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NBC and the JRTC Experience

by MAJ Chuck McArthur

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The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) offers a wide variety of chemical challenges for a maneuver brigade and light forces during a rotation. Many of the skills necessary to survive in a nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) environment are put to the test at the center. For many years it was common practice to hear units jokingly say "NBC - Nobody cares." Now with the vision and support of the JRTC's leadership, NBC event integration into rotations at the JRTC is alive and well. The opposing force (OPFOR) is an outstanding training tool that assists with setting the conditions for NBC play at JRTC. The use of chemical agents by the OPFOR on the battlefield is a viable threat. Each chemical attack the OPFOR executes has a clearly defined task and purpose that is doctrinally sound. The basic OPFOR objective is to employ chemical munitions to disrupt the brigade's combat operations.

A majority of light units depart JRTC with a new-found appreciation of NBC as a combat multiplier on the battlefield and with a better understanding of the potential this combat element has to unhinge a ground tactical plan. An observation that has been reinforced over and over again is that units exercising at the JRTC are not conducting thorough NBC training at home station or they execute an intensified NBC trainup just prior to deployment. The JRTC is the place to execute the skills that soldiers trained for at home station. NBC skills are tough and perishable. We cannot expect soldiers to retain skills that are not sustained through repetition and training. In the event of a chemical attack, many of the necessary soldier skills are conditioned responses that should have been learned and facilitated by good sound training at home station.

During Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, we had the luxury of having an extended period of time to train up on perishable NBC skills prior to the start of the ground war. In our next fight, given the world situation, the availability of weapons of mass destruction and the technology to design and build such weapons, we may not have this luxury. A terrorist chemical threat looms just over the horizon. Since terrorist factions today are more active than in the past; there are an increased number of supporters that readily provide financial as well as technical support. It is only a matter of time before we see the employment of chemical devices by terrorists against U.S. interests or forces--will we be ready?

The JRTC OPFOR

The OPFOR at the JRTC currently possess no nuclear or biological capability. They can use virtually all their weapons systems, which include artillery, aerial bombs, missiles, and aerosol sprayers, to deliver limited quantities of chemical agents. The OPFOR's artillery systems provide the OPFOR commander the capability to easily range rotational units while in the maneuver box. The OPFOR's air force is capable of employing chemical agents from fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. Persistent and nonpersistent chemical agents replicated at JRTC include: Nerve Tabum (GA), Sarin (GB), and Mustard - Lewsite (H and HL). Some nerve agents can be thickened with various substances to increase persistency. All these agents are realistically portrayed at the JRTC with real-world persistency times. Additionally, the chemical terrorist threat is replicated with great detail. The OPFOR has the technology to construct a number of terrorist-delivered devices, with components acquired from the surrounding industrial and agricultural areas. The OPFOR conducts an extensive reconnaissance campaign against rotational units to identify priority targets and key nodes. Furthermore, they identify units that have weak force protection measures in place. These units are normally high valued targets for attack.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

Although trained at the chemical school, chemical personnel in the brigade task force routinely conduct limited or no chemical IPB. There are many reasons for a lack of a good chemical IPB and they include:

• Unfamiliarity by chemical personnel with IPB.

• Not knowing the products they need to develop based on the IPB process.

• Weak integration between the S2 and other chemical cells.

• Chemical personnel being overwhelmed with other tasks such as battle captain/non-commissioned officer (NCO).

• Not receiving the proper amount of time to go through a detailed process.

Many chemical personnel wait until they arrive at the JRTC to start their IPB; at this point. it is already too late. It is possible to start this process prior to deployment and update products while in the intermediate staging base (ISB). Country studies are sent out to the brigade at home station before they leave for Cortina.

Most chemical personnel in the brigade task force do not follow a structured IPB process. They are not focused and often overlook key and essential information. With a structured IPB process, chemical staffs should produce, as a minimum, a chemical template depicting their best estimate of potential strike locations based upon OPFOR employment doctrine and capabilities. This chemical template is a tool that the chemical officer can later use to plan decontamination and NBC reconnaissance to counter the OPFOR's employment of agents. It is a good tool for chemical personnel to carry into the mission analysis process and use as a road map to predict expected OPFOR activity.

It is paramount that chemical personnel integrate an analysis of the potential OPFOR chemical actions with the S-2. During mission analysis, often the S-2 and the chemical officer present a disjointed assessment of the enemy chemical potential. This adds unneeded friction to the commander's decisionmaking process. If a battalion commander has received a different assessment from the brigade S-2, there is a tendency to disregard his own chemical officer's assessment. This results in a loss of credibility and future disregarding of the chemical officer's assessment. The chemical officer and the S-2 must synchronize their efforts. If not, it will result in repeatedly verifying key information about the chemical threat and wasting precious time. By the time the information is verified and action is taken, it is often too late.

