Section II. IPB AND THE DECISIONMAKING PROCESS: INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

Section II

IPB AND THE DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Commanders and staffs use the decisionmaking process to select a COA and develop an operations plan (OPLAN), operations order (OPORD), or fragmentary order (FRAGO) to implement that COA. The results and products of IPB are essential elements of the decisionmaking process. The major IPB effort occurs before and during the first of five steps in the decisionmaking process.

Figure 2-1. IPB and the Decisionmaking Process

MISSION ANALYSIS

During this step, IPB enables the commander to assess facts about the battlefield and make assumptions about how friendly and threat forces will interact on the battlefield. The description of the battlefield's effects identifies constraints and opportunities for potential friendly COAs. Threat evaluation provides detailed information on the threat's current disposition, recent activities, equipment, and organizational capabilities that the staff needs to complete their own staff estimates and planning. Enemy COA models developed in step four (Determine Threat COAs) of the IPB process provide a basis for formulating friendly COAs and complete the intelligence estimate. The IPB process identifies any critical gaps in the commander's knowledge of the battlefield environment or threat situation. As a part of his initial planning guidance, the commander uses these gaps as a guide to establish his initial intelligence requirements. For mission analysis, the S2 provides the pertinent threat COAs (multiple SITEMPs) and HVT listing for each to prepare for the next step, Course of Action development.

OBSERVATION: S2 sections are not producing a complete Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (MCOO) for terrain analysis.

DISCUSSION: S2s are not stressing the OCOKA factors while conducting terrain analysis. As a result, vital information from terrain analysis is not incorporated into the TDMP. S2s tend to omit many critical aspects of the terrain that have a significant impact on military operations. Enemy avenues of approach that lead into friendly sectors do not identify potential engagement areas, fire sacks, defensible terrain and specific system or equipment positions. Terrain analysis fails to identify where maneuver forces are most vulnerable to enemy observation and fires. As a result, the commander cannot see how the enemy will use terrain to his advantage or how he can deploy his (friendly) forces to take advantage of the opportunities that the terrain presents.

LESSON(S): S2s should develop terrain analysis products before deployment. The S2 should coordinate with the Division Terrain Team for terrain analysis products. The terrain analysis product should cover the potential area of operation (AO) and area of interest (AI). Brigade and battalion S2s should also learn to share their products so the same products are not produced separately. The terrain product developed at home station should be a "generic" MCOO that focuses on cross-country mobility, avenues of approach, lines of communication, and obstacles. However, this "generic" MCOO is still incomplete. Once an exact Area of Operations is identified, the S2 can take his "generic" MCOO and refine it. He can concentrate his efforts on that smaller piece of terrain that will effect his upcoming mission. The S2 can identify areas that are best suited for: potential engagement areas, battle positions, infiltration lanes, weapon system firing lines, and areas where friendly forces are vulnerable to enemy observation and fire. Finally, it is very important for the S2 to go out and observe the actual terrain to confirm or deny terrain products. A map terrain analysis can only be so good. This reconnaissance is very easy in the defense, but much more difficult in the offense.

OBSERVATION: S2s rarely develop complete threat models.

DISCUSSION: A threat model consists of three different items: doctrinal templates, description of threat tactics and options, and a list of high value targets (HVTs). In most threat models, the S2 omits the description of tactics and options as well as the HVTs. S2s should keep in mind that HVTs cannot be determined until the enemy mission is known. This may require the S2 to develop sets of HVTs for various enemy missions.

LESSON(S): S2s should develop valid threat models, using steps 1-3 of the IPB process before deployment. If the threat is known, then a doctrinal template and historical data will suffice. If the threat is new or unknown, the S2 may have to develop and update the threat model as information becomes available. In many cases, this must be done in the field. This approach should save the S2 valuable time later on in the TDMP. Country studies are available for the combat training centers. These documents provide doctrinal templates for the threat. They also provide lengthy discussions on the tactics, doctrine and options that the threat will use. The country studies do not provide significant detail on HVTs (See Section V). However, the S2 needs to develop a useful tool using these resources. The S2 should develop his threat models (doctrinal templates, description of doctrine and tactics, and HVTs) on one overlay that can be used for mission analysis. With all of the possible options that the threat can pursue, the amount of work that this requires is extensive. However, the benefit is great. For contingency operations, the process is the same. The S2 should have a good idea of the possible contingency areas (should be stated in the unit mission letters) that his unit can be deployed. He should pursue the development of threat models in the same manner, starting with the most likely area and threat.

