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Return to High Intensity:
Observations Made of One Unit's Rotation at CMTC
Upon Return From Bosnia

by CPT Roy Outcelt

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BACKGROUND: The commander of the first company-size element returning from Bosnia that I observed at CMTC had previously served as the TF S-4 while deployed in Bosnia. Three of the four platoon leaders and the first sergeant had been in their positions for 60 days or less. The XO and nearly 75 percent of the unit remained in the same positions they held in Bosnia. Five months after returning to Germany from Bosnia, the unit came to CMTC.

DISCUSSION: The successes and failures of this unit were similar to those which most units experience during a CMTC rotation. The following discussion addresses this rotation in terms of battle command, maintenance, and troop morale.

Battle Command. According to FM 17-97, "Effective battle command begins in the planning phase and continues through the execution phase of each mission...." Difficulty with time management and the orders process hindered the unit throughout its rotation.

• The TFs used too much time issuing its own order.

• Frequent changes made to the plan subsequent to execution time.

• Impact was most directly felt at the platoon level. Platoon leaders often did not issue orders until after company-level rehearsals.

• Because of the limited amount of time at the company level, much of the troop-leading procedures were conducted at company level.
  RESULT: The unit conducted company-level rehearsals as opposed to platoon-level rehearsals. Effects of this centralized planning at company level were apparent during execution.
  EXAMPLE: Whenever leadership lost communication or became a casualty, soldiers at the lowest level were forced to continue execution with little understanding of the chain-of-command's guidance and plans.

• The unit was initially quite weak in rehearsals, but continually improved throughout the rotation and eventually conducted a full, mounted rehearsal before its last mission.

• The unit commander failed to give detailed guidance on what things he specifically wanted rehearsed.

• This left much latitude for junior leaders to develop what they thought important.
  RESULT: Junior leaders lost a lot of time early in the rotation by failing to maximize preparation and rehearsal time.

Maintenance. On various missions over 15 days of training, some combat systems were down for maintenance.

• All vehicles were fixed and returned to action in less than 48 hours.

• This ability to conduct sustained operations while continuing to care for equipment is attributed to experience gained while deployed to Bosnia.

• Junior leadership maintained appropriate maintenance discipline, had appropriate resources and close supervision by the First Sergeant and the Executive Officer.

Morale. This assessment is based entirely on discussions between the unit commander and the O/C. It is based on his impressions of the unit.

Positive areas:

• Junior leadership
• Tactical proficiency
• Gunnery
• Maintenance

Areas needing emphasis. The commander believed that the excessive amount of time that his unit had been deployed created issues that plagued unit morale.

• Troop Strength
  • One M1 tank system could not be fully fielded because of troop shortages. This tank remained for most of the rotation with the First Sergeant in the combat trains.

  • All other tanks were operated with three-man crews. An acceptable alternative, but guarantees future problems when soldiers are forced to leave the tank as casualties, or because of emergency leave, reassignment, etc.

  There is scarcely a commander in the Army who does not wish for more soldiers to help share the workload. But, if this unit had been forced to spend additional time on rotation or to deploy and conduct combat operations, manpower shortfalls would have hindered future missions.

• Divorce
  • In the five months since the troop had returned from Bosnia, at least six soldiers were in the process of divorce proceedings and at least another 10 soldiers were greatly distracted by personal/family matters.

  • These were specific cases brought to the commander's attention. There were probably more in his unit. One NCO did leave the troop during the rotation because of extensive family issues. Another soldier was injured during the rotation. It was the consensus in the unit that he was "faking" injury so that he would be sent back to Home Station to solve personal issues.

In these times of increased OPTEMPO, reduction of forces, etc., distracters at the lowest level are sure to increase over time. And their effect on soldiers, leaders, and units will likewise increase. These are not new issues for leaders to cope with. High morale can be a combat multiplier. Low morale can have devastating effects on the success of a unit. In this case, the commander was very concerned about his troop's possible deployment to Bosnia. He was not concerned about the technical and tactical expertise of his unit. As a leader, he cared about the continued pressures on the personal lives of his soldiers and the effect of those distracters on mission accomplishment. And he was determined to find solutions.

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Engineers Return to High Intensity Conflict
Acknowledgements