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Military

Chapter IV

EXECUTION (cont)

Issue: To be successful using the search and attack technique, you must be capable of rapidly fixing and finishing the enemy before he attrits and breaks contact with your unit.

Discussion: Once contact with the enemy is made, simple and effective systems must be in place to facilitate fixing and destroying the enemy force. Rapidly massing the effects of ground maneuver, indirect fire, and attack aviation assets is critical. These are the most common resources directly involved in fixing and finishing the enemy.

Massing the effects of ground maneuver assets can be the most time consuming of the three options depending on the proximity to the initial contact. If the necessary ground maneuver assets are in the immediate area, they can readily contribute to the fight. This is often not the case. Normally squads and platoons must first be consolidated and then moved to where the contact occurred. By this time the enemy has engaged, attritted your force, and broken contact. There are no easy solutions to this problem. There are, however, a few considerations, that if implemented can improve your ability to rapidly mass your ground maneuver assets.

The first consideration involves the physical size of your area of operations (AO). You may not be able to control the actual size of your AO, but you can subdivide your AO into zones of action that can help focus the efforts of subordinate units. By keeping the area relatively small, your forces are automatically closer together which decreases the time and distance required to support an adjacent unit once contact with the enemy is made. By analyzing your area of operations, and determining where contact with the enemy is most likely to occur, you can begin to reduce your search area, thus increasing your ability to rapidly consolidate forces once contact is made. This technique can be applied from squad to battalion level.

The second consideration involves the use of graphic control measures. Graphic control measures are useful in providing the flexibility needed to implement decisions rapidly. Adequate graphic control measures facilitate link ups, control direct and indirect fires, and control movement of your subordinate units. When conducting search and attacks, some of the more useful graphic control measures include checkpoints, linkup points, and target reference points. These graphic control measures facilitate linkups between units, control unit movements, and request and control supporting fires. Their wide scale use and dissemination help reduce the time required to pass orders and facilitate a common understanding of those orders and instructions.

The last consideration involves the size of the core unit operating throughout your area of operations. Generally in the search and attack environment, the core size unit is the platoon. Additional time is required to assemble a significant force if the unit is operating below platoon level.

Integrating aviation assets into the search and attack is the most difficult of the three resources (ground maneuver, artillery, and aviation), but if thoroughly planned and rehearsed can be one of the most responsive and decisive fixing or finishing forces available. The most difficult challenge to overcome when integrating aviation assets is establishing timely communications between the ground element in contact and the aviation scout weapons team. The unit must have standing operating procedures in place to facilitate the passing of timely, clear and concise orders and instructions between the aviation and ground maneuver assets. Below are some ideas to help alleviate this problem.

Ideally the scout weapons team is actively involved in the search and attack, or at least pre-positioned in a designated holding area prepared to support the search and attack. If not, the ground element in contact requests aviation support through its chain of command to the supporting aviation unit. The FRAGO to the scout weapons team must include the following information:

  • location of the designated holding area
  • routes, corridors, or air axis to holding area
  • alternate holding area location
  • location of the engagement area/objective area
  • frequency/call sign of the supported battalion headquarters

Once this information is provided, the scout weapons team can be dispatched. While enroute to the holding area, the scout weapons team contacts the supported battalion headquarters. Once radio contact is established, the supported battalion provides the scout weapons team the following information:

  • location of primary and alternate holding areas
  • enemy and friendly situation update
  • frequency/call sign of unit in contact

The scout weapons team then contacts the subordinate unit in contact (on the supported units frequency) and provides them the following information:

  • current location
  • station time and duration
  • armament capabilities (weapons type and number of rounds available)
  • night-vision capabilities

Once the above information is passed, the unit in contact then passes the following information to the scout weapons team:

  • enemy/friendly situation
  • proposed mission statement for scout weapons team
  • concept of operations
  • location of battle positions or attack by fire positions
  • lift and shift signals
  • method of marking friendly units

This process must occur over a very short amount of time and can only be streamlined through detailed planning, coordination, and rehearsals. The aviation trainers at the Joint Readiness Training Center developed a "How to Video" titled Air-To Ground Coordination in the Hasty Attack, that discusses these procedures in detail.

