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Regardless of the echelon, there are five steps or phases to the collection management process. At the maneuver brigade and battalion levels, the S2 section performs the collection mangement function. The five phases are:

• Receive and analyze requirements. (Identifying what the commander must know about the enemy, weather, and terrain to accomplish the mission. Normally they are expressed as PIRs or IRs.)

• Determine resource availability and capability. (What means the unit has to look for the specific item developed in step one.)

• Task resources. (Tell the collector what it should look for, when to look for it, and how to report information.)

• Evaluate reporting. (Is the asset accurately reporting what it sees based on its capabilities? And does the report answer the original question?)

• Update collection planning. (Redirect assets as necessary to answer requirements.)

This chapter primarily deals with the first phase (receive and analyze requirements) of the collection management process. IPB is useful to develop these requirements. FM 34-2, Collection Management and Synchronization Planning, covers the entire collection management process in detail.

The primary purpose of collection management is to answer the commander's IRs while making the best use of scarce intelligence collection resources. The secondary purpose is to answer IRs of other intelligence users. The commander's IRs provide the information necessary to execute the selected course of action and carry out his targeting strategy. IPB helps the commander identify his IRs and provides the focus and direction needed to satisfy them.

MISSION ANALYSIS

The commander bases his initial IRs on the critical gaps in the command's knowledge of threat forces, the battlefield environment, and its effects on potential COAs. Based on the commander's guidance, some gaps become the S2's initial priorities for intelligence collection. Mission analysis also produces a set of threat COA models. The significance differences between these COAs are the basis of the initial event template and its supporting matrix. The S2 uses this initial event template and matrix to focus his collection efforts to identify the COA the threat will adopt.

COA DEVELOPMENT

During COA development, the S2 needs to begin the task of determining the collection assets that are available to him.

ANALYZE AND COMPARE COAs (WARGAMING)

During the staff's "fight" of the enemy and friendly COAs, the staff identifies areas (named areas of interest (NAIs)) where intelligence confirms enemy activities or other key events. This allows the S2 to program collection assets against a particular NAI at a specific time. During wargaming, the commander may discover that he needs to make a decision based on the intelligence from a NAI. That NAI becomes a decision point (DP) or creates a DP related to that NAI. The information required to make that decision becomes an intelligence requirement and is added to the list of proposed IRs for that particular COA. The targeting process uses many decision points developed during wargaming. Because of wargaming, the S2 has identified all IRs needed to support his collection strategy. He develops and depicts these strategies for potential friendly COAs using an intelligence synchronization matrix and a collection plan.

DECISION

Following the staffs' recommendations, the commander decides upon a COA that fits the needs of the unit. He also approves the list of IRs associated with that COA developed before and during wargaming. He then identifies the most important as priority intelligence requirements (PIRs).

EXECUTION

As the unit executes the selected COA, the S2 executes the collection plan. The S2 focuses collection assets on the proper intelligence requirement at each stage of the operation. He receives the information it produces, processes it, and then produces and disseminates intelligence of value to the commander in time to support the mission. During execution, the S2 monitors both current operations and the intelligence situation. He maintains contact with his asset managers to ensure effective cross-cuing and retasking of collection assets. This allows the S2 to take advantage of presented opportunities, avoid surprise, and keep intelligence synchronized with the command's operation.

INTELLIGENCE SYNCHRONIZATION

Intelligence synchronization is the process that ensures the intelligence system provides answers to IRs in time to influence the decision they support. The S2 develops specific orders (from higher commands) and requests (from subordinate and adjacent commands) (SOR) sets that synchronize the activities of the intelligence collectors with specific information requirements. He ensures that:

• A set of SORs supports all requirements.
• The collection and reporting timelines deliver intelligence in time to influence each decision.
• He plans and allocates time for collection, processing, and dissemination.

The S2 (collection manager) is the key to intelligence synchronization. He checks to ensure that all decisions identified during COA development are supported one for one by intelligence requirements. He then manages the collection management process to ensure that:

• Collection supports all intelligence requirements.
• All SORs support some intelligence requirements.
• Collection strategies are properly "backwards planned" to ensure timely receipt of intelligence.
• Collectors and processors have dissemination guidelines.
• Collectors execute the strategies within the timelines each IR dictates.

