Battalion S-2s: Back to the Basics
by CPT Norman H. Fuss III, Commander, C Detachment, 203d MI Bn, NTC". . . provide enough information about the enemy disposition to allow their commanders to make correct and timely decisions . . . ." This is the bottom line for maneuver battalion S-2s.
As equipment and emerging technology grow increasingly sophisticated, the battalion S-2 will, and should, have access to, and the support of, higher intelligence channels and products.
PROBLEM: Higher level intelligence is not always responsive enough or accurate enough to support battalion or lower level operations.
RESULT: Maneuver battalion S-2s must be able to meet all intelligence requirements with the assets on hand, and nothing else.
EXAMPLE: At the NTC, practically all OPFOR intelligence comes from scouts - not from higher, Electronic Warfare platforms, or secondary imagery dissemination systems. The picture the Chief of Reconnaissance puts together comes from spot reports, a map and an alcohol pen. The most basic, low tech approach.
At battalion/task-force level, S-2s must develop their skills in employing those intelligence assets immediately available. This means back to the basics. This means being able to successfully employ the battalion scout platoon.
The Bn/TF scout platoon is the most accessible intelligence collection assets available to the S-2, regardless of who exercises direct command and control.
1. Scouts are reconnaissance assets. These guys are lookers, not killers. When a scout dies, the commander loses another set of eyes and ears - a valuable source of information. Train the scouts to not get into a killing role during counter-reconnaissance. The trade-off is not worth it.
2. The scout platoon leader must be a subject matter expert on how best to employ his platoon. He must be involved in Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R& and counter-reconnaissance planning. He should know best the strengths and weaknesses of his platoon and his equipment. Take the time to send him to the Scout Platoon Leader Course (SPLC). Conduct sufficient Home-Station training for the scouts to exercise their individual and collective skills. These skills are perishable.
3. The battalion S-2 should control and task the scout platoon. Certainly some units will have the S-3 controlling the scouts for the commander. Either way, the S-2 and the S-3 have to work very closely to link IPB products into the Tactical Decision Making Process. Ideally the S-2 is also an SPLC graduate. This way the S-2 will learn first hand the capabilities and limitations of his only taskable intelligence-gathering asset. The S-2 should train with the scouts as often as possible at Home Station.
4.
Plan reconnaissance throughout the sector or zone:
- Use the commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) to set priorities for scout employment. EXAMPLE: Plan to have battalion eyes cover critical Named Areas of Interest (NAI) that answer the Bn/TF commander's PIR. Don't rely on higher to do this for you.
- Plan for redundant coverage of critical areas, such as Decision Points (DPs).
- Plan for the repositioning of reconnaissance assets as losses are taken.
- It may be necessary to send individual vehicles, rather than sections, to get coverage of OP locations.
- Man dismounted OPs at least a few hundred meters from the vehicle. A vehicle is much easier to find and kill than one or two scouts with a PRC-77 or PRC 126.
- Plan for and use a Radio Retransmission System (RETRANS).
- Include the signal officer in the R& planning process.
PROBLEM: Far too much information is given in the clear over BLUFOR scout nets, and captured by the OPFOR.
Technique: Practice communication in the red; use good codewords. You never know when your VINSON will fail, or when you must talk single channel with SINCGARS.
These Basic Rules of Employment for the scout platoon apply regardless of the mission. Next, look at scout employment for specific missions: movement to contact, defense, and offense (deliberate attack).
A movement to contact is a flexible, though not unpredictable, battle. The S-2 must determine avenues of approach within the zone. Next, he must template defensible terrain suitable for forces to stop and set up a hasty defense, while awaiting the still moving enemy.
The commander must have a plan to counter any enemy course of action within the zone. The R& plan must provide coverage throughout the zone to allow the commander to prepare for any option the enemy may execute.
Success in a movement to contact comes to the element that is able to find the enemy, halt in defensible terrain and bring effective direct and indirect fires on that enemy before the enemy can assume defensible positions.
The Bn/TF scouts can play a key role in giving the unit the edge in gaining and maintaining the initiative in a movement to contact. The idea is to make contact where we want it, not where the enemy wants it.
Keys
to successful movement to contact reconnaissance:
1. Speed: the sooner the scouts are out, the less likely they will be caught while moving by enemy scouts or counter-reconnaissance teams.
2. Depth: push reconnaissance assets to and beyond the objective area, OR until they find the enemy laager site or assembly area. IF, the laager is found early enough, certain friendly courses of action may be invalidated. This may cause a refocus of subsequent reconnaissance efforts. That may necessitate a redistribution of reconnaissance assets within the zone. Devise an R& plan flexible enough to be adjusted based on what early reconnaissance efforts reveal.
3. Remind dismounted OPs they may have to quickly remount if they have to shadow an enemy element within the zone.
4. The scouts must know the scheme of maneuver. They can help predict where the battle will take place, and suggest options to the commander. They can also vector in friendly forces to an exposed enemy flank, or weak spot.
5. Ensure the S-2 knows the scheme of maneuver, particularly triggers for key actions. EXAMPLE: at a DP where the enemy can go either north or south, an enemy decision to go north triggers a set friendly reaction, while an enemy decision to go south triggers a different friendly reaction. Obviously, this North/South NAI and DP is key. This information would focus the S-2's priorities for employing reconnaissance assets to make sure the DP was observed.
6. The scouts must know the indirect fire plan, particularly targets within each section's portion of the zone of action. The scouts must also know the priority of fires, and what events trigger a change in priorities. The scouts must be able to communicate with other assets involved with the deep battle, i.e., Army aviation, TAC air, the battalion FSO, and also any Long Range Surveillance Detachments (LRSDs) in zone. Any of these other assets could also initiate a call for indirect fire within the zone.
7. The scouts must know the plans to employ friendly FASCAM, CAS, etc., to reduce the risk of fratricide.
8. IF the scout platoon is at a level of training where they can report by element rather than by number of vehicles, THEN have them report that way. EXAMPLE: when facing a Motorized Rifle Battalion, track by Motorized Rifle Companies (MRC), rather than the doctrinal 10 tanks and 31 BMPs. Tracking by MRC makes the plotting of spot reports easier and takes up less time on already crowded command nets. The assumption in this reporting technique is that the scouts are proficient enough to do the first analytical step, i.e., This number/type of vehicles equals this type/size unit, etc.
9. Most importantly, the S-2 must be able to communicate with the scouts throughout the depth of the battlefield.
Table
of Contents
Fast
and Accurate Fires in the Close Fight
Battalion
S-2s: Back to the Basics, Part 2
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