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Civil Affairs (CA) Integration at the JRTC

by MAJ Michael Eyre, CPT David Albanese,
SFC John Stockton, and SFC Colleen Burrows

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The Joint Readiness Center ( JRTC) at Fort Polk, LA, trains battalion and brigade commanders and their staffs in the most realistic training short of combat. It is at the brigade level that Civil Affairs (CA) integrates with the maneuver force in a stressful, near-combat environment. CA operations enhance the military effort in all operational environments. The versatility and flexibility of CA throughout the operational continuum make it a combat multiplier due to its ability to minimize civilian interference while lending legitimacy to and facilitating U.S. military operations and objectives.

Whether in peace, conflict, or war, military operations are more effective when they include CA support. Although conditions differ throughout the continuum, CA establishes, maintains, influences, or exploits relations between military forces and civil authorities and the civilian populace in an Area of Operations (AO). CA operations are actions carried out as an integral part of a military mission. They assure local authority and popular understanding of military operations and consolidation activities to attain U.S. objectives. The CA mission has two components: Civil Military Operations (CMOs) and military support to civil administration. The emphasis at the JRTC is in CMO.

Integral to modern land warfare are CMOs. The importance of the civilian dimension of the modern battlefield will not diminish; it will only loom larger. Commanders can no longer relegate CMO activities as an adjunct activity. Commanders must fully utilize CMO to influence control or develop civilian activities and civil organizations. It must be remembered that the maneuver commander is responsible for CMO. CMO includes the following mission-related activities:

• Foreign Nation Support
• Populace and Resources Control
• Humanitarian Assistance
• Military Civic Action
• Civil Defense

Civil Affairs Support Teams. Civil Affairs Support Teams are normally composed of four to six soldiers and provide support to maneuver brigades and battalions. These teams are identified below and normally consist of the following designated personnel and rank:

• Brigade Support Team (BST)
  • Commander, Major
  • Detachment Sergeant, Sergeant First Class
  • Civil Military Operations Officer, Captain
  • Team Sergeant, Sergeant First Class
  • CA Sergeant, Sergeant
  • CA Specialist, Specialist

• Tactical Support Team (TST) (Battalion level)
  • Civil Military Operations Officer, Captain
  • Team Sergeant, Sergeant First Class
  • CA Sergeant, Sergeant
  • CA Specialist, Specialist

These teams will provide staff augmentation and civil affairs planning and assessment support. Each team has the capability to conduct general and limited technical assessments. Additionally, each team provides regional and cultural expertise to supported units. A maneuver commander that properly uses CMO planning and effectively uses CA soldiers will not have to use his own resources to deal with difficult situations in the civilian arena. Potential problems associated with using soldiers not familiar with these terms or types of operations can be avoided. The maneuver commander may even risk further complicating any problems the COBs may present by wasting time and diverting resources unnecessarily to the resolution of these problems. CA soldiers can ensure a coordinated effort between the military, non-governmental organizations, private volunteer organizations, international organizations, and local governments.

Why do I need Civil Affairs? Civil Affairs specialists can be employed to legitimize and facilitate U.S. military and national objectives. During pre-combat operations, the CA teams assist the commander in completing an estimate of the situation and preparing a CA Annex to the Operations Order, as well as analyzing various courses of action from the CA/CMO standpoint. CA soldiers can perform those tasks previously mentioned in addition to minimizing civilian interference with military operations. They can support post-combat operations by providing a means of reconstructing public administration organizations and facilities and affording the commander a means of conducting transition between civil and military agencies. CA soldiers provide interface with host-nation civil and military personnel and provide language/cultural expertise to U.S. military commanders.

Categories of Civilians Encountered during JRTC Rotations. During any given JRTC rotation, a brigade commander may encounter one of the following situations that present for him ideal circumstances to exercise his Civil Affairs (CA) team. Allowing the CA team to use their expertise and deal with these situations will ultimately enhance the commander's ability to accomplish the mission and achieve success.

• Civilians on the Battlefield (COBs). This is a JRTC-developed term and can include, but is not limited to, displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees. Another category of civilians identified as a COB can be the local populace residing in the JRTC villages and towns within the maneuver commander's AO.

• Dislocated Civilians (DCs). This generic term identifies a displaced person, refugee, evacuee, stateless person, or war victim.

By providing a wide range of options, CA teams play a critical role in promoting regional stability and preventing or reducing conflicts and threats. CA units create immediate, direct, and tangible benefits by making a difference in the lives of the local populace. CA soldiers are a valuable asset to the maneuver commander by representing a combat and a diplomatic multiplier.

