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CHAPTER II

OPERATIONS, SECURITY, AND TACTICS

SITUATION: A unit was conducting a dismounted patrol when it came under fire from an elderly, intoxicated civilian.

REACTION UNDER FIRE!!! The soldiers took cover behind their overwatching M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, which was struck by several AK-47 rounds; neighbors came out and wrestled the man to the ground.

• The individual was disarmed, detained, and turned over to FWF Police.

• Deadly return of fire was authorized under the current Rules of Engagement: "You may open fire against an individual who fires or aims his weapon at you, friendly forces, or persons with designated special status under your protection."

TTP!!! The discipline and alertness of the patrol saved this individual's life. By properly assessing the nature of the attack, and mindful that the Rules of Engagement also state "Use only the minimum force necessary to defend yourself," the patrol averted a tragedy.

SITUATION: A unit was tasked to secure a communications site in the area of operations. The security element emplaced magnesium flares as early warning devices along likely avenues of approach into the area. In the early evening, a trip flare was activated, alerting the Quick Reaction Force (QRF).

REACTION UNDER FIRE!!! Seeing footprints and hearing movement, the QRF fired two M203 illumination rounds. A burst of small arms fire was heard. The soldiers fired three more illumination rounds, but still could not identify any personnel targets. The incident was immediately reported to headquarters and the security posture was increased to 100 percent.

The unit exercised effective Operational Security (OPSEC) and correctly employed the Rules of Engagement (ROE):

• "Use only the minimum force necessary to defend yourself."

• "Fire only aimed shots."

SITUATION: TFE constantly has convoys on the road, to the point that it seems routine. However, the reality of movement in Bosnia is anything but routine. Convoys may hit a mine, get lost, loose communications, have an accident, hit an unauthorized checkpoint, or any number of other unpleasant events.

TTP!!! Convoy commanders should ensure that soldiers do not become complacent about convoy operations. Before each convoy, brief the following actions to all members of the convoy:

• Actions at breakdowns

• MEDEVAC procedures

• Routes, Checkpoints and Rally Points

• Minestrike procedures/locations of known minefields

• Actions on contact

• Actions to take if there is a break in contact

TTP!!! Units should develop and drill "lost communications" actions. Both the convoy and the unit must have an established drill to regain communications, especially if the convoy is overdue. On one occasion, a convoy was overdue, and the BDE had to send out helicopters and the QRF to regain communication.

Leaders must ensure that soldiers understand and are prepared for the dangers faced when conducting convoys. Special care should be taken to prevent complacency on safety, communications, and readiness issues.

SITUATION: FWF guards at an equipment collection site were noted by a soldier as having not shaved or bathed in several days, were in need of dental work and their weapons were dirty. Also, the guards belonged to the local militia and lived in the next town. Over several days a soldier performing guard duty at a lodgement area gate noticed a pattern of behavior by some local men. A soldier driving in a convoy noted replaced windows and patched roofs on a few abandoned buildings.

DISCUSSION: There is a temendous amount of important intelligence information to be found in the obvious. Every soldier can observe and discover information by observing the area, equipment, and people along wherever they may be. This seemingly ordinary information can help the S2 "fill in the gaps" and develop a more accurate picture of what is really going on in the local community. For example, the above true situations revealed the following facts:

• The FWF equipment guards were poorly trained, lacked support by their chain of command, and had poor morale.

• The local men were agents conducting active surveilliance of the camp.

• Some people had been going to the town to work on houses and planned to move into them.

This is all important information. Simply by doing your job and keeping your eyes open, you can contribute a great deal to the Task Force effort.

TTP!!!