Integrating indirect fires into the search and attack is the other critical aspect of fixing and finishing the enemy. With detailed planning, coordination, and rehearsals, indirect fires can be even more responsive and just as decisive as the integration of aviation assets. Once again this requires detailed and enforced standing operating procedures and battle drills. Effective integration begins with detailed planning. Indirect fires must be planned for and anticipated during each phase of the search and attack. Some of the more critical planning considerations include:

  • Plan priority targets along designated routes, ambush and blocking positions, and templated enemy locations.

  • Plan to cancel and activate these priority targets in conjunction with the movement of the supported unit.

  • Identify units operating in and around your area. Determine current and planned locations of these units. This will assist you in clearing fires once requested. Typically this becomes an issue with assets such as low-level voice intercept (LLVI) teams, long-range surveillance (LRS) teams, and other assets that are not organic or attached to your unit.

  • Allocate appropriate weapon systems to provide immediate fire support to the ground maneuver unit.

The following are considerations during the execution phase:

  • Platoon forward observers must know and report their exact locations at all times. Use a ground positioning system to confirm location. Input targets as way points to confirm your location with respect to a specific target.

  • Fire marking rounds if needed to identify exact target location.

  • Cancel and update priority targets during your movement.

  • Once requested, make bold corrections as necessary, or creep the supporting fires into position to isolate, fix, or suppress the enemy.

  • Subordinate units must constantly update and report their current location to facilitate rapid clearance of fires.

  • Pre-clear fires if possible, so the only clearance of fires that will be necessary is that of the requesting unit.

The Fire Support Trainers from the Joint Readiness Training Center published an article, Fast and Accurate Fires in the Close Fight, in the CALL CTC Bulletin No. 96-4, Mar 96. This article discusses this issue in detail.

TTP:

Ground Maneuver Specific:

  • When conducting the IPB, carefully analyze your AO to determine where contact with the enemy is most likely to occur. Designate these areas as zones of action to help reduce the physical size of your AO and to help focus the effort of subordinate units.

  • Use sufficient graphic control measures to incorporate flexibility into your plan.

  • Consciously decide and enforce what core size unit at which you will operate. This decision can potentially increase your ability to rapidly mass the effects of your ground maneuver assets.

Aviation Specific:

  • Ensure your soldiers understand the basic capabilities, weapons effects, safety considerations, night-vision capabilities, and radio capabilities of aviation assets.

  • Ensure supporting aviation units understand your unit-marking procedures. The procedures may include the use of chem lights, strobe lights, MRE heaters, colored smoke, or laser pointers.

  • Ensure you incorporate graphic control measures to facilitate the integration of aviation assets. These graphic control measures should include holding areas, attack-by-fire positions, checkpoints, and battle positions.

  • Review, refine, and develop as necessary your procedures to facilitate the integration and synchronization of the scout weapons team. Use the procedures listed above as a starting point and adjust as necessary. These procedures must be rehearsed at all levels down to and including squad level.

  • Order the JRTC "How to Video," Air-to-Ground Coordination in the Hasty Attack, and incorporate these concepts into your unit training program.

Fire Support Specific:

  • Indirect fires can best be used as a means to block and fix the enemy versus destroying the enemy.

  • Plan and adjust priority targets along movement routes.

  • There are no easy solutions to clearance of fire procedures. A well-rehearsed staff battle drill and good unit reporting procedures enhance your ability to rapidly clear fires. Ensure all subordinate units constantly report and update their location to facilitate rapid clearance of fires.

  • Forward observers should use ground positioning systems to confirm current locations to facilitate rapid calls for fires.

Issue: Action or inaction during the first minutes of contact with the enemy determines the outcome of the engagement.

Discussion: Once contact with the enemy is made, the initial actions of the unit are absolutely critical in determining the outcome of the engagement. The unit that immediately seizes the initiative generally establishes and maintains control of the engagement. At the JRTC, it is not uncommon for the BLUFOR to sustain casualties at a ratio of seven friendly casualties to one OPFOR casualty. There are many reasons why this occurs; below are some of the more important reasons:

  • The enemy usually initiates the contact when they are at the advantage. Many times the enemy initiates contact against a lone squad or fire team conducting either a reconnaissance and security patrol or a squad movement to contact operation. Currently, most squads are manned with seven personnel; some squads are even smaller. As a result the BLUFOR is fighting the OPFOR at essentially a one-to-one ratio.

