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Keeping Our Eye on the Target:
Successfully Linking IPB with Maneuver

by LTC Mike Flynn, Senior Intelligence O/C, Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC)
At brigade and battalion/task force level, several problems related to the successful linkage between Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) products and maneuver consistently arise at the Combat Training Centers. Problem areas:
  • Reconnaissance and Surveillance
  • Intelligence Support to Targeting
  • Battle Tracking
  • Information Management
  • MI asset integration with maneuver
This article gives some techniques and/or procedures which can be implemented at Home Station during training exercises to help eliminate the problems before the unit deploys.

WHO'S RESPONSIBLE?

While there is obviously a greater understanding about IPB among maneuver commanders and leaders, many still believe that the IPB process is solely an intelligence officer function. In those units where the link between IPB products and maneuver planning is successful, the process could really be called Commander's Preparation of the Battlefield. These unit staffs successfully integrate not only intelligence, but the other Battlefield Operating Systems (BOSs) as well. The Battle Staffs function as a team, rather than "stovepiped" sections planning in isolation. The result: OPORDs with schemes of maneuver reflecting far greater synchronization of all assets working toward mission accomplishment.

Technique: Brigade and battalion Battle Staffs must train at Home Station to function as a totally integrated unit during the planning process. Practicing the "how to" of staff integration should be an important training objective at Home Station.

RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE

Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R& planning results in a key IPB product. The S-2 determines where, when and what to look for.

PROBLEM: Many units develop a collection plan, rather than an R& plan. The collection plan is not tied to paragraph 3 of the OPORD, or coordinating instructions.

RESULT: R& execution is unsuccessful. S-2s place multiple Named Areas of Interest (NAI) on a map, with no timelines, then identify subordinate units responsible for the NAIs. But, often the "tasked" units don't see the collection plan, and, therefore, don't execute the tasking.

Technique: for R& taskings.

Work with the S-3 to ensure tasks to subordinate units are specified in the OPORD. Incorporate R& taskings into briefbacks to the commander and subsequent rehearsals.

Techniques: to determine the taskings.

1. The S-2 must know the assets available, based on task organization and command relationships.
2. Know the capabilities and limitations of the available assets, and recommend to the S-3 which assets to employ.
3. S-2 tools:
  • intelligence synchronization matrix
  • menu of available assets
  • situation/event template (current)
  • updated Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs)
  • R& Execution Matrix
4. Note: Create fill-in-the-blank forms at Home Station for the synch matrix, asset menu and the R& matrix.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO TARGETING

PROBLEMS:

1. The S-2's role in daily targeting meetings is not clearly understood.
2. Many S-2s come to the meeting unprepared, not being sure what their role is or the expected meeting outcome.

Techniques: for S-2s to prepare for targeting meetings. There are two parts to the preparation:

1. analysis: determine what the enemy is doing, and then determine what the enemy will do.
2. products: resultant from the IPB process. EXAMPLES: terrain analysis, situational template, R& collection plan, etc.; use those relevant to the targeting process.

Apply analysis and the resultant products to your targeting meeting preparation in terms of the targeting process: DECIDE, DETECT, DELIVER, ASSESS.

DECIDE: the S-2 should have done preliminary analysis and arrived at the daily targeting meeting prepared to do the following:

  • brief the current and future enemy situation with an event template.
  • brief battle damage assessment update.
  • brief enemy high value targets (HVTs).
  • update ongoing PIRs.
  • propose PIRs for the next 24 hours.
  • use the Intel Synch Matrix to show asset availability and time available.
  • conduct hasty wargaming, as necessary.
  • begin drafting the R& plan.

DETECT: results, based on quick analysis of information from the DECIDE portion of the meeting:

  • identification of specific intelligence collectors.
  • staff consensus of PIRs to recommend to the commander.
  • identify collection asset redundancy against enemy high payoff targets (HPT).
  • initial R& plan.

