Military

EARLY OCCUPATION

The basic objective of the brigade commander designating the maximum amount of preparation time possible is to get units to occupy their defensive positions as early as possible. Therefore, based on a mission warning order, have elements occupy their defensive positions. Soldiers must have enough time available to properly complete the priorities of work established for the preparation phase. What's important to the commander is the criteria for reporting the defensive preparations complete.

This task is not well defined in doctrine. At a minimum, a unit must complete the following tasks, in order, to complete occupation:

• Establish security and communications
• Reconnoiter the defensive sector or battle position
• Position crew-served weapons
• Assign sectors of fire
• Plan Final Protective Fires (FPFs)
• Establish hasty alternate positions
• Emplace critical obstacles

The reporting of completed occupation should be in the unit SOP.

Commanders and the Battle Staff must use backwards planning to determine the time when units must occupy to have enough time to complete the work priorites during the preparation phase.

PROBLEM: Too many units miss this step. Units get lulled into a false sense of time security by focusing on the defend NLT time. It may appear that plenty of time is available to plan, move and prepare the defense in a logical, sequential manner. In their attempts to adhere to the 1/3 - 2/3 rule, units too often wither away available time, which leaves them with very little time for actual preparation. Concurrently, brigade and battalion staffs begin to pressure company/teams to:

• Receive handover of obstacles
• Identify Class IV/V logistics release points
• Position forces to counter enemy divisional and regimental reconnaissance
• Submit, and then adjust FPF grids
• Backbrief
• Rehearse

These requirements further eat away at the limited time available. Units focus almost entirely on building fighting positions and drawing sector sketches, because that's all they have time for.

RESULTS:

1. Company commanders lose focus.

2. Company- through squad-level Troop-Leading Procedures suffer.

3. Unsatisfactory reconnaissance, force protection and weapon positioning.

4. Failure to integrate obstacles with the company/team scheme of maneuver, as engineer equipment remain idle.

5. Insufficient doctrinal and procedural coordination.

6. Failure to conduct R&S patrolling.

7. Inadequate local security.

8. Failure to protect attached engineer assets.

9. Poor passive air defense.

10. Inadequate camouflage and concealment of protective obstacles.

Techniques: to use in the planning phase to establish work priorities for the preparation phase. See Figure 1, 72-Hour Defense Planning Time Schedule.

(Figure 1, 72-Hour Defense Planning Time Schedule, compares the techniques for a brigade that receives the division OPORD 72 hours prior to theDefend NLT Time.)

1. Option 1, Brigade Commander Estimate. During mission analysis, the commander determines how long he feels it will take his unit, based on training level, terrain, other METT-T factors, to complete defensive preparations at the defend NLT time specified in the warning order and subsequent OPORD.
   EXAMPLE: The commander figures it will take 36 hours to complete defensive preparations. Next, he subtracts 36 hours from the time available to the defend NLT time. Then, the commander uses the 1/3 - 2/3 rule to develop his planning time schedule for the time left until his established occupation time.

2. Option 2, 1/3 Available Time for Preparation. In this instance, the brigade commader allocates 1/3 of the available time (24 hours) for defensive preparation. With the 48 hours remaining, a variant of the 1/3 - 2/3 rule applies.
   EXAMPLE: Referring to Figure 1, you can see that the 16 hours alloted for brigade-level TLP is 1/3 of 48. Subtracting those 16 hours from 48 leaves 32 hours available. Taking 1/3 of 32 leaves 11 hours (rounded) for Bn/TF level TLP. Therefore, Co/Tms will have 7 hours available for TLP because 32 - 11 = 21, and 1/3 of 21 is 7.

   The key to this technique is to take, at each level, 1/3 of the time remaining AFTER subtracting 1/3 of the TOTAL time the brigade commander allocates to defensive preparations.

3. Option 3, 1/5 - 4/5 Rule. In this instance, the brigade commander chooses to use this conventional variant of the normal 1/3 - 2/3 rule.
   EXAMPLE: Referring to Figure 1, you can see that at each level, 1/5 of the time available is used for TLP.

Comparing these three techniques to the normal 1/3 - 2/3 rule found in the left column of Figure 1, it is very clear that the amount of time alloted to defensive preparation is significantly great in each of the techniques. With between 36 to 20 hours of preparation, compared to the < 10 hours remaining with the normal 1/3 - 2/3 it is clear that these time techniques will yield at least double the amount of planning time.

However, there is obviously a cost associated with using these techniques. The disadvantage is the reduced planning time at brigade and battalion levels. This is not necessarily bad news. It may be better to get a hasty plan to subordinates with enough time to get them on the terrain to confirm the plan and refine it as necessary. Reconnaissance and the backbrief/rehearsal process can very effectively result in refinements to a plan that will be effective during mission execution. Moving units early into the planned defensive sector or battle position also provides security for continuous reconnaissance as well.