S2s can take this process one step further. The S2 can also develop situation templates at home station. If the three components of a threat model and the area of operations are known, S2s can develop possible combinations of situation templates for every mission before deployment, file them systematically, and retrieve them as needed during mission analysis. It is also important for S2s to realize that the responsibility to develop threat models does not fall entirely on the shoulders of the S2. The division G2, which is better staffed and has more time available to accomplish this important analysis, should play a major role in developing these threat models. The S2 could refine these threat models as necessary.

OBSERVATION: S2s frequently do not produce multiple Situation Templates (SITEMPs) quickly with sufficient detail.

DISCUSSION: S2s habitually concentrate on only one SITEMP during the mission analysis portion of the TDMP. Occasionally S2s produce more than one SITEMP but only one is fully developed. By submitting only one serious SITEMP, S2s are not presenting the full range of enemy tactical options. SITEMPs produced by S2s are rarely complete. The SITEMPs usually lack the necessary detail to portray the full spectrum of enemy BOSs. They do not graphically portray all of the enemy's combat multipliers. Without an accurate depiction of how and when threat forces will deploy, friendly commanders have a difficult time calculating the necessary number and type of weapon systems to employ at critical points to achieve his intent.

LESSON(S): S2s should develop a full set of COAs available to the threat. However, due to most mission time constraints, a minimum of two threat COAs, most probable and most dangerous, along with their associated situation templates must be developed. Experience at the CTCs has shown that most staffs have only enough time to wargame against one enemy COA, with consideration given to the most probable or most dangerous branches to that threat COA. Typically, the S2 will brief the Most Probable COA (MPCOA) and Most Dangerous COA (MDCOA) to the commander, who will direct the staff to plan against one or the other. Each enemy COA that is developed must address the following:

Who? - what element
What? - type of operation
When? - time the action will begin
Where? - the sectors, zones, axis of advance, avenue of approach, objectives
How? - the method the enemy will use to employ his assets, (i.e., main effort, supporting effort, scheme of maneuver, fires, and support)
Why? - the objective or endstate the enemy expects to achieve (Basically, a set of enemy maneuver graphics with the concept of the operation portion of the enemy's operations order, and a HVT list)
An enemy event template will greatly assist in deciding when the enemy will be entering the unit's battle space. S2s should attempt, with time permitting, to complete event templates in conjunction with SITEMPS. An enemy event template must be produced on a separate overlay for each COA that depicts at least:
Time-phase lines
NAIs (associated with critical events)
Avenues of approach
In most cases, the amount of time available determines how detailed these SITEMPS can be. With that in mind, the following techniques can help the S2 develop SITEMPS quickly:
Ensure that the threat models that were described earlier are developed at home station. This gives the S2 a large data base of possible enemy actions. If the S2 has done a good job with his threat models at home station, a SITEMP can be easily made by incorporating the threat model with the applicable battlefield conditions.
The S2 should concentrate his efforts on the enemy's most probable and most dangerous courses of action. In the development of these COAs, the S2 should enlist (and the XO direct) the help of all staff officers. The staff officers should analyze their specific staff areas from a reverse BOS point of view. Many special staff members have some extra time during mission analysis. They could assist the S2 with his SITEMPs. An example of this would be for the engineer officer to assist in developing how the enemy would employ obstacle belts in the defense or the ADA officer providing information on how the threat would employ air assets. Staff integration with the S2 is discussed in more detail in Section VI.
The S2 can save time and materials by combining all threat model templates and the event template on a single overlay or a cartoon graphic. The trick is to color-code each COA to keep them separated from other COAs. The S2 should start with the most dangerous or most likely COA and develop each according to time available. Focus the event template on identifying the threat COA that the enemy adopts (focus on the differences in the COAs). The initial collection requirements can wait until after wargaming. Never take just one COA into the wargaming process; this is not the way to abbreviate the IPB process. The single product that results from this approach is vastly different from the complete set of products that was described earlier. However, this one product, when developed in quality detail, has repeatedly proven to be very effective for most units.
Commanders and staffs should be aware that a "most" probable enemy COA may actually become the enemy's least likely option. For example, during the mission analysis brief for a friendly defense in sector, the S2 decides the enemy's most probable attack option is in the north part of the friendly sector. The IPB process drives a friendly COA which defends with a main effort in the north. Successful enemy reconnaissance sees the bulk of the engineer effort, especially obstacle work, occurring in the north. The enemy reconnaissance reports this information, their S2 assesses our main effort is in the north, and the enemy develops a plan to attack our weakness in the south. The enemy may have initially planned to attack north but decided against it once his reconnaissance confirmed our strength there. S2s must consider this type scenario when briefing mission analysis and explain enemy options. In this way, commanders can build flexibility into the friendly plan.
Finally, the S2 must have a trained intelligence section that understands the IPB and tactical decisionmaking processes. The S2 must use his section effectively if he wants to provide quality IPB products. An example timeline of how the S2 section can quickly produce multiple SITEMPs and EVENTEMPs is provided at figure 2-2 .