COBs are the responsibility of the brigade commander. Information available to CA units will be invaluable in determining the methods and techniques used in dealing with these situations. The task for the CA team is to review this information, share it with the brigade commander, and recommend a course of action consistent with the brigade's mission.

During a JRTC rotation, COBs will have a direct impact on the mission of the maneuver brigade. The CA team's primary task is to minimize civilian interference on the JRTC battlefield. During each rotation, towns and villages are populated with COBs. Each town and village has a political profile. That profile can range from pro-government to anti-government. This presents an opportunity for the maneuver commander to engage in efforts designed to win the support of the local populace. This is accomplished by sending a CA team into the town or village to open dialogue with the local officials. Failure to do this can result in increased OPFOR influence and control of the town or village.

It is important for the maneuver brigade commander to be aware of the political attitude of towns and villages in the AO. Obtain this insight from information gathered by the CA team. The attitude of the populace may range as follows:

• Neutral to Pro-Government
  • Improper usage. A military commander who fails to open dialogue with the local town or village officials may alienate the citizens of that town or village. The lack of communication with the local populace opens the door for the OPFOR to influence the local populace.

  • Proper usage. Action on the part of the CA team reinforces the positive perception of U.S. forces and its efforts to help the people of the town or village. These actions can lead to greater cooperation from the local population.

• Neutral to Anti-Government
  • Improper usage. Failure of the CA team to visit or make contact with a town or village can lead to increased resistance to U.S. forces, help the cause of the OPFOR, and contribute to the loss of valuable intelligence. It is important to note that the populace has seen and possibly aided the OPFOR. Therefore, efforts to win their support could greatly increase the chances of a successful mission.

  • Proper usage. Towns and villages that are supportive to the OPFOR present an excellent opportunity for the brigade to gain valuable information about the enemy in an area. Sending a CA team to talk with the local officials and leaders in the area demonstrates that U.S. forces are concerned for the safety and well-being of the populace and helps deliver the maneuver commander's message for the support of the populace.

The CMO mission dictates that CA units conduct Populace and Resources Control, Foreign Nation Support, and Humanitarian Assistance. Based on past experience at the JRTC, the following are examples of what actions and inactions the maneuver brigade commander can produce.

COBs/DCs play an integral part at the JRTC. Proper use of the CA team in coordinating the movement of DCs assists in reducing the impact DCs have on the operation. Proper DC control measures will ensure minimal interference with brigade operations. In addition, the CA team can be a source of information; however, this is not part of their primary mission.

"Because of the Civil Affairs personnel working so closely with the Division, over 70 percent of my intelligence was denied. I finally had to pull back my few available agents before they, too, were caught," stated the OPFOR senior commander at the JRTC in 1994.

Coordination with Civil/Military Authorities. At JRTC, coordination with civil/military authorities is essential to the success of CMO. The local civil/military authorities can be influenced in many ways to assist the brigade in the accomplishment of its mission. This is done by using the CA team to coordinate with the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs) portrayed during the rotation.

• Proper coordination. Coordination with the NGOs and PVOs will result in a controlled flow of DCs with minimum impact on brigade operations. The coordination by the CA team can allow for the use of host-nation assets and limit brigade assets required to control the flow of DCs.

• Improper coordination. This will result in the uncontrolled flow of DCs. Failure to coordinate the use of host-nation assets to transport DCs from the collection points could result in using brigade assets required for other missions. Also, coordination with local medical authorities reduces the need for the brigade to provide medical assistance to the DCs.

Civilians Have Requested Shelter for Homeless

• In the event that homeless civilians have requested shelter, steps must be taken to determine the number of homeless and the location of suitable shelter. This request must be seriously received by the maneuver commander.

• If shelter is not provided for homeless civilians, their presence in the maneuver area may adversely affect the maneuver commander's mission. Finding shelter for these people will free up MSRs, enhance battlefield circulation control, and encourage a stay-put policy.

Civilians Have Requested or Are In Need of Food/Medical Care.

• While it remains the local government's responsibility to feed and provide health care to its population, it is possible that the local government may look to the maneuver commander for food and medicine.

• Every effort should be made to ensure that U.S. supplies are used only as a last resort. Civilian supplies or captured enemy supplies may be used to feed and provide medicine to the local populace. Coordination with the local government to obtain local supplies for the populace will reduce the strain on U.S. resources and logistical capabilities.

Civilians Have Requested Protection from Combat. Civilian panic, due to combat operations, can greatly increase unnecessary civilian casualties. Coordination with local officials will ensure enforcement of a stay-put policy or an evacuation, thus enabling the maneuver commander to manage his battle space with minimal civilian interference.

Civilians Have Requested Protection from Enemy Forces/Guerrillas.