DISCUSSION: An Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) crossing by the FWF from Maglaj to the village of Rijecca in the Doboj municipality was coordinated through the mayors of Maglaj and Doboj. The purpose of the crossing was to visit a cemetery. It was agreed that the visit would take place and another Chief of Police guaranteed the safety of the faction visitors. Coordination by both TFE and NORPOL staffs ensured that the conditions were set to minimize the possibility of a confrontation between the two FWFs. These actions included: positioning of checkpoints along the route to monitor movement and to ensure weapons were not brought into the ZOS; helicopters were on standby; and QRFs were postured to respond, if necessary. In addition, the IPTF and UNHCR would accompany the visiting factions personnel throughout the visitation. When the visitors reached the IEBL, an FWF police force handed the group over to another FWF police force who escorted them to the cemetery. A crowd of 15 other faction personnel were at the site. Four of the other faction individuals instigated an altercation with journalist who were with the visitors. One of the faction individuals fired two shots in the air; the FWF police subdued him and confiscated the weapon. The incident was reported by the IPTF to the TFE TOC. As a result, the DANBN QRF was positioned two kilometers north of the site; a tactical PSYOP team moved to link up with the QRF; a OH58C flew to the location; and the TFE QRF with combat camera crew were put on a 30-minute alert. The OH58C confirmed the number of FWFs at the site to be 15. The visit resumed, but was later suspended because of rock throwing and increased tension. The FWF police escorted the visitors back to the appropriate side of the faction IEBL.

TTP!!! Because of the prior coordination by the TFE staff ensuring the involvement of the mayors, both factional police, the IPTF, and the UNHCR, the situation was resolved by the civil authorities rather than TFE soldiers.

TTP!!! The TFE staff also synchronized a branch plan to introduce TFE forces, if the situation could not be resolved by the civil authorities.

TTP!!! Generally good reporting by the IPTF and NORDPOL allowed the TFE Battle Captain to track the battle and provide updates to the Commander and Staff. This facilitated the rapid buildup of combat power once the shooting incident occurred.

TTP!!! The OH58C, with observer, served as a redundant means to confirm or deny reporting.

DISCUSSION: There were 51 incidents of unauthorized personnel attempting to penetrate the perimeter of base camps - - 24 were successful. The perpetrators were frequently being identified and detained prior to entering the base camp. This is mostly due to the increased vigilance and situational awareness of guards and patrols in the base camps. The TFE G2 analyzed the incidents, distinguishing no clear trends. However, the geographic concentration of the incidents correlate with local populace needs (trying to acquire foodstuffs) and existing targets of opportunity (if security does not appear to be maintained). Most of the intruders are teenagers. There were no indications of a prospective threat from organized or terrorist elements.

TTP!!! Varying the patterns or activities of base camp security helps avoid routines and reduces the possibility of being targeted.

TTP!!! Effective base camp security measures is the best precaution to deter prospective intruders from attempting a base camp penetration.

TTP!!! Constant assessment and re-evaluation of incidents and reporting from units and convoys assist the S2/G2 in identifying trends and analyzing the tactics and techniques of perpetrators.

TTP!!! Proactive CID programs are the cornerstone to a thorough investigation of incidents and Civil Affairs campaigns assist in identifying community needs and the dissemination of information.

During an IEBL crossing, two civilians were killed and six were wounded. TFE provided a great effort to minimize the possibility of violence during the crossings. However, the potential for civilians and or soldiers being injured during a confrontation is always present. A cavalry unit has developed a detailed "contingency plan" for the employment of not only their combat forces, but also the synchronization of their medical assets in the case of a violent crossing which results in injuries. This lesson and TTP spans beyond the spectrum of operations in Bosnia to all missions undertaken by U.S. Forces - both present and future.

TTP!!! "Surge" medical assets during a IEBL crossing, thereby weighting the main effort with the necessary resources. The unit task organizes a medic with every squad. A medic is also deployed with the CA team and observes the people getting on a bus, and identifies potential casualties based on a visual assessment (e.g., old people who are likely to be heat casualties or have heart problems).

TTP!!! In past incidents, wounded civilians were evacuated in POVs. Although a hospital was in proximity of the incident, the casualties were evacuated to a facility farther away because it was the same ethnicity of the wounded personnel. Planners must wargame the location of hospitals and the ethnicity of the facility in case the unit is required to evacuate civilian casualties.

TTP!!! The Battalion Surgeon positions himself, along with a partial Advanced Trauma Lifesaving System (ATLS), approximately 400 meters from the crossing site. This allows him to rapidly respond to an incident. A MEDEVAC helicopter is also on alert.

A "rock drill" rehearsal is conducted prior to every operation. Each contingency is wargamed, using the "action-reaction-counteraction" methodology to anticipate every possible event that may occur and the response of the unit.

SITUATION: Criminal acts, harassment, and attacks occur against civilians (usually personnel from all the FWFs) along a MSR in a unit area of responsibility. Police, or individuals claiming to be police, or well-armed criminal groups use these common techniques:

• Individuals dressed in plain clothes, identifying themselves as police, stop civilians to check for ethnicity, or car license information.