Figure 2-2. S2 Timeline for Development of Situation and Event Templates

(Commander's Guidance)

The commander usually gives some type of guidance after the mission analysis portion of the TDMP. This guidance varies from commander to commander. Some commanders provide very specific guidance while others provide only general guidance. Frequently, the guidance only addresses maneuver. Commanders should give considerable thought to guidance for intelligence. The structure of his Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) and Reconnaissance and Surveillance intent set the framework for all intelligence collection.

OBSERVATION: Commanders rarely give specific commander's guidance to the S2 after mission analysis.

DISCUSSION: Commander's guidance serves to focus the staff on the commander's intent, concept, and concerns about a mission. Often the commander omits specific guidance to the S2. Valuable time is wasted if the S2 does not completely understand the aspects of the enemy that the commander is most concerned about (initial PIR), commander's concept of deployment of R&S assets, commander's concept of target acquisition or the commander's intent to employ friendly assets so the S2 can anticipate intelligence support requirements. With a better understanding of the commander's intent, the S2 can fulfill his responsibility of recommending how to use limited intelligence assets to best defeat the enemy.

LESSON(S): Commander's should consider all of the requirements and time constraints that his staff is faced with. However, the IPB process drives the train for the TDMP. He should not overlook this. The S2 should ask questions to ensure that he understands the commander's intent and that he has all of the guidance necessary to continue mission planning. The S2 can ask certain questions that will allow him to get ahead in the IPB process. Some of these questions are:

What are the initial concerns that the commander has about the enemy? This allows the S2 more time for the intelligence system to provide answers to these questions.
What is the commander's concept for deploying R&S assets? This gives the S2 a better understanding of the assets that are available (including maneuver forces) that can be used to collect intelligence. It also helps the S2 understand how much time will be available to develop a R&S plan.
What is the commander's concept of targeting? This allows the staff more time to identify possible High Payoff Targets (HPTs). It helps the staff understand the commander's intent on how he wants to fight the battle. It establishes how the commander wants to strike deep and attrite the threat or mass all of his firepower at one critical point. All this helps the staff mentally wargame the upcoming battle and prepare for COA analysis (wargaming).
What is the commander's intent to employ his assets? This allows the S2 to anticipate intelligence support requirements. An example of this might be: If the commander wants to employ aircraft against a deep target, then the S2 should begin coordination for the electronic warfare support required to support Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD).

COA DEVELOPMENT

The staff develops friendly COAs based on the SITEMP and the facts and assumptions identified during IPB and mission analysis. Incorporating the results of IPB into COA development ensures that each friendly COA takes advantage of the opportunities the environment and threat situation offer and ensures that each COA is realistic. During COA development, the S2 prioritizes the SITEMPS and drafts an event template, if it was not developed during mission analysis.

OBSERVATION: Often the enemy SITEMP is not used to develop COAs.

DISCUSSION: When the staff develops friendly COAs without using the SITEMP, the result is planning that is not being driven by the IPB process and COAs that do not take advantage of the enemy's weaknesses. Without using the enemy SITEMP, the analysis of relative combat power and the arraying of initial forces cannot be conducted to standard.

LESSON(S): During COA development, the staff must use the S2's SITEMP. The S2 must prepare products that support the entire staff's participation in this process. A 1:50,000-scale situation template does not allow the entire staff to adequately see the battlefield. A better method is a large, detailed, and accurate sketch of the main battle area with the enemy SITEMP applied. This large sketch allows the entire staff to easily see and provide input to COA development. The sketch can be done by either an intelligence analyst or by another soldier that is available in the early stages of mission analysis. This large sketch can also be of use later in the wargaming process. Overlay material should be used over the sketch map so changes can be made to the various SITEMPs. An EVENTEMP is also very useful for COA development. It helps the staff understand the friendly options in relationship to time. Less, detailed sketches or "cartoons" can also be effective. These less, detailed methods can be used when not enough time is available to create a detailed sketch.

