THE SPECIAL STAFF
THE FSB ORDERS PROCESS
INTO THE FSB ORDERS PROCESS
by MAJ Mark Olinger, SECOPS, NTC
The NTC rotation is often the final training event of the fiscal year for a Forces Command (FORSCOM) heavy brigade combat team (BCT), and is where the effectiveness of an entire year of Home-Station training drills and field exercises are put to the final test. The brigade's Forward Support Battalion (FSB) is privileged to be included in this "final exam," and the FSB commander now has his opportunity to demonstrate how skillfully his soldiers and staff can accomplish their sustain-and-support mission. HOWEVER,
rotation, the typical
that occurs for the|
Brigade Support Area (BSA), and the typical reaction of the FSB
Commander and staff do not culminate in mission accomplishment.
Training Day (TD) 12, 1530 - FSB XO leads convoy to Division Support Area (DSA) to prepare for regeneration operations in Tactical Assembly Area (TAA) Sioux. Regeneration will not occur for at least another 36 to 48 hours, after receipt of continue-the-mission (CTM) instructions and the brigade completes road march back into TAA Sioux. FSB XO departs without giving instructions to the staff to prepare the road march order. The BSA has occupied its current location for 72 hours and has almost nonexistent survivability positions. While the FSB has an engineer dig matrix, they never requested engineer assets.
TD 12, 1930 - PPG squad-size element executes a mortar attack on the BSA and inflicts approximately 30 casualties. Critical Friendly Zone (CFZ) around the BSA is not in effect, thus artillery counterfire cannot be used in response to the attack. Denial of aviation support request allows PPG to relocate undetected. The BSA has no force to sweep this area of operations to find the PPGs.
TD 13, 0730 - CFZ around the BSA is still not in effect.
TD 13, 0830 - Krasnovian forces launch an artillery attack against U.S. forces located approximately 5-7 kilometers southwest of the BSA. The FSB Commander, S-2/3, and at least one company commander observe the Krasnovian artillery attack but do not submit a SPOT Report. None of the BSA tenants submit SPOT Reports, and the FSB Tactical Operations Center (TOC) does not aggressively pursue information either through the companies or the assets involved with the R&S plan.
TD 13, 0930 - Krasnovian artillery uses nonpersistent chemical munitions vicinity of the brigade main command post. Minutes later, persistent chemical munitions are employed along the FEBA and a high-speed avenue of approach two kilometers west of the BSA. FSB TOC is aware of the attack on the brigade main command post and the indirect fires west of the BSA. BSA remains at mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) Level 2.
TD 13, 0945 - Krasnovians use a nonpersistent chemical munition against the Aviation Task Force assembly area located two kilometers north of the BSA. Supply Company observation post observes and reports attack. BSA remains at MOPP Level 2.
TD 13, 1000 - Krasnovians use nonpersistent chemical munitions against the BSA. FSB suffers an immediate 40 chemical casualties (chemical defense equipment shortfalls previously identified during Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI) not yet fixed). FSB TOC directs entire BSA to assume MOPP Level 4; all units do not comply. The FSB Commander orders unmasking procedures at 1200 without consulting either his S-2/3 or Chemical Staff NCO to determine if the entire BSA had two negative M256 kits.
TD 13, 1330 - CTM instructions are received. FSB is the brigade priority to tactical road march to TAA Sioux to support regeneration operations on TD 14. FSB staff scrambles to prepare road march tables and issues oral movement instructions to the companies and FSB tenants. Late in the afternoon, the BSA begins a tactical road march to TAA Sioux.
TD 13, 2330 - Last BSA element arrives in TAA Sioux. In a period of about 24 hours, the FSB suffers over 70 casualties. At least 40 of the casualties result in the deaths of U.S. soldiers.
What Went Wrong?
the FSB Commander and XO failed to|
ensure integration of the "special staff" into the military
decisionmaking process (MDMP) and orders drill.
staff officers are responsible for acquiring information, analyzing the information
to determine the implications and impact . . . (providing) the commander with
timely and accurate recommendations to assist . . . in making the best decision.
the accomplishment of their responsibilities, coordinating staff officers often
request and receive information and recommendations from special staff officers.
The coordinating staff officers are responsible for ensuring that information
and recommendations received from special staff officers are coordinated with
other coordinating staff officers as required."
