Military

2. Command posts lack staff organization.

RESULTS:

1. Targets passed during execution often stray from the HPT list.

2. Focus is lost, and CAS is wasted on insignificant targets, or no targets at all.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Hold collective planning, rehearsals, and targeting cell meetings (huddles) during execution. Conduct these staff huddles every 30 minutes. These continuous huddles provide valuable coordination between members of the staff. Participants should include: XO, S3 Air, S2, FSO, ALO, ADO. These participants should anticipate the arrival of CAS sorties, and ALOs can provide a valuable "heads up" to the staff on fighter estimated times of arrival (ETAs).

2. Continually develop targets for CAS and SEAD throughout the battle and be prepared for short notice of fighter arrival. The BOS chiefs must set the conditions early to minimize fighter time on station.

3. It is very common that most CAS will come in the form of immediate or push CAS for brigades and task forces. Treat immediate CAS as an opportunity to exploit additional combat power. Establish a staff battle drill which features rapid target identification and prompt input of execution instructions from all participants. Major features of this battle drill are a staff which continuously tracks HPTs, provides the commander with only clear, succinct target options that meet his intent, and coordinates the airstrike prior to aircraft on station.

4. Be realistic about how much time it takes to set up and employ CAS missions. The average time (at the NTC) for a well-drilled brigade fire support element (FSE) to establish the conditions and employ an air strike is 15 to 20 minutes. (A relevant discussion of fire support time planning factors can be found in the table, "Basic Guidelines for Placement of DPs", page 6, Annex A, FM 6-20-10, The Targeting Process).

ISSUE 2: FAILURE TO PUSH CAS TO TASK FORCES AND POOR UNDERSTANDING OF "CLOSE CAS" PROCEDURES.

OBSERVATION: The brigades (or regiments) tend to retain all target and execution options and rarely allocate CAS to the task forces (or squadrons). With brigades attempting to control CAS in the close fight, no assets are pushed forward to Air Liaison Officers (ALOs) or Enlisted Terminal Attack Controllers (ETACs) for direct control. Task force staffs do not plan for CAS employment because they are not given the mission and have no allocation of sorties.

DISCUSSION:

1. Because of faulty wargaming, the brigades are often too absorbed with the deep battle, at the expense of the close fight. Brigade staffs neither identify the desired combat ratios necessary for the close fights, nor push CAS forward to help set those ratios.

2. At the task force level, commanders and staffs sometimes forget to provide adequate logistical or force protection resources for Tactical Air Control Parties (TACPs) to properly position for direct control of CAS in the close fight.

RESULTS:

1. Brigade-level TACPs attempting to control CAS from remote locations have contributed to fratricides and near fratricides.

2. Battalion-level TACPs are not tasked to provide direct control for air strikes close to friendly units within their zones or sectors.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Brigade staffs should target enemy forces by formation and function, recognizing that the desired enemy force will not always be found in the deep battle.

2. Resource the task forces, and have them plan to utilize CAS in the close fight to obtain favorable combat ratios. Task forces should train to employ immediate and push CAS as the norm, with a staff battle drill that rapidly develops and executes CAS missions.

3. In the close fight, Direct Control procedures are paramount to mission survivability, fratricide prevention, and ultimate success.

4. The brigade and its task forces should have a checklist to speed coordination of mission handoff, with particular emphasis on deconflicting all other aircraft and fires (i.e., direct, indirect, helicopter and other CAS fires). Rapid transmission of up-to-the-minute friendly positions, particularly individual positions, such as COLTs, OPs etc., is critical to reducing risk.

5. References:

ISSUE 3: POOR SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIR DEFENSE (SEAD).

OBSERVATION: Units have difficulty executing SEAD Call for Fires (CFFs) quickly and efficiently. SEAD is usually reactive and not pre-planned or programmed using adequate risk analysis techniques.

DISCUSSION: Units that do not consider all the factors associated with planning and coordinating for SEAD are usually unsuccessful in execution. Some of the common problems observed:

1. Units seldom identify or treat enemy Air Defense systems as a priority information requirement (PIR) and, when they do, the staff only searches for these systems when CAS is on station.

