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Military

Putting the Tactical Back in the TOC

by CPT Louis B. Rago, II, Assistant TF S3 O/C, Green Team, CMTC
One of the most critical aspects of a unit's transition from peace support operations (PSOs) back to war fighting is standing up the tactical operations center (TOC). At first glance the transition does not appear to be difficult. But difficulties experienced by units during recent rotations at the CMTC indicate that units returning from Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR (OJE) and JOINT GUARD (OJG) share the same problems:

  • Difficulties in many aspects of the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).

    • Poor time management.

    • Incomplete wargaming.

  • Conducting battle staff operations.

  • Performing basic TOC functions.

TIME MANAGEMENT. The battle staff must strive to maintain its perspective on proper time management. An OJE/OJG task force staff normally provides a detailed plan for the execution of a single company/team or platoon mission. Two major factors tend to influence the battle staff's inaccurate estimate of the time necessary for subordinate commands to fully prepare for combat operations:

1. In PSO, the staff is accustomed to taking most of the time because they focus on one subordinate unit's mission and can provide the subordinate commander the "95-percent solution." Since very little refinement is required, the subordinate unit needs only the time necessary to brief, rehearse, and perform a pre-combat inspection on its soldiers.

2. Night operations are minimal in Bosnia. Staffs lose awareness of the time relationship between subordinate command preparation during daylight and hours of darkness.

Technique: Strict adherence to the "1/3-2/3 Rule" is often difficult for battle staffs that normally train for combat. Units that have lost focus of the necessity for disciplined time management after several months of PSO have an even greater challenge.

WARGAMING. Proper conduct of the wargame process is a perishable skill. Units returning from Bosnia experience great difficulty in conducting effective, thorough wargames.

1. Units participating in OJE/OJG are constrained by specific guidelines and relatively strict rules of engagement.

2. The possible foes in Bosnia have very limited capabilities compared to those of the OPFOR. Thus, units tend to treat the OPFOR as a cooperative enemy.

3. They seldom fully develop enemy courses of action based on the full array of OPFOR capabilities. This often leads to an ineffective wargame and the development of inadequate products.

BATTLE STAFF OPERATIONS. A poor wargame correlates to inadequate synchronization matrices and decision support templates. Many units returning from service in the Former Yugoslavia have forgotten the importance of these products. A major factor in the battle staff's inability to execute basic TOC functions during combat operations is the Graduated Response Matrix (GRM). In Bosnia many of the tactical decisions are limited by the GRM. The GRM withholds authority for the use of most combat multipliers at the brigade and division levels. This tends to significantly reduce the task force's reliance on these products.

TOC FUNCTIONS. Some basic TOC functions seem foreign to the battle staff after six to twelve months of PSOs. The most significant function is providing recommendations and courses of action to the commander.

  • As indicated earlier, battle staffs tend to lose focus of important aspects of the MDMP and produce "tools" that are inadequate for war fighting.

    RESULTS:

    1. The staff often reacts to enemy actions rather than anticipating them.

    2. The TOC loses situational awareness and is unable to provide quality recommendations to the commander.

  • TOCs returning to combat operations also experience problems in the functions of receiving and distributing information.

    • During PSO the TOC is normally required to command and control the actions of units over a relatively well known area with redundant missions.

    • Daily missions for a task force in Bosnia are mostly conducted at the company/team level with only one or two units maneuvering at a time.

  • Conversely, during combat, the TOC must control the movement of several subordinate commands simultaneously over a large and often unfamiliar area of operations.

    RESULTS: This causes problems for a TOC accustomed to limited information flow.

    1. Often the former OJE/OJG battle staff becomes overwhelmed by the amount and intensity of reporting as they return to combat operations.

    2. Accurate recording of information received from subordinate units and timely dissemination to the remainder of the task force is often not accomplished to an acceptable standard.

    3. This problem is prevalent with the primary TOC staff and is often compounded by a less experienced "second team."

  • TOC shift operations. Operations in Bosnia are almost exclusively conducted during daylight hours.

    • Units do not fully staff the TOC during hours of darkness.

    • Allows the vast majority of the battle staff's experience to focus on the most important missions.

    • Relegates the night shift into a radio watch rather than a fully functioning TOC crew.

  • A serious disparity exists between most of the day and night shifts in units returning from PSO.

    • Limited manning.

    • Lack of key combat function representation on the night shift.

    RESULTS:

    1. Difficulty in coordinating tasks that routinely occur during the hours of darkness:

    a. Counter-reconnaissance, counter-mobility operations, and survivability efforts were often not synchronized because of the lack of a fully integrated battle staff at night.

    b. Night-shift personnel often did not adequately record or pass on information collected throughout the night.

    2. Day shift receives inaccurate unit status and an unclear picture of the enemy situation. In some cases, the "first team" loses situational awareness before even engaging the enemy.

Key responsibilities of the battle staff and essential functions of the TOC often become dull during PSO. The task force must sharpen these skills to make an effective transition back to war fighting. There is no fast way to regain lost capabilities. Units returning from PSO should start retraining the battle staff immediately:

  • Review the basics of the MDMP and exercise the process through issuing the operations order.

  • Exercise the TOC during command post exercises. A few days of around-the-clock operations will allow the entire battle staff to sufficiently proof the TOC standing operating procedure and validate the integration of the different shifts.

It's hard to do. But reviewing the basics outlined here will help reinstate the focus in the TOC essential to the task force's ability to fight and win.


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