1. Too often during the MDMP and the writing of the operations order (OPORD), only the FSB Commander's staff participates, with limited staff supervision by the FSB XO. Table 1 shows two observations, identifying in each which FSB staff officer typically prepares what annex of the OPORD.
|ANNEX||OBSERVATION 1||OBSERVATION 2|
|Task Organization||FSB S-2/3||FSB S-2/3 or SPO|
|Intelligence||FSB S-2/3||FSB S-2/3|
|Operations Overlay||FSB S-2/3||FSB S-2/3|
|Fire Support||FSB XO||FSB S-2/3|
|Air Defense||FSB S-2/3||FSB S-2/3|
SPO or taken from BDE OPORD
|Movements||FSB S-2/3||FSB S-2/3|
|Engineer||FSB XO||FSB S-2/3|
|Military Police||FSB S-2/3||FSB S-2/3|
|Service Support (Internal)||FSB S-1/4||FSB S-1/4|
|Risk Assessment||FSB S-1||FSB S-1|
2. The MTOE authorizes the FSB Commander a coordinating staff that consists of the S-1, S-2/3, S-4, and the Support Operations Officer (SPO).
|NOTE: Throughout the remainder of the discussion, the coordinating staff will be referred to as the "FSB staff."|
3. The specific number and duties of special staff officers vary at each level of command based on MTOE authorizations, the desires of the commander, and the level of the command. In some cases, a special staff officer is a unit commander. For the FSB Commander, special staff officers are authorized on the FSB MTOE and from selected BSA tenant unit commanders.
4. Special staff officers assist the FSB Commander and staff by performing the basic functions of all staff officers. They also:
- Assist FSB staff officers in preparing plans, orders, overlays, and reports.
- Plan and supervise training in their own unit or staff section.
- Provide staff supervision and input to the FSB Commander on the level of training throughout the BSA in their respective areas.
- Consult and coordinate with all other interested staff officers.
5. While the special staff is not an integral part of the FSB staff, there are areas of command interest and habitual association. In these areas of mutual interest, the FSB staff officer is responsible for guidance, direction, and coordination of actions of the special staff.
TECHNIQUES: Table 2 below shows how to integrate the FSB XO, S-2, S-3 and SPO and other special staff officers into the FSB orders process, concentrating only on staff officer functional responsibility for annex development.
Table 2 is the recommended FSB Annex Development, with suggested functional responsibility.
|ANNEX||PREPARED BY||FUNCTIONAL RESP|
|Task Organization||FSB S-2/3||FSB S-2/3|
|Intelligence||FSB S-2/3||FSB S-2/3|
|Operations Overlay||FSB S-2/3||FSB S-2/3|
|Fire Support||BSA FSCOORD (Svc Btry Cdr)||FSB S-2/3|
|NBC||BSA Chem Staff Off (Chem NCO)||FSB S-2/3|
|Air Defense||BSA AD SME (Btry 1SG)||FSB S-2/3|
Army Aviation LO
|Movements||FSB S-2/3||FSB S-2/3|
|Civil Affairs||Civil Affairs Staff Off or FSB S-2/3||FSB S-2/3|
|Engineer||BSA Engr Off (HHC Cdr, Engr Bn)||FSB S-2/3|
|Military Police||Senior BSA MP||FSB S-2/3|
|Service Support (Internal)||FSB S-1/4||FSB S-1/4|
|Risk Assessment||FSB S-1||FSB S-1|
1. At the end of the orders process, a recommended finished product for an FSB should consist of a five-paragraph operations order with overlay annexes and matrices for those annexes that require them (e.g., CSS execution, fire support, and engineers). To successfully sustain a BCT does not require all of the annexes to be written. Too many times, commanders and staff officers are focusing on the process associated with the written annex and ignoring the overlay associated with it.
2. The FSB XO directs, supervises, and ensures coordination of the work of the staff, except in those specific areas reserved by the commander, thereby freeing the commander from routine details. Specifically, the FSB XO should be responsible for:
a. Formulating and announcing staff operating policies with timelines. Timelines should address both time constrained and unconstrained for MDMP. The MDMP process is the same for both, but the time spent and level of detail will differ given time available.
b. Ensuring that the FSB Commander and staff remain informed on matters affecting the unit and BSA.
c. Maintaining the master policy file and monitoring the Tactical Standing Operating Procedures (TACSOP) .
d. Exercising direct supervision of the FSB TOC and its operations.
e. Requiring that all FSB and special staff officers, unless instructed otherwise by the FSB Commander, inform him of any recommendations or information that they give directly to the commander or any instructions they receive directly from the commander.
f. Ensuring the commander's decisions, concepts, and intent are implemented, by directing the staff and assigning specific responsibilities when necessary to prepare and issue plans, orders, and other staff actions.
g. Reviewing staff actions to ensure that they are adequate, coordinated, and designed to produce the commander's intended results.
h. Approving actions if authorized; otherwise obtaining the commander's approval.
i. Ensuring that subordinate unit commanders and BSA tenants remain informed of decisions or actions that will affect their units.