COA ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON (WARGAMING)

During this phase, the S2 and S3 "fight" threat COAs, developed in step four of the IPB process, against potential friendly COAs. The remainder of the staff identifies support requirements to synchronize the battle. Ideally, all enemy COAs should be fought against all friendly COAs. Because experience at the CTCs shows it takes about two hours to fight one set of COAs, the commander should provide guidance on which COAs that he wants wargamed. Targeting follows or accompanies this session to develop the targeting concept for the operation. Based on the results of wargaming, for each potential COA, the staff:

Constructs a decision support template (DST) and its associated synchronization matrix.
Identifies supporting intelligence requirements.
Refines the enemy COA models and event templates and matrices (if necessary), focusing on the intelligence required to execute the friendly COA.
Confirms the enemy most dangerous threat COA.
Refines the friendly COA, to include identifying the need for branches and sequels.
Determines the probability of success of the friendly COA.
Refines CCIR.
Refines the reconnaissance and surveillance plan.

The result of wargaming each potential friendly COA against the set of enemy COA models allows the staff to make a recommendation on the best friendly COA. The S2's recommendation includes an evaluation of the intelligence system's ability to provide the intelligence needed to support each COA.

Figure 2-3. Wargaming

OBSERVATION: Frequently, S2s do not have all of the IPB products (intelligence tools) required to support the wargaming process.

DISCUSSION: There are many intelligence products that support the wargaming process. Situation and event templates portray how the enemy will employ and fight his forces. Having incomplete situation and event templates severely hampers the wargaming process. In most cases, the event and situation templates are done on 1:50,000-scale overlays. If this technique is used, only two or three people can get close enough to the map to provide information to the process. However, for normal intelligence operations and battle-tracking purposes, the 1:50,000-scale situation and event template overlays are a must.

LESSON(S): The S2 must provide the appropriate intelligence products required to support the wargaming process. As a minimum, the S2 should have:

A detailed MCOO - The MCOO should be prepared as described earlier in this newsletter.
Situation templates - at least two, most dangerous and most likely enemy COAs should be developed. However the commander should provide guidance on the number of enemy COAs that should be prepared. The enemy situation templates should all be prepared in the same amount of detail and should ideally cover every BOS. Do not forget about the HVT list.
Event template - Event template should contain all of the information that was described earlier in this newsletter. The event template also forms the basis of the Decision Support Template. During wargaming, the event template will be transformed into the DST. (See DST development portion of this newsletter.)
A large, detailed, accurate sketch of the battlefield that is large enough for everyone participating in the wargaming session to see. The sketch should concentrate on the main battle areas or critical event areas that were identified earlier in the IPB process. Ensure that event and situation template overlays are prepared to support the large sketches.
Any other useful intelligence products need to be available and posted. An example could be the commander's initial PIRs. A cross-check should be made in the wargaming process to determine if the PIRs are still valid and if there is a means to collect information to answer these PIRs.

OBSERVATION: Often, during the wargaming process, the S2 does not do an efficient job portraying the "uncooperative" enemy commander.

DISCUSSION: The S2 must portray a realistic enemy. This requires the S2 to be very knowledgeable on enemy tactics and doctrine at every echelon of the enemy's structure. In most cases, the S2 fails to consider some options or techniques that the enemy commander can use.

Wargaming sessions where S2s do a good job portraying the "uncooperative" enemy can usually be contributed to one of two factors. The first is when the S2 has extensive experience and is very knowledgeable of wargaming the enemy's actions. In most units, the S2 is usually the most junior officer on the staff and does not possess the knowledge base to do this effectively. If the S2 has these skills and experience, the S2 is fortunate. The second technique is when the S2 solicits the help of other staff members.

The leader directing the wargaming section needs to ensure all staff members offer their input. Often, wargaming is dominated by the S3. At other times, the S3 and S2 dominate the session, with more junior officers and staff members left out.

