Military

4. High payoff targets are not specific enough to be of value.

Techniques:

the prioritization of the HPTs,
what asset(s) will acquire (detect) each target,
what assets will attack the target, the desired effects, and the requirements for assessment, and
the assets tasked to conduct BDA.

Remember, this process involves not only the fire support element, but almost all BOSs in the brigade combat team!

5. The brigade FSO must manage the location of the coordinated fire line (CFL).

Technique: Ask the brigade commander for his guidance on use of the CFL (purpose) and any restrictions or limitations he has on its placement.

• Some commanders want the line to always be forward of the most forward friendly troop. Others are comfortable accepting risk by allowing scouts forward of the CFL.

• When scouts are forward, ensure all locations for these friendly units are accurate to prevent fratricide.

• When the CFL is applied doctrinally (e.g., to expedite attack of targets on the far side), the FSO must carefully select placement of the CFL to ensure some assets can range beyond the CFL to attack targets in addition to monitoring the locations of both friendly and enemy forces.

6. The FSO must conduct mission analysis prior to any division deep operations.

Techniques:

Successful deep attacks begin with detailed coordination between the brigade and the division.

7. Synchronizing the effects of fires and maneuver requires detailed coordination among all members of the brigade staff. Effective synchronization relies on the FSO's ability to clearly understand the commander's intent for the operation and his guidance for fire support.

Techniques:

Mobility/Survivability BOS

1. The Assistant Brigade Engineers (ABEs) and their sections were well integrated into the BCT's staff planning cycle. They were the key players in the future operations planning.

Technique: Above-average Situational Awareness and Battle Tracking allowed ABEs flexibility in BCT operations throughout the exercises. This strength was applied in crosstalk with Enginee Battalion TOCs to enhance the productivity of the Direct Support Companies.

2. All rehearsals and backbriefs included attendance by the company commanders, battalion staff, assistant brigade engineer, and the battalion commander.

• Company commanders briefed their tasks and purpose for all phases of the operation.

• The battalion staff responded to any change in the CSS operations for both specified and implied requirements, thus synchronizing the M/S BOS.

3. Obstacle Intelligence reporting and dissemination were slow and often incomplete. This created confusion for follow-on units throughout the BCT sector. The ABE cell would receive the report and pass it to the engineer battalion TOC.

RESULT: Information was collected with no analysis and incomplete dissemination throughout the BCT.

Technique: The ABE and S2 should crosstalk to confirm or deny the situational template.

4. The Engineer Battlefield Assessment (EBA) was inadequate. The EBA did not effectively depict the opposing force capabilities and the effects of terrain on both opposing force and friendly operations.

RESULT: A mobility reserve was not identified during offensive operations. Engineer timeline affected by adjustments that had adverse impact on the maneuver units.

Technique: Plan from the objective back to the LD to highlight terrain-driven implied tasks.

5. The transition from the offense to the defense was slow. Slow transition in both the planning and utilization of the engineer assets.

• The lack of shaping of engagement areas and the slow siting of M1/M2 battle positions delayed the utilization of dig assets.

• The lack of synchronization, planning, and preparation within the brigade staff was the key factor for the late transition to the defense.

Technique: Not offered.

6. The use of FASCAM or Situational Obstacles for both ground and air employment was not planned based on NAIs and TAIs, but left to targets of opportunity.

RESULTS:

Techniques: Artillery-delivered FASCAM is crucial to the deep fight.

Air Defense BOS

1. Air Defense participation. Transition from peace support operations back to high intensity operations makes it essential for the air defense battery commander to refocus attention on participating in planning for all operations and execute the air defense plan developed to support the tactical scheme of maneuver. Although these trends are based solely on one brigade CPX, these areas are indicative of areas where air defense battery commanders can make a positive impact on brigade operations.

Air defenders must refocus from their roles in peace support operations to the fast-paced, warrior mentality air defense roles vital to success during high intensity conflict.

2. The battery commander was well integrated into the planning and execution of follow-on missions. He forced himself into the brigade planning process to ensure brigade planners understood what the air defense unit brought to the fight.

RESULTS:

3. Inadequate preparation of the Air Defense annex and OPORD.

Techniques:

4. Ineffective initial planning for the brigade attack. The battery commander must fight the approved plan whether he has been in the planning process or not.