3. The BSA FSCOORD. The Service Battery Commander, direct-support field artillery battalion, should be designated the BSA Fire Support Coordinator (FSCOORD). This battery commander resides in the BSA as a tenant and is the BSA's subject matter expert (SME) on fire support. The FSB S-2/3 would have functional responsibility of the Fire Support Annex and the Service Battery Commander would actually prepare the annex. The BSA FSCOORD is responsible for:
a. Assisting in the preparation of operational plans, overlays, and orders by providing information about fire support organizations and operations to include fire support coordination measures, priorities and OPFOR artillery doctrine.
b. Supervising the preparation of the fire support annex and supporting appendices.
c. Providing information on the status of field artillery (FA) fire support means.
d. Submitting to the FSB S-2/3 information and intelligence derived from FA operations.
e. Planning and coordinating engagement of surface targets, target acquisition, counterfire operations, and deception operations by fire support means to defend the BSA. This includes confirming twice daily with the Brigade Fire Support Officer that the CFZ around the BSA is activated in the Q-36 or Q37 target acquisition radar's TACFIRE. Another technique is to activate the CFZ when the Decision Support Template (DST) indicates prudent use.
f. Monitoring the maintenance and supply status of his battalion and advising the FSB SPO on potential problem areas.
g. Supervising the fire support training program for the BSA ICW the FSB S-2/3.
4. BSA Chemical Staff Officer. The Chemical NCO (54B40) authorized by MTOE in the S-2/3 Section would perform the duties of the Chemical Staff Officer. The FSB S-2/3 would have functional responsibility of the Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Annex. The Chemical Staff Officer would actually prepare the annex. The BSA Chemical Staff Officer is the SME on NBC operations and is responsible for:
a. Advising the FSB Commander and staff on matters concerning offensive and defensive chemical operations.
b. Preparing the NBC Annex of plans, orders and overlays.
c. Preparing NBC estimates and SOPs for defense against NBC attacks.
d. Planning and supervising, as a minimum, the following:
(1) Receipt, collation, evaluation, preparation, and distribution of NBC reports.
(2) NBC strike reports and assessment of effects for all enemy strikes and friendly nuclear and chemical strikes, as required in coordination with the BSA FSCOORD.
(3) Collection of NBC contamination information in conjunction with higher, lower, and adjacent units.
(4) Collation, evaluation, and distribution of NBC contamination data.
(5) Maintenance of the NBC situation overlay.
e. Advising on the following:
(1) Impact of NBC contamination on logistic operations.
(2) NBC intelligence matters.
(3) Implementation of mission-oriented protective posture.
(4) Adequacy and implementation of NBC countermeasures.
(5) Acquisition, storage, issue, and movement of chemical equipment and supplies, to include MOPP materiel resupply rates and distribution schedules.
(6) The vulnerability of the BSA to enemy employment of NBC weapons.
f. Exercising staff supervision over NBC training program throughout the BSA in coordination with the FSB S-2/3.
5. BSA Air Defense SME. The brigade combat team's supporting Air Defense battery trains reside in the BSA under the control of the battery first sergeant (1SG). The battery 1SG is the BSA SME on air defense and should be responsible for developing the Air Defense annex. Functional responsibility would reside with the FSB S-2/3. Minimum responsibilities should be:
a. Preparing the ADA annex of plans, overlays, and orders.
b. Advising the FSB Commander and staff on all matters about the employment of ADA assets.
c. Coordinating with the FSB S-2/3 the integration of ADA operations into the overall BSA Reconnaissance and Security (R&S) Plan.
d. Submitting to the FSB S-2/3 information and intelligence derived from ADA operations.
e. Monitoring the maintenance and supply status of his battery and advising the FSB SPO on potential problem areas.
f. Supervising the ADA support training program for the BSA ICW the FSB S-2/3.
