Section IV. THE CURRENT "LEGISLATIVE" MODEL FOR APPLYING ROE: ROE TRAINING

SECTION IV

THE CURRENT "LEGISLATIVE" MODEL FOR
APPLYING ROE1

The challenge for commanders really just begins with the formulation of ROE. In fact, it ignites the requirement to transfer the rules to soldier performance. There are several misgivings about our current methodology of applying ROE, as discussed below.

1. Controlling Conduct. "The underlying problem of our present method of imparting ROE to ground troops is that it relies on a "legislative" model of controlling conduct [of soldiers and small unit leaders] . . . the sensible inclination is to control conduct by creating rules . . . issuing orders, or announcing policy, writing a law . . . [However] [t]he mere making of a rule does not change behavior . . . [In this legislative approach, adherence to ROE] must come from . . . willful obedience to rules or enforcement of the rules."2Published ROE, including ROE cards, are instructions; they do not, in and of themselves, constitute training to a predetermined standard.

2. Interpretation. The legislative approach of imparting ROE to soldiers ". . . assumes that members will consult and can assimilate the rules prior to acting . . . that members will be able to decide which rules take precedence on the frequent occasions when many rules apply to a situation."3In fact, we should not expect ". . . that the soldier under stress can consult, interpret, and deconflict a body of rules and orders that leaders stack on him . . ."4 at the outset of an unfolding contingency operation. Invariably, ROE training for recent peace operations has been an added, exceptional training requirement for soldiers who have previously been trained for their unit's wartime mission.

3. Enforcement. "Under the legislative model, violations of ROE too readily take on the appearance of criminal violations . . . [T]his factor . . . frustrates the goal of fielding a ground force infused with initiative as well as restraint."5 "Most disturbing, however, is that the enforcement features of the legislative model . . . turn military doctrine and precepts into legal ones . . . Given the shortcomings of the legislative approach to controlling behavior, and given the constraints on a soldier's decision processes under stress, military rather than legal principles should dictate the ground component's doctrine and training. . . ."6 These circumstances do not go unnoticed by soldiers; hence, the legislative approach tears at the fabric of soldier confidence and unit cohesion -- so essential to a healthy command climate.

4. Doctrine and Training. Current ROE doctrine for peace operations reinforces the legislative model. While it does present "a persuasive image of soldiers internalizing rules through rehearsals and scenario-driven training . . . it glosses over the commander's challenge to identify the pertinent ROE far enough in advance to train on them . . ."7to a pre-determined standard. Chapter 13, FM 100-5, Operations, states, in part: "The actions of soldiers and units are framed by the disciplined application of force, including specific ROE. In operations other than war, these ROE will be more restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political concerns than in war. Moreover, these rules may change frequently."8

Army doctrine also ". . . makes no reference to the [SROE] . . . the terms "hostile act" and "hostile intent," or to the necessity and proportionality rules . . . No manual or circular acknowledges the 10 distinct functional types of rules . . . or establishes . . . a format by which operations orders might disseminate them in a comprehensible fashion . . . Furthermore, the entire doctrinal apparatus, built as it is on the conventionally sharp distinction between peace and war, reaffirms the view that contingency operations require "tailored" ROE, that conventional operations require "wartime" ROE, and that the two demand entirely separate drafting exercises."9This is unfortunate.

For troops already deployed, it may not be feasible to stand down the force to train to the new changes -- even though each change warrants revision of training and retraining of soldiers. Thus, changes to ROE are likely to be "legislated" periodically -- the expedient way to convey new standards to a force already committed to a contingency. This would not be necessary if soldiers had a body of core, baseline ROE on which they have habitually trained to a predetermined standard, and that are applicable to both combat and peace operations.

5. Soldier's Load -- The Cognitive Side. "Soldiers urgently need effective training on a baseline scheme of ROE because of the harsh contingency environments in which they must assess-decide-act on whether, how, when, and where to use force."10Soldiers often perceive an unfamiliar contingency environment as one in which the members of the indigenous society have riled against any obedience to customary civil law. This ". . . tends to heighten soldiers' fear, their sense of being alone, and the stress of being confronted by a potentially dangerous foe."11It is a significant load on soldiers' mental faculties and their decisionmaking processes. Equipping soldiers with the capacity to apply ROE prudently requires experiential training, not just instruction on the legal impact of the laws of war on their actions.

Unfortunately, "[u]nder the present approach, rules of engagement for operations short of war are things to be 'briefed, not trained.'"12 Such a legislative approach to imparting ROE to soldier decisions and actions must be discarded in favor of a methodology that makes soldier responses to confrontations second nature -- assimilated through experiential training. Commanders should bear in mind that the written ROE, including the boilerplate of self defense, are not, by themselves, sufficient instruments to balance soldier initiative and restraint in contingency operations. The challenge is to structure the rules ". . . so that ordinary soldiers might assimilate the most important ones for their purposes and later -- in a crisis -- retrieve them from memory."13 To be applied properly and effectively, ROE must be internalized in advance by the soldier through ROE-focused training so that the soldier's reaction to a crisis is based on individual experience and judgment.

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NOTES

1Major Mark S. Martins, "Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training, Not Lawyering," Military Law Review, Volume 143 (Winter 1994), pp. 55-70.

2Ibid., pp. 55-56.

3Ibid., p. 58.

4Ibid., p. 85.

5Ibid., p. 60.

6Ibid., p. 68.

7Ibid., p. 69.

8Ibid., p. 69.

9Ibid., p. 70.

10Ibid., p. 71.

11Ibid., p. 71.

12Ibid., p. 72.

13Ibid., p. 78.