• Three to five individuals in police or quasi-police uniforms with traffic paddles conduct unauthorized checkpoints and stop "out-of-towners."

• Two to six individuals in one or two cars will identify a vehicle and run it off the road.

In each instance, the civilians are usually beaten and robbed. Often, the vehicles are stolen. The carjacking activities peak between 0400 and 0800 and 1600 and 2000 on weekdays to exploit routine traffic patterns and early morning travelers moving south from a factional geographic area.

TTP!!! IPTF and local police are integrated into the operation. Efforts to establish ownership for law and order among local police are continued through meetings.

TTP!!! Crime will be deterred through the presence of U.S. forces. Temporary observation posts are established to monitor traffic, stop and randomly search vehicles. Ground and aerial patrols are conducted. Adherence to the ROE is key to mission success.

TTP!!! All activities are well documented, with photographs and accurate reports. Operations must be calmly and deliberately executed, ensuring force protection.

TTP!!! The old adage ". . . if you don't check it, it won't get done right . . . ." clearly applies to our efforts in holding the local police responsible for maintaining law and order. Our presence (and discipline) is a constant reminder to the factions that they must implement the peace. If they know we are scrutinizing their activities--they will do it right.

DISCUSSION: A U.S. unit conducted several joint patrols with an element from a Russian Brigade. The last joint patrol conducted was task-organized with two BTR-80s and 10 Russian soldiers, two M2A2s, one HMMWV, and 17 U.S. soldiers which included a medic, forward observer, enlisted tactical air controller (ETAC) and an interpreter. The mission of the patrol was to reconnoiter a named area of interest (NAI) and patrol primarily Russian BDE routes.

TTP!!! If nothing else, the fact that two former enemies working together in a mission of peace demonstrates to the FWF that seemingly insurmountable differences can be overcome.

TTP!!! The equitable force mix of two BTR 80s and two BFVs clearly portrayed a "joint" effort. Because the patrol was conducted in the Russian sector, the Russian element was in the lead--there was no evidence of one unit trying to upstage the other.

TTP!!! The same two units worked together on other patrols--the same Russian interpreter was on every joint patrol. The habitual relationship facilitated the process--vague details of the operation were worked out through face-to-face coordination. The ease of the coordination would not have been afforded if the two units had never worked together.

LESSON RELEARNED!!! Patrol orders must have a clear task and purpose. The task must be definable, attainable and decisive. FM 101-5-1 provides the definition for U.S. military tasks. The purpose is simply "why" it's being conducted. However--remember that the purpose is the most important component of a mission statement. Consequently, before the units commence a joint patrol, ensure there is a commonality in terms for the task and a complete understanding of the purpose of the mission.

A TFE unit periodically conducts "Field Craft" After-Action Reviews where TTP from current operations are identified, collated, and disseminated throughout the battalion and the Ready First Combat Team. This, in itself, is a great TTP. CALL was fortunate to receive a copy of the AAR and provide the rest of Task Force Eagle with some of the "Black Knight's" TTP.

TTP!!! Counter-Sniper Operations: While operating from an observation post, several potential sniper "hides" and "loop-holes" were reconnoitered and destroyed. The sniper qualified personnel in platoons are especially valuable in performing counter-sniper assessments.

TTP!!! Mine Destruction: Some mines are destroyed in place (TMRP-6s), while others can be stacked in piles (TMM-1s). Be prepared to do a combination of techniques. The unit rigged all demolition and firing systems. The FWFs placed the charges and initiated the system. If blowing numerous piles, have systems timed differently to have distinct explosions. Count the explosions. For non-electric systems, wait 30 minutes after a mis-fire. Go back a safe distance. Directly behind buildings is not acceptable - - falling shingles can be deadly.

TTP!!! Mounted Patrols. Ensure driver's hatches are down and Bradley Commander's hatches are up--it reduces visibility, but increases force protection. Driver's hatches should be up on three occasions: (1) When parking; (2) If weather significantly hinders visibility; (3) When in crowded areas.