  • The friendly force often moves using an inappropriate movement technique or formation and when contact is made, the friendly unit is not postured to effectively react. Poor soldier situational awareness also contributes to units being engaged by an unseen enemy from a position of advantage.

  • Units do not normally execute react to contact battle drills effectively. Units are often slow react as contact with the enemy is made. Overwhelming suppressive fire and well-aimed shots are not achieved, leader assessment of the situation is slow, and a maneuver force is not deployed to an assailable flank to destroy the enemy. Either calls for indirect fire are not initiated or indirect fires are not responsive.

  • Often, when units sustain a casualty, the mission focus diverts from destroying the enemy to conducting casualty evacuation. Today's infantry squad manning levels are approximately seven soldiers per squad. When the squad sustains a casualty, a combat lifesaver is usually employed to treat the wounded soldier. The squad-size element now becomes a fire team, losing its ability to effectively fire and maneuver against the enemy. This situation forces the squad leader to make a decision to continue the fight or secure and evacuate the casualty. If the squad leader decides to evacuate the casualty, four personnel may be required to move the casualty if the injuries are serious, or the casualty must be moved an extended distance. The squad now has three personnel to secure the evacuation process. Because the squad cannot adequately secure themselves, the OPFOR then continues to attrit the squad as they evacuate the casualty.

TTP:

  • The React to Contact battle drill should be the number one training priority for squads and platoons.

  • Do not task squads to conduct movement to contact operations. If squads are tasked to conduct R&S patrols, platoon leaders should ensure they have adequate combat power to defeat the enemy during contact. Task two squads to conduct R&S patrols, and keep one squad in the quick reaction force role with the platoon sergeant. The platoon leader and FO can move with one squad (probably the platoon main effort). If contact is made, the platoon sergeant can maneuver the QRF. Patrol plans must be detailed, and graphics provided to the company commander. The platoon leader should constantly update the commander on the progress of the patrol.

  • Use the appropriate movement techniques and formations given the METT-T conditions. In addition to the three movement techniques (traveling, traveling overwatch, and bounding overwatch), FM 7-8 and FM 7-10 outlines various movement formations for squads and platoons (p. 2-29 and p. 2-37) and company movement formations (p. 3-3).

    A company movement formation that is effective at JRTC is similar to the approach march movement to contact technique. This movement formation and the associated battle drill when contact is made are not fully addressed in FM 7-10, but are based on observations from several JRTC rotations. The company moves in column with a platoon as an "advanced guard" no more than 200 meters forward of the company main body. The purpose of the advanced guard is to provide early warning for the rest of the company and to fix the enemy if contact is made. The rest of the company moves with the same dispersion as the traveling overwatch movement technique. A 60-mm mortar squad is attached to the advanced guard. When contact is made to the front, the 60-mm mortar can move to a firing position and ideally direct-lay fires at enemy locations, while the rest of the platoon fixes the enemy with direct fire. For this technique to be effective, the company must have a good drill for consolidating mortar rounds with the mortar squad. A technique is to use three stakes colored red, green, and yellow (the same color chemlites should be fixed to the stakes for limited visibility). Soldiers carrying the various mortar rounds (WP, HE, and illumination) can place the rounds at a respective stake. This eases identification of the rounds for the mortar squad. The rounds can be dropped off as soldiers occupy support by fire positions. As the lead platoon fixes the enemy, the mortar squad to the rear can place fires behind and to the flanks to further fix the enemy. The rest of the drill consists of a hasty attack based on the commander's assessment of the situation.

  • Develop casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) drills for actions on contact. A technique is to establish a CASEVAC team under the control of the 1SG or platoon sergeant. The team also consists of the senior line medic and possibly a squad for casualty collection point (CCP) security and to transport casualties. Once contact is made, the CASEVAC team immediately establishes the CCP. Four colored stakes (with chemlites attached for limited visibility) are positioned for urgent, priority, routine casualties, and KIA personnel (out of sight of the casualties). This greatly facilitates triage and expedites evacuation. As the remainder of the company or platoon continues the fight, the 1SG/platoon sergeant coordinates for evacuation of the casualties. If a platoon or squad is not committed to the fight, they should assist in securing the CCP and the evacuation site. If aerial MEDEVAC is being used for evacuation, the element can establish and secure the pickup zone or they can secure the ground evacuation pickup point. Units must maximize the use of combat lifesavers, SKEDs and poleless litters for evacuation. At squad level, this drill is much more difficult - - another reason why movement to contacts should not be conducted independently at squad level.