Additional benefits of using these techniques include the increased time to:

• Coordinate obstacle positioning and handoff
• Emplace tactical obstacles
• Backbrief on the ground
• Class IV/V supply/resupply

PRIORITIES OF WORK

While these planning techniques will result in additional preparation time, the effective use of the addtional time is key to mission success. Early occupation, for example, is not sufficient without a focus.

Technique: Upon receipt of a Warning Order, and following mission analysis, make a tentative plan encompassing the following to establish the Priorities of Work during the preparation phase:

1. Determine avenues of approach.

2. Identify engagement areas.

3. Identify tentative AT weapon positions

4. Identify tentative tactical obstacle positions to support engagement areas.

5. Identify tentative dismounted infantry positions to counter dismounted avenues of approach, likely enemy dismount points, and to overwatch tactical obstacles.

6. Develop a concept for integrating all the Battlefield Operating Systems (BOSs).

Use the results of this tentative planning to establish the priorities of work during the preparation phase.

Once the OPORD is issued at each echelon, the order in which the commander and staff apply this model is greatly dependent on the task and purpose assigned to their unit.

EXAMPLE: Based on the mission analysis and the specified task and purpose, and the assumption that the purpose of the defense is to take initiative away from the attacker, take the following steps-- (Refer to Figure 2, Staff Planning Priority of Work)

• Analyze the enemy avenues of approach and how the enemy will use them.

• Designate engagement areas best suited to task and purpose; i.e., delay, disrupt or destroy the enemy (enemy focus).

• Based on task and purpose, position AT weapons focused on the engagement area.

• Based on task and purpose, position obstacles to fix or disrupt the enemy.

• IF the unit must retain terrain, turn, block or canalize the enemy (terrain focus), position tactical obstacles to block or turn the enemy.

• Position AT weapons to overwatch and protect emplaced obstacles.

• Position infantry to protect AT weapons and obstacles.

• Integrate fire support, intelligence collection, and command and control to support the scheme of maneuver. Focus the combat multipliers against the biggest threat at the decisive point: (enemy focused plan): focus assets to detect, deliver, assess and direct combat power against the mounted forces in the engagement area and protect the killers from the dismounted threat; ( terrain focued plan): focus assets to prevent the breach of obstacles, with emphasis on threat elements that can unhinge the obstacle plan, such as dismounted infantry and engineer equipment. Concurrently, kill enough of the mounted force to convince the enemy to go where we wish.

• Integrate combat service support and air defense plans with the scheme of maneuver.

Figure 2. Staff Planning Priority of Work

TIME SCHEDULE

The last concept for efficient use of time in preparing a defense is to integrate the priority of work into the unit time schedule.

Technique:

The commander must look at the time between occupation and the Defend NLT time and determine two things:

1. The actual priority of task accomplishment
2. The acceptable level of preparation at the Defend NLT time

The actual priority of task accomplishment will vary based on anticipated enemy actions. EXAMPLE: If the enemy's Regimental Artillery Group (RAG) is within range and air parity exists, then overhead cover and MOPP 2 are more important than if the RAG will not be within range for 24 hours, and we have air superiority.

The level of acceptable preparation is based on how the commander visualizes the battle. EXAMPLE: If the commander believes that most of his units will have to occupy alternate or supplementary positions before the enemy culminates, then he may wish to have hasty alternate and supplementary positions. Otherwise, he may simply require reconned routes to designated positions using natural cover only.

Once the commander determines the actual priority and the acceptable level of preparation, then the staff must allocate time to accomplish these critical tasks and establish NLT times within the preparation priority of work for each task.

These times should be established in relation to the enemy's anticipated actions.

RESULT: This allows the staff to track the preparation of the defend and to recommend to the commander when it is necessary to shift assets if a segment of the defense is not prepared in a timely manner.

Refer to Figure 3 as an example using a company/team timeline to achieve this.

Figure 3. Defense Preparation Priority of Work (Based on FM 7-10)

CONCLUSION

The defense is an extremely difficult mission because of the enormous number of tasks that must be done in preparation. Units can quickly lose valuable time during planning because it seems initially that much time is available. Yet time is a nonrecoverable resource. Without maximizing the time available for preparation, and then ruthlessly managing that time, no unit can effectively prepare the defense to achieve their commander's intent. By making the decision upfront to provide the maximum amount of time a METT-T analysis provides, the brigade commander must then ensure that his Battle Staff can effectively use the diminished staff preparation time while his maneuver and support assets build the defense. These time managment techniques should result in levels of preparation that put the unit in the best position to accomplish the mission.

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