6. Aviation LO. Typically, an Army Aviation annex is not included in an FSB OPORD, except for the use of Corps Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) helicopters in the Service Support (External) Annex prepared by the FSB SPO. The use of Army Aviation has never been as critical in sustaining combat forces as it is on today's battlefield. CH-47D Chinooks and UH-60A Blackhawks are used for transporting
- major assemblies
- critical repair parts in MILVAN containers or CONEXes
- support of a mass casualty evacuation
- rations, in some cases using echelon above division assets using throughput as far forward as UMCPs and CTCPs.
In very limited cases, FSBs sometimes have an aviation liaison officer (LO). In any case, the FSB SPO is functionally responsible for the Army Aviation Annex, working in coordination with the brigade S-3 Air and aviation LO. This is because of the critical impact that Army aviation has on Combat Service Support (CSS). It is recommended that the FSBs receive an aviation LO from the supporting aviation task force. If the aviation LO is obtained during the trainup for an NTC rotation and then retained for the rotation, he will be fully integrated into the SPO Section, and a key asset for successful and high utilization of Army aviation. The Army aviation LO should be responsible for:
a. Assisting the staff in preparing aviation portions of estimates, plans, orders, reports and overlays.
b. Exercising staff supervision over technical and tactical aspects of Army aviation operations in support of the FSB's CSS mission.
c. Coordinating with transportation and movements' staff personnel when Army aircraft is required for CSS operations and other administrative flight operations.
d. Monitoring the flying-hour program and providing information and recommendations to the FSB SPO.
e. Assisting in the planning and supervising of the following Army aviation operations:
(1) Employment of aviation in combat service support operations.
(2) Assisting the brigade S-3 Air in planning and coordinating the use of airspace.
7. Civil Affairs Staff Officer. With the Army's increased involvement in Stability and Support Operation (SASO), the importance of Civil Affairs has increased. Operations, such as JUST CAUSE, DESERT STORM, RESTORE HOPE, RESTORE DEMOCRACY, and JOINT ENDEAVOR, had significant requirements involving the use of Civil Affairs doctrine. For the FSB Commander and staff, the most significant Civil Affairs issue the BSA has to contend with is Civilians on the Battlefield (COBs). If the brigade combat team does not receive a civil affairs support team from either the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, Ft. Bragg, NC, or the Army Reserve, then the FSB Commander needs to designate his S-2/3 to be responsible for developing the Civil Affairs Annex. Another technique a FSB Commander can use is to appoint a senior first lieutenant to be the battalion S-5. This has been done very successfully by selected light infantry battalion commanders for JRTC rotations in the last few years. The Civil Affairs Staff Officer is responsible for:
a. Preparing the Civil Affairs Annex for plans, orders, and overlays focusing on Civil Affairs activities and civil-military cooperation.
b. Providing technical advice and assistance to all categories of dislocated civilians (displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees).
c. Coordinating OPSEC countermeasures and military intelligence aspects of Civil Affairs activities with the brigade S-2.
d. Exercising staff supervision over Civil Affairs units that are assigned, attached, or under operational control of the BSA.
e. Recommending command policy and guidance concerning obligations between civil and military authorities.
f. Recommending policy concerning the population of the area of operations, with regard to customs, treaties, agreements, conventions, international law, and U.S. policy.
g. Coordinating civil support for CSS operations to prevent civilian interference with military operations.
8. BSA Engineer Officer. The engineer battalion's Headquarters and Headquarters Company Commander should be designated as the BSA Engineer Officer. This company commander resides in the BSA as a tenant and is the BSA's SME on engineer operations. Typically this Engineer Captain is on a second company command tour having previously commanded a line company in the engineer battalion. The FSB S-2/3 would have functional responsibility of the Engineer Annex, and the Engineer Headquarters Company Commander would actually prepare the annex. The BSA Engineer Officer is responsible for:
a. Preparing the Engineer Annex of plans, orders, and overlays to include obstacle plan and denial plan.
b. Determining the requirements for engineer support at all levels; recommending to the FSB Commander the allocation of engineer resources; recommending the support relationship between FSB units and BSA tenants; and exercising staff supervision over engineer operations.
c. Planning and supervising engineer functional activities of:
(1) Mobility: Build/improve traffic patterns in the BSA, expedient construction and/or emergency repair of roads, trails, bridges, and aircraft ground sites (landing zones, drop zones, airstrips, and rearm-refuel points).
(2) Countermobility: Obstacle construction, mine operations, and employment of demolitions that degrades the enemy's freedom of movement in and around the BSA.