Issue: Reserves are often not responsive at the decisive moment during a battle.

Discussion: Most units designate either a reserve, quick reaction force (QRF), or follow and support element to support the search and attack. As defined in FM 101-5-1, the reserve and follow and support (QRF is not defined in the manual) are clearly different missions. However, all three potentially offer the commander flexibility and the ability to mass combat power at the decisive time and place. Unfortunately commanders and staffs do not thoroughly wargame how, when, and where they want to commit these elements. When the reserve is committed, it rarely has a positive impact on the operation because it usually cannot get to the decisive point in a timely manner with the right force mix.

Poor employment of the reserve is the result of several factors which include:

  • The reserve is usually located at the brigade or battalion TOC or combat trains waiting for the order to move. Unless the reserve is positioned at a responsive location to all units in the area of operation, it is unlikely that its employment will be decisive. Plans for employment of the reserve must consider the following:

    • How long it takes from receipt of the mission to execution. The reserve will have to receive the mission, conduct an abbreviated mission analysis, issue a FRAGO, load transportation, move to a debarking point, move to the objective area, assess the situation, and then deploy accordingly.

    • Method of transportation to the objective area. Methods of transportation include trucks, air assets, or foot movement. Each method is accompanied with its own set of disadvantages:

TRUCK MOVEMENT

Is there a route to the objective area?
Has the route been cleared of mines?

Security of the convoy?

Truck assets available vs other mission requirements?

Movement from the debark point to the objective area?

AIR ASSETS

Aircraft availability? Landing zone in vicinity of the objective area?

Air mission brief, SEAD, attack helicopter security.

Command and control of the air assault? Air Assault Task Force Commander?

FOOT MOVEMENT

Response time to the objective area?

Physical condition of unit when they
arrive at the objective area?

Friction of land navigation, chance contacts, and linkups?

  • Decision points to commit the reserve are seldom wargamed. The purpose of the reserve is to provide decisive action at a critical point in the battle. Potential critical points must be identified prior to the execution of the operation to ensure effective employment of the reserve.

  • The reserve is an uncommitted force and doctrinally cannot be tasked with another mission. However, the commander of the reserve can arguably be given "be prepared missions" and "priorities in planning." Both will save a great deal of time when the reserve is tasked to execute a mission. For example, the reserve commander may be given the following guidance:

    ". . .In priority, the reserve must plan to (1) move to checkpoint 1 and assume the mission of the finish force, (2) move to checkpoint 2 and establish blocking positions to prevent withdrawal of the enemy from the objective area, (3) move to the objective and continue the attack east to ensure complete destruction of the enemy. . . ."

TTP: A follow and support unit (or quick reaction force) may be more appropriate for a search and attack. A unit given a follow and support mission is not a reserve. Follow and support is an operation in which a committed force follows and supports the mission accomplishment of a force conducting offensive operations. A unit given this mission may destroy bypassed units, conduct a relief in place, block enemy movements, secure lines of communications, and any other operation the commander deems necessary. In a battalion search and attack, the follow and support element could be positioned behind the finishing force or at any location that would ensure responsive support to the battalion.

Issue: The capabilities of armor or mechanized units are not maximized during search and attacks.

Discussion: Search and attacks are most often conducted in environments that are best suited for light infantry operations. However, heavy-light operations are common to most contingency missions. Most infantry brigade task forces will conduct contingency operations with an attached armor or mechanized company team. Except for mines and a scarce number of light antitank weapons, most enemies in a low intensity environment do not possess a decisive antiarmor capability. As a result, armor or mechanized assets can be very effective as a finishing or fixing force.

Clearly, employment of armor or mechanized assets requires a corridor, normally roads or trails, which facilitate maneuver. These routes must be cleared. Of all units in the task organization, armor or mechanized units are the best suited to perform a reserve role because they do not require external transportation requirements. However, the enemy in a low-intensity environment rarely occupies positions that are readily accessible to heavy vehicles. Consequently, the decision criteria to employ the armor assets must be predicated on their ability to influence the action at the decisive time and place. The decision criteria must be established during the wargaming process.