NBC Annexes

Many brigade task forces do not include an NBC annex in their order. A strong argument can be presented for writing an annex versus using a matrix in the order. The use of an annex allows chemical personnel to completely relay all the key and essential information about the chemical threat and the actions to be taken in the event of a chemical attack. The technique of using a matrix in an order limits the amount of information passed on to units. Key and essential information, such as task organization, chemical logistics (fog oil resupply, mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) gear and chemical defensive equipment (CDE) issues), chemical decontamination sites, and templated strike locations, to name a few, are often omitted. The chemical officers at brigade have a good idea about these topics but fail to communicate out and down to all levels in the form of a NBC annex. The chemical annex is key and essential to coordinating the chemical operation. Another seldom-used tool by chemical officers is the use of subordinate briefbacks. This process will resolve any problems associated with the annex. Rehearsals can solidify the chemical operation for the brigade task force.

NBC Battle Tracking

Often task force chemical personnel deploy with minimal chemical battle-tracking systems and charts and do not properly execute battle-tracking procedures. Charts that many chemical personnel produce only cover marginal information such as the brigade or battalion overall MOPP level or decontamination sites. This information is routinely grouped with other tactical information around the current operations map. Battle-tracking information, such as the brigade MOPP level, must reflect all the organic and attached units operating in the brigade. Normally commanders want to limit the amount of charts around the current operations map. As the NBC threat escalates, the NBC battle-tracking charts should migrate to a prominent place in the tactical operation center (TOC). This allows the battle captain to stay abreast of the NBC status of the brigade or battalion task force. It allows the various battle operating system (BOS) representatives and liaisons in the TOC to access the information and continually update their units and their plans.

Most chemical personnel make the mistake of not using the BOS representatives or liaison officers in the TOC. These personnel can relay important information and eliminate the time chemical personnel spend on the phone coordinating directly with units. Many times the brigade task force will increase the MOPP levels and this information fails to reach the units, thereby resulting in high number of chemical casualties. This can be corrected with a credible battle-tracking system designed for the detailed tracking of MOPP levels in the entire task force.

Often visibility of chemical assets in the brigade task force is lost. Since the battle captain and battle NCOs are involved in the current fight and tracking maneuver units, chemical personnel must track NBC assets and update their status which includes:

• unit locations.
• movement times.
• mission complete times.
• the last time contact was made with the chemical element.

Chemical assets have gone for days without someone in the TOC checking on their status and location. In the past chemical units will become engaged with OPFOR resulting in casualties and destroyed or capture equipment. No one outside the unit will know about this contact. Sometimes the OPFOR will use one of the chemical dual-purpose vehicles, M998, with a M3A4 smoke generator and effectively produces more smoke than anyone in the brigade task force.

A technique recommended for use at JRTC is a battle-tracking book. Chemical personnel normally get little to no space at a TOC anyway. This fact hinders their ability to post status charts and conduct effective battle tracking. This book offers an alternative to keep up with the fast-paced activity in the TOC and can be broken down into sections containing information for battle tracking such as:

• Current NBC annexes and plans.

• Maintain and update DA Form 1594, Staff Journal, for the tracking of NBC-related activity and coordination.

• NBC intelligence.

• NBC estimate information.

• The status of intensively managed NBC information (MOPP levels for all assets, NBC decontamination sites and their status, chemical defensive equipment, etc.).

In case the chemical officer or NCO at brigade or battalion level is unavailable, someone on the battlestaff in the TOC can pick up the book and carry on. For this to work, the battle captain must know about the book, what is in it and where it is located. Finally, it is important to mention that for the battle-tracking book to be useful, it must be maintained as it will only be as reliable as the last time it was updated. In many instances chemical representatives are unwilling to make the effort or cannot envision the importance of keeping battle-tracking systems updated until a crisis arises. By then the chemical officer and/or NCO lose track of the chemical assets on the battlefield and cannot effectively redirect the chemical assets.

NBC Asset Integration

Smoke. The struggle to integrate NBC assets in support of combat operations is a difficult one. The majority of units are reluctant to employ motorized smoke assets on the battlefield. This is largely due to two reasons. One is a lack of training at home station as a combined arms team with supporting smoke assets. The other is a lack of knowledge at battalion level on how to properly employ them. Many commanders and staff are unfamiliar with the doctrinal methods of employing smoke as a combined arms asset. These techniques are in chapter 6, FM 3-100, NBC Defense Chemical Warfare, Smoke, and Flame Operations, or FM 3-50, Smoke Operations. When smoke assets are task-organized to battalions, they idly do nothing as their battalion executes its mission. The brigade chemical officer must assist the battalion chemical officer, who lacks the experience of the senior brigade chemical officer and who knows the different techniques to properly integrate smoke assets in the battalion fight. Chemical officers must articulate to the commanders and staffs the benefits of using smoke in combat operations.

Decontamination. Units integrate decontamination assets well at JRTC. This is because decontamination platoons are held under brigade control during high NBC threat periods. The brigade chemical officer is able to coordinate the actions of the chemical platoon directly with the platoon leader. Some techniques the brigade chemical officer can do to increase the brigade's chances of success during a chemical attack are as follows:

• Have the chemical platoon leader back-brief him on his mission and then once he writes his platoon order, back-brief him on that plan.