Successful synchronization provides critical intelligence in a timely manner that influences battlefield decisions. Failure to synchronize intelligence results in:

• Decisions made without the benefit of intelligence.
• Collection against IRs no longer valid.
• Collection of intelligence that will not influence the COA.
• Under or over-used collection systems.

R&S PLANNING AND IPB

Experience at the combat training centers has proven the importance of R&S planning. Gaining and maintaining contact with the enemy is essential in winning the battle. With a good picture of the enemy, the commander can gauge the intentions of the enemy, anticipate the enemy's actions, and mass his combat power to defeat him. IPB plays a major role in R&S planning.

The two principles of R&S are to tell the commanders what they need to know in time for them to act and do as much as possible ahead of time. The R&S plan should directly address what the commander wants to know. It is command-oriented and command-directed. The commander focuses his R&S effort with his PIRs. PIRs cover the critical information gaps that the commander needs to accomplish his mission. The IPB process provides the best method to analyze the battlefield environment. With IPB playing such a critical part in R&S planning, it is easy to understand the second principle of R&S, do as much as possible ahead of time. As discussed earlier in this publication, the IPB process is very time consuming and much of this process can be done at home station.

The IPB process provides the framework for the R&S effort. Of all IPB products, the event template is the most important product for R&S planning. The event template allows the S2 to confirm or deny the situation templates, gauge enemy and friendly rates of movement, compare rates of movement between mobility corridors and avenues of approach, and cue other collection assets based on friendly and enemy movement. The associated event analysis matrix is also used to analyze specific events. The S2 uses this to find out when and where events will take place on the battlefield. The DST developed during the wargaming process is also important to R&S planning. The R&S plan must support the DST.

OBSERVATION: S2s are failing to tie the IPB process into the R&S planning process.

DISCUSSION: TF commanders and S3s "delegate" the responsibility for planning, integrating and supervising the reconnaissance effort to the S2. Most S2s develop R&S plans without integrating other staff elements before the staff issues the OPORD. The chances that R&S assets will be ineffectively employed increase dramatically when the S2 fails to integrate the collection plan with the S3's maneuver COAs before the commander's decision brief. The result is a failed reconnaissance effort that partially covers NAIs, which hampers the staff's ability to determine threat weakness or strength and then exploit threat weakness.

LESSON(S): FM 34-2-1, Reconnaissance and Surveillance and Intelligence Support to Counter-Reconnaissance, is the doctrinal reference for R&S planning. TF commanders, XOs, and S3s should drive the R&S plan development with the S2. The staff should develop the R&S plan similar to an OPORD. In this way, the staff integrates and synchronizes the plan. Early in the staff planning process, identify PIRs, develop SIRs, and then list indicators for each NAI. The R&S plan should not only answer the Specific Information Requirements (SIRs) but should also support the commander's plan of maneuver. The R&S plan should be in both written and graphic form to task assets in the OPORD. Ensure that subordinate commanders are held accountable for their NAIs. This allows the S2 time to analyze reconnaissance results and redirect collection assets as necessary.

DEVELOPING THE R&S PLAN

The S2 is responsible for driving the R&S effort. The first step deals with receiving the unit's mission. As the S2 analyzes the mission, he identifies intelligence gaps that he must answer for the commander to accomplish that mission. The critical intelligence gaps become the commander's PIR. These PIR, along with other IRs provide the focus for R&S planning. The R&S plan should answer these requirements. The S2 has to translate the initial PIR and IR into indicators on which R&S assets can collect. The S2 then identifies the specific information requirements (SIR) and specific orders and requests (SOR) for the R&S plan. The SIR and SOR ensure that assets are collecting specific information that answers the PIR and IR. The S2 then compares the SIR to the event template. This tells the S2 where and when to position friendly collection assets. The S2 positions collection assets on these areas and they become named areas of interest (NAIs). The S2 then prioritizes the SIR. He should concentrate his collection effort on the SIR that provide the greatest amount of intelligence in the shortest amount of time. The next step is to identify the collectors that are available and can collect the information. The final step is to task the collector to conduct the mission. The S2, with the S3, should task assets to ensure that the assets are available and that the total R&S effort supports the unit mission.