Armor/mech assets can also be used in an overwatch position or as an observation post (OP) which maximizes the capabilities of the weapons to include thermal optics at night. When employed in overwatch or as an OP, dismounted security should be provided.

TTP:

  • Routes into the objective area must be trafficable. A supporting task to this effort may be a route reconnaissance by the scout platoon followed by route clearance operations. Routes should be cleared into the objective area as far as possible, without compromising the operation.

  • Measures for identification of friendly forces must be developed. The likelihood of fratricide of dismounted infantry by armor is potentially high if detailed control measures are not established.

  • The armor unit must be able to communicate with the dismounted unit in contact and a command and control relationship must be established. Ideally, the battalion commander on the ground or the TAC will command and control the employment of the armor assets. However, this is not always feasible. Consequently, the dismounted unit in contact should command and control the employment of the armor assets once they reach the objective area. This lowers the risk of fratricide and helps ensure unity of effort in finishing the enemy. Rarely will the armor unit be capable of completely finishing the enemy by itself because of terrain constraints. However, the armor assets can perform a supporting role by fixing the enemy as they withdraw or supporting by fire as the finishing force conducts the assault. To successfully accomplish these tasks, the dismounted unit commander must be able to talk to the armor leader.

Issue: Leaders and soldiers are not intimately familiar with intelligence indicators that will assist them in identifying the enemy.

Discussion: Normally, infantry platoons and squads serve as part of the find force. These squads and platoons typically conduct zone or area reconnaissance missions to locate enemy targets. These targets often include mortars, logistics or cache sites, and command, control, and communication (C3) sites. However, individual soldiers who actually conduct the search usually cannot provide any detailed information on sites for which they are specifically looking. They know they are searching for an enemy mortar site, but cannot describe the indicators that may lead them to the actual mortar site. This information typically includes the following: number of enemy personnel at the locations, types of terrain where the target can be located, and types of equipment associated with that specific target. This information is critical in assisting the soldier as he searches for the specific target.

The following discussion represents some of the characteristics of enemy targets in a low-intensity environment. The following information specifically addresses the JRTC, OPFOR threat model for an insurgent force. In areas where future continency operations may be conducted, enemy indicators will probably be different. Units conducting a contingency operation in a low-intensity environment may not have the luxury of knowing the enemy order of battle. In this situation, they will have to conduct thorough patrol debriefs or interview local inhabitants to develop an appropriate list of indicators. Regardless, this list provides a starting point that can be used and adjusted as necessary.

TTP:

1. Enemy Mortars

Indicators:

  • A three- to five-man team carrying ruck sacks with radio.

  • Soldiers carrying black cylindrical casings.

  • The sound of a mortar firing.

  • Being engaged by a four-man team at longer than usual ranges (200+ meters).

  • A four-man team that blatantly exposes itself to lure you away from the firing point.

  • The finding of a mortar ammunition cache.

  • The finding of numerous booby traps.

Enemy Mortar Tactics/Techniques:

The OPFOR mortar section usually has a minimum of three firing positions within its area of operation. A cache of mortar rounds is located within 200-300 meters of the firing positions. The section will normally fire several rounds and move to its alternate firing position to avoid being detected by acquisition radars. If the section leader determines that the section is about to be compromised, a team may be deployed to lure that element away from the location. Firing positions require the same traits as those used by U.S. mortars - mask and overhead clearance. However, the hide positions are usually in dense terrain. Locating a mortar cache is a key intelligence indicator because the firing positions are normally in close proximity. Soldiers should able to distinguish the following: whether it is an old or recent cache, if the rounds are expended, or whether they are U.S. or enemy mortar rounds. If foliage is dried or the camouflage is washed away, then it is probably an old cache. Once the cache is found, the leader can draw a concentric 300-meter circle on his map around the location. The leader can then analyze the terrain within the 300-meter circle to determine possible mortar locations.

If the unit is engaged by a four-man element from a distance greater than 200 meters, it is possible that the enemy team is attempting to lure a unit away from the mortars. It is also likely that the mortar section is attempting to displace. Consequently, the leader should attempt to fix the four-man team. Upon completion of a quick map analysis, the unit should maneuver an element(s) to possible avenues of egress. Another element can also be tasked to clear likely hide sites or firing locations.