TTP!!! Employment of NVDs in Lighted Areas. Clearly, NVDs are not effective in lighted areas. However, during patrols around base camps and other areas, personnel often move from lighted to unlit areas. If the PVS-7Bs are properly worn, soldiers can mount the NVDs on the headharness so they are slightly tilted upwards allowing normal vision while looking straight ahead. When entering an unlit area, the head can be tilted downward permitting employment of the NVD. Properly mounting the NVDs frees the hands to perform more important tasks--such as employing one's weapon when required. Soldiers should avoid using NVDs in the handheld mode, succumbing to the "$2,000 Necklace Syndrome"--this takes discipline!

DISCUSSION: A meeting was held in 1 BCT's sector which consisted of the BDE's Unit Ministry Team (UMT), members of non-governmental organizations (NGO) and private organizations (PVO), members of an FWF Orthodox clergy and laity, some FWF Catholic clergy and FWF clerics, and interpreters. The group discussed a variety of topics to include past cemetery visits to Modrica and Gradacac, the disposition of church records and church property left behind by fleeing congregations during the war, and the involvement of the clergy in politics. The overall spirit of the meeting was reserved at first, and then warmed as personnel met others they had known before the war. The group demonstrated no sense of using the pulpit to advance the broader cause of peace, but there was considerable willingness on the part of the participants to help solve one another's specific problems. The assembled clergy remained inward-focused in the sense of reaching across denominational lines only within the circle of professional clergy, and only to solve professional problems. The clergy was not yet ready to take a leading role in forging a true and lasting peace among the people of Bosnia.

TTP!!! The UMTs worked closely with clergy of the FWFs to build a bridge across seemingly insurmountable religious differences--differences that have often led to violence.

TTP!!! Combat power is often defined in terms of four elements--Fire Power, Maneuver, Protection, and Leadership. Commanders and staffs develop plans to arrange battlefield activities to concentrate combat power at the decisive time and place--that is synchronization. One of the most important lessons learned during Operation Joint Endeavor is that combat power sometimes transcends beyond the traditional elements--it also may include UMTs, JMC, and PAO. In addition, the decisive point does not necessarily have to be a piece of terrain. In some cases, it may be a joint religious meeting.

A brigade conducted a "no-notice" alert to practice readiness procedures if the Brigade was required to upgrade its security posture to SECCON 1. The practice alert is an excellent technique to gauge readiness. In addition, some valuable lessons were learned from the exercise.

Notification Procedures Within Base Camps:

TTP!!! In one unit, it was discovered that notification of the alert was spread largely by word of mouth.

TTP!!! One unit used a visual signal (star clusters) to alert personnel in base camps. Another unit used a combination of a star cluster for visual and two audio signals--a "Triangle Warning" and three short blasts from a whistle. This unit also used a "runner" and a PA system to issue instructions.

Civilians Inside the Base Camps:

TTP!!! There are many civilians inside the wire at any given time. These civilians include local nationals and IFOR-employed civilians from other countries.

TTP!!! There needs to be a combination of signals, both visual and audio. Civilians need to be accounted for and secured at a protected location. A decision must be made whether the situation permits the local civilians to be escorted outside the wire. Regardless, local civilians should not be allowed to use the phones to call home.

Command and Control of the Perimeter Defense:

One unit positioned the HHC Commander, who was tasked to command and control the perimeter defense, inside the TOC. The TOC was cramped due to the excess number of people.

TTP!!! Another location needs to be designated for command and control of the perimeter defense other than the TOC. This location needs to have ample space for excess personnel and good communications.

DISCUSSION: Units secured the BRCKO Bridge since it was opened to military traffic. The following represents several lessons from the operation.

TTP!!! Lighting on the bridge was inadequate, and the area could not be illuminated with flashlights or perimeter lights. A possible solution is to hang a flare on a wire over the side of the bridge.

TTP!!! At night, it is difficult for motorist to see the blue barrels and tetrahedrons. Additional traffic cones and lighting is required. Reflective tape would assist in identification of the cones.

TTP!!! There must be detailed coordination with the Military Police who control traffic on the bridge. Reporting and communication procedures need to be established to facilitate command and control.

TTP!!! Locals in the area continually request assistance from units securing the bridge. As much as soldiers would like to help, they cannot be diverted from their primary task.

TTP!!! CA and PSYOP teams must inform civilians that the bridge may only be used for military traffic.

TTP!!! Non-U.S. IFOR units arrive at the bridge unscheduled. These units often do not know the procedures for getting road-march credits.