• Conduct a chemical rehearsal with task force chemical personnel to discuss key chemical actions.

• Have battalion chemical officers provide copies of their NBC annexes and their plan for decontamination to him.

The execution of a decontamination mission as a result of a chemical strike is a brigade fight. A chemical strike should affect the entire brigade in some fashion. Furthermore, the brigade TOC is the best place to command and control this operation.

One major shortfall associated with the integration of decontamination assets is that units do not understand that a chemical platoon needs augmentation to execute its mission. Although augmentation by nonchemical personnel is planned, they usually fail to arrive. Units require soldiers to operate the personnel decontamination portion of decontamination sites. These soldiers lack the training. The unit usually fails to have the required materials and equipment to set up or operate the decontamination stations.

Reconnaissance. Normally brigade task forces deploy with two M93 NBC Reconnaissance Systems, better know as the FOX. A staff sergeant is the senior person operating the FOX. Some brigade operations officers will designate operational control (OPCON) of the FOX to the chemical platoon because they are unfamiliar with its employment. This results in an additional task of employing reconnaissance assets for the chemical platoon leader, in addition to his smoke and decontamination mission. No one seeks input of the squad leader of the FOX. The squad leader is usually very knowledgeable on the techniques and methods of properly employing his FOX and should be used as a resource. Usually, maneuver battalions have no idea how to employ the FOX on the battlefield. The FOX function better if left under brigade control and dispatched with escorts to areas of interest.

Additionally, we find that the NBC reconnaissance plan is not tied to the NBC template (product of IPB) and is not integrated with the S-2s collection plan. It does not take a FOX to cover every chemical named area of interest (NAI) on the battlefield. Finally, little or no discussion is given to anti-fratricide measures, setting the FOX and its crew up for certain peril.

Force Protection

The issue of force protection surfaces repeatedly during rotations. We stress to rotational units that they must fight a 360-degree fight, meaning that enemy forces are all around. The OPFOR will rapidly gather intelligence against their opposition. The OPFOR commander will use this intelligence to gain an accurate understanding of the disposition of his enemy. Stationary or poorly defended units become high priority targets for the OPFOR. The OPFOR commander will then decide the method to engage these targets, one method being chemical munitions. These chemicals are delivered either by terrorist or conventional means.

Units at JRTC continue to suffer high casualty rates as a result of chemical attacks. Poor MOPP discipline is a key contributor to the chemical casualties. The brigade and battalions direct the MOPP levels. Compliance to the directive is lacking; leaders do not enforce the standard. MOPP discipline is truly a leadership challenge. Leaders and soldiers do not understand the meaning of the various MOPP levels. When questioned about the various MOPP levels, many failed to answer correctly. Leaders have demonstrated a willingness to accept risk in a potential NBC environment. Not taking the chemical threat seriously can be attributed to the lack of understanding of the actual chemical threat and the serious ramifications they present to mission accomplishment. In doing this leaders are reinforcing negative learning trends for junior leaders and soldiers and playing with a potential disaster in any real-world NBC environment.

The OPFOR chemical threat changes and is gradually increased during a rotation. Initially, the OPFOR only possesses the capability to employ riot control agents (RCAs), and crudely made chemical bombs designed from industrial chemicals captured in the surrounding cities during the low intensity phase. Although not lethal, riot control agents have the potential to momentarily incapacitate a force. This period of time is long enough to swing the momentum of battle, which may result in casualties. During periods when the OPFOR has the capability to employ agents by conventional means, units are slow to react to the threat and take the minimal defensive measures. This includes not carrying MOPP suits and keeping protective masks in rucksacks. Soldiers are often separated from their rucksacks and have no chemical protection. Battalion task forces consolidate their personnel's MOPP suits in squad bags. These bags are maintained in the brigade support area (BSA) with their unit's field trains. Little attention is given to establishing a decision point that triggers the movement forward of chemical protective suits. All these factors add up to marginal NBC force protection and the potential for a large scale loss of lives.

SUMMARY

What will tomorrow's chemical battlefield bring? This serious question is open to debate. We do not posses the crystal ball that will give us the answer. Whatever the scenario we have to face it has probably already been played out on the JRTC battlefield. The JRTC will continue to refine and make the chemical scenarios at the center more challenging and realistic. Senior leaders must take the chemical threat seriously and devise better ways to integrate NBC training into home-station training. Chemical training that is sporadically conducted will not allow our soldiers the time they need to master key and essential NBC skills. The chemical fight of tomorrow may present itself sooner than anyone could imagine -- will you be ready, and, more importantly, will your men be ready to face an enemy that has nothing to lose. It is the leaders at all levels that have the responsibility to train our soldiers for success. A well-trained unit can take adversity in stride and accomplish the mission NBC conditions or not.

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Foreword
Preparing for a Deliberate Defense