LESSON(S): The technique that most S2s fail to use is asking other staff members for their help in portraying enemy actions. Before the wargaming session, the S2 should discuss how he thinks the enemy will fight the battle. He should seek out the experienced officers and NCOs in the command to see how they think the enemy will fight. The amount of information and insight that these senior officers can provide is very valuable to the S2. Each staff officer should be asked to analyze his specific staff areas from a reverse BOS point of view and provide that analysis to the S2. The S2 should discuss what he believes to be the enemy's concept of:

Fire support with the Fire Support Officer
Air defense asset utilization with the ADA officer
Engineer asset utilization with the engineer officer
NBC asset utilization with the NBC officer
Close maneuver with the S3 or battle captains.

Another technique that is useful, if the information database is available, is for the S2 to study the background and personality of the enemy commander. The enemy commander's background or personality may provide key items that are very useful to the S2 when determining how an enemy commander may fight. For instance, if an enemy commander has had extensive experience as a former reconnaissance commander at a lower level, then he may deploy reconnaissance assets more aggressively.

The key to the S2 becoming a good "uncooperative" enemy commander during the wargaming session is for the S2 to pull information from all available resources and understand the personality of the specific enemy commander.

OBSERVATION: Often, the S2 does not use the wargaming session to develop, refine and synchronize intelligence products. (Examples are: Collection management, R&S planning, and targeting.)

DISCUSSION: The wargaming session is one of the few opportunities for the S2 to coordinate intelligence synchronization. During the wargaming session, all staff sections are represented. The entire battle is fought, and all BOSs are incorporated into this wargame. The S2 should make every effort to use the wargaming process to support collection management, R&S planning and the targeting effort. Each of these topics is addressed in the wargaming process, but often the S2 fails to capture and synchronize these actions. As a result, these areas have to be addressed later when all staff sections may not be available.

LESSON(S): The S2 should make every effort to refine the R&S plan during the wargaming process. This may add some time to the wargaming process, but it saves time in the overall TDMP. It also ensures that the R&S plan supports the friendly COA. The S2 should bring an additional intelligence recorder to the wargaming session. The recorder should concentrate on only intelligence specific items. This intelligence recorder should be developing the R&S plan as the different COAs are wargamed. The wargaming process usually identifies where and when critical events take place on the battlefield (NAIs), who should be responsible for observing these NAIs (intelligence collector identified), and action that takes place at the NAI. The S2 provides information on how and what the intelligence collector is to report and the timeliness the information is required - (latest time of intelligence value), and the targeting concept, if any. With this information, the collection plan is 90-percent complete. The S2 also ensures that intelligence synchronization takes place by bringing up all of these topics during the wargaming process.

OBSERVATION: Often, during the wargaming process, the S2 does not keep a record of the battle damage assessment (BDA) of the enemy as the battle is fought.

DISCUSSION: Battle damage assessment is critical during the wargaming process. It helps to identify force ratios that are required to defeat the enemy at the critical points on the battlefield. BDA also helps identify weak areas of a COA, where force ratios do not favor the friendly commander. The portrayal of realistic BDA helps in the targeting process. Frequently, a COA is wargamed and the S2 assesses the projected BDA that the enemy would sustain for a critical point on the battlefield in order for a COA to be successful. If, during the execution of the mission, that BDA is not achieved, then it would be clear that the target needs to be reengaged until the required BDA was achieved.

LESSON(S): A technique that works for many S2s at the combat training centers is the development of a chart that lists weapon systems for enemy units. As the S2 and S3 wargame a battle and weapon systems are destroyed, the list is adjusted to reflect the new total. This helps the staff identify if a COA is feasible or if a COA needs to be refined by repositioning assets to achieve the firepower necessary to defeat the enemy. An example enemy BDA chart (for a motorized rifle battalion (BMR), augmented with a tank company, is listed at figure 2-4. A similar chart can be developed for any enemy force. The S3 should develop a BDA chart for friendly forces.

Figure 2-4. MRB (BMP) BDA Chart

DECISION

During the decision briefing to the commander, the S2 should provide an evaluation of the intelligence system's ability to provide the intelligence needed to support each COA. The MI company commander should support the S2 by providing the technical expertise in employing MI company assets. Following the staff's recommendation, the commander decides upon a COA and issues implementing orders. As the commander approves a COA, he also approves the final list of intelligence requirements associated with that COA and identifies the most important as priority intelligence requirements (PIRs). The S2 then uses the commander's decision and the results of COA analysis to refine the collection plan to ensure that the PIRs are answered.

OBSERVATION: Often, during the decision briefing, S2s do not provide an in-depth evaluation of the intelligence system's ability to provide intelligence needed to support each COA.