TTP!!! Mine detectors are much less effective around the bridge because of the high density of metal.

TTP!!! Sand Vipers have become more abundant around the bridge. Snake bite kits and serum must be on hand in the event of a snake bite.

TTP!!! The light generator is not very durable. To prevent overloading the generator or damaging the lights, it is best to turn on one lamp at a time as opposed to turning them all on at once.

TTP!!! Locals often inadvertently activate trip flares. Signs should be posted to alert civilians not to enter the area.

SITUATION: During a convoy, a vehicle broke down. The convoy did not have the necessary equipment to conduct self-recovery to tow the inoperable vehicle. The convoy commander decided to leave the vehicle with the driver and TC, while the remainder of the convoy (three vehicles) moved to the closest base camp to get assistance. Ultimately, the vehicle and personnel were left at the location overnight. The next day the vehicle was recovered without incident.

DISCUSSION: The purpose of the four-vehicle convoy is to facilitate force protection, deterring ambush and kidnapping. Additionally, the four-vehicle rule provides convoy commanders flexibility. The convoy commander can cross-load personnel from an inoperable vehicle if self-recovery cannot be performed. Another alternative is to leave a vehicle with the element while the remainder of the convoy seeks assistance. Only under the most extreme circumstances should soldiers and a single vehicle be left alone.

TTP!!! Actions for vehicle breakdowns during convoys must be wargamed and incorporated in unit standing operating procedures. Units should approach vehicle breakdown procedures as a battle drill with actions being executed sequentially.

TTP!!! Units should consider the following actions:

• Step 1: Establish communications notifying the units higher headquarters that a vehicle in the convoy has broken down.

• Step 2: Attempt self-recovery - - This step infers that the convoy has the appropriate equipment to execute the task. Pre-convoy inspections should ensure that self-recovery equipment is available and serviceable.

• Step 3: If self-recovery cannot be performed, leave a vehicle with the inoperable vehicle. Before departing, the convoy commander should render a "five-point contingency plan" outlining what actions to take in specific instances (e.g., attack).

• Step 4: If steps 2 and 3 are not appropriate, cross-load personnel and move to the closest base camp.

SITUATION: A car bomb exploded at the front gate. Mortar rounds were impacting within the confines of the base. Sirens were wailing. Armed personnel were trying to breach the perimeter. Eagle Base was under attack. These are just several of the scenarios that TFE soldiers at Eagle Base had to react to during a base defense exercise.

DISCUSSION: TFE bases are subject to attack at any time. To prepare for such an attack, the soldiers assigned to Eagle Base participated in a five-hour base defense exercise to sharpen their base defense skills. The first three hours of the exercise were devoted to situation development. The last two hours were incident development. The main tasks that were evaluated included:

• Establishing the Eagle Base Defense Coordination Net.

• Passing indications and warning (I&W) from the division to unit TOCs on the base.

• Raising force protection levels for all soldiers on base.

• Activating and manning all perimeter supplemental positions.

• Reacting to/stopping perimeter breach by armed personnel.

• Reacting to car bomb incident.

• Reacting to attack from indirect fire or air attack. Activating the bunker occupation plan.

• Reacting to/evacuating a casualty.

TTP!!! Actions for base defense should be clearly outlined in the base defense SOP. The base defense SOP should be disseminated down to the soldier level ensuring that every soldier understands his part in the base defense plan. Base defense exercises should be conducted regularly to ensure compliance with the SOP. It is too late to discover a flaw in the base defense plan when an actual attack occurs.

Units should consider the following when creating or updating base defense SOPs:

Force Protection Levels

TTP!!! A systematic approach needs to be established to alert all units on a base about the increase in the force protection level. Often, isolated units and civilian/government organizations are overlooked.

TTP!!! Soldiers need to ensure that protective equipment, such as body armor and protective mask, is readily available. Many soldiers do not bring this equipment to their daily assigned positions. In the event of an increase in the force protection level, these soldiers would have to leave their place of duty to retrieve their equipment, thus disrupting daily operations at a critical time.

Bunkers

TTP!!! Engineers should routinely inspect bunkers to ensure that they are safe to occupy.

TTP!!! Units that maintain bunkers should ensure that a plan exists to provide light, heat, food and water for the bunker. In the event that bunkers are occupied for extended periods, these life support items are essential.

