Chapter 5
TRACKING COMBAT POWER
| Combat power is created by combining the elements of maneuver, firepower, protection and leadership. --FM 100-5 |
Army forces normally arrive in the theater of operations with soldiers traveling apart from their equipment and separated echelons of command. The deploying units and higher commands are very interested in knowing when and where the unit will be combat ready. With the advances in information systems technology, the ability to transfer RSO&I data to various levels and locations of command currently exists. These systems include the Logistics Information File (LIF), cellular telephone, tactical satellite and tactical facsimile, to name a few.
Force tracking is the monitoring of a unit's status (equipment, personnel, and training) and location during deployment and before integration. Combat power is a term used in association with mission capability for a unit while personnel and equipment incrementally arrive in the theater. Force tracking aids in predicting the unit's arrival time in theater and incremental combat power buildup. Predicting combat power is very important for planning when a unit is available for a mission.
A Home Station Army unit's mission capability is reported monthly to the Department of the Army using the Unit Status Report (USR). A unit commander reports his personnel, equipment, and training status on the USR. The USR has strict criteria which determine the unit's mission capability (readiness). The USR is the start point for force tracking and predicting combat power for a unit deploying with its own equipment. For a unit drawing prepositioned equipment, the unit's USR personnel and training section, in conjunction with the prepositioned equipment status report, is used as a start point for force tracking and predicting combat power. Force tracking transitions to combat power tracking with the incremental arrival of personnel and equipment in theater.
Combat capability by unit comes from "slant" reports per unit TACSOP. Slant needs to be clearly defined; however, this is not done by most units. An effective way to look at slant for a particular system is to define critical areas needed for a system to be mission capable. Examples are: shoot, move, communicate, sustain, force protection, training and personnel-crew status.
A vehicle not black in any of the critical areas could be reported as mission capable on the slant.
One of the hardest steps during RSO&I and specifically during staging is building combat power. Success in building combat power requires that a few rules or definitions be established.
These rules include:
defining
combat capability defining
logistic capability and sustainability defining
how to track and visualize combat power establishing
a glide path for the incremental building of combat power prioritizing
and adjusting the glide path as needed managing
and supervising the unit's progress developing
a complementary tracking system that applies for combat operations as well
as RSO&I An example of a tracking system encompassing the rules and steps above was developed at the National Training Center and is in chart format at Appendix B.
The definition of unit combat power can be divided into five subordinate parts:
At Task Force level, what is most important is to have a system that graphically portrays how each element of combat power is built. In addition to tracking combat power, the Task Force must plan for and track the incremental generation of logistics sustainability. With the wide range of misssions which cross between tactical and logistical compnay level units, a comprehensive system to plan and track logistics sustainability has proven to be a challenge to most units.
Defining combat power encompasses several elements that make weapons systems combat capable. These elements include the following:
trained crews
ammunition
prescribed equipment uploaded according to load plans
equipment able to move, shoot and communicate Simply counting the number of vehicles or weapon systems that have been issued is not a measure of combat power.
At Appendix B is a technique for planning as well as tracking the incremental build of combat power. Although this NTC example is an Army brigade battle task force, the system (unit format sheets) can be easily modified to fit any unit. A color system is used to depict the unit's condition. Green is 90 percent or more mission capable, amber is 70- to 89-percent mission capable, red is 50- to 69-percent mission capable, and black is 49 percent or less mission capable (see sample below). This technique provides commanders a quick reference to determine, "If we fight tonight, what can I bring to the fight?"
Chapter
4: Army War Reserve "-3 & -5"
Appendix
A: Glossary of Common RSO& Terms
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