OBSERVATION: The staff often fails to support their R&S assets with essential information and plans necessary to succeed during training and combat operations.

DISCUSSION: The failure to support a unit's R&S assets can significantly degrade a unit's ability to successfully accomplish its assigned mission. There are numerous reasons why this may occur. However, two factors are often observed at the combat training centers. The first is late and inadequately planned R&S operations by the staff. The second is the late deployment of collection assets.

The main problem appears to be the inability of the staff to plan and coordinate a timely R&S effort while going through the tactical decisionmaking process. Commanders and S3s recognize the need to get collection assets out early, but fail to ensure timely and complete instructions are given to them to facilitate employment. During most cases, the R&S plan is developed in a vacuum, with limited input from the entire staff. Many units delay their collection asset deployment until after the unit's operations order. This should be avoided at all costs. Collection assets should be employed early enough to allow them time to provide battlefield information. This allows the staff time to adjust and refine the scheme of maneuver prior to the execution of the mission. Late deployment of forces as collection assets usually increases the risk of chance contact with the enemy.

LESSON(S): Some recommended solutions to this problem are: the appointment of a Chief of Reconnaissance to manage the entire R&S effort, empowered with decisionmaking authority during execution; the establishment of an R&S operations planning cell, the development of a standard list of collection asset information and plans required prior to deployment, and additional training for collection assets on the IPB and METT-T process. These techniques and procedures can significantly reduce the time spent planning and preparing a collection asset for mission deployment.

A unit may consider the development of an R&S operation planning cell. This could be difficult at the battalion level due to manning. This cell would consist primarily of trained NCOs performing an additional function in support of the R&S mission. Often, primary staff officers are involved in planning current operations and are not available to focus on R&S planning. The emphasis of the NCOs would be the following five battlefield operating systems: intelligence, maneuver, fire support, combat service support, and command and control. The recommended composition of this planning cell would be the operations NCO, fire support NCO, S2 NCO, communications NCO, S4 NCO, and any specific collection asset leader (scout platoon leader, scout platoon sergeant, LLVI section leader, GSR squad leader, or REMBASS team leader). These NCOs would gather as soon as the higher headquarters issues the warning order. They would begin to develop the plan necessary to support collection asset deployment. The executive officer and LOs should assist in the process to ensure adequate coordination and timely operations planning occurs. The planning cell would consider only the critical aspects of the R&S operation. A suggested list of required information and plans is as follows:

• Most current S2 SITEMP (S2 NCO)
• Unit's mission statement (S3 NCO)
• R&S collection asset's mission statement (S3 NCO/S2 NCO/specific collection asset leader)
• Commander's Intent (Commander through the S3 NCO)
• Initial NAIs, PIR, and SIR (S2 NCO)
• Hasty fire support plan, target list, NFAs and SEAD plan (FSNCO)
• Casualty evacuation plan (S4 NCO)
• Transportation plan (S3 NCO/S4 NCO)
• Resupply plan (S4 NCO)
• Long range communications plan (S3 NCO/S2 NCO/Commo NCO)

Most of the information listed above is identified during the mission analysis phase of the TDMP. The NCO's function would be to assist the staff officer in conducting mission analysis, but to pay particular attention to those issues that affect the R&S effort. Upon completion of mission analysis, the commander provides guidance to the staff. He should also provide specific guidance to focus the efforts of R&S planning. The R&S planning cell then refines, coordinates, and assists the collection assets in preparing for their missions. Once the staff completes and refines the overall plan, changes can be sent to collection assets by FM radio.

Units can become more effective by increasing the training and experience level of their collection assets. This can be done through leader development seminars on IPB and METT-T analysis, practical exercises involving collection assets and a trained OPFOR, and individual threat doctrine study. With this additional training, collection asset leaders can more effectively plan their observation post locations, routes, and determine areas where contact with the enemy is likely.

An improved planning process for intelligence collection assets will result in a more timely R&S plan and collection asset deployment. A unit cannot afford to delay the deployment of their valuable intelligence collection assets.