TTP!!! When a bunker occupation plan is activated, each bunker must have a type of communication means to ensure that soldiers remain informed of the situation. Either a land line or an FM radio will work.

Alarms

TTP!!! Alarms, such as sirens, need to be tested routinely. Alarms should be heard throughout all areas of the base. Supplemental alarms, such as vehicle horns, may need to be used to reach isolated areas of a base.

TTP!!! Different alarms can be used to distinguish between different types of attacks. One type of alarm can signify an air/mortar/artillery attack and a different type of alarm for a ground attack. Different actions may be required of soldiers for these two types of attacks.

New/Transient Soldiers and Visitors

TTP!!! Units should ensure that new soldiers are briefed on force protection levels on the first day they arrive in theater. Units should also provide guidance to newly arrived soldiers on actions to take in the event of an attack on the base.

TTP!!! Soldiers in transit and visitors may be visiting a base when it is attacked. These soldiers will not be aware of the actions that are required of them in the event of an attack. It is the responsibility of all soldiers to assist and provide guidance to these visitors who are not familiar with the base SOPs.

Civilians/Local Nationals on Base

TTP!!! There are many local nationals on base doing various jobs. These local nationals need to be accounted for, ensuring their safety from attack and the safety of TFE soldiers in the event that some of these local nationals decide to participate in the attack.

SITUATION: TFE soldiers observed individuals conducting surveillance of various base camps throughout the area of responsibility. One male approached the front gate at Commanche base and asked questions regarding how guard shifts were conducted. The guards provided no information and reported the incident through their chain of command. The military police detained the individual the following day. Guards also observed one male taking photographs of defensive positions at another base. Guards notified the QRF and attempted to approach the individual. The individual fled the area and is still at large. Also at the same base, guards observed two Japanese males photographing the defensive obstacles. Guards notified the QRF, who apprehended the suspects. The QRF questioned and searched the suspects. They found a drawing of a float bridge. They confiscated both the film and the drawing. At a lodgment area, a civilian worker within the base camp threw a gym bag over the wire to three local nationals. The QRF detained and questioned the local nationals. The local nationals refused to identify the civilian who threw the bag over the fence. The bag contained a rope, a pair of sneakers, and a bag of candy. Although none of the incidents posed a major threat to TFE soldiers, information derived from their endeavors could have provided valuable information to hostile forces.

DISCUSSION: TFE bases are subject to attack at any time. The more the attacker knows about the defenses of a base, the more likely the attack will succeed. TFE soldiers should make every effort to deny this valuable information to a possible attacker.

Soldiers at various bases were successful in defeating hostile surveillance because they understood the current situation. They were aware of the possible threats to the base. The guards were alert. They took their job seriously, understanding that many soldiers depended on them for protection.

A QRF was ready to reinforce or investigate a possible hostile or suspicious situation. Potential hostile groups did not gain valuable information due to quick actions and response of the QRF.

It is imperative that guards detain suspicious people conducting surveillance of base camps. Guard force leaders should plan for contingencies in which a suspect makes it to the "get away" vehicle and have mobile assets available to block escape routes.

Guards understood that serious incidents, such as surveillance of base defenses, need to be investigated and reported through their chain of command to either the unit's S3 or S2.

DISCUSSION: As identified earlier in The Maglaj Incident, there were numerous lessons on civil disturbances. Most importantly, TFE internalized that it is the civil authorities, not Task Force Eagle's responsibility to enforce the law. TFE forces are not to serve as crowd control or riot police; however, units may be requested to assist on a case-by-case basis, to the extent of their primary mission. Soldiers and leaders may be placed in a position where they may have to address crowds - - possibly hostile crowds.

Members of PSYOP company participated in several civil disturbances. From their experiences, they provided the following lessons for addressing crowds.

TTP!!! If the group is organized and there appears to be a leader of the group, ask that individual if the matter could be discussed face to face, ideally away from the crowd. This is the preferred method, as it provides immediate feedback to the issue and the problem. Talking away from the crowd prevents outside influences from sidetracking the discussion.

TTP!!! Use key communicators, when possible, to address the crowd, e.g., local mayor, police, and military leaders.

TTP!!! When using a loudspeaker system, follow these guidelines:

• Direct the broadcast toward the agitators or main portion of the crowd.