2. ADA systems are usually identified as an HPT, but the execution is not adequately prioritized by the staff or resourced by the fire support system.

3. SEAD, as an Essential Fire Support Task (EFST), is often not identified, planned or rehearsed in the scheme of fires.

4. When carried out, units sometimes execute SEAD fires technically incorrect, (i.e., wrong timing, insufficient volume, etc).

RESULTS:

1. Lack of prior planning and coordination causes delays, because units try to overlay SEAD missions when FA fires are already heavily engaged.

2. SEAD CFFs are not tagged or prioritized and, thus, get lost in the system or execution cue.

3. SEAD fires tend to delay air strikes and are often ineffective.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. The requirement for SEAD should be an ALO call, as a tactic for successful employment. It is determined by the factors of METT-T, addressed by all of the BOS chiefs and the pilots. If there is a recommendation not to provide SEAD, then the commander must be informed. When there is no SEAD by FA systems, aircraft can compensate by doing "Self-SEAD," changing attack routes, terrain masking, altitude changes and/or a new target, but these compensatory efforts can degrade the effectiveness of the sorties.

2. The best conditions for a CAS attack are obviously when there are no ADA systems or when there is an effective suppression of ADA systems. Therefore, make a commitment to kill identified ADA systems as they are located. The cumulative effect of ADA system destruction can produce favorable conditions for future CAS attacks.

3. Make sure the target report meets the Target Selection Standards (TSSs), i.e., the target location meets accuracy requirements and timeliness with respect to the report. If you do not have an ADA system report which meets TSSs, consider executing SEAD in conjunction with the air strike to suppress ADA systems within the target array, such as SA-14, ZSUs, etc.

4. For simultaneous target engagement, use altitude deconfliction or time separation informal ACA methods. There can be tremendous benefits for continuously suppressing the CAS target to facilitate fighter ingress and prevent aircrew disruption due to counter-fires from the target itself.

The following is a discussion of some of the most critical actions members of the command and staff must accomplish to break these negative trends.

1. COMMANDER: Provide clear guidance regarding what enemy formation or function to attack and why. Mass your CAS sorties on your critical targets. Once in battle, authorize your staff to execute targets with little guidance and let your HPTs and priority of fires drive the employment. Realize that CAS is force-oriented; keep in mind your primary target will move (enemy in the offense) or may be in secondary/alternate locations (enemy in the defense). You must give your staff (and CAS) depth and time to contribute to the success of your critical tasks. Discuss CAS in terms of time and space or phase of the operation to help the integration effort.

2. XO: To get the commander's approval rapidly, you must understand his intent and pro-actively develop and recommend CAS targets to him (seek pre-approval if possible). You accomplish this through well-timed staff huddles which produce several viable targets just prior to CAS arrival. Pre-planned sorties are a luxury; train your staff to execute Immediate or push CAS with little warning as to the actual arrival time of fighters. The BOS chiefs must remain constantly aware of the situation, pertaining not only to their BOS responsibilities but to each others as well. Make CAS a high priority while fighters are on station.

3. S2: Timeliness begins with the S2 being able to continuously identify and track CAS HPTs. Be prepared to utilize the FAC-A (through the ALO) to confirm or deny target information. Contact higher regularly to update ADA targets, particularly 30 minutes prior to an air strike. Do not forget non-lethal SEAD measures you may have at your disposal. Train the ALO/ETACs on how to derive intelligence from their pilots. Integrate pilot reports into your human intelligence process to develop the situation.

4. S3/S3 AIR: Submit CAS requests per doctrine and unit SOPs. Be sure you understand the brigade/division target cycle so you can make timely requests and update/refine those requests as necessary. The S3 must be involved in final approval of FSCMs, ACAs, Air BPs, Air Corridors, Artillery/Mortar position areas as they relate to maneuver. Be the devil's advocate; watch for situations which would cause fires to be interrupted (or worse, fratricide risks) during planning and rehearsals. Prioritize the execution of close-in CAS. To do this, ensure Terminal Controllers (TCs) are near the FLOT or target areas and watch maneuver elements to keep them clear of target areas.