• In the event that local national forces cannot provide security for their citizens, it may be necessary for U.S. forces to provide some sort of protection against enemy conventional and guerrilla forces. Coordinate with local officials to identify civilians that may be loyal to enemy forces and have these individuals detained by civilian authorities.

• If a commander determines it is necessary to employ U.S. combat units to locate and destroy enemy forces, develop a plan to ensure civilian cooperation/support (stay-put, screening, intelligence from civilians). A sense of security among the populace will increase support to U.S. forces in the area. Failure to provide a secure environment may result in continued fear, suspicion, panic, and increased casualties.

Civilians Have Requested Support in Restoring Facilities.

• Coordinate with civilian officials for necessary repairs by local assets using local resources if damage is not caused by U.S. forces. The division is not equipped or resourced to make major repairs.

• If damage is caused by U.S. forces, inform local officials that repairs can be requested after cessation of combat operations.

• Repairs to facilities will keep refugees to a minimum; ensure U.S. use of key facilities, if necessary, and encourage a favorable view toward U.S. forces.

Reports of Civilian Deaths as a Result of Combat Operations/Reports of Civilian Remains Found on Battle Field, Cause of Death Has Not Been Attributed to Combat Operations/Cause of Death Undetermined.

• Determine if deaths have actually occurred, if U.S. forces have been operating in the suspected location of the remains, and if deaths were caused by U.S. forces or enemy forces.

• If deaths were caused by U.S. forces, ensure that an initial investigation is conducted to determine approximate cause of death. Coordinate with local officials for proper recovery and disposition of civilian remains.

• Failure to show concern for civilian deaths will place U.S. forces in a bad light with the local population. This lack of concern may be perceived as contempt and will alienate the local populace. It will also give the OPFOR an opportunity to exploit the incident.

Reports of Livestock Being Killed Due to Combat Operations.

• If livestock were killed by U.S. forces, the private owner of that livestock has grounds to make a claim against the United States. Determine if livestock have actually been killed and, if so, what type, and how many.

• Livestock losses can greatly impact the economy of an area. Loss of livestock and income can rapidly turn public sentiment against U.S. forces. The maneuver commander can ill afford to treat livestock destruction lightly; livestock must be considered as a source of livelihood for the populace and, therefore, given the attention it demands.

U.S. Forces Have Moved to New Locations and Have Left Unrecoverable Minefields in Previous AO.

• Before units move, engineers must verify locations, dimensions, and number of minefields that will not be recovered. This will be reported to local civilian officials. Coordination must be made with civil officials and PSYOP units to disseminate information concerning minefields.

• The effect of unrecovered mines may have devastating consequences for the local populace. Beyond the obvious personal suffering, unrecovered mines deny farmers use of their fields, hinders the resumption of agricultural production, denies access to markets, reduces public confidence in fledgling governments, and causes resentment of U.S. forces.

DCs Have Requested Refugee Status. Only the Department of State (DOS) can grant refugee status. The local commander, normally division but no lower than brigade, has authority to grant temporary refuge. If refugee status is granted, follow-on instructions and guidance will be provided by Corps Headquarters.

Civilians Request Transportation Support from Friendly Forces.

• When transportation is for movement of civilians, determine if their movement will have an adverse impact on operations. Explain to civilian authorities that DCs may have to walk using specified routes.

• When transportation is for movement of cargo, determine importance of transporting. If cargo is emergency food/medical supplies/civilian resources to support DC operations, coordinate with local officials to determine if supporting the request will have adverse impact on operations.

CONCLUSION. The proper use of CA assets in CMO is critical for mission success, whether it is at the JRTC or in an actual contingency. The maneuver commander is responsible for CMO and this fact demonstrates that CA is a function of command. COBs have been, and will continue to be, a fact of life on the battlefield. The CA team's primary mission at the tactical level is to minimize civilian interference on the maneuver unit's ability to accomplish its objective. Tactical commanders must learn, understand, and appreciate what CA brings to the battle space. Increased awareness of the versatility and employability of these assets throughout the operational continuum is vital for the success of tomorrow.

RESOURCES:

Bishop, William R., MAJ, "Civil Affairs Unit Skills at the Joint Readiness Training Center" (After Action Report), 431st Civil Affairs Battalion, North Little Rock, AR, 1994.

Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, Washington, DC, GPO, 1993.

Holmes, H. Allen, Assistant Secretary of State for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, "Civil Affairs: Reflections of the Future," prepared remarks at the Worldwide Civil Affairs Conference, Chicago, IL, 6 June 1997.

96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne), Leader's Reference Book, Fort Bragg, NC, 1997.

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Unit Training: Planning for Lane Training Exercises or Situational Training Exercises
Air Assault Operations for Heavy Forces