• Anticipate what the crowd may do and have a prepared message.

• Do not allow yourself to become surrounded by a crowd.

TTP!!! Make your messages simple, concise, and short. Maintain your composure. Use a male voice in a male-dominated society.

TTP!!! Be careful when using ultimatums or threats. Do not use them unless the situation makes it absolutely necessary and you are willing and have the authority to carry them out.

TTP!!! Ensure you have a trustworthy interpreter. Write down what you are going to say and read it verbatim.

SITUATION: A new soldier arrives at your unit. What do you do to bring him "up to speed" on the current situation? Your actions in the first 48 hours may save his life and make him an integral part of your team.

TTP!!! New soldiers will continue to arrive in theater until U.S. Forces redeploy. Many units have developed "New Soldier" training programs designed to rapidly bring the new soldier "up to speed" on the current situation. These units rely on their veterans to conduct the majority of this training. One squadron implemented a "New Soldier" training program. Within 24 hours of arrival, the squadron conducted the following training: a welcome briefing, the locations of subordinate units, the squadron's mission, the squadron's task organization, the squadron's chain of command, and the soldier's troop assignment. Within 24 hours of being assigned to a troop, the squadron conducted the following training: the location of the soldiers' assigned unit in relation to other units, an updated ROE briefing, a lessons briefing, a current Division, Brigade, and Squadron policies briefing, a General Order No. 1 briefing, a mine awareness update, a troop mission briefing, a troop task organization briefing, an issue and account for ammunition, a TA-50 shakedown, and a PMCS verification. During inprocessing, the troop also offered a "tick shot" to the new soldier and assigned him to a platoon. Upon arrival at the platoon, the soldier participated in squad drills and would "right-seat" with a seasoned soldier learning and sustaining individual and crew skills to support the daily mission.

DISCUSSION: The International Police Task Force (IPTF) was given a list of the United Nation's vehicles stolen during the war in Bosnia. With this information, IPTF officers patrolling in Orasje identified one of the stolen vehicles parked at a bar. The vehicle had FWF license plates and was painted camouflage. The vehicle was equipped with the same radio system that is currently being used by the IPTF. On the same day, a mini-van suspected of being stolen was also identified. This vehicle had been repainted and was labeled as an ambulance for the Brcko canton. The emergency medical crew using the vehicle did not respond to questioning when approached. Again, the vehicle was equipped with the same radio system used by the IPTF.

TTP!!! The fact that some of the stolen vehicles were equipped with similar radio systems as the IPTF may indicate that various factions have the capability to monitor IPTF radio transmissions. This may adversely affect the IPTF's ability to perform their mission and could be an OPSEC risk to TFE units working with the IPTF.

It is likely that stolen vehicles will be repainted and the license plates replaced. One way to identify a vehicle is to check the vehicle identification number (VIN). VINs could be provided to checkpoints to assist in identification of stolen vehicles. If the VIN was removed, it may be an indication that the vehicle is stolen. The most common location of the VIN is on a steel plate located where the dashboard and the windshield meet. It is usually located on the driver's side of the car. The easiest way to view this VIN plate from the outside of the vehicle is to look through the windshield at the base of the dashboard where it meets the windshield.

Soldiers operating checkpoints should be suspicious if they find a vehicle that has a unique radio system (similar to those of the IPTF or IFOR). This also indicates that the vehicle may be stolen. The IPTF believes that Brown and Root utility vehicles are particularly at risk for theft.

Stolen vehicles with UN markings present an even greater danger. These vehicles could possibly be used to gain access to TFE bases. The potential to use these vehicles as a transporter of some type of car bomb exists. TFE base guards should consider comparing stolen VINs to UN vehicles that enter any TFE base.

DISCUSSION: A TFE unit reported an unruly crowd of approximately 100 FWF personnel on the Modrica Bridge. Some of the individuals were spitting, throwing small rocks and blocking the road. The unit coordinated with the IPTF and the Modrica police chief. An adjacent unit discussed the situation with the Gradacac IPTF who stated that they would also coordinate with the Modrica police. The unit, in turn, coordinated directly with the Modrica police.

The crowd eventually dispersed about an hour later. The Modrica police chief stated that the spitting and rock throwing was not directed at the IFOR. He said the crowd was composed of young males who were being inducted into the army. The crowd got drunk and out of control. He stated that these incidents occur whenever the army has a recruiting drive.