(3) Survivability: Construction of fighting positions for vehicles, crew-served weapons systems, and individuals; construction of protective positions (berms or dug-in positions) for tactical sites such as command posts, aid stations, or logistics assets (e.g., 5,000-gallon tankers or Class IX vans). Use of fighting positions enhance the BSA's force protection and ability to continue operations when subjected to a high volume of direct and indirect fire.
|ON THE USE OF BERMS: A trend that is being observed is the use of berms when constructing survivability positions for critical assets in the BSA. Most have been ineffective because the task, purpose, and endstate for the berm has not been clearly communicated to the engineer unit executing the mission. When constructing berms, the BSA Engineer Staff Officer should be consulted during the planning process. Too often the completed berm aids the PPG and not the defender. Doctrinal references are: FM 5-100, Engineer Operations; FM 5-101, Mobility; FM 5-102, Countermobility; and FM 5-434, Earthmoving Operations.|
9. Senior MP. The Military Police (MP) Annex is prepared by the senior MP in support of the BSA. Typically, this will be a sergeant (MOS 95B20) to first lieutenant. Size of the force ranges from section to platoon level based on the allocation of MP assets by the brigade. The recommended force is platoon size for the BSA. The FSB S-2/3 has functional responsibility for this annex. The senior MP is responsible for:
a. Serving as the staff advisor on MP operations in support of the CSS mission and force protection.
b. Preparing the MP annex to plans, orders, and overlays.
c. Determining requirements for MP forces, based on the commander's priorities and in coordination with other staff elements and subordinate commanders in the BSA.
d. Planning and supervising the following:
(1) Battlefield Circulation Control (BCC) operations taken to expedite the movement of personnel and vehicles to support the commander's tactical plans. BCC operations include route reconnaissance and surveillance; main supply route (MSR) regulation enforcement; refugee and straggler control; and information dissemination.
(2) Area security operations taken to protect personnel, materiel, and facilities from enemy rear area attacks. Area security operations include area reconnaissance; intelligence collection and reporting; security of designated personnel, units, convoys, and MSR critical points (e.g., First Destination Reporting Points); NBC surveillance and monitoring; and area damage control.
(3) Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) operations taken to ensure the humane treatment, accountability, and evacuation of EPWs and dislocated civilians.
10. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). EOD operations just happen and are very rarely addressed in either the brigade or the FSB Service Support Annexes. With the proliferation of minefields (marked and unmarked) and unexploded ordnance (UXO) on today's battlefield, the importance of EOD is ever increasing. EOD support may come from other services, allied countries, or host nation, and the command relationship will either be operational control (OPCON) or attached. While not an annex to the FSB OPORD, EOD should be an appendix to the Service Support (External) Annex, prepared by the FSB SPO. As a minimum, the following should be addressed:
a. Supporting EOD Detachment or team with current location.
b. Published EOD incident reporting system with procedures.
c. Technical intelligence reporting procedures as prescribed by AR 75-15.
1. Once an FSB Commander decides to implement these recommendations, the road to meeting and maintaining the standard is difficult. Among the challenges voiced by FSB Commanders for Special Staff integration, all of which impact on the FSB's ability to achieve a fully integrated orders process, are:
a. Personnel turnover rates at 10-15 percent per month in some units.
b. Critical MOS shortfalls BSA-wide.
c. Limited training dollars to conduct FTXs and fullup trainups.
2. Integrating the FSB Staff and Special Staff is obtainable by requiring complete participation in all brigade orders drills. Experience has shown that most units only require the FSB Commander and SPO to participate. If the brigade commander requires a backbrief from the battalion commanders as part of the orders drill, then this is a great low-cost training opportunity to train both the primary and secondary teams. In this situation, the various staffs involved will need to focus on more than just the garrison mission for a limited time period.
3. Orders drills, simulations, CPXs, FTXs, NTC rotations are our training opportunities to transition and prepare for war. As an Army, we must get away from the mentality that if we provide good support, then we have achieved mission success. When FSB Commanders, XOs, and SPOs achieve full FSB staff and special staff integration, they are extremely pleased with the results obtained, the increased situational awareness experienced, and the knowledge of what RIGHT looks like.
WHAT RIGHT LOOKS LIKE:
TD 12, 1530 - FSB Commander sends an LO team led by the Ground Support Platoon Leader to begin preparation for the movement of the brigade to TAA Sioux. FSB XO focuses the FSB staff and special staff on the Movement plan to return the BSA to TAA Sioux. BSA has occupied current location for 72 hours and survivability positions were completed 60 hours before. MPs have been extremely successful with BCC and area security operations.