DISCUSSION: During most COA decision briefings, the S2 states that "the intelligence system can support each COA with the needed intelligence." This may be a true statement, but it does not give the commander a true picture of the intelligence collection (R&S) assets required to collect the necessary intelligence.

LESSON(S): S2s should use the intelligence system's ability evaluation to receive direction on the collection (R&S) plan. In this way, the commander understands what assets he has to devote to collect this information and if it fits into his overall intent. The S2 should also highlight the information that cannot be collected at the unit level (information that must be provided by higher headquarters). With this technique, the commander understands exactly what information his unit can collect and what information he needs from higher. If there is critical information that can only be gathered by his higher headquarters, the commander can express his concern about this critical requirement with his higher headquarters commander.

EXECUTION

As intelligence confirms or denies planning assumptions on the battlefield environment and the threat's COA, a continuous IPB process identifies new intelligence requirements. As the battle progresses, IPB is used to continuously evaluate the situation facing the command. If there are dramatic changes, a new iteration of the decisionmaking process may have to take place.

OBSERVATION: While initial IPB products are satisfactory, many intelligence sections fail to follow up on the process. As the situation changes and new information becomes available, S2s often fail to refine their products.

DISCUSSION: Examples are:

Failure to update terrain by receiving, plotting, and disseminating LOCs or crossing points that were not initially identified on the maps.
Failure to incorporate weather changes and their effects on terrain, as reflected in the modified combined obstacles overlay (MCOO).
Failure to update the MCOO based on a ground reconnaissance.
Failure to maintain incident overlays.
Failure to update situation templates.
Failure to update or refine PIRs which results in a failure to update the collection (R&S) plan.

LESSON(S): The S2 should update the IPB as the situation dictates. Most intelligence sections fail to do this because they have inadequate SOPs. Few personnel are knowledgeable of their responsibilities and, at times, requirements are not completed. CALL Newsletter 95-7, Tactical Operations Center (TOC), outlines many good techniques for TOC responsibilities and staff drills.

OBSERVATION: Inadequate battle tracking by battalion S2s hinders predictive analysis.

DISCUSSION: Effective battle tracking is the key to predictive analysis. It allows the S2 to confirm previously developed templates and then make an accurate assessment of the enemy's next action or reaction. The key ingredient to battle tracking is receiving timely accurate reports. Many reports that come into the TOC are lost or not routed to the section that needs the information.

LESSON(S): Most cases of bad battle tracking can be attributed to two things: Inadequate reporting and information management. The section needs an SOP or Battle Drill for receiving, logging, plotting, and passing reports. The first thing that needs to be established by the S2 in regards to handling intelligence information is to decide how specific types of messages will be processed by the intelligence section. After identifying the different types of messages to be processed, determine who conducts the actions required. Refer to CALL Newsletter 95-7. Finally, the process must be practiced. Here are some tips that may assist in processing information.

Use pre-printed message forms that automatically produce multiple copies.
Have RTOs use headsets to help keep the noise level down in the TOC.
Identify and prioritize critical information that must be tracked. Ensure that all RTOs (not just in S2 section) understand what to do with this information once it is obtained.
Develop a system to track the information determined to be critical. Use charts, matrices, or butcher board.
Determine a system to track enemy and friendly units. Successful techniques include using color-coded cellophane stickers, and thumb tacks, or color-coded dot-type stickers. Ensure that all personnel understand and use the system.
Do not let the entering of messages into a journal create a backlog in the information management system at the expense of posting maps, analysis, disseminating information, and receiving reports. A technique that helps is using a folder to maintain messages and then recording them in the journal as time allows.
Ensure that the S2 map board is standardized with other map boards in the TOC. This ensures that overlays from one section can be easily and quickly transferred within other sections.
Techniques that help in receiving an accurate report.
Ensure that all units use the SALUTE format. This format has proven itself reliable over time.
Ensure that RTOs understand the necessity to receive a full report. Ensure that RTOs keep the collector on the line long enough to receive a full report. Sometimes the collector may have to call back with other needed information. Permit the RTO to do his job.
Ensure that collectors report exactly what they saw. This takes practice and SALUTE reporting should always be incorporated into every FTX.
Ensure that PIRs are published in the operations order and understood by subordinate commanders. Ensure that specific reporting instructions are provided in the operations order to include negative reports. Often no contact, or nothing seen provides valuable information to the S2.

Section I: Doctrinal Overview

Section III: Commander's Role in the IPB Process

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