A very effective technique to locate the mortars is through crater analysis. However, this is the least accepted method because mortar rounds are fired and soldiers may be wounded or killed as a result. Nonetheless, all soldiers within the platoon should be trained in crater analysis procedures. The most accepted technique to locate the mortars is through detailed analysis and planning.

2. Logistics/Cache Site

Indicators:

  • The finding of any food, water, or fuel.

  • The sighting of an enemy helicopter or resupply aircraft.

  • The sighting of an enemy aircraft or vehicle around suspected enemy LZs.

  • The sighting of enemy resupply vehicles such as all terrain vehicles (ATV), bicycles, or trucks.

  • Tire tracks appropriate to the vehicles listed above.

  • Grass, dirt, or foliage that looks out of place.

Enemy Tactics/Techniques:

The enemy normally places great emphasis on concealing their logistics/cache sites. These efforts include burying the caches and camouflaging them. In addition, a large cache site, such as a battalion supply point (BSP), can be extended over distances in excess of 600 meters with several smaller caches of items such as air defense missiles and mortar rounds, mines, water, and food in the area. The supply points are normally located in low ground in the vicinity of a water supply and trail or road network which is easily accessible. Deception BSPs are also used extensively. The enemy may intentionally expose and booby-trap deception BSPs. The JRTC OPFOR rarely booby-traps items that they want to access. Several different types of supply points are also used. The supply transfer point (STP) is used as a central location where supplies are transferred between BSPs and company supply points (CSPs). STPs usually have several HMMWVs, possibly an ATV, and a three- or four-person security force. The CSP may have a squad security force and the BSP may have up to a platoon minus (15 personnel) at that location. It is also important to note that the OPFOR will use the supply points only when forced.

The preferred method to locate a logistics site is to observe either its use, preparation, or resupply of the site. Appropriate vehicle noises and tire tracks leading into low areas are good indicators that a supply point may be in the vicinity. The enemy may use helicopters or other aircraft (even civilian aircraft) to conduct resupply operations. Soldiers should note the landing or taking off of enemy helicopters or other aircraft and notify their leaders. They should get an azimuth and orient the possible LZ in relation to key terrain features. Once the unit determines they might have located a logistics site, they must be prepared to conduct an extensive search of the area to find all the supplies. They may include using wooden stakes or E-tools to probe the ground to find buried caches. In addition, the unit must resolve what it is going to do with all the supplies once it finds them. Options include transporting them on vehicles or destroying them with demolitions. The unit must also be prepared to defend the site against a counterattack. The enemy will generally fight hard to keep a BSP, and counterattack as necessary to regain control of a lost BSP.

3. Command, Control, and Communications (C3) Sites

Indicators:

  • Enemy soldiers with the rank of Platoon Sergeant or above.

  • Radios with long-range antenna systems.

  • Enemy soldiers carrying leader-type sidearms (pistols).

Enemy Tactics/Techniques:

Enemy C3sites are generally very austere with only three or four personnel, a radio, and a long-range antenna system. The C3site is positioned where it can communicate, but the site will be well camouflaged. If the site becomes compromised, an enemy soldier may attempt to lure the attacking force away from the site or attempt to fix with fire. The remainder of the C3element may attempt to break contact to a pre-established linkup point.

Unless the unit has access to Low-Level Voice Intercept or QUICK FIX information, it is very difficult to locate a C3site. Sometimes they are only located by chance. However, if the unit makes contact with a lone enemy soldier, there is the possibility that the unit compromised an enemy C3site. The unit should execute the react to contact battle drill.

4. Other Indicators:

OPFOR maps are usually sterilized when they enter an operation. If there are graphics on a map, then they are probably for deception purposes. However, the soldier should not decide this for himself. All information should be expedited to the unit S2 for analysis. Many times, enemy soldiers hide useful information in very inconspicuous places. Soldiers must conduct very thorough searches to obtain the potential information.

Collecting information on the enemy and converting it to useful intelligence products is a key to success on any battlefield. However, soldiers must know what to look for to be situationally aware and obtain the information. It is paramount that leaders provide the soldiers the most current tactics and techniques of an opposing force, whether it is on the island of Atlantica in Cortina (JRTC) or against a more unforgiving enemy in a real-world contingency operation. Although the tactics and techniques of that enemy may change, the tasks and standards of analysis remain the same.


Chapter IV, Part 1
Chapter V: Home-Station Training



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