TTP!!! When factions have recruiting drives for military inductions, TFE units may expect an increase in unruly behavior. This could result in a civil disturbance. "When and where will recruiting drives occur?" may be an Information Requirement (IR) for TFE units.

The unit ensured redundancy of coordination. Not only did they request that the IPTF coordinate with the Modrica police, the unit also coordinated directly with the Modrica police. This may seem as a waste of effort - - but it is not. Redundancy is often paramount to successful command and control.

As TFE internalized, ". . . maintaining law and order remains the responsibility of the FWFs parties and local civil authorities." The coordination with the TFE units, the IPTF and civil police was key to quelling the disturbance.

DISCUSSION: There were a growing number of incidents in which FWF families left the Federation, crossed the Zone of Separation, and attempted to rebuild their previous homes. In Mahala, Ministry of the Interior Police armed with pistols and sticks evicted the FWF families. Local radio stations began broadcasting messages encouraging locals to gather outside the IPTF Headquarters in Mahala to protest the action. The unruly mob trapped the IPTF officers inside their headquarters. Within a short time, a convoy of 250 personnel began moving from Zvornic toward Mahala to join the mob. The situation was escalating.

TTP!!! TFE successfully dealt with this and other similar situations using a technique which can be described using the key words: Isolate; Dominate; maintain Common Situational Awareness; and employ Multi-dimensional, Multi-echeloned Actions (IDAM).

Bottom Line: Training + Rehearsal + Situational Awareness = Success

• Leaders can fight fatigue. Ensure drivers get proper rest before each movement. Stop frequently along the route. This provides an opportunity to stretch, relax, and regroup. Take 15-minute breaks every two hours.

• Drivers and convoy commanders are responsible for maintaining proper distances, speeds, and vehicle control. Proper speeds and vehicle distances change based upon weather, obstacles, and road conditions. A good internal communications plan can aid in controlling convoy operations.

• Ensure that each vehicle is prepared for the trip. This includes proper PMCS and rehearsing self-recovery operations should a vehicle break down.

• Train new soldiers on winter driving skills because they have not faced a Bosnia winter before.

OPSEC

DISCUSSION: AR 530-1, Operations Security (OPSEC), 3 Mar 95, defines OPSEC as a command responsibility. The Commander ensures the implementation of an OPSEC program by assigning responsibilities to a specific staff section or individual. However, OPSEC, as with all security issues, rests with each individual. Units and individuals may become complacent regarding OPSEC posture within TFE. This may be due to the current "Peacekeeping" role. However, there is a real threat to all TFE personnel and operations. Everything soldiers do, say, and the actions they take, provide an adversary "bits and pieces" of information. By gathering enough of the pieces, they can develop a good look at the "big picture" of TFE operations.

The TFE goal, through Good OPSEC Procedures, is to keep the adversaries guessing. Denying those "bits" of sensitive information, classified or unclassified, will deny them a look at our operations. Unclassified information may be sensitive (i.e., the loss, misuse or unauthorized access to which could adversely affect the national interest). Enough sensitive information may possibly be classified, if it reveals friendly plans, operations, or vulnerabilities. It is up to all soldiers and civilian employees to practice "Good OPSEC" by using common sense and following sound security practices.

TTP!!!: Here are several good OPSEC practices to follow:

• Never discuss classified or sensitive information in unauthorized areas (i.e., hallways, latrines, dining facility, PX, etc.). There are numerous local national employees working on the installation. Do not assume they cannot speak English.

• Local national translators and interpreters do not have security clearances. They are not authorized access to classified information. Never give sensitive unclassified information to translators or interpreters to photocopy. Again, remember "Need-to-Know."

• Protect all classified material. Mark it properly; transport in sealed or locked containers; provide access only to those who have the proper clearance and a valid need-to-know; use cover sheets when working with classified; and destroy by burning or by shredding in an approved shredder.

• Process classified material only on computers authorized for classified processing. Mark your computer for the level it is authorized to process. Protect your system with a password and do not give your password to anyone else. Mark all diskettes with the highest classification of material they contain. Ensure your screen is not facing the doorway, window or in an area where unauthorized individuals may read it.

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Chapter I: Mines, Booby Traps, Field Expedients, and Mine Clearance
Chapter III: Safety

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