OBSERVATION: Many intelligence personnel do not understand the capabilities and limitations of their R&S assets.

DISCUSSION: All personnel in intelligence sections need to understand all aspects of the intelligence collection systems available to them. This requires all intelligence personnel to understand the capabilities of the MI assets found in the MI battalion, the capabilities of the scouts, and of other assets available to them. They need to understand exactly how they can use these assets in the R&S plan.

LESSON(S): Unit staffs need to practice developing R&S plans. During every FTX, MI battalion assets should be incorporated into training scenarios to help the staff understand their employment. The S2 should also work closely with the scout platoon to ensure that he understands all of their capabilities. The S2 should be aware of all collection assets to include maneuver assets (infantry, armor, aviation, engineers, and others) A checklist of intelligence collection assets (Bde level and below) is available in figure 4-1.

OBSERVATION: Often, S2s and S3s do not know the locations of all intelligence collection assets on the battlefield.

DISCUSSION: In many units, the S2 develops the R&S plan by himself. The S2 tasks units to collect information in the intelligence annex portion of the operations order. As a result, the S3 never really knows exactly where these units are located. Because of this, it is difficult to clear fires because of fear of fratricide. Or worse, friendly units fire on the targets and collection assets are lost due to friendly fire.

LESSON(S): The S2 and S3 should work closely together in the R&S effort. Both the S2 and the S3 should track the locations of these collection assets. The S3 should task these units in the tasks to subordinate units (S3s) portion of the operations order. The S2 should also ensure that, as he updates his R&S plan, retasking units, he passes the new locations of intelligence collectors to the S3 and FSO. A technique to track collection assets is to use butcher board or charts to depict locations of these units. The chart should be visible to everyone in the TOC to facilitate operations. This is especially critical for the FSO to see to clear fires.

OBSERVATION: Many units do not have a clear SOP established to task R&S assets.

DISCUSSION: The S3 is responsible for, and has tasking authority over, maneuver elements. The S2 makes recommendations to the commander or S3. The S2 is usually the prime user of most intelligence collection assets within a unit and, in many units, actually tasks them. However, this should only be done after the R&S plan is approved by the commander and S3. Every unit should establish an SOP to determine who tasks R&S assets. Frequently, the S3 does not have time to prepare and publish separate R&S missions. It is then completed by the S2. The next problem that many units experience is where to place the R&S tasking in the operations order. There are three places in the operations order that R&S taskings can be placed. The first is "tasks to subordinate units" in paragraph three of the main order (Figure 4-2). The second is "intelligence acquisition tasks" in paragraph three of the intelligence annex (Figure 4-3). The final place is in the Specific Orders and Requests (SORs) of the R&S matrix. Placing R&S taskings in either place has its drawbacks. Subordinate maneuver units tend to concentrate on only their subordinate unit instruction portion of the main order. If R&S tasks were assigned to a subordinate maneuver unit in the intelligence annex, the subordinate unit may overlook the R&S tasking. Subordinate intelligence units usually look to the intelligence annex for their R&S missions. These units could easily overlook R&S taskings in the main order.

LESSON(S): The first requirement that a unit must establish is who has tasking authority over R&S assets. The best approach is for the S3 to maintain tasking authority over all assets. In this approach, the S3 ensures that the R&S plan supports the overall mission. He also ensures that the R&S plan receives complete staff attention. With the S3 controlling the R&S assets, he also can maintain control of all collection asset locations. However, the S2 should play a major role in planning the R&S plan and recommending how best to employ R&S assets. This should be established in the unit SOP.

The next requirement a unit needs to do is to establish were R&S taskings are to be placed in the operations order. The unit should establish an SOP that provides this information. However, different units may augment a unit at any given time. Therefore, R&S taskings should be placed in both of the paragraphs that are mentioned above. In this way, R&S taskings are not overlooked. This also ensures that subordinate units understand the importance of the R&S missions because they are given more command emphasis.

A third method that was presented earlier was the formation of the R&S planning cell. If the R&S planning cell method is used, a separate warning order and frago is issued in lieu of the main operations order. However, the main order should still contain the R&S taskings.

Section III: Commander's Role in the IPB Process

Section V: IPB and the Targeting Process