5. FSO: Prioritize and rapidly execute lethal SEAD which meets target selection standards at every opportunity. Always plan and rehearse SEAD on CAS target areas and marking rounds. Marking rounds should not be an option for close CAS missions. Constantly coordinate and re-coordinate informal ACA methods, throughout planning and execution, to ensure simultaneous or near simultaneous fires can be achieved. Include CAS attacks within the scheme of fires and have the ALO rehearse with the rest of the fire support system at the appropriate times. Know the status and location of all firing units DS, R, Mortars and D/A, at all times. You will not have time to confirm this information once CAS is on station. This information is vital for establishing IP, ACAs and TOT decisions which will cause little to no interference between fire support systems.

6. ALO: You must fully understand the commander's HPTs, not just what enemy to attack, but why.what must my sorties accomplish against a particular formation. Get ahead on execution by pre-coordinating nine-line messages for all EAs or objectives with the FSO. Coordinate the positioning of ground FACs and work with the S2 to get his input on where to utilize a FAC-A for the intelligence effort. Be sure you coordinate your triggers with the S2, S3 and FSO to make sure they are viable, don't forget to reconfirm them during execution. Learn how to collect pilot intelligence which has specifics which are directly related to what the staff needs to make decisions. Be prepared to train the S3 Air and FSO on how to work 1972s and use your Air Force C2to assist the pre-planned CAS request process. Focus your 1972 requests on desired ordnance, type of aircraft and expected time window. Train the staff to execute Immediate or push CAS as the norm. Finally, command and direct FAC-A, GFAC, and fighters to achieve the commanders guidance. When current, known targets do not fit the commander's intent well, then recommend the next best use of CAS for now, while continuing to look for the commander's target.

7. ADO: Maintain a constant plot of friendly ADA systems and keep the ALO situationally aware of these locations and the SHORAD status. Immediately alert SHORAD of the arrival of friendly air assets and provide updates when expected CAS target locations move. Acknowledge all aircraft traffic reports. Rapidly modify the units' Air Defense Warning/Weapons Control Status and notify the staff when all subordinate units acknowledge the status change.

8. UNIT: Task forces and above should always plan to use CAS, even if none is currently allocated. Task forces can and should always request Immediate CAS to attack targets of opportunity which meet the commander's intent. Build your CAS execution plan from the close fight.out, by phase if possible. Position your ALO/ETAC observers where they can control a wide variety of attack options, using Direct Control Procedures. Provide adequate TACP logistical/force protection support based on METT-T. Develop an SOP with brigade which standardizes methods to rapidly mark your FLOT, day or night.

It has become a disturbing fact that over the past year brigades have had little or no CAS participation in their trainups. Real-world mission demands, scheduling conflicts, and missed opportunities have taken a toll on the mechanized forces' ability to train. These situations require an imaginative FSO/ALO team to keep CAS planning "in the loop."

The lack of training maintenance has severely impacted the integration of tactical air control parties (TACPs) into the plan; bad habits are becoming the norm:

• ALOs are not being trained and integrated into the planning processes.

• Army staffs do not know what to expect from an ALO, during planning and rehearsals.

A good start to overcoming this negative trend is to always "play" CAS, even if it is notional.

• Put CAS in the fire support plan.

• Allocate sorties to subordinate units.

• Request other Air Force personnel "role play" fighters and FAC-As in support of field exercises.

• Exercise the fire support system to handle immediate, short-notice CAS.

• Have the TACP conduct OPDs which show the capabilities of air-delivered ordnance, employment techniques, and how fighters execute air strikes.

• Take the TACP personnel to a battalion and battery FDC during live fires so they will gain an appreciation of what happens in these critical control centers.

Introduction

Chapter 2: Defining the Army-Air Force 3-D Battlefield