DELIVER: results from this portion of the meeting:

  • how the intelligence system will work to track the target from sensor to shooter.
  • the communications structure to decrease the sensor to shooter time.

EXAMPLE:

* REMBASS (the sensor) must be placed along a suspected enemy infiltration route.

* An OH-58D (the shooter) is tasked to cover that route, but can only do so for certain periods of time.

* Decision: where to emplace the REMBASS monitor to decrease the sensor to shooter time?

* Choices:

  • on board a command and control aircraft?
  • at the aviation battalion TOC?
  • at the brigade TOC?
  • at a forward TAC?
  • use multiple monitors at different locations?

These represent typical situational choices. A METT-T analysis during this meeting should result in a REMBASS employment decision. This would then be a task to a subordinate unit that would be part of the OPORD, or a new FRAGO.

NOTE: A necessary byproduct of the meeting should be a complete situational awareness of friendly force locations and activities during the operation. This will help to avoid fratricide incidents.

ASSESS: The same assets available for initial collection should also be used to collect Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) as the mission is executed.

NOTE: When briefing BDA to the commander, provide an assessment of what the raw numbers mean. What does the damage inflicted do to the enemy's ability to fight? What are the implications for subsequent friendly force operations?

BATTLETRACKING

Battletracking standard:

  • information being collected in the time originally intended.
  • information processed through channels procedurally specified.
  • predictive analysis being done, and results disseminated.
  • development of a common picture of the battlefield by brigade and battalion S-2s; dissemination to subordinate elements.
  • received intelligence tied back to the targeting process, i.e., Sensor to shooter.
  • intelligence products refined and updated, i.e., Timelines, pattern analysis, identification of gaps, etc.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

Information management, done properly, results in the common picture referred to above. The Battletracking standards above, to be effective, must be shared by intelligence elements at all levels, and then immediately fed to maneuver and support commanders. The system employed by units for information management directly relates to their TOC operations and the functioning of the respective Battle Staffs. The procedures for information management, and the communications systems to support the information dissemination must be drilled and tested for functionality at every Home Station training opportunity.

PATTERN ANALYSIS

Pattern analysis contributes to predictive analysis. For example, the S2 analyzes enemy actions. Then based on what is known, the S2 can predict subsequent enemy behavior. Examples of activities which produce patterns:

  • enemy minefield emplacement (time, location, reseeding activity, etc.).
  • resupply associated with identified ground infiltration routes (seized caches, reports of enemy sightings, etc.).
  • enemy aerial resupply (entry/exit routes, time of day, etc.).
  • ambushes, i.e., Time of day/night.
  • intelligence collection by civilians suspected of supporting the enemy.

Technique: The activities must be reported and then recorded and/or plotted on a map as appropriate. The S2 must then analyze this information to see if patterns emerge. If patterns do emerge, then predictions of enemy activity can more reliably be made for commanders. This all directly relates to information management within TOCs.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ASSET INTEGRATION

The key to asset integration is the composite understanding of the Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP). The successful application of this process for the planning and preparation of combat operations results in the synchronized application of the BOS to accomplish the mission. This implies the integration of MI assets to support these efforts.

Techniques:

1. All available MI assets must have a understanding of the scheme of maneuver. Each MI asset must then have a clear task and purpose on the battlefield.

2. The respective MI assets' task and purpose must be linked to the overall intelligence collection efforts, as well as to the concept of operations.

3. MI assets must function as a collective force with a single focus.

4. The MI company commander must be skilled in using warning orders, OPORDs, and subsequent FRAGOs to keep the MI assets informed andresponsive to the dynamics of the battlefield.

CONCLUSION

Military intelligence, and the products resultant from the IPB process should be the planning drivers for development of concepts of operation and schemes of maneuver to defeat the enemy.

The ability of units to successfully integrate the Intelligence BOS into the overall application of the TDMP will positively impact successful mission accomplishment.

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