Technique: Full integration and coordination with the brigade staff will ensure the battery commander has a plan that supports the scheme of maneuver and the air defense priorities which were developed during the planning process.

Failure to be in the planning process may result in misidentified air defense priorities and subsequently an air defense plan which does not properly support the maneuver plan.

Intelligence BOS

1. The S2 sections made a considerable effort in the brigade TOC to coordinate the friendly and enemy picture for the entire staff.

• Significant improvements in
  • the type of information collected,
  • the organization of the S2 cell,
  • the process of handling the information.

• The brigade S2 sections actively maintained current assessments of the enemy situation and ensured other staff elements (FSO, ENG, ADA) were apprised of the current situation.

• The procedures used clearly helped categorize, maintain, and disseminate the bulk of information in an orderly manner (FM 34-3).

2. The initial IPB process was positive. Understanding the IPB process and the effective initial preparation of IPB was above average.

• During the initial mission analysis brief, the S2s presented and displayed detailed products (situation and event templates and MCOO).

• Collection of information, intelligence analysis, weather, and situational templating are all areas which were seen with positive results (FM 34-130).

Technique: Effective use of Home Station during the initial preparation for operations:

• developed data bases.
• significant effort to develop the correct templates for the initial set.

3. R&S preparation and execution continually challenged both brigades.

• The S2s lacked synchronizing the R&S plan with the staff and subordinate units.

• Sporadic monitoring of the R&S effort, especially during the initial phases of an operation.

• S2 section set the R&S effort into motion by writing the plan and completing a fairly detailed R&S matrix. But, only took limited action to determine how well the plan was being executed (i.e., monitoring, supervising and execution).

• Gaps in intelligence were uncovered, collection did not occur, and battle-tracking suffered. S2 sections generally did not know the location, status, or immediate intent of assets tasked to cover NAIs. Staff elements must be involved in the detailed planning and execution of R&S to ensure assets are directed, redirected, and positioned correctly. R&S must be planned and executed cooperatively between the S2 and S3, but someone must actively manage the R&S effort throughout the battle(s). A working system for tracking/monitoring assets would have helped in this regard. Finally, for the R&S effort for the brigade to be successful, commanders must set the conditions for R&S to be part of the initial main effort (FM 34-2-1, FM 34-2).

RESULTS:

4. S-2 sections generally had difficulties with battle tracking. In both missions, the S-2s had trouble maintaining the correct read without reconfirming with division G2. Several events contributed to this:

• Gaps in the R&S effort.

• Cumbersome TOC operations.

• Poor reporting.

• The most damaging to battle tracking was the absence of reporting from the TFs, once engaged with the enemy.

• Very little active communication occurred between the BDE S2s and subordinate S2s.

• Numerous instances of inaccurate and incomplete reporting severely hindered the S2 section's ability to track the battle and provide accurate assessments.

• Critical pieces of information were missing from the SALUTE/SALT reports provided to the S2 section.

• On several occasions, the S2 sections received reports on enemy disposition (type and location) and actions which were incorrect.

RESULTS:

5. Despite this strong initial step, event templates occasionally lacked the detail to determine an enemy course of action or were not developed at all for follow-on missions.

Although the initial phases of IPB process were well executed by the S2 sections in which they showed a strong understanding and had a firm grasp on doctrinal templates required, NAIs

• were not developed throughout the wargaming process,

• were not necessarily placed to determine a key event or ascertain an enemy decision, and

• were not arrayed through the depth of the battlefield.

Technique: In most cases, an event matrix, providing details on the type of activity expected at each NAI and its relationship to other events on the battlefield, would have helped in refining the template and focusing the collection plan (FM 34-130, 34-3).

Brigades that have not undergone the Warfighter experience would do well to use the observations and TTPs discussed above as part of the training plan for the Brigade headquarters. These TTPs can also serve as a guide for taking a hard look at brigade staff procedures and as an aid for walking all the BOSs through the complete plan, prep, and execute model under HIC conditions before executing a Warfigher exercise.

Peace Support Operations Rehearsals at the CMTC

Troop-Leading Procedures and the NCO