TD 12, 1930 - PPG squad-size element executes a mortar attack on the BSA and inflicts approximately 15 casualties. Use of survivability positions is credited for low number of casualties. CFZ around the BSA is active, and counterfires are able to respond to the attack. Followup aviation support denies the PPG the ability to successfully relocate, and they are eventually captured by the MPs.
TD 13, 0100 - Movement contingency plan (CONPLAN) Burma Road is delivered to FSB Company commanders and BSA tenants. Subordinate leaders are able to conduct troop-leading procedures.
TD 13, 0730 - CFZ around the BSA is still active.
TD 13, 0830 - Krasnovian forces launch an artillery attack against U.S. forces located approximately 5-7 kilometers southwest of the BSA. The FSB Commander, S-2/3, and at least one company commander observe the Krasnovian artillery attack and submit SPOT Reports. BSA tenants submit SPOT Reports and the FSB Tactical Operations Center (TOC) sends MPs to determine what effects the attack had on that area.
TD 13, 0930 - Krasnovian artillery uses nonpersistent chemical munitions vicinity of the brigade main command post. Minutes later, persistent chemical munitions are employed along the FEBA and a high-speed avenue of approach 2 kilometers west of the BSA. FSB TOC is aware of all three attacks in the brigade area and directs the MPs to conduct NBC surveillance and monitoring. Based on persistent chemical within 2 kilometers of the BSA and the wind direction blowing northeast, the BSA assumes MOPP Level 4.
TD 13, 0945 - Krasnovians use a nonpersistent chemical munition against the Aviation Task Force assembly area located 2 kilometers north of the BSA. Supply Company Observation Post observe and report the attack. BSA remains at MOPP Level 4.
TD 13, 1000 - Krasnovians use nonpersistent chemical munitions against the BSA. Chemical defense equipment shortfalls identified during RSOI were eliminated by cross-leveling within the FSB and BSA. FSB TOC reminds entire BSA to remain at MOPP Level 4; all units comply and execute M256 kits. At approximately 1130, the FSB Commander orders unmasking procedures after consulting with his Chemical Staff Officer to determine if each unit in the entire BSA had two negative M256 kits.
TD 13, 1330 - CTM instructions received. FSB is the brigade priority to tactical road march back to TAA Sioux to support regeneration operations on TD 14. FSB Commander directs BSA to execute the CONPLAN Burma Road.
TD 13, 2030 - Last BSA element arrives in TAA Sioux.
What Went Right?
1. Endstate in this scenario was minimal casualties to the FSB and BSA tenants.
2. Integration of the special staff allowed the FSB Commander to have survivability positions dug to standard within the first six hours of occupation.
3. MPs were utilized to conduct BCC and rear area security with aviation support that assisted in the capture of PPGs.
4. Establishment of a CFZ around the entire BSA was active based on an identified threat.
5. Aggressive battle-tracking combined with the situational awareness by the OPs identified the chemical strikes preventing chemical casualties in the BSA.
6. At receipt of CTM instructions, the FSB and FSB tenants had a plan that had been rehearsed to return to TAA Sioux.
The application of superior combat power at the decisive time and place determines the outcome of the battle. The FSB Commander uses his CSS assets to enhance the abilities of the maneuver task forces and to weight the main effort within the BCT. The effects the FSB has in support of the maneuver plan are increased by integrating the special staff into the orders process from the beginning of the planning process or course-of-action development. This prevents FSB assets from becoming additives attached to a completed plan and insures that the BSA has an integrated plan. Final endstate allows the FSB to serve as true combat multipliers for the BCT.
- Hodge, George E., Major, "The Aviation LNO - What You Should Expect," Armor Magazine, May-June 1993.
- Holder, L.D., Colonel, "Concept of Operation," Military Review, August 1990.
- U.S. Army, Field Manual 5-100, Engineer Operations, February 1996.
- U.S. Army, Field Manual 5-101, Mobility, January 1985.
- U.S. Army, Field Manual 5-102, Countermobility, March 1985.
- U.S. Army, Field Manual 5-434, Earthmoving Operations, September 1992.
- U.S. Army, Field Manual 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, December 1985.
- U.S. Army, Field Manual 63-20, Forward Support Battalion.
- U.S. Army, Field Manual 71-3, The Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade, January 1996.
- U.S. Army, Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, May 1984.
Troop-Leading Procedures: Building the BSA Defense
Company Casualty Evacuation: Planning for Success
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