms of personnel as they relate to combat systems. The information also allows the ALOC to identify early on those soldiers which will be pushed back through the replacement system. At a minimum, the initial report should include:

- Battle roster number.

- Type of casualty (RTD, WIA, KIA, non-battle).

- Location.

- Date-time.

- A quick event description so that personnel losses are tied to specific actions or equipment losses on the battlefield.

b. Following the initial reports, formal Casualty Feeder Reports/Witness Reports, action summaries, and personnel status reports should be sent through battalion FM channels or through the LOGPAC. These follow-up reports provide verification of initial reports and the information necessary to generate awards, letters, and action summary reports as necessary.

(TA. Evacuate Casualties)

TREND 4: Tracking task force supply status at the CTCP/FTCP. Units have difficulty tracking task force key classes of supply within the CTCP or FTCP.


1. Units do not know how much fuel and ammunition are in the field trains, combat trains, or in the company/teams.

2. Daily LOGSTAT reports are bypassing key nodes in the task force CSS team. Either they go straight to the field trains without the S4 knowing what is on them, or they go to the CTCP and then either late to the field trains or not at all.

3. Company/teams report what they want, not what they have on-hand.


1. Supply crises arise without warning and require immediate resolution by the unit S4.

2. Supplies can not be forecast, which forces the S4 to make decisions regarding the allocation, forecasting, and cross-leveling of scarce supplies without accurate information on which to base this decision.

Techniques: A good track of the supply status allows good decisions and enables the resupply effort to be more responsive and timely for the unit's needs.

1. Develop a system of charts that easily and accurately displays the logistics status of the unit.

2. Ensure that the LOGSTAT report includes a column for on-hand as well as requested quantities of supplies.

3. Determine standard times or events that cause the CTCP and FTCP to share logistics information.

4. Ensure that unit LOGSTAT reports go to the CTCP as well as the FTCP. (Method: Turn in two copies at LOGPAC pickup. The S4 or his representative makes notes on and approves the requests, then a copy goes with him to the CTCP, and the support platoon leader or some other field trains person takes a copy to the FTCP.)

(TA.7.5.2 Supply the Force)

TREND 5: Development of field artillery Unit Basic Loads (UBLs). Too often, units are deploying with no developed or published UBLs.


1. The battalion is not aware of what they need and have not divided the required classes of supply into battery amounts.

2. The requirements are not part of the battalion SOP so batteries cannot properly develop their load plans.

3. Distribution plans are not developed so units have not identified what host nation support they may need.

Procedures: Refer to FM 101-10-1, historical data, supply usage requirements, operations logistics planner software, FORSCOM Reg 700-3, FM 8-10-5, and SB 8-75 for guidance on UBLs.


1. Units need to have a clear understanding of all classes of supply, and pertinent information should be included in the unit TACSOP.

2. Appoint an OIC/NCOIC for each class of supply.

3. Deploy a robust advance party that can open all accounts and begin drawing.

(TA.7.5.2 Supply the Force)

TREND 6: Field artillery battalion Rearm, Refuel, Resupply, and Survey Point (R3SP) operations.


1. Field artillery battalion staffs usually identify R3SP requirements but often do not integrate or synchronize the operation with the tactical plan.

2. The S3s give poor or untimely ammunition guidance.

3. There is often no effective timeline and/or trigger.

4. The required equipment and assets, although available, are not postured forward to execute an R3SP.

5. A typical R3SP location is along the brigade MSR in an open field with no concealment and poor dispersion.

6. There is poor coordination between unit advance parties and the R3SP site OIC.


1. The lack of discussion of R3SPs during the planning process causes poor site selection and unsynchronized execution within the battalion movement plan and logistics plan.

2. Poor guidance from the S3 impedes the S4's effort to consolidate the necessary R3SP assets (CL III [B], V, survey, and LOGPAC if available) at the correct time and location.

3. Often an R3SP turns into a refuel operation or unit distribution effort because of inadequate triggers.

4. Poor coordination between advance parties and the R3SP site OIC causes delays and confusion during the operation.


1. The R3SP's principle mission is to rearm and refuel the battalion with secondary missions of providing survey update for the M109A6 and linking up LOGPAC vehicles (if possible) or required unit supplies. The R3SP is not the only resupply technique. It is, however, the most efficient method to rearm, refuel, and resupply a battalion conducting a deliberate movement. A properly planned, prepared, and executed R3SP is the combat multiplier necessary to allow the battalion to continue the fight uninterrupted.

2. The S4 integrates and synchronizes the execution of the R3SP with the battalion's tactical plan.

3. The S4 should position the R3SP site central to the Paladin position areas to facilitate rapid execution. It must be tactically positioned with good concealment, as survivability is a primary consideration for site selection. Maximize terrain for cover and concealment and ensure good dispersion of assets.

4. The S3 provides guidance (ammunition types and powders) to the S4 with sufficient time for the battalion logisticians to execute the plan.

5. The S4, considering battery ammunition statuses, remaining mission requirements (estimate), and the battalion's on-hand ammunition, gives guidance to the Battalion Ammunition Officer (BAO) who, in-turn, begins configuring ammunition.

a. The BAO should focus on configuring pure PLS loads of killer ammunition with the correct powders.

b. Special munitions (i.e., FASCAM or smoke) can be linked up with the appropriate unit at the R3SP or in the unit location.

c. The BAO notifies the S3 and units what is available at the R3SP to include ammunition types.

6. The ammunition PSG configures the R3SP in the field trains and possibly stages it in a forward location.

7. Combat trains assets are for emergency resupply during the battle and should not be used; if they are used, they must be resupplied, reconfigured, or replaced immediately.

8. Ensure all assets are assembled early enough to conduct a rehearsal.

9. The R3SP site layout should facilitate rapid execution.

a. Establish an entry point, track plan, multiple ammunition upload lanes, by-pass lanes for vehicles not requiring ammunition, refuel points with survey control points, and a LOGPAC/supply linkup point at the exit.

b. Each element within the R3SP should maintain tactical dispersion.

c. The R3SP site should be set up to maximize the use of the multiple assets and be able to conduct multiple operations simultaneously.

10. The S4, CAT CDR, or BAO should be the R3SP site OIC and be responsible for site reconnaissance, conduct communications checks, and establish the R3SP prior to units arriving.

a. The R3SP OIC ensures the site layout facilitates rapid execution of R3SP.

b. Batteries should upload howitzers from battery ammunition vehicles prior to arrival, thus minimizing vehicles that rearm at the R3SP.

c. Batteries should transload ammunition from battery ammunition resupply vehicles (PLS) to section FAASVs, again minimizing R3SP execution time.

d. This also will reduce the ammunition burden on the R3SP assets.

11. The R3SP site OIC positions the refuel point after the rearm point allowing simultaneous operations, e.g., refueling howitzers while rearming ammunition vehicles.

12. The recon survey officer establishes the survey control points at the refuel sites to facilitate simultaneous operations.

13. The S4 should position LOGPAC vehicles (if available) near the R3SP exit to link up with their unit as they depart the R3SP site.

14. Inclusion of the R3SP in the battalion TACSOP is the key to success. The TACSOP must establish responsibilities, time lines, a pre-R3SP advance party link up checklist, security responsibilities, and a site layout diagram.

(TA.7.